| // Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. | 
 | // | 
 | // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); | 
 | // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. | 
 | // You may obtain a copy of the License at | 
 | // | 
 | //     https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 | 
 | // | 
 | // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software | 
 | // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, | 
 | // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. | 
 | // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and | 
 | // limitations under the License. | 
 |  | 
 | #include <openssl/ssl.h> | 
 |  | 
 | #include <assert.h> | 
 | #include <string.h> | 
 |  | 
 | #include <algorithm> | 
 |  | 
 | #include <openssl/bio.h> | 
 | #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | 
 | #include <openssl/err.h> | 
 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | 
 | #include <openssl/mem.h> | 
 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | 
 |  | 
 | #include "../crypto/internal.h" | 
 | #include "internal.h" | 
 |  | 
 |  | 
 | BSSL_NAMESPACE_BEGIN | 
 |  | 
 | ssl_open_record_t dtls1_process_ack(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, | 
 |                                     DTLSRecordNumber ack_record_number, | 
 |                                     Span<const uint8_t> data) { | 
 |   // As a DTLS-1.3-capable client, it is possible to receive an ACK before we | 
 |   // receive ServerHello and learned the server picked DTLS 1.3. Thus, tolerate | 
 |   // but ignore ACKs before the version is set. | 
 |   if (!ssl_has_final_version(ssl)) { | 
 |     return ssl_open_record_discard; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   // ACKs are only allowed in DTLS 1.3. Reject them if we've negotiated a | 
 |   // version and it's not 1.3. | 
 |   if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_3_VERSION) { | 
 |     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | 
 |     *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | 
 |     return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   CBS cbs = data, record_numbers; | 
 |   if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &record_numbers) || | 
 |       CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { | 
 |     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | 
 |     *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | 
 |     return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   while (CBS_len(&record_numbers) != 0) { | 
 |     uint64_t epoch, seq; | 
 |     if (!CBS_get_u64(&record_numbers, &epoch) || | 
 |         !CBS_get_u64(&record_numbers, &seq)) { | 
 |       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | 
 |       *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | 
 |       return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |     } | 
 |  | 
 |     // During the handshake, records must be ACKed at the same or higher epoch. | 
 |     // See https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid8108. Additionally, if the | 
 |     // record does not fit in DTLSRecordNumber, it is definitely not a record | 
 |     // number that we sent. | 
 |     if ((ack_record_number.epoch() < ssl_encryption_application && | 
 |          epoch > ack_record_number.epoch()) || | 
 |         epoch > UINT16_MAX || seq > DTLSRecordNumber::kMaxSequence) { | 
 |       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | 
 |       *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | 
 |       return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |     } | 
 |  | 
 |     // Find the sent record that matches this ACK. | 
 |     DTLSRecordNumber number(static_cast<uint16_t>(epoch), seq); | 
 |     DTLSSentRecord *sent_record = nullptr; | 
 |     if (ssl->d1->sent_records != nullptr) { | 
 |       for (size_t i = 0; i < ssl->d1->sent_records->size(); i++) { | 
 |         if ((*ssl->d1->sent_records)[i].number == number) { | 
 |           sent_record = &(*ssl->d1->sent_records)[i]; | 
 |           break; | 
 |         } | 
 |       } | 
 |     } | 
 |     if (sent_record == nullptr) { | 
 |       // We may have sent this record and forgotten it, so this is not an error. | 
 |       continue; | 
 |     } | 
 |  | 
 |     // Mark each message as ACKed. | 
 |     if (sent_record->first_msg == sent_record->last_msg) { | 
 |       ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->first_msg].acked.MarkRange( | 
 |           sent_record->first_msg_start, sent_record->last_msg_end); | 
 |     } else { | 
 |       ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->first_msg].acked.MarkRange( | 
 |           sent_record->first_msg_start, SIZE_MAX); | 
 |       for (size_t i = size_t{sent_record->first_msg} + 1; | 
 |            i < sent_record->last_msg; i++) { | 
 |         ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i].acked.MarkRange(0, SIZE_MAX); | 
 |       } | 
 |       if (sent_record->last_msg_end != 0) { | 
 |         ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[sent_record->last_msg].acked.MarkRange( | 
 |             0, sent_record->last_msg_end); | 
 |       } | 
 |     } | 
 |  | 
 |     // Clear the state so we don't bother re-marking the messages next time. | 
 |     sent_record->first_msg = 0; | 
 |     sent_record->first_msg_start = 0; | 
 |     sent_record->last_msg = 0; | 
 |     sent_record->last_msg_end = 0; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   // If the outgoing flight is now fully ACKed, we are done retransmitting. | 
 |   if (std::all_of(ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.begin(), | 
 |                   ssl->d1->outgoing_messages.end(), | 
 |                   [](const auto &msg) { return msg.IsFullyAcked(); })) { | 
 |     dtls1_stop_timer(ssl); | 
 |     dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(ssl); | 
 |  | 
 |     // DTLS 1.3 defers the key update to when the message is ACKed. | 
 |     if (ssl->s3->key_update_pending) { | 
 |       if (!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) { | 
 |         return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |       } | 
 |       ssl->s3->key_update_pending = false; | 
 |     } | 
 |  | 
 |     // Check for deferred messages. | 
 |     if (ssl->d1->queued_key_update != QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone) { | 
 |       int request_type = | 
 |           ssl->d1->queued_key_update == QueuedKeyUpdate::kUpdateRequested | 
 |               ? SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED | 
 |               : SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; | 
 |       ssl->d1->queued_key_update = QueuedKeyUpdate::kNone; | 
 |       if (!tls13_add_key_update(ssl, request_type)) { | 
 |         return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |       } | 
 |     } | 
 |   } else { | 
 |     // We may still be able to drop unused write epochs. | 
 |     dtls_clear_unused_write_epochs(ssl); | 
 |  | 
 |     // TODO(crbug.com/42290594): Schedule a retransmit. The peer will have | 
 |     // waited before sending the ACK, so a partial ACK suggests packet loss. | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, /*is_write=*/0, SSL3_RT_ACK, data); | 
 |   return ssl_open_record_discard; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_app_data(SSL *ssl, Span<uint8_t> *out, | 
 |                                       size_t *out_consumed, uint8_t *out_alert, | 
 |                                       Span<uint8_t> in) { | 
 |   assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl)); | 
 |  | 
 |   uint8_t type; | 
 |   DTLSRecordNumber record_number; | 
 |   Span<uint8_t> record; | 
 |   auto ret = dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &record_number, &record, out_consumed, | 
 |                               out_alert, in); | 
 |   if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) { | 
 |     return ret; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | 
 |     // Process handshake fragments for DTLS 1.3 post-handshake messages. | 
 |     if (ssl_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { | 
 |       if (!dtls1_process_handshake_fragments(ssl, out_alert, record_number, | 
 |                                              record)) { | 
 |         return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |       } | 
 |       return ssl_open_record_discard; | 
 |     } | 
 |  | 
 |     // Parse the first fragment header to determine if this is a pre-CCS or | 
 |     // post-CCS handshake record. DTLS resets handshake message numbers on each | 
 |     // handshake, so renegotiations and retransmissions are ambiguous. | 
 |     // | 
 |     // TODO(crbug.com/42290594): Move this logic into | 
 |     // |dtls1_process_handshake_fragments| and integrate it into DTLS 1.3 | 
 |     // retransmit conditions. | 
 |     CBS cbs, body; | 
 |     struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; | 
 |     CBS_init(&cbs, record.data(), record.size()); | 
 |     if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) { | 
 |       OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD); | 
 |       *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | 
 |       return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |     } | 
 |  | 
 |     if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && | 
 |         msg_hdr.seq == ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq - 1) { | 
 |       if (!ssl->d1->sending_flight && msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) { | 
 |         // Retransmit our last flight of messages. If the peer sends the second | 
 |         // Finished, they may not have received ours. Only do this for the | 
 |         // first fragment, in case the Finished was fragmented. | 
 |         // | 
 |         // This is not really a timeout, but increment the timeout count so we | 
 |         // eventually give up. | 
 |         ssl->d1->num_timeouts++; | 
 |         ssl->d1->sending_flight = true; | 
 |       } | 
 |       return ssl_open_record_discard; | 
 |     } | 
 |  | 
 |     // Otherwise, this is a pre-CCS handshake message from an unsupported | 
 |     // renegotiation attempt. Fall through to the error path. | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   if (type == SSL3_RT_ACK) { | 
 |     return dtls1_process_ack(ssl, out_alert, record_number, record); | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   if (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | 
 |     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | 
 |     *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | 
 |     return ssl_open_record_error; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   if (record.empty()) { | 
 |     return ssl_open_record_discard; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   *out = record; | 
 |   return ssl_open_record_success; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | int dtls1_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, bool *out_needs_handshake, | 
 |                          size_t *out_bytes_written, Span<const uint8_t> in) { | 
 |   assert(!SSL_in_init(ssl)); | 
 |   *out_needs_handshake = false; | 
 |  | 
 |   if (ssl->s3->write_shutdown != ssl_shutdown_none) { | 
 |     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); | 
 |     return -1; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   // DTLS does not split the input across records. | 
 |   if (in.size() > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | 
 |     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); | 
 |     return -1; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   if (in.empty()) { | 
 |     *out_bytes_written = 0; | 
 |     return 1; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   // TODO(crbug.com/381113363): Use the 0-RTT epoch if writing 0-RTT. | 
 |   int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, in, | 
 |                                ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch()); | 
 |   if (ret <= 0) { | 
 |     return ret; | 
 |   } | 
 |   *out_bytes_written = in.size(); | 
 |   return 1; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | int dtls1_write_record(SSL *ssl, int type, Span<const uint8_t> in, | 
 |                        uint16_t epoch) { | 
 |   SSLBuffer *buf = &ssl->s3->write_buffer; | 
 |   assert(in.size() <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); | 
 |   // There should never be a pending write buffer in DTLS. One can't write half | 
 |   // a datagram, so the write buffer is always dropped in | 
 |   // |ssl_write_buffer_flush|. | 
 |   assert(buf->empty()); | 
 |  | 
 |   if (in.size() > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | 
 |     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | 
 |     return -1; | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   DTLSRecordNumber record_number; | 
 |   size_t ciphertext_len; | 
 |   if (!buf->EnsureCap(dtls_seal_prefix_len(ssl, epoch), | 
 |                       in.size() + SSL_max_seal_overhead(ssl)) || | 
 |       !dtls_seal_record(ssl, &record_number, buf->remaining().data(), | 
 |                         &ciphertext_len, buf->remaining().size(), type, | 
 |                         in.data(), in.size(), epoch)) { | 
 |     buf->Clear(); | 
 |     return -1; | 
 |   } | 
 |   buf->DidWrite(ciphertext_len); | 
 |  | 
 |   int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(ssl); | 
 |   if (ret <= 0) { | 
 |     return ret; | 
 |   } | 
 |   return 1; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *ssl) { | 
 |   int ret = dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert, | 
 |                                ssl->d1->write_epoch.epoch()); | 
 |   if (ret <= 0) { | 
 |     return ret; | 
 |   } | 
 |   ssl->s3->alert_dispatch = false; | 
 |  | 
 |   // If the alert is fatal, flush the BIO now. | 
 |   if (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | 
 |     BIO_flush(ssl->wbio.get()); | 
 |   } | 
 |  | 
 |   ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, SSL3_RT_ALERT, ssl->s3->send_alert); | 
 |  | 
 |   int alert = (ssl->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | ssl->s3->send_alert[1]; | 
 |   ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, alert); | 
 |  | 
 |   return 1; | 
 | } | 
 |  | 
 | BSSL_NAMESPACE_END |