| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
| #include <openssl/asn1t.h> |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/stack.h> |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| |
| #include "../asn1/internal.h" |
| #include "../internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a, |
| const X509_REVOKED *const *b); |
| static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp); |
| |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_REVOKED) = { |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_REVOKED, revocationDate, ASN1_TIME), |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_REVOKED, extensions, X509_EXTENSION), |
| } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_REVOKED) |
| |
| static int crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer); |
| |
| // The X509_CRL_INFO structure needs a bit of customisation. Since we cache |
| // the original encoding the signature wont be affected by reordering of the |
| // revoked field. |
| static int crl_inf_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, |
| void *exarg) { |
| X509_CRL_INFO *a = (X509_CRL_INFO *)*pval; |
| |
| if (!a || !a->revoked) { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| switch (operation) { |
| // Just set cmp function here. We don't sort because that would |
| // affect the output of X509_CRL_print(). |
| case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: |
| (void)sk_X509_REVOKED_set_cmp_func(a->revoked, X509_REVOKED_cmp); |
| break; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, enc, crl_inf_cb) = { |
| ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, issuer, X509_NAME), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL_INFO, lastUpdate, ASN1_TIME), |
| ASN1_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, nextUpdate, ASN1_TIME), |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, revoked, X509_REVOKED), |
| ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(X509_CRL_INFO, extensions, X509_EXTENSION, 0), |
| } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_enc(X509_CRL_INFO, X509_CRL_INFO) |
| |
| static int crl_parse_entry_extensions(X509_CRL *crl) { |
| STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl); |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revoked); i++) { |
| X509_REVOKED *rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revoked, i); |
| |
| int crit; |
| ASN1_ENUMERATED *reason = |
| X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(rev, NID_crl_reason, &crit, NULL); |
| if (!reason && crit != -1) { |
| crl->flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| if (reason) { |
| rev->reason = ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(reason); |
| ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(reason); |
| } else { |
| rev->reason = CRL_REASON_NONE; |
| } |
| |
| // We do not support any critical CRL entry extensions. |
| const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = rev->extensions; |
| for (size_t j = 0; j < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); j++) { |
| const X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, j); |
| if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) { |
| crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| // The X509_CRL structure needs a bit of customisation. Cache some extensions |
| // and hash of the whole CRL. |
| static int crl_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it, |
| void *exarg) { |
| X509_CRL *crl = (X509_CRL *)*pval; |
| int i; |
| |
| switch (operation) { |
| case ASN1_OP_NEW_POST: |
| crl->idp = NULL; |
| crl->akid = NULL; |
| crl->flags = 0; |
| crl->idp_flags = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case ASN1_OP_D2I_POST: { |
| // The version must be one of v1(0) or v2(1). |
| long version = X509_CRL_VERSION_1; |
| if (crl->crl->version != NULL) { |
| version = ASN1_INTEGER_get(crl->crl->version); |
| // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/364): |X509_CRL_VERSION_1| |
| // should also be rejected. This means an explicitly-encoded X.509v1 |
| // version. v1 is DEFAULT, so DER requires it be omitted. |
| if (version < X509_CRL_VERSION_1 || version > X509_CRL_VERSION_2) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_VERSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Per RFC 5280, section 5.1.2.1, extensions require v2. |
| if (version != X509_CRL_VERSION_2 && crl->crl->extensions != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_FOR_VERSION); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!X509_CRL_digest(crl, EVP_sha256(), crl->crl_hash, NULL)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| crl->idp = |
| X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_issuing_distribution_point, &i, NULL); |
| if (crl->idp != NULL) { |
| if (!setup_idp(crl, crl->idp)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else if (i != -1) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| crl->akid = |
| X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_authority_key_identifier, &i, NULL); |
| if (crl->akid == NULL && i != -1) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| // See if we have any unhandled critical CRL extensions and indicate |
| // this in a flag. We only currently handle IDP so anything else |
| // critical sets the flag. This code accesses the X509_CRL structure |
| // directly: applications shouldn't do this. |
| const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = crl->crl->extensions; |
| for (size_t idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++) { |
| const X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx); |
| int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)); |
| if (X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) { |
| if (nid == NID_issuing_distribution_point || |
| nid == NID_authority_key_identifier) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| crl->flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!crl_parse_entry_extensions(crl)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| case ASN1_OP_FREE_POST: |
| AUTHORITY_KEYID_free(crl->akid); |
| ISSUING_DIST_POINT_free(crl->idp); |
| break; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| // Convert IDP into a more convenient form |
| // |
| // TODO(davidben): Each of these flags are already booleans, so this is not |
| // really more convenient. We can probably remove |idp_flags|. |
| static int setup_idp(X509_CRL *crl, ISSUING_DIST_POINT *idp) { |
| int idp_only = 0; |
| // Set various flags according to IDP |
| crl->idp_flags |= IDP_PRESENT; |
| if (idp->onlyuser > 0) { |
| idp_only++; |
| crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYUSER; |
| } |
| if (idp->onlyCA > 0) { |
| idp_only++; |
| crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYCA; |
| } |
| if (idp->onlyattr > 0) { |
| idp_only++; |
| crl->idp_flags |= IDP_ONLYATTR; |
| } |
| |
| // Per RFC 5280, section 5.2.5, at most one of onlyContainsUserCerts, |
| // onlyContainsCACerts, and onlyContainsAttributeCerts may be true. |
| // |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/443): Move this check to the |ISSUING_DIST_POINT| |
| // parser. |
| if (idp_only > 1) { |
| crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INVALID; |
| } |
| |
| if (idp->indirectCRL > 0) { |
| crl->idp_flags |= IDP_INDIRECT; |
| } |
| |
| if (idp->onlysomereasons) { |
| crl->idp_flags |= IDP_REASONS; |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(davidben): The new verifier does not support nameRelativeToCRLIssuer. |
| // Remove this? |
| return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(idp->distpoint, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)); |
| } |
| |
| ASN1_SEQUENCE_ref(X509_CRL, crl_cb) = { |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, crl, X509_CRL_INFO), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, sig_alg, X509_ALGOR), |
| ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_CRL, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING), |
| } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_ref(X509_CRL, X509_CRL) |
| |
| // Although |X509_REVOKED| contains an |X509_NAME|, it can be const. It is not |
| // affected by https://crbug.com/boringssl/407 because the |X509_NAME| does |
| // not participate in serialization. |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(X509_REVOKED) |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION_const(X509_REVOKED) |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO) |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL) |
| IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_CRL) |
| |
| static int X509_REVOKED_cmp(const X509_REVOKED *const *a, |
| const X509_REVOKED *const *b) { |
| return ASN1_STRING_cmp((*a)->serialNumber, (*b)->serialNumber); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev) { |
| X509_CRL_INFO *inf; |
| inf = crl->crl; |
| if (!inf->revoked) { |
| inf->revoked = sk_X509_REVOKED_new(X509_REVOKED_cmp); |
| } |
| if (!inf->revoked || !sk_X509_REVOKED_push(inf->revoked, rev)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| asn1_encoding_clear(&inf->enc); |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { |
| if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(crl->sig_alg, crl->crl->sig_alg) != 0) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(X509, X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), crl->sig_alg, |
| crl->signature, crl->crl, pkey); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *serial) { |
| return crl_lookup(crl, ret, serial, NULL); |
| } |
| |
| int X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, X509 *x) { |
| return crl_lookup(crl, ret, X509_get_serialNumber(x), |
| X509_get_issuer_name(x)); |
| } |
| |
| static int crl_revoked_issuer_match(X509_CRL *crl, X509_NAME *nm, |
| X509_REVOKED *rev) { |
| return nm == NULL || X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)) == 0; |
| } |
| |
| static CRYPTO_MUTEX g_crl_sort_lock = CRYPTO_MUTEX_INIT; |
| |
| static int crl_lookup(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED **ret, |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *serial, X509_NAME *issuer) { |
| // Use an assert, rather than a runtime error, because returning nothing for a |
| // CRL is arguably failing open, rather than closed. |
| assert(serial->type == V_ASN1_INTEGER || serial->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER); |
| X509_REVOKED rtmp, *rev; |
| size_t idx; |
| rtmp.serialNumber = (ASN1_INTEGER *)serial; |
| // Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted. Do this |
| // under a lock to avoid race condition. |
| |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&g_crl_sort_lock); |
| const int is_sorted = sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked); |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&g_crl_sort_lock); |
| |
| if (!is_sorted) { |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&g_crl_sort_lock); |
| if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked)) { |
| sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked); |
| } |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&g_crl_sort_lock); |
| } |
| |
| if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &idx, &rtmp)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| // Need to look for matching name |
| for (; idx < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(crl->crl->revoked); idx++) { |
| rev = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(crl->crl->revoked, idx); |
| if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(rev->serialNumber, serial)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (crl_revoked_issuer_match(crl, issuer, rev)) { |
| if (ret) { |
| *ret = rev; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |