| /* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc. | |
| * | |
| * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any | |
| * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above | |
| * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. | |
| * | |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES | |
| * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF | |
| * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY | |
| * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES | |
| * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION | |
| * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN | |
| * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ | |
| #include <algorithm> | |
| #include <functional> | |
| #include <string> | |
| #include <vector> | |
| #include <gtest/gtest.h> | |
| #include <openssl/asn1.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bio.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/conf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/crypto.h> | |
| #include <openssl/curve25519.h> | |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/nid.h> | |
| #include <openssl/pem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/pool.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| #include "../internal.h" | |
| #include "../test/test_util.h" | |
| #include "../x509v3/internal.h" | |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) | |
| #include <thread> | |
| #endif | |
| std::string GetTestData(const char *path); | |
| static const char kCrossSigningRootPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICcTCCAdqgAwIBAgIIagJHiPvE0MowDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwPDEaMBgGA1UE | |
| ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v | |
| dCBDQTAgFw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowPDEaMBgGA1UE | |
| ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v | |
| dCBDQTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAwo3qFvSB9Zmlbpzn9wJp | |
| ikI75Rxkatez8VkLqyxbOhPYl2Haz8F5p1gDG96dCI6jcLGgu3AKT9uhEQyyUko5 | |
| EKYasazSeA9CQrdyhPg0mkTYVETnPM1W/ebid1YtqQbq1CMWlq2aTDoSGAReGFKP | |
| RTdXAbuAXzpCfi/d8LqV13UCAwEAAaN6MHgwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgIEMB0GA1Ud | |
| JQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MBkGA1Ud | |
| DgQSBBBHKHC7V3Z/3oLvEZx0RZRwMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEcocLtXdn/egu8RnHRF | |
| lHAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAnglibsy6mGtpIXivtlcz4zIEnHw/lNW+r/eC | |
| CY7evZTmOoOuC/x9SS3MF9vawt1HFUummWM6ZgErqVBOXIB4//ykrcCgf5ZbF5Hr | |
| +3EFprKhBqYiXdD8hpBkrBoXwn85LPYWNd2TceCrx0YtLIprE2R5MB2RIq8y4Jk3 | |
| YFXvkME= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kRootCAPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICVTCCAb6gAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwLjEaMBgGA1UE | |
| ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwIBcNMTUwMTAx | |
| MDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMC4xGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBU | |
| RVNUSU5HMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCB | |
| iQKBgQDpDn8RDOZa5oaDcPZRBy4CeBH1siSSOO4mYgLHlPE+oXdqwI/VImi2XeJM | |
| 2uCFETXCknJJjYG0iJdrt/yyRFvZTQZw+QzGj+mz36NqhGxDWb6dstB2m8PX+plZ | |
| w7jl81MDvUnWs8yiQ/6twgu5AbhWKZQDJKcNKCEpqa6UW0r5nwIDAQABo3oweDAO | |
| BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEGCCsGAQUFBwMCMA8G | |
| A1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wGQYDVR0OBBIEEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwGwYDVR0j | |
| BBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQDXylEK77Za | |
| kKeY6ZerrScWyZhrjIGtHFu09qVpdJEzrk87k2G7iHHR9CAvSofCgEExKtWNS9dN | |
| +9WiZp/U48iHLk7qaYXdEuO07No4BYtXn+lkOykE+FUxmA4wvOF1cTd2tdj3MzX2 | |
| kfGIBAYhzGZWhY3JbhIfTEfY1PNM1pWChQ== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kRootCrossSignedPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICYzCCAcygAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwPDEaMBgGA1UE | |
| ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxHjAcBgNVBAMTFUNyb3NzLXNpZ25pbmcgUm9v | |
| dCBDQTAgFw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowLjEaMBgGA1UE | |
| ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwgZ8wDQYJKoZI | |
| hvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAOkOfxEM5lrmhoNw9lEHLgJ4EfWyJJI47iZiAseU | |
| 8T6hd2rAj9UiaLZd4kza4IURNcKSckmNgbSIl2u3/LJEW9lNBnD5DMaP6bPfo2qE | |
| bENZvp2y0Habw9f6mVnDuOXzUwO9SdazzKJD/q3CC7kBuFYplAMkpw0oISmprpRb | |
| SvmfAgMBAAGjejB4MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwICBDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcD | |
| AQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQQDfXAftAL7gc | |
| flQEJ4xZATAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBHKHC7V3Z/3oLvEZx0RZRwMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB | |
| CwUAA4GBAErTxYJ0en9HVRHAAr5OO5wuk5Iq3VMc79TMyQLCXVL8YH8Uk7KEwv+q | |
| 9MEKZv2eR/Vfm4HlXlUuIqfgUXbwrAYC/YVVX86Wnbpy/jc73NYVCq8FEZeO+0XU | |
| 90SWAPDdp+iL7aZdimnMtG1qlM1edmz8AKbrhN/R3IbA2CL0nCWV | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kIntermediatePEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICXjCCAcegAwIBAgIJAKJMH+7rscPcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMC4xGjAYBgNV | |
| BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMCAXDTE1MDEw | |
| MTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjA2MRowGAYDVQQKExFCb3JpbmdTU0wg | |
| VEVTVElORzEYMBYGA1UEAxMPSW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlIENBMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB | |
| AQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQC7YtI0l8ocTYJ0gKyXTtPL4iMJCNY4OcxXl48jkncVG1Hl | |
| blicgNUa1r9m9YFtVkxvBinb8dXiUpEGhVg4awRPDcatlsBSEBuJkiZGYbRcAmSu | |
| CmZYnf6u3aYQ18SU8WqVERPpE4cwVVs+6kwlzRw0+XDoZAczu8ZezVhCUc6NbQID | |
| AQABo3oweDAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEGCCsG | |
| AQUFBwMCMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wGQYDVR0OBBIEEIwaaKi1dttdV3sfjRSy | |
| BqMwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOB | |
| gQCvnolNWEHuQS8PFVVyuLR+FKBeUUdrVbSfHSzTqNAqQGp0C9fk5oCzDq6ZgTfY | |
| ESXM4cJhb3IAnW0UM0NFsYSKQJ50JZL2L3z5ZLQhHdbs4RmODGoC40BVdnJ4/qgB | |
| aGSh09eQRvAVmbVCviDK2ipkWNegdyI19jFfNP5uIkGlYg== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kIntermediateSelfSignedPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICZjCCAc+gAwIBAgIJAKJMH+7rscPcMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDYxGjAYBgNV | |
| BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0Ew | |
| IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDYxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv | |
| cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0EwgZ8wDQYJ | |
| KoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBALti0jSXyhxNgnSArJdO08viIwkI1jg5zFeX | |
| jyOSdxUbUeVuWJyA1RrWv2b1gW1WTG8GKdvx1eJSkQaFWDhrBE8Nxq2WwFIQG4mS | |
| JkZhtFwCZK4KZlid/q7dphDXxJTxapURE+kThzBVWz7qTCXNHDT5cOhkBzO7xl7N | |
| WEJRzo1tAgMBAAGjejB4MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwICBDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEF | |
| BQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQjBpoqLV2 | |
| 211Xex+NFLIGozAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBCMGmiotXbbXVd7H40UsgajMA0GCSqGSIb3 | |
| DQEBCwUAA4GBALcccSrAQ0/EqQBsx0ZDTUydHXXNP2DrUkpUKmAXIe8McqIVSlkT | |
| 6H4xz7z8VRKBo9j+drjjtCw2i0CQc8aOLxRb5WJ8eVLnaW2XRlUqAzhF0CrulfVI | |
| E4Vs6ZLU+fra1WAuIj6qFiigRja+3YkZArG8tMA9vtlhTX/g7YBZIkqH | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kLeafPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICXjCCAcegAwIBAgIIWjO48ufpunYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwNjEaMBgGA1UE | |
| ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxGDAWBgNVBAMTD0ludGVybWVkaWF0ZSBDQTAg | |
| Fw0xNTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowMjEaMBgGA1UEChMRQm9y | |
| aW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxFDASBgNVBAMTC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3 | |
| DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDD0U0ZYgqShJ7oOjsyNKyVXEHqeafmk/bAoPqY/h1c | |
| oPw2E8KmeqiUSoTPjG5IXSblOxcqpbAXgnjPzo8DI3GNMhAf8SYNYsoH7gc7Uy7j | |
| 5x8bUrisGnuTHqkqH6d4/e7ETJ7i3CpR8bvK16DggEvQTudLipz8FBHtYhFakfdh | |
| TwIDAQABo3cwdTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBaAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYIKwYBBQUHAwEG | |
| CCsGAQUFBwMCMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGQYDVR0OBBIEEKN5pvbur7mlXjeMEYA0 | |
| 4nUwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQjBpoqLV2211Xex+NFLIGozANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOB | |
| gQBj/p+JChp//LnXWC1k121LM/ii7hFzQzMrt70bny406SGz9jAjaPOX4S3gt38y | |
| rhjpPukBlSzgQXFg66y6q5qp1nQTD1Cw6NkKBe9WuBlY3iYfmsf7WT8nhlT1CttU | |
| xNCwyMX9mtdXdQicOfNjIGUCD5OLV5PgHFPRKiHHioBAhg== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kLeafNoKeyUsagePEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICNTCCAZ6gAwIBAgIJAIFQGaLQ0G2mMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMDYxGjAYBgNV | |
| BAoTEUJvcmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRgwFgYDVQQDEw9JbnRlcm1lZGlhdGUgQ0Ew | |
| IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDcxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv | |
| cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRkwFwYDVQQDExBldmlsLmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0G | |
| CSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDOKoZe75NPz77EOaMMl4/0s3PyQw++zJvp | |
| ejHAxZiTPCJgMbEHLrSzNoHdopg+CLUH5bE4wTXM8w9Inv5P8OAFJt7gJuPUunmk | |
| j+NoU3QfzOR6BroePcz1vXX9jyVHRs087M/sLqWRHu9IR+/A+UTcBaWaFiDVUxtJ | |
| YOwFMwjNPQIDAQABo0gwRjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMBkGA1UdDgQSBBBJfLEUWHq1 | |
| 27rZ1AVx2J5GMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEIwaaKi1dttdV3sfjRSyBqMwDQYJKoZIhvcN | |
| AQELBQADgYEALVKN2Y3LZJOtu6SxFIYKxbLaXhTGTdIjxipZhmbBRDFjbZjZZOTe | |
| 6Oo+VDNPYco4rBexK7umYXJyfTqoY0E8dbiImhTcGTEj7OAB3DbBomgU1AYe+t2D | |
| uwBqh4Y3Eto+Zn4pMVsxGEfUpjzjZDel7bN1/oU/9KWPpDfywfUmjgk= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kForgeryPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICZzCCAdCgAwIBAgIIdTlMzQoKkeMwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwNzEaMBgGA1UE | |
| ChMRQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRFU1RJTkcxGTAXBgNVBAMTEGV2aWwuZXhhbXBsZS5jb20w | |
| IBcNMTUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMDoxGjAYBgNVBAoTEUJv | |
| cmluZ1NTTCBURVNUSU5HMRwwGgYDVQQDExNmb3JnZXJ5LmV4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGf | |
| MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDADTwruBQZGb7Ay6s9HiYv5d1lwtEy | |
| xQdA2Sy8Rn8uA20Q4KgqwVY7wzIZ+z5Butrsmwb70gdG1XU+yRaDeE7XVoW6jSpm | |
| 0sw35/5vJbTcL4THEFbnX0OPZnvpuZDFUkvVtq5kxpDWsVyM24G8EEq7kPih3Sa3 | |
| OMhXVXF8kso6UQIDAQABo3cwdTAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBaAwHQYDVR0lBBYwFAYI | |
| KwYBBQUHAwEGCCsGAQUFBwMCMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGQYDVR0OBBIEEEYJ/WHM | |
| 8p64erPWIg4/liwwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQSXyxFFh6tdu62dQFcdieRjANBgkqhkiG | |
| 9w0BAQsFAAOBgQA+zH7bHPElWRWJvjxDqRexmYLn+D3Aivs8XgXQJsM94W0EzSUf | |
| DSLfRgaQwcb2gg2xpDFoG+W0vc6O651uF23WGt5JaFFJJxqjII05IexfCNhuPmp4 | |
| 4UZAXPttuJXpn74IY1tuouaM06B3vXKZR+/ityKmfJvSwxacmFcK+2ziAg== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kBadPSSCertPEM is a self-signed RSA-PSS certificate with bad parameters. | |
| static const char kBadPSSCertPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIDdjCCAjqgAwIBAgIJANcwZLyfEv7DMD4GCSqGSIb3DQEBCjAxoA0wCwYJYIZI | |
| AWUDBAIBoRowGAYJKoZIhvcNAQEIMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAaIEAgIA3jAnMSUwIwYD | |
| VQQDDBxUZXN0IEludmFsaWQgUFNTIGNlcnRpZmljYXRlMB4XDTE1MTEwNDE2MDIz | |
| NVoXDTE1MTIwNDE2MDIzNVowJzElMCMGA1UEAwwcVGVzdCBJbnZhbGlkIFBTUyBj | |
| ZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZTCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAMTaM7WH | |
| qVCAGAIA+zL1KWvvASTrhlq+1ePdO7wsrWX2KiYoTYrJYTnxhLnn0wrHqApt79nL | |
| IBG7cfShyZqFHOY/IzlYPMVt+gPo293gw96Fds5JBsjhjkyGnOyr9OUntFqvxDbT | |
| IIFU7o9IdxD4edaqjRv+fegVE+B79pDk4s0ujsk6dULtCg9Rst0ucGFo19mr+b7k | |
| dbfn8pZ72ZNDJPueVdrUAWw9oll61UcYfk75XdrLk6JlL41GrYHc8KlfXf43gGQq | |
| QfrpHkg4Ih2cI6Wt2nhFGAzrlcorzLliQIUJRIhM8h4IgDfpBpaPdVQLqS2pFbXa | |
| 5eQjqiyJwak2vJ8CAwEAAaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFCt180N4oGUt5LbzBwQ4Ia+2 | |
| 4V97MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFCt180N4oGUt5LbzBwQ4Ia+24V97MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMB | |
| Af8wMQYJKoZIhvcNAQEKMCSgDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgGhDTALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQii | |
| BAICAN4DggEBAAjBtm90lGxgddjc4Xu/nbXXFHVs2zVcHv/mqOZoQkGB9r/BVgLb | |
| xhHrFZ2pHGElbUYPfifdS9ztB73e1d4J+P29o0yBqfd4/wGAc/JA8qgn6AAEO/Xn | |
| plhFeTRJQtLZVl75CkHXgUGUd3h+ADvKtcBuW9dSUncaUrgNKR8u/h/2sMG38RWY | |
| DzBddC/66YTa3r7KkVUfW7yqRQfELiGKdcm+bjlTEMsvS+EhHup9CzbpoCx2Fx9p | |
| NPtFY3yEObQhmL1JyoCRWqBE75GzFPbRaiux5UpEkns+i3trkGssZzsOuVqHNTNZ | |
| lC9+9hPHIoc9UMmAQNo1vGIW3NWVoeGbaJ8= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kRSAKey[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| MIICXgIBAAKBgQDYK8imMuRi/03z0K1Zi0WnvfFHvwlYeyK9Na6XJYaUoIDAtB92 | |
| kWdGMdAQhLciHnAjkXLI6W15OoV3gA/ElRZ1xUpxTMhjP6PyY5wqT5r6y8FxbiiF | |
| KKAnHmUcrgfVW28tQ+0rkLGMryRtrukXOgXBv7gcrmU7G1jC2a7WqmeI8QIDAQAB | |
| AoGBAIBy09Fd4DOq/Ijp8HeKuCMKTHqTW1xGHshLQ6jwVV2vWZIn9aIgmDsvkjCe | |
| i6ssZvnbjVcwzSoByhjN8ZCf/i15HECWDFFh6gt0P5z0MnChwzZmvatV/FXCT0j+ | |
| WmGNB/gkehKjGXLLcjTb6dRYVJSCZhVuOLLcbWIV10gggJQBAkEA8S8sGe4ezyyZ | |
| m4e9r95g6s43kPqtj5rewTsUxt+2n4eVodD+ZUlCULWVNAFLkYRTBCASlSrm9Xhj | |
| QpmWAHJUkQJBAOVzQdFUaewLtdOJoPCtpYoY1zd22eae8TQEmpGOR11L6kbxLQsk | |
| aMly/DOnOaa82tqAGTdqDEZgSNmCeKKknmECQAvpnY8GUOVAubGR6c+W90iBuQLj | |
| LtFp/9ihd2w/PoDwrHZaoUYVcT4VSfJQog/k7kjE4MYXYWL8eEKg3WTWQNECQQDk | |
| 104Wi91Umd1PzF0ijd2jXOERJU1wEKe6XLkYYNHWQAe5l4J4MWj9OdxFXAxIuuR/ | |
| tfDwbqkta4xcux67//khAkEAvvRXLHTaa6VFzTaiiO8SaFsHV3lQyXOtMrBpB5jd | |
| moZWgjHvB2W9Ckn7sDqsPB+U2tyX0joDdQEyuiMECDY8oQ== | |
| -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kP256Key[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgBw8IcnrUoEqc3VnJ | |
| TYlodwi1b8ldMHcO6NHJzgqLtGqhRANCAATmK2niv2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4N | |
| Rvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYaHPUdfvGULUvPciLB | |
| -----END PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kCRLTestRoot is a test root certificate. It has private key: | |
| // | |
| // -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| // MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3BS/dUBpbrzd1aeFzN | |
| // lI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY | |
| // 07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWpuRqO6rctN9qUoMlT | |
| // IAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n8H922qmvPNA9idmX | |
| // 9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbLP2o9orxGx7aCtnnB | |
| // ZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABAoIBAQCJF9MTHfHGkk+/ | |
| // DwCXlA0Wg0e6hBuHl10iNobYkMWIl/xXjOknhYiqOqb181py76472SVC5ERprC+r | |
| // Lf0PXzqKuA117mnkwT2bYLCL9Skf8WEhoFLQNbVlloF6wYjqXcYgKYKh8HgQbZl4 | |
| // aLg2YQl2NADTNABsUWj/4H2WEelsODVviqfFs725lFg9KHDI8zxAZXLzDt/M9uVL | |
| // GxJiX12tr0AwaeAFZ1oPM/y+LznM3N3+Ht3jHHw3jZ/u8Z1RdAmdpu3bZ6tbwGBr | |
| // 9edsH5rKkm9aBvMrY7eX5VHqaqyRNFyG152ZOJh4XiiFG7EmgTPCpaHo50Y018Re | |
| // grVtk+FBAoGBANY3lY+V8ZOwMxSHes+kTnoimHO5Ob7nxrOC71i27x+4HHsYUeAr | |
| // /zOOghiDIn+oNkuiX5CIOWZKx159Bp65CPpCbTb/fh+HYnSgXFgCw7XptycO7LXM | |
| // 5GwR5jSfpfzBFdYxjxoUzDMFBwTEYRTm0HkUHkH+s+ajjw5wqqbcGLcfAoGBAMM8 | |
| // DKW6Tb66xsf708f0jonAjKYTLZ+WOcwsBEWSFHoY8dUjvW5gqx5acHTEsc5ZTeh4 | |
| // BCFLa+Mn9cuJWVJNs09k7Xb2PNl92HQ4GN2vbdkJhExbkT6oLDHg1hVD0w8KLfz1 | |
| // lTAW6pS+6CdOHMEJpvqx89EgU/1GgIQ1fXYczE75AoGAKeJoXdDFkUjsU+FBhAPu | |
| // TDcjc80Nm2QaF9NMFR5/lsYa236f06MGnQAKM9zADBHJu/Qdl1brUjLg1HrBppsr | |
| // RDNkw1IlSOjhuUf5hkPUHGd8Jijm440SRIcjabqla8wdBupdvo2+d2NOQgJbsQiI | |
| // ToQ+fkzcxAXK3Nnuo/1436UCgYBjLH7UNOZHS8OsVM0I1r8NVKVdu4JCfeJQR8/H | |
| // s2P5ffBir+wLRMnH+nMDreMQiibcPxMCArkERAlE4jlgaJ38Z62E76KLbLTmnJRt | |
| // EC9Bv+bXjvAiHvWMRMUbOj/ddPNVez7Uld+FvdBaHwDWQlvzHzBWfBCOKSEhh7Z6 | |
| // qDhUqQKBgQDPMDx2i5rfmQp3imV9xUcCkIRsyYQVf8Eo7NV07IdUy/otmksgn4Zt | |
| // Lbf3v2dvxOpTNTONWjp2c+iUQo8QxJCZr5Sfb21oQ9Ktcrmc/CY7LeBVDibXwxdM | |
| // vRG8kBzvslFWh7REzC3u06GSVhyKDfW93kN2cKVwGoahRlhj7oHuZQ== | |
| // -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| static const char kCRLTestRoot[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIDbzCCAlegAwIBAgIJAODri7v0dDUFMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAME4xCzAJBgNV | |
| BAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRYwFAYDVQQHDA1Nb3VudGFpbiBW | |
| aWV3MRIwEAYDVQQKDAlCb3JpbmdTU0wwHhcNMTYwOTI2MTUwNjI2WhcNMjYwOTI0 | |
| MTUwNjI2WjBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQG | |
| A1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJQm9yaW5nU1NMMIIBIjANBgkq | |
| hkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAo16WiLWZuaymsD8n5SKPmxV1y6jjgr3B | |
| S/dUBpbrzd1aeFzNlI8l2jfAnzUyp+I21RQ+nh/MhqjGElkTtK9xMn1Y+S9GMRh+ | |
| 5R/Du0iCb1tCZIPY07Tgrb0KMNWe0v2QKVVruuYSgxIWodBfxlKO64Z8AJ5IbnWp | |
| uRqO6rctN9qUoMlTIAB6dL4G0tDJ/PGFWOJYwOMEIX54bly2wgyYJVBKiRRt4f7n | |
| 8H922qmvPNA9idmX9G1VAtgV6x97XXi7ULORIQvn9lVQF6nTYDBJhyuPB+mLThbL | |
| P2o9orxGx7aCtnnBZUIxUvHNOI0FaSaZH7Fi0xsZ/GkG2HZe7ImPJwIDAQABo1Aw | |
| TjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUWPt3N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUWPt3 | |
| N5cZ/CRvubbrkqfBnAqhq94wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOC | |
| AQEAORu6M0MOwXy+3VEBwNilfTxyqDfruQsc1jA4PT8Oe8zora1WxE1JB4q2FJOz | |
| EAuM3H/NXvEnBuN+ITvKZAJUfm4NKX97qmjMJwLKWe1gVv+VQTr63aR7mgWJReQN | |
| XdMztlVeZs2dppV6uEg3ia1X0G7LARxGpA9ETbMyCpb39XxlYuTClcbA5ftDN99B | |
| 3Xg9KNdd++Ew22O3HWRDvdDpTO/JkzQfzi3sYwUtzMEonENhczJhGf7bQMmvL/w5 | |
| 24Wxj4Z7KzzWIHsNqE/RIs6RV3fcW61j/mRgW2XyoWnMVeBzvcJr9NXp4VQYmFPw | |
| amd8GKMZQvP0ufGnUn7D7uartA== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kCRLTestLeaf[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIDkDCCAnigAwIBAgICEAAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwTjELMAkGA1UEBhMCVVMx | |
| EzARBgNVBAgMCkNhbGlmb3JuaWExFjAUBgNVBAcMDU1vdW50YWluIFZpZXcxEjAQ | |
| BgNVBAoMCUJvcmluZ1NTTDAeFw0xNjA5MjYxNTA4MzFaFw0xNzA5MjYxNTA4MzFa | |
| MEsxCzAJBgNVBAYTAlVTMRMwEQYDVQQIDApDYWxpZm9ybmlhMRIwEAYDVQQKDAlC | |
| b3JpbmdTU0wxEzARBgNVBAMMCmJvcmluZy5zc2wwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUA | |
| A4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDc5v1S1M0W+QWM+raWfO0LH8uvqEwuJQgODqMaGnSlWUx9 | |
| 8iQcnWfjyPja3lWg9K62hSOFDuSyEkysKHDxijz5R93CfLcfnVXjWQDJe7EJTTDP | |
| ozEvxN6RjAeYv7CF000euYr3QT5iyBjg76+bon1p0jHZBJeNPP1KqGYgyxp+hzpx | |
| e0gZmTlGAXd8JQK4v8kpdYwD6PPifFL/jpmQpqOtQmH/6zcLjY4ojmqpEdBqIKIX | |
| +saA29hMq0+NK3K+wgg31RU+cVWxu3tLOIiesETkeDgArjWRS1Vkzbi4v9SJxtNu | |
| OZuAxWiynRJw3JwH/OFHYZIvQqz68ZBoj96cepjPAgMBAAGjezB5MAkGA1UdEwQC | |
| MAAwLAYJYIZIAYb4QgENBB8WHU9wZW5TU0wgR2VuZXJhdGVkIENlcnRpZmljYXRl | |
| MB0GA1UdDgQWBBTGn0OVVh/aoYt0bvEKG+PIERqnDzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRY+3c3 | |
| lxn8JG+5tuuSp8GcCqGr3jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAd2nM8gCQN2Dc8QJw | |
| XSZXyuI3DBGGCHcay/3iXu0JvTC3EiQo8J6Djv7WLI0N5KH8mkm40u89fJAB2lLZ | |
| ShuHVtcC182bOKnePgwp9CNwQ21p0rDEu/P3X46ZvFgdxx82E9xLa0tBB8PiPDWh | |
| lV16jbaKTgX5AZqjnsyjR5o9/mbZVupZJXx5Syq+XA8qiJfstSYJs4KyKK9UOjql | |
| ICkJVKpi2ahDBqX4MOH4SLfzVk8pqSpviS6yaA1RXqjpkxiN45WWaXDldVHMSkhC | |
| 5CNXsXi4b1nAntu89crwSLA3rEwzCWeYj+BX7e1T9rr3oJdwOU/2KQtW1js1yQUG | |
| tjJMFw== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kBasicCRL[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBpzCBkAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNV | |
| HRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnrBKKgvd9x9zwK9rtUvVeFeJ7+LN | |
| ZEAc+a5oxpPNEsJx6hXoApYEbzXMxuWBQoCs5iEBycSGudct21L+MVf27M38KrWo | |
| eOkq0a2siqViQZO2Fb/SUFR0k9zb8xl86Zf65lgPplALun0bV/HT7MJcl04Tc4os | |
| dsAReBs5nqTGNEd5AlC1iKHvQZkM//MD51DspKnDpsDiUVi54h9C1SpfZmX8H2Vv | |
| diyu0fZ/bPAM3VAGawatf/SyWfBMyKpoPXEG39oAzmjjOj8en82psn7m474IGaho | |
| /vBbhl1ms5qQiLYPjm4YELtnXQoFyC72tBjbdFd/ZE9k4CNKDbxFUXFbkw== | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kRevokedCRL[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBvjCBpwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyNDRaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEyNDRaMBUwEwICEAAX | |
| DTE2MDkyNjE1MTIyNlqgDjAMMAoGA1UdFAQDAgECMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB | |
| AQCUGaM4DcWzlQKrcZvI8TMeR8BpsvQeo5BoI/XZu2a8h//PyRyMwYeaOM+3zl0d | |
| sjgCT8b3C1FPgT+P2Lkowv7rJ+FHJRNQkogr+RuqCSPTq65ha4WKlRGWkMFybzVH | |
| NloxC+aU3lgp/NlX9yUtfqYmJek1CDrOOGPrAEAwj1l/BUeYKNGqfBWYJQtPJu+5 | |
| OaSvIYGpETCZJscUWODmLEb/O3DM438vLvxonwGqXqS0KX37+CHpUlyhnSovxXxp | |
| Pz4aF+L7OtczxL0GYtD2fR9B7TDMqsNmHXgQrixvvOY7MUdLGbd4RfJL3yA53hyO | |
| xzfKY2TzxLiOmctG0hXFkH5J | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kBadIssuerCRL[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBwjCBqwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBSMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzEWMBQGA1UECgwN | |
| Tm90IEJvcmluZ1NTTBcNMTYwOTI2MTUxMjQ0WhcNMTYxMDI2MTUxMjQ0WjAVMBMC | |
| AhAAFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEyMjZaoA4wDDAKBgNVHRQEAwIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF | |
| AAOCAQEAlBmjOA3Fs5UCq3GbyPEzHkfAabL0HqOQaCP12btmvIf/z8kcjMGHmjjP | |
| t85dHbI4Ak/G9wtRT4E/j9i5KML+6yfhRyUTUJKIK/kbqgkj06uuYWuFipURlpDB | |
| cm81RzZaMQvmlN5YKfzZV/clLX6mJiXpNQg6zjhj6wBAMI9ZfwVHmCjRqnwVmCUL | |
| TybvuTmkryGBqREwmSbHFFjg5ixG/ztwzON/Ly78aJ8Bql6ktCl9+/gh6VJcoZ0q | |
| L8V8aT8+Ghfi+zrXM8S9BmLQ9n0fQe0wzKrDZh14EK4sb7zmOzFHSxm3eEXyS98g | |
| Od4cjsc3ymNk88S4jpnLRtIVxZB+SQ== | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kKnownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution point | |
| // extension. | |
| static const char kKnownCriticalCRL[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBuDCBoQIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoB8wHTAKBgNV | |
| HRQEAwIBATAPBgNVHRwBAf8EBTADgQH/MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAs37Jq | |
| 3Htcehm6C2PKXOHekwTqTLOPWsYHfF68kYhdzcopDZBeoKE7jLRkRRGFDaR/tfUs | |
| kwLSDNSQ8EwPb9PT1X8kmFn9QmJgWD6f6BzaH5ZZ9iBUwOcvrydlb/jnjdIZHQxs | |
| fKOAceW5XX3f7DANC3qwYLsQZR/APkfV8nXjPYVUz1kKj04uq/BbQviInjyUYixN | |
| xDx+GDWVVXccehcwAu983kAqP+JDaVQPBVksLuBXz2adrEWwvbLCnZeL3zH1IY9h | |
| 6MFO6echpvGbU/H+dRX9UkhdJ7gdwKVD3RjfJl+DRVox9lz8Pbo5H699Tkv9/DQP | |
| 9dMWxqhQlv23osLp | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kUnknownCriticalCRL is kBasicCRL but with an unknown critical extension. | |
| static const char kUnknownCriticalCRL[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBvDCBpQIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCMwITAKBgNV | |
| HRQEAwIBATATBgwqhkiG9xIEAYS3CQABAf8EADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA | |
| GvBP0xqL509InMj/3493YVRV+ldTpBv5uTD6jewzf5XdaxEQ/VjTNe5zKnxbpAib | |
| Kf7cwX0PMSkZjx7k7kKdDlEucwVvDoqC+O9aJcqVmM6GDyNb9xENxd0XCXja6MZC | |
| yVgP4AwLauB2vSiEprYJyI1APph3iAEeDm60lTXX/wBM/tupQDDujKh2GPyvBRfJ | |
| +wEDwGg3ICwvu4gO4zeC5qnFR+bpL9t5tOMAQnVZ0NWv+k7mkd2LbHdD44dxrfXC | |
| nhtfERx99SDmC/jtUAJrGhtCO8acr7exCeYcduN7KKCm91OeCJKK6OzWst0Og1DB | |
| kwzzU2rL3G65CrZ7H0SZsQ== | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kUnknownCriticalCRL2 is kBasicCRL but with a critical issuing distribution | |
| // point extension followed by an unknown critical extension | |
| static const char kUnknownCriticalCRL2[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBzTCBtgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoDQwMjAKBgNV | |
| HRQEAwIBATAPBgNVHRwBAf8EBTADgQH/MBMGDCqGSIb3EgQBhLcJAAEB/wQAMA0G | |
| CSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IBAQBgSogsC5kf2wzr+0hmZtmLXYd0itAiYO0Gh9AyaEOO | |
| myJFuqICHBSLXXUgwNkTUa2x2I/ivyReVFV756VOlWoaV2wJUs0zeCeVBgC9ZFsq | |
| 5a+8OGgXwgoYESFV5Y3QRF2a1Ytzfbw/o6xLXzTngvMsLOs12D4B5SkopyEZibF4 | |
| tXlRZyvEudTg3CCrjNP+p/GV07nZ3wcMmKJwQeilgzFUV7NaVCCo9jvPBGp0RxAN | |
| KNif7jmjK4hD5mswo/Eq5kxQIc+mTfuUFdgHuAu1hfLYe0YK+Hr4RFf6Qy4hl7Ne | |
| YjqkkSVIcr87u+8AznwdstnQzsyD27Jt7SjVORkYRywi | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kBadExtensionCRL is kBasicCRL but with an incorrectly-encoded issuing | |
| // distribution point extension. | |
| static const char kBadExtensionCRL[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBujCBowIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoCEwHzAKBgNV | |
| HRQEAwIBATARBgNVHRwBAf8EBzAFoQMBAf8wDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADggEBAA+3 | |
| i+5e5Ub8sccfgOBs6WVJFI9c8gvJjrJ8/dYfFIAuCyeocs7DFXn1n13CRZ+URR/Q | |
| mVWgU28+xeusuSPYFpd9cyYTcVyNUGNTI3lwgcE/yVjPaOmzSZKdPakApRxtpKKQ | |
| NN/56aQz3bnT/ZSHQNciRB8U6jiD9V30t0w+FDTpGaG+7bzzUH3UVF9xf9Ctp60A | |
| 3mfLe0scas7owSt4AEFuj2SPvcE7yvdOXbu+IEv21cEJUVExJAbhvIweHXh6yRW+ | |
| 7VVeiNzdIjkZjyTmAzoXGha4+wbxXyBRbfH+XWcO/H+8nwyG8Gktdu2QB9S9nnIp | |
| o/1TpfOMSGhMyMoyPrk= | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kAlgorithmMismatchCRL is kBasicCRL but with mismatched AlgorithmIdentifiers | |
| // in the outer structure and signed portion. The signature reflects the signed | |
| // portion. | |
| static const char kAlgorithmMismatchCRL[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBpzCBkAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNV | |
| HRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQwFAAOCAQEAnrBKKgvd9x9zwK9rtUvVeFeJ7+LN | |
| ZEAc+a5oxpPNEsJx6hXoApYEbzXMxuWBQoCs5iEBycSGudct21L+MVf27M38KrWo | |
| eOkq0a2siqViQZO2Fb/SUFR0k9zb8xl86Zf65lgPplALun0bV/HT7MJcl04Tc4os | |
| dsAReBs5nqTGNEd5AlC1iKHvQZkM//MD51DspKnDpsDiUVi54h9C1SpfZmX8H2Vv | |
| diyu0fZ/bPAM3VAGawatf/SyWfBMyKpoPXEG39oAzmjjOj8en82psn7m474IGaho | |
| /vBbhl1ms5qQiLYPjm4YELtnXQoFyC72tBjbdFd/ZE9k4CNKDbxFUXFbkw== | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kAlgorithmMismatchCRL2 is kBasicCRL but with mismatched AlgorithmIdentifiers | |
| // in the outer structure and signed portion. The signature reflects the outer | |
| // structure. | |
| static const char kAlgorithmMismatchCRL2[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBpzCBkAIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQwFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNV | |
| HRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAjCWtU7AK8nQ5TCFfzvbU04MWNuLp | |
| iZfqapRSRyMta4pyRomK773rEmJmYOc/ZNeIphVOlupMgGC2wyv5Z/SD1mxccJbv | |
| SlUWciwjskjgvyyU9KnJ5xPgf3e3Fl3G0u9yJEFd4mg6fRavs5pEDX56b0f+SkG+ | |
| Vl1FZU94Uylm2kCqk9fRpTxualPGP6dksj3Aitt4x2Vdni4sUfg9vIEEOx2jnisq | |
| iLqpT94IdETCWAciE0dgbogdOOsNzMqSASfHM/XPigYLXpYgfaR8fca6OKDwFsVH | |
| SrkFz8Se3F6mCHnbDzYElbmA46iKU2J12LTrso3Ewq/qHq0mebfp2z0y6g== | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kEd25519Cert is a self-signed Ed25519 certificate. | |
| static const char kEd25519Cert[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBkTCCAUOgAwIBAgIJAJwooam0UCDmMAUGAytlcDBFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTET | |
| MBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQ | |
| dHkgTHRkMB4XDTE0MDQyMzIzMjE1N1oXDTE0MDUyMzIzMjE1N1owRTELMAkGA1UE | |
| BhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdp | |
| ZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAqMAUGAytlcAMhANdamAGCsQq31Uv+08lkBzoO4XLz2qYj | |
| Ja8CGmj3B1Eao1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUoux7eV+fJK2v3ah6QPU/lj1/+7UwHwYD | |
| VR0jBBgwFoAUoux7eV+fJK2v3ah6QPU/lj1/+7UwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAFBgMr | |
| ZXADQQBuCzqji8VP9xU8mHEMjXGChX7YP5J664UyVKHKH9Z1u4wEbB8dJ3ScaWSL | |
| r+VHVKUhsrvcdCelnXRrrSD7xWAL | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kEd25519CertNull is an invalid self-signed Ed25519 with an explicit NULL in | |
| // the signature algorithm. | |
| static const char kEd25519CertNull[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBlTCCAUWgAwIBAgIJAJwooam0UCDmMAcGAytlcAUAMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFV | |
| MRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRz | |
| IFB0eSBMdGQwHhcNMTQwNDIzMjMyMTU3WhcNMTQwNTIzMjMyMTU3WjBFMQswCQYD | |
| VQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQg | |
| V2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMCowBQYDK2VwAyEA11qYAYKxCrfVS/7TyWQHOg7hcvPa | |
| piMlrwIaaPcHURqjUDBOMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSi7Ht5X58kra/dqHpA9T+WPX/7tTAf | |
| BgNVHSMEGDAWgBSi7Ht5X58kra/dqHpA9T+WPX/7tTAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAcG | |
| AytlcAUAA0EA70uefNocdJohkKPNROKVyBuBD3LXMyvmdTklsaxSRY3PcZdOohlr | |
| recgVPpVS7B+d9g4EwtZXIh4lodTBDHBBw== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kX25519 is the example X25519 certificate from | |
| // https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8410#section-10.2 | |
| static const char kX25519Cert[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBLDCB36ADAgECAghWAUdKKo3DMDAFBgMrZXAwGTEXMBUGA1UEAwwOSUVURiBUZX | |
| N0IERlbW8wHhcNMTYwODAxMTIxOTI0WhcNNDAxMjMxMjM1OTU5WjAZMRcwFQYDVQQD | |
| DA5JRVRGIFRlc3QgRGVtbzAqMAUGAytlbgMhAIUg8AmJMKdUdIt93LQ+91oNvzoNJj | |
| ga9OukqY6qm05qo0UwQzAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQEAMA4GA1UdDwEBAAQEAwIDCDAg | |
| BgNVHQ4BAQAEFgQUmx9e7e0EM4Xk97xiPFl1uQvIuzswBQYDK2VwA0EAryMB/t3J5v | |
| /BzKc9dNZIpDmAgs3babFOTQbs+BolzlDUwsPrdGxO3YNGhW7Ibz3OGhhlxXrCe1Cg | |
| w1AH9efZBw== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kSANTypesLeaf is a leaf certificate (signed by |kSANTypesRoot|) which | |
| // contains SANS for example.com, test@example.com, 127.0.0.1, and | |
| // https://example.com/. (The latter is useless for now since crypto/x509 | |
| // doesn't deal with URI SANs directly.) | |
| static const char kSANTypesLeaf[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIClzCCAgCgAwIBAgIJAOjwnT/iW+qmMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMCsxFzAVBgNV | |
| BAoTDkJvcmluZ1NTTCBUZXN0MRAwDgYDVQQDEwdSb290IENBMB4XDTE1MDEwMTAw | |
| MDAwMFoXDTI1MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowLzEXMBUGA1UEChMOQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRlc3Qx | |
| FDASBgNVBAMTC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKB | |
| gQDbRn2TLhInBki8Bighq37EtqJd/h5SRYh6NkelCA2SQlvCgcC+l3mYQPtPbRT9 | |
| KxOLwqUuZ9jUCZ7WIji3Sgt0cyvCNPHRk+WW2XR781ifbGE8wLBB1NkrKyQjd1sc | |
| O711Xc4gVM+hY4cdHiTE8x0aUIuqthRD7ZendWL0FMhS1wIDAQABo4G+MIG7MA4G | |
| A1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggrBgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDAYD | |
| VR0TAQH/BAIwADAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQn5EWH0NDPkmm3m22gNefYDAbBgNVHSMEFDAS | |
| gBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMEQGA1UdEQQ9MDuCC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tgRB0ZXN0 | |
| QGV4YW1wbGUuY29thwR/AAABhhRodHRwczovL2V4YW1wbGUuY29tLzANBgkqhkiG | |
| 9w0BAQsFAAOBgQBtwJvY6+Tk6D6DOtDVaNoJ5y8E25CCuE/Ga4OuIcYJas+yLckf | |
| dZwUV3GUG2oBXl2MrpUFxXd4hKBO1CmlBY+hZEeIx0Yp6QWK9P/vnZeydOTP26mk | |
| jusJ2PqSmtKNU1Zcaba4d29oFejmOAfeguhR8AHpsc/zHEaS5Q9cJsuJcw== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| // MIICWwIBAAKBgQDbRn2TLhInBki8Bighq37EtqJd/h5SRYh6NkelCA2SQlvCgcC+ | |
| // l3mYQPtPbRT9KxOLwqUuZ9jUCZ7WIji3Sgt0cyvCNPHRk+WW2XR781ifbGE8wLBB | |
| // 1NkrKyQjd1scO711Xc4gVM+hY4cdHiTE8x0aUIuqthRD7ZendWL0FMhS1wIDAQAB | |
| // AoGACwf7z0i1DxOI2zSwFimLghfyCSp8mgT3fbZ3Wj0SebYu6ZUffjceneM/AVrq | |
| // gGYHYLOVHcWJqfkl7X3hPo9SDhzLx0mM545/q21ZWCwjhswH7WiCEqV2/zeDO9WU | |
| // NIO1VU0VoLm0AQ7ZvwnyB+fpgF9kkkDtbBJW7XWrfNVtlnECQQD97YENpEJ3X1kj | |
| // 3rrkrHWDkKAyoWWY1i8Fm7LnganC9Bv6AVwgn5ZlE/479aWHF8vbOFEA3pFPiNZJ | |
| // t9FTCfpJAkEA3RCXjGI0Y6GALFLwEs+nL/XZAfJaIpJEZVLCVosYQOSaMS4SchfC | |
| // GGYVquT7ZgKk9uvz89Fg87OtBMWS9lrkHwJADGkGLKeBhBoJ3kHtem2fVK3F1pOi | |
| // xoR5SdnhNYVVyaxqjZ5xZTrHe+stOrr3uxGDqhQniVZXXb6/Ul0Egv1y2QJAVg/h | |
| // kAujba4wIhFf2VLyOZ+yjil1ocPj0LZ5Zgvcs1bMGJ1hHP3W2HzVrqRaowoggui1 | |
| // HpTC891dXGA2qKYV7QJAFDmT2A7OVvh3y4AEgzVwHrDmCMwMHKjCIntS7fjxrJnF | |
| // YvJUG1zoHwUVrxxbR3DbpTODlktLcl/0b97D0IkH3w== | |
| // -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| static const char kSANTypesRoot[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICTTCCAbagAwIBAgIIAj5CwoHlWuYwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwKzEXMBUGA1UE | |
| ChMOQm9yaW5nU1NMIFRlc3QxEDAOBgNVBAMTB1Jvb3QgQ0EwHhcNMTUwMTAxMDAw | |
| MDAwWhcNMjUwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3JpbmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQ | |
| MA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEA6Q5/ | |
| EQzmWuaGg3D2UQcuAngR9bIkkjjuJmICx5TxPqF3asCP1SJotl3iTNrghRE1wpJy | |
| SY2BtIiXa7f8skRb2U0GcPkMxo/ps9+jaoRsQ1m+nbLQdpvD1/qZWcO45fNTA71J | |
| 1rPMokP+rcILuQG4VimUAySnDSghKamulFtK+Z8CAwEAAaN6MHgwDgYDVR0PAQH/ | |
| BAQDAgIEMB0GA1UdJQQWMBQGCCsGAQUFBwMBBggrBgEFBQcDAjAPBgNVHRMBAf8E | |
| BTADAQH/MBkGA1UdDgQSBBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA3 | |
| 1wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAc4N6hTE62/3gwg+kyc2f | |
| c/Jj1mHrOt+0NRaBnmvbmNpsEjHS96Ef4Wt/ZlPXPkkv1C1VosJnOIMF3Q522wRH | |
| bqaxARldS12VAa3gcWisDWD+SqSyDxjyojz0XDiJkTrFuCTCUiZO+1GLB7SO10Ms | |
| d5YVX0c90VMnUhF/dlrqS9U= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| // MIICXAIBAAKBgQDpDn8RDOZa5oaDcPZRBy4CeBH1siSSOO4mYgLHlPE+oXdqwI/V | |
| // Imi2XeJM2uCFETXCknJJjYG0iJdrt/yyRFvZTQZw+QzGj+mz36NqhGxDWb6dstB2 | |
| // m8PX+plZw7jl81MDvUnWs8yiQ/6twgu5AbhWKZQDJKcNKCEpqa6UW0r5nwIDAQAB | |
| // AoGALEF5daZqc+aEsp8X1yky3nsoheyPL0kqSBWii33IFemZgKcSaRnAoqjPWWLS | |
| // 8dHj0I/4rej2MW8iuezVSpDak9tK5boHORC3w4p/wifkizQkLt1DANxTVbzcKvrt | |
| // aZ7LjVaKkhjRJbLddniowFHkkWVbUccjvzcUd7Y2VuLbAhECQQDq4FE88aHio8zg | |
| // bxSd0PwjEFwLYQTR19u812SoR8PmR6ofIL+pDwOV+fVs+OGcAAOgkhIukOrksQ4A | |
| // 1cKtnyhXAkEA/gRI+u3tZ7UE1twIkBfZ6IvCdRodkPqHAYIxMRLzL+MhyZt4MEGc | |
| // Ngb/F6U9/WOBFnoR/PI7IwE3ejutzKcL+QJBAKh+6eilk7QKPETZi1m3/dmNt+p1 | |
| // 3EZJ65pqjwxmB3Rg/vs7vCMk4TarTdSyKu+F1xRPFfoP/mK3Xctdjj6NyhsCQAYF | |
| // 7/0TOzfkUPMPUJyqFB6xgbDpJ55ScnUUsznoqx+NkTWInDb4t02IqO/UmT2y6FKy | |
| // Hk8TJ1fTJY+ebqaVp3ECQApx9gQ+n0zIhx97FMUuiRse73xkcW4+pZ8nF+8DmeQL | |
| // /JKuuFGmzkG+rUbXFmo/Zg2ozVplw71NnQJ4znPsf7A= | |
| // -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| // The following four certificates were generated with this Go program, varying | |
| // |includeNetscapeExtension| and defining rootKeyPEM and rootCertPEM to be | |
| // strings containing the kSANTypesRoot, above. | |
| // package main | |
| // import ( | |
| // "crypto/ecdsa" | |
| // "crypto/elliptic" | |
| // "crypto/rand" | |
| // "crypto/x509" | |
| // "crypto/x509/pkix" | |
| // "encoding/asn1" | |
| // "encoding/pem" | |
| // "math/big" | |
| // "os" | |
| // "time" | |
| // ) | |
| // const includeNetscapeExtension = true | |
| // func main() { | |
| // block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(rootKeyPEM)) | |
| // rootPriv, _ := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes) | |
| // block, _ = pem.Decode([]byte(rootCertPEM)) | |
| // root, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes) | |
| // interTemplate := &x509.Certificate{ | |
| // SerialNumber: big.NewInt(2), | |
| // Subject: pkix.Name{ | |
| // CommonName: "No Basic Constraints (Netscape)", | |
| // }, | |
| // NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), | |
| // NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), | |
| // } | |
| // if includeNetscapeExtension { | |
| // interTemplate.ExtraExtensions = []pkix.Extension{ | |
| // pkix.Extension{ | |
| // Id: asn1.ObjectIdentifier([]int{2, 16, 840, 1, 113730, 1, 1}), | |
| // Value: []byte{0x03, 0x02, 2, 0x04}, | |
| // }, | |
| // } | |
| // } else { | |
| // interTemplate.KeyUsage = x509.KeyUsageCertSign | |
| // } | |
| // interKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) | |
| // interDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, interTemplate, root, &interKey.PublicKey, rootPriv) | |
| // if err != nil { | |
| // panic(err) | |
| // } | |
| // pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: interDER}) | |
| // inter, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(interDER) | |
| // leafTemplate := &x509.Certificate{ | |
| // SerialNumber: big.NewInt(3), | |
| // Subject: pkix.Name{ | |
| // CommonName: "Leaf from CA with no Basic Constraints", | |
| // }, | |
| // NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), | |
| // NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), | |
| // BasicConstraintsValid: true, | |
| // } | |
| // leafKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) | |
| // leafDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTemplate, inter, &leafKey.PublicKey, interKey) | |
| // if err != nil { | |
| // panic(err) | |
| // } | |
| // pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leafDER}) | |
| // } | |
| // kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate doesn't have isCA set, but contains | |
| // certSign in the keyUsage. | |
| static const char kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBqjCCAROgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowHzEdMBsGA1UEAxMUTm8gQmFzaWMgQ29uc3RyYWludHMw | |
| WTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASEFMblfxIEDO8My7wHtHWTuDzNyID1 | |
| OsPkMGkn32O/pSyXxXuAqDeFoMVffUMTyfm8JcYugSEbrv2qEXXM4bZRoy8wLTAO | |
| BgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAgQwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQEJ4xZATANBgkq | |
| hkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQC1Lh6hIAm3K5kRh5iIydU0YAEm7eV6ZSskERDUq3DLJyl9 | |
| ZUZCHUzvb464dkwZjeNzaUVS1pdElJslwX3DtGgeJLJGCnk8zUjBjaNrrDm0kzPW | |
| xKt/6oif1ci/KCKqKNXJAIFbc4e+IiBpenwpxHk3If4NM+Ek0nKoO8Uj0NkgTQ== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignLeaf[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBUDCB96ADAgECAgEDMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCMB8xHTAbBgNVBAMTFE5vIEJhc2lj | |
| IENvbnN0cmFpbnRzMCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAx | |
| MS8wLQYDVQQDEyZMZWFmIGZyb20gQ0Egd2l0aCBubyBCYXNpYyBDb25zdHJhaW50 | |
| czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEsYPMwzdJKjB+2gpC90ib2ilHoB | |
| w/arQ6ikUX0CNUDDaKaOu/jF39ogzVlg4lDFrjCKShSfCCcrwgONv70IZGijEDAO | |
| MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIgbV7R99yM+okXSIs6Fp3o | |
| eCOXiDL60IBxaTOcLS44ywcCIQDbn87Gj5cFgHBYAkzdHqDsyGXkxQTHDq9jmX24 | |
| Djy3Zw== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate doesn't have isCA set, but contains | |
| // a Netscape certificate-type extension that asserts a type of "SSL CA". | |
| static const char kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBuDCCASGgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowKjEoMCYGA1UEAxMfTm8gQmFzaWMgQ29uc3RyYWludHMg | |
| KE5ldHNjYXBlKTBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABCeMbmCaOtMzXBqi | |
| PrCdNOH23CkaawUA+pAezitAN4RXS1O2CGK5sJjGPVVeogROU8G7/b+mU+ciZIzH | |
| 1PP8FJKjMjAwMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEwEQYJYIZIAYb4 | |
| QgEBBAQDAgIEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAAgNWjh7cfBTClTAk+Ml//5xb9Ju | |
| tkBhG6Rm+kkMD+qiSMO6t7xS7CsA0+jIBjkdEYaLZ3oxtQCBdZsVNxUvRxZ0AUfF | |
| G3DtRFTsrI1f7IQhpMuqEMF4shPW+5x54hrq0Fo6xMs6XoinJZcTUaaB8EeXRF6M | |
| P9p6HuyLrmn0c/F0 | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCALeaf[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBXDCCAQKgAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAqMSgwJgYDVQQDEx9ObyBCYXNp | |
| YyBDb25zdHJhaW50cyAoTmV0c2NhcGUpMCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIwOTkw | |
| MTAxMDAwMDAwWjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZMZWFmIGZyb20gQ0Egd2l0aCBubyBCYXNp | |
| YyBDb25zdHJhaW50czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABDlJKolDu3R2 | |
| tPqSDycr0QJcWhxdBv76V0EEVflcHRxED6vAioTEcnQszt1OfKtBZvjlo0yp6i6Q | |
| DaYit0ZInmWjEDAOMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAJsh | |
| aZL6BHeEfoUBj1oZ2Ln91qzj3UCVMJ+vrmwAFdYyAiA3wp2JphgchvmoUFuzPXwj | |
| XyPwWPbymSTpzKhB4xB7qQ== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kSelfSignedMismatchAlgorithms[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIFMjCCAxqgAwIBAgIJAL0mG5fOeJ7xMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBDQUAMC0xCzAJBgNV | |
| BAYTAkdCMQ8wDQYDVQQHDAZMb25kb24xDTALBgNVBAoMBFRlc3QwIBcNMTgwOTE3 | |
| MTIxNzU3WhgPMjExODA4MjQxMjE3NTdaMC0xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkdCMQ8wDQYDVQQH | |
| DAZMb25kb24xDTALBgNVBAoMBFRlc3QwggIiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4ICDwAw | |
| ggIKAoICAQDCMhBrRAGGw+n2GdctBr/cEK4FZA6ajiHjihgpCHoSBdyL4R2jGKLS | |
| g0WgaMXa1HpkKN7LcIySosEBPlmcRkr1RqbEvQStOSvoFCXYvtx3alM6HTbXMcDR | |
| mqoKoABP6LXsPSoMWIgqMtP2X9EOppzHVIK1yFYFfbIlvYUV2Ka+MuMe0Vh5wvD1 | |
| 4GanPb+cWSKgdRSVQovCCMY3yWtZKVEaxRpCsk/mYYIFWz0tcgMjIKwDx1XXgiAV | |
| nU6NK43xbaw3XhtnaD/pv9lhTTbNrlcln9LjTD097BaK4R+1AEPHnpfxA9Ui3upn | |
| kbsNUdGdOB0ksZi/vd7lh833YgquQUIAhYrbfvq/HFCpVV1gljzlS3sqULYpLE// | |
| i3OsuL2mE+CYIJGpIi2GeJJWXciNMTJDOqTn+fRDtVb4RPp4Y70DJirp7XzaBi3q | |
| H0edANCzPSRCDbZsOhzIXhXshldiXVRX666DDlbMQgLTEnNKrkwv6DmU8o15XQsb | |
| 8k1Os2YwXmkEOxUQ7AJZXVTZSf6UK9Znmdq1ZrHjybMfRUkHVxJcnKvrxfryralv | |
| gzfvu+D6HuxrCo3Ojqa+nDgIbxKEBtdrcsMhq1jWPFhjwo1fSadAkKOfdCAuXJRD | |
| THg3b4Sf+W7Cpc570YHrIpBf7WFl2XsPcEM0mJZ5+yATASCubNozQwIDAQABo1Mw | |
| UTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUES0hupZSqY21JOba10QyZuxm91EwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUES0h | |
| upZSqY21JOba10QyZuxm91EwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsF | |
| AAOCAgEABTN5S30ng/RMpBweDm2N561PdpaCdiRXtAFCRVWR2mkDYC/Xj9Vqe6be | |
| PyM7L/5OKYVjzF1yJu67z/dx+ja5o+41g17jdqla7hyPx+9B4uRyDh+1KJTa+duj | |
| mw/aA1LCr6O6W4WizDOsChJ6FaB2Y1+GlFnKWb5nUdhVJqXQE1WOX9dZnw8Y4Npd | |
| VmAsjWot0BZorJrt3fwfcv3QfA896twkbo7Llv/8qzg4sXZXZ4ZtgAOqnPngiSn+ | |
| JT/vYCXZ406VvAFpFqMcVz2dO/VGuL8lGIMHRKNyafrsV81EzH1W/XmRWOgvgj6r | |
| yQI63ln/AMY72HQ97xLkE1xKunGz6bK5Ug5+O43Uftc4Mb6MUgzo+ZqEQ3Ob+cAV | |
| cvjmtwDaPO/O39O5Xq0tLTlkn2/cKf4OQ6S++GDxzyRVHh5JXgP4j9+jfZY57Woy | |
| R1bE7N50JjY4cDermBJKdlBIjL7UPhqmLyaG7V0hBitFlgGBUCcJtJOV0xYd5aF3 | |
| pxNkvMXhBmh95fjxJ0cJjpO7tN1RAwtMMNgsl7OUbuVRQCHOPW5DgP5qY21jDeRn | |
| BY82382l+9QzykmJLI5MZnmj4BA9uIDCwMtoTTvP++SsvhUAbuvh7MOOUQL0EY4m | |
| KStYq7X9PKseN+PvmfeoffIKc5R/Ha39oi7cGMVHCr8aiEhsf94= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kCommonNameWithSANs is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with | |
| // *.host1.test as the common name and a SAN list of *.host2.test and | |
| // foo.host3.test. | |
| static const char kCommonNameWithSANs[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIB2zCCAUSgAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowNzEeMBwGA1UEChMVQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgd2l0aCBTQU5z | |
| MRUwEwYDVQQDDAwqLmhvc3QxLnRlc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNC | |
| AASgWzfnFnpQrokSLIC+LhCKJDUAY/2usfIDpOnafYoYCasbYetkmOslgyY4Nn07 | |
| zjvjNROprA/0bdULXAkdL9bNo0gwRjAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQn | |
| jFkBMCcGA1UdEQQgMB6CDCouaG9zdDIudGVzdIIOZm9vLmhvc3QzLnRlc3QwDQYJ | |
| KoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAtv2e3hBhsslXB1HTxgusjoschWOVtvGZUaYlhkKzKTCL | |
| 4YpDn50BccnucBU/b9phYvaEZtyzOv4ZXhxTGyLnLrIVB9x5ikfCcfl+LNYNjDwM | |
| enm/h1zOfJ7wXLyscD4kU29Wc/zxBd70thIgLYn16CC1S9NtXKsXXDXv5VVH/bg= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kCommonNameWithSANs is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with | |
| // *.host1.test as the common name and no SAN list. | |
| static const char kCommonNameWithoutSANs[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBtTCCAR6gAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowOjEhMB8GA1UEChMYQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgd2l0aG91dCBT | |
| QU5zMRUwEwYDVQQDDAwqLmhvc3QxLnRlc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMB | |
| BwNCAARt2vjlIrPE+kr11VS1rRP/AYQu4fvf1bNw/K9rwYlVBhmLMPYasEmpCtKE | |
| 0bDIFydtDYC3wZDpSS+YiaG40sdAox8wHTAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+ | |
| VAQnjFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAHRbIeaCEytOpJpw9O2dlB656AHe1+t5 | |
| 4JiS5mvtzoVOLn7fFk5EFQtZS7sG1Uc2XjlSw+iyvFoTFEqfKyU/mIdc2vBuPwA2 | |
| +YXT8aE4S+UZ9oz5j0gDpikGnkSCW0cyHD8L8fntNjaQRSaM482JpmtdmuxClmWO | |
| pFFXI2B5usgI | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kCommonNameWithEmailSAN is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with | |
| // *.host1.test as the common name and the email address test@host2.test in the | |
| // SAN list. | |
| static const char kCommonNameWithEmailSAN[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBvDCCASWgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFzEVMBMGA1UEAwwMKi5ob3N0MS50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZI | |
| zj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEtevOxcTjpPzlNGoUMFfZyr1k03/Hiuh+EsnuScDs | |
| 8XLKi6fDkvSaDClI99ycabQZRPIrvyT+dglDC6ugQd+CYqNJMEcwDAYDVR0TAQH/ | |
| BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMBoGA1UdEQQTMBGBD3Rl | |
| c3RAaG9zdDIudGVzdDANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQCGbqb78OWJWl4zb+qw0Dz2 | |
| HJgZZJt6/+nNG/XJKdaYeS4eofsbwsJI4fuuOF6ZvYCJxVNtGqdfZDgycvFA9hjv | |
| NGosBF1/spP17cmzTahLjxs71jDvHV/EQJbKGl/Zpta1Em1VrzSrwoOFabPXzZTJ | |
| aet/mER21Z/9ZsTUoJQPJw== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kCommonNameWithIPSAN is a leaf certificate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with | |
| // *.host1.test as the common name and the IP address 127.0.0.1 in the | |
| // SAN list. | |
| static const char kCommonNameWithIPSAN[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBsTCCARqgAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFzEVMBMGA1UEAwwMKi5ob3N0MS50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZI | |
| zj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEFKrgkxm8PysXbwnHQeTD3p8YY0+sY4ssnZgmj8wX | |
| KTyn893fdBHWlz71GO6t82wMTF5d+ZYwI2XU52pfl4SB2aM+MDwwDAYDVR0TAQH/ | |
| BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMA8GA1UdEQQIMAaHBH8A | |
| AAEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAQWZ8Oj059ZjS109V/ijMYT28xuAN5n6HHxCO | |
| DopTP56Zu9+gme5wTETWEfocspZvgecoUOcedTFoKSQ7JafO09NcVLA+D6ddYpju | |
| mgfuiLy9dDhqvX/NHaLBMxOBWWbOLwWE+ibyX+pOzjWRCw1L7eUXOr6PhZAOQsmU | |
| D0+O6KI= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kConstrainedIntermediate is an intermediate signed by kSANTypesRoot, with | |
| // permitted DNS names of permitted1.test and foo.permitted2.test and an | |
| // excluded DNS name of excluded.permitted1.test. Its private key is: | |
| // | |
| // -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| // MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgTXUM4tJWM7OzATty | |
| // JhNOfIv/d8heWFBeKOfMR+RfaROhRANCAASbbbWYiN6mn+BCpg4XNpibOH0D/DN4 | |
| // kZ5C/Ml2YVomC9T83OKk2CzB8fPAabPb4P4Vv+fIabpEfjWS5nzKLY1y | |
| // -----END PRIVATE KEY----- | |
| static const char kConstrainedIntermediate[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICDjCCAXegAwIBAgIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowKDEmMCQGA1UEAxMdTmFtZSBDb25zdHJhaW50cyBJbnRl | |
| cm1lZGlhdGUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASbbbWYiN6mn+BCpg4X | |
| NpibOH0D/DN4kZ5C/Ml2YVomC9T83OKk2CzB8fPAabPb4P4Vv+fIabpEfjWS5nzK | |
| LY1yo4GJMIGGMA8GA1UdEwEB/wQFMAMBAf8wGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gc | |
| flQEJ4xZATBWBgNVHR4BAf8ETDBKoCowEYIPcGVybWl0dGVkMS50ZXN0MBWCE2Zv | |
| by5wZXJtaXR0ZWQyLnRlc3ShHDAaghhleGNsdWRlZC5wZXJtaXR0ZWQxLnRlc3Qw | |
| DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAFq1Ka05hiKREwRpSceQPzIIH4B5a5IVBg5/EvmQI | |
| 9V0fXyAE1GmahPt70sIBxIgzNTEaY8P/IoOuCdlZWe0msmyEO3S6YSAzOWR5Van6 | |
| cXmFM1uMd95TlkxUMRdV+jKJTvG6R/BM2zltaV7Xt662k5HtzT5Svw0rZlFaggZz | |
| UyM= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kCommonNamePermittedLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by | |
| // kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is permitted by the name | |
| // constraints. | |
| static const char kCommonNamePermittedLeaf[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBaDCCAQ2gAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv | |
| bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw | |
| MTAwMDAwMFowPjEeMBwGA1UEChMVQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgcGVybWl0dGVkMRwwGgYD | |
| VQQDExNmb28ucGVybWl0dGVkMS50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcD | |
| QgAENX5Ycs8q8MRzPYUz6DqLHhJR3wcmniFRgkiEa7MxE/mRe00y0VGwH7xi7Aoc | |
| emXPrtD4JwN5bssbcxWGAKYYzaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjOPQQD | |
| AgNJADBGAiEAtsnWuRQXtw2xbieC78Y8SVEtTjcZUx8uZyQe1GPLfGICIQDR4fNY | |
| yg3PC94ydPNQZVsFxAne32CbonWWsokalTFpUQ== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kCommonNamePermitted[] = "foo.permitted1.test"; | |
| // kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by | |
| // kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not permitted by the name | |
| // constraints. | |
| static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBazCCARCgAwIBAgIBBDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv | |
| bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw | |
| MTAwMDAwMFowQTEiMCAGA1UEChMZQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgbm90IHBlcm1pdHRlZDEb | |
| MBkGA1UEAxMSbm90LXBlcm1pdHRlZC50ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0D | |
| AQcDQgAEzfghKuWf0JoXb0Drp09C3yXMSQQ1byt+AUaymvsHOWsxQ9v1Q+vkF/IM | |
| HRqGTk2TyxrB2iClVEn/Uu+YtYox1KMQMA4wDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAKBggqhkjO | |
| PQQDAgNJADBGAiEAxaUslxmoWL1tIvnDz7gDkto/HcmdU0jHVuUQLXcCG8wCIQCN | |
| 5xZjitlCQU8UB5qSu9wH4B+0JcVO3Ss4Az76HEJWMw== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kCommonNameNotPermitted[] = "not-permitted.test"; | |
| // kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by | |
| // kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not permitted by the name | |
| // constraints but it has a SAN list. | |
| static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBqTCCAU+gAwIBAgIBBjAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv | |
| bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw | |
| MTAwMDAwMFowSzEsMCoGA1UEChMjQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgbm90IHBlcm1pdHRlZCB3 | |
| aXRoIFNBTlMxGzAZBgNVBAMTEm5vdC1wZXJtaXR0ZWQudGVzdDBZMBMGByqGSM49 | |
| AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABKsn9wOApXFHrqhLdQgbFSeaSoAIbxgO0zVSRZUb5naR | |
| 93zoL3MFOvZEF8xiEqh7le+l3XuUig0fwqpcsZzRNJajRTBDMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQC | |
| MAAwMwYDVR0RBCwwKoITZm9vLnBlcm1pdHRlZDEudGVzdIITZm9vLnBlcm1pdHRl | |
| ZDIudGVzdDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiACk+1f184KkKAXuntmrz+Ygcq8MiZl | |
| 4delx44FtcNaegIhAIA5nYfzxNcTXxDo3U+x1vSLH6Y7faLvHiFySp7O//q+ | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANs[] = "not-permitted.test"; | |
| // kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf is a leaf certificate signed by | |
| // kConstrainedIntermediate. Its common name is not a DNS name. | |
| static const char kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBYTCCAQagAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAoMSYwJAYDVQQDEx1OYW1lIENv | |
| bnN0cmFpbnRzIEludGVybWVkaWF0ZTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMDk5MDEw | |
| MTAwMDAwMFowNzEcMBoGA1UEChMTQ29tbW9uIG5hbWUgbm90IEROUzEXMBUGA1UE | |
| AxMOTm90IGEgRE5TIG5hbWUwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAASnueyc | |
| Zxtnw5ke2J2T0/LwAK37auQP/RSFd9mem+BJVbgviawtAlignJmafp7Zw4/GdYEJ | |
| Vm8qlriOJtluvXGcoxAwDjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0kAMEYC | |
| IQChUAmVNI39VHe0zemRE09VDcSEgOxr1nTvjLcg/Q8pVQIhAJYZnJI0YZAi05QH | |
| RHNlAkTK2TnUaVn3fGSylaLiFS1r | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kCommonNameNotDNS[] = "Not a DNS name"; | |
| // The following six certificates are issued by |kSANTypesRoot| and have | |
| // different extended key usage values. They were created with the following | |
| // Go program: | |
| // | |
| // func main() { | |
| // block, _ := pem.Decode([]byte(rootKeyPEM)) | |
| // rootPriv, _ := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes) | |
| // block, _ = pem.Decode([]byte(rootCertPEM)) | |
| // root, _ := x509.ParseCertificate(block.Bytes) | |
| // | |
| // leafTemplate := &x509.Certificate{ | |
| // SerialNumber: big.NewInt(3), | |
| // Subject: pkix.Name{ | |
| // CommonName: "EKU msSGC", | |
| // }, | |
| // NotBefore: time.Date(2000, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), | |
| // NotAfter: time.Date(2099, time.January, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC), | |
| // BasicConstraintsValid: true, | |
| // ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{FILL IN HERE}, | |
| // } | |
| // leafKey, _ := ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader) | |
| // leafDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, leafTemplate, root, &leafKey.PublicKey, rootPriv) | |
| // if err != nil { | |
| // panic(err) | |
| // } | |
| // pem.Encode(os.Stdout, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: leafDER}) | |
| // } | |
| static const char kMicrosoftSGCCert[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBtDCCAR2gAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C | |
| AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEEn61v3Vs+q6bTyyRnrJvuKBE8PTNVLbXGB52jig4Qse2 | |
| mGygNEysS0uzZ0luz+rn2hDRUFL6sHLUs1d8UMbI/6NEMEIwFQYDVR0lBA4wDAYK | |
| KwYBBAGCNwoDAzAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA31wH7QC+4HH5U | |
| BCeMWQEwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAgDQI9RSo3E3ZVnU71TV/LjG9xwHtfk6I | |
| rlNnlJJ0lsTHAuMc1mwCbzhtsmasetwYlIa9G8GFWB9Gh/QqHA7G649iGGmXShqe | |
| aVDuWgeSEJxBPE2jILoMm4pEYF7jfonTn7XXX6O78yuSlP+NPIU0gUKHkWZ1sWk0 | |
| cC4l0r/6jik= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kNetscapeSGCCert[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBszCCARygAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C | |
| AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE3NbT+TnBfq1DWJCezjaUL52YhDU7cOkI2S2PoWgJ1v7x | |
| kKLwBonUFZjppZs69SyBHeJdti+KoJ3qTW+hCG08EaNDMEEwFAYDVR0lBA0wCwYJ | |
| YIZIAYb4QgQBMAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwGwYDVR0jBBQwEoAQQDfXAftAL7gcflQE | |
| J4xZATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQBuiyVcfazekHkCWksxdFmjPmMtWCxFjkzc | |
| 8VBxFE0CfSHQAfZ8J7tXd1FbAq/eXdZvvo8v0JB4sOM4Ex1ob1fuvDFHdSAHAD7W | |
| dhKIjJyzVojoxjCjyue0XMeEPl7RiqbdxoS/R5HFAqAF0T2OeQAqP9gTpOXoau1M | |
| RQHX6HQJJg== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kServerEKUCert[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBsjCCARugAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C | |
| AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEDd35i+VWPwIOKLrLWTuP5cqD+yJDB5nujEzPgkXP5LKJ | |
| SZRbHTqTdpYZB2jy6y90RY2Bsjx7FfZ7nN5G2g1GOKNCMEAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYI | |
| KwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQn | |
| jFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAIKmbMBjuivL/rxDu7u7Vr3o3cdmEggBJxwL | |
| iatNW3x1wg0645aNYOktW/iQ7mAAiziTY73GFyfiJDWqnY+CwA94ZWyQidjHdN/I | |
| 6BR52sN/dkYEoInYEbmDNMc/if+T0yqeBQLP4BeKLiT8p0qqaimae6LgibS19hDP | |
| 2hoEMdz2 | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kServerEKUPlusMicrosoftSGCCert[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBvjCCASegAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C | |
| AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEDO1MYPxq+U4oXMIK8UnsS4C696wpcu4UOmcMJJ5CUd5Z | |
| ZpJShN6kYKnrb3GK/6xEgbUGntmrzSRG5FYqk6QgD6NOMEwwHwYDVR0lBBgwFgYI | |
| KwYBBQUHAwEGCisGAQQBgjcKAwMwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBA | |
| N9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GBAHOu2IBa4lHzVGS36HxS | |
| SejUE87Ji1ysM6BgkYbfxfS9MuV+J3UnqH57JjbH/3CFl4ZDWceF6SGBSCn8LqKa | |
| KHpwoNFU3zA99iQzVJgbUyN0PbKwHEanLyKDJZyFk71R39ToxhSNQgaQYjZYCy1H | |
| 5V9oXd1bodEqVsOZ/mur24Ku | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kAnyEKU[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBrjCCARegAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C | |
| AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE9nsLABDporlTvx1OBUc4Hd5vxfX+8nS/OhbHmKtFLYNu | |
| 1CLLrImbwMQYD2G+PgLO6sQHmASq2jmJKp6ZWsRkTqM+MDwwDwYDVR0lBAgwBgYE | |
| VR0lADAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMBsGA1UdIwQUMBKAEEA31wH7QC+4HH5UBCeMWQEw | |
| DQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQADgYEAxgjgn1SAzQ+2GeCicZ5ndvVhKIeFelGCQ989XTVq | |
| uUbAYBW6v8GXNuVzoXYxDgNSanF6U+w+INrJ6daKVrIxAxdk9QFgBXqJoupuRAA3 | |
| /OqnmYux0EqOTLbTK1P8DhaiaD0KV6dWGUwzqsgBmPkZ0lgNaPjvb1mKV3jhBkjz | |
| L6A= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kNoEKU[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBnTCCAQagAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADArMRcwFQYDVQQKEw5Cb3Jp | |
| bmdTU0wgVGVzdDEQMA4GA1UEAxMHUm9vdCBDQTAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8y | |
| MDk5MDEwMTAwMDAwMFowFDESMBAGA1UEAxMJRUtVIG1zU0dDMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0C | |
| AQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEpSFSqbYY86ZcMamE606dqdyjWlwhSHKOLUFsUUIzkMPz | |
| KHRu/x3Yzi8+Hm8eFK/TnCbkpYsYw4hIw00176dYzaMtMCswDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIw | |
| ADAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBBAN9cB+0AvuBx+VAQnjFkBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4GB | |
| AHvYzynIkjLThExHRS+385hfv4vgrQSMmCM1SAnEIjSBGsU7RPgiGAstN06XivuF | |
| T1fNugRmTu4OtOIbfdYkcjavJufw9hR9zWTt77CNMTy9XmOZLgdS5boFTtLCztr3 | |
| TXHOSQQD8Dl4BK0wOet+TP6LBEjHlRFjAqK4bu9xpxV2 | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // CertFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated PEM block and returns an | |
| // |X509*|. | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<X509> CertFromPEM(const char *pem) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem))); | |
| return bssl::UniquePtr<X509>( | |
| PEM_read_bio_X509(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); | |
| } | |
| // CRLFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated PEM block and returns an | |
| // |X509_CRL*|. | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> CRLFromPEM(const char *pem) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem))); | |
| return bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL>( | |
| PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); | |
| } | |
| // CSRFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated PEM block and returns an | |
| // |X509_REQ*|. | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<X509_REQ> CSRFromPEM(const char *pem) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem))); | |
| return bssl::UniquePtr<X509_REQ>( | |
| PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); | |
| } | |
| // PrivateKeyFromPEM parses the given, NUL-terminated PEM block and returns an | |
| // |EVP_PKEY*|. | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> PrivateKeyFromPEM(const char *pem) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio( | |
| BIO_new_mem_buf(const_cast<char *>(pem), strlen(pem))); | |
| return bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY>( | |
| PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); | |
| } | |
| // CertsToStack converts a vector of |X509*| to an OpenSSL STACK_OF(X509), | |
| // bumping the reference counts for each certificate in question. | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> CertsToStack( | |
| const std::vector<X509 *> &certs) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> stack(sk_X509_new_null()); | |
| if (!stack) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| for (auto cert : certs) { | |
| if (!bssl::PushToStack(stack.get(), bssl::UpRef(cert))) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return stack; | |
| } | |
| // CRLsToStack converts a vector of |X509_CRL*| to an OpenSSL | |
| // STACK_OF(X509_CRL), bumping the reference counts for each CRL in question. | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> CRLsToStack( | |
| const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> stack(sk_X509_CRL_new_null()); | |
| if (!stack) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| for (auto crl : crls) { | |
| if (!bssl::PushToStack(stack.get(), bssl::UpRef(crl))) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return stack; | |
| } | |
| static const int64_t kReferenceTime = 1474934400 /* Sep 27th, 2016 */; | |
| static int Verify( | |
| X509 *leaf, const std::vector<X509 *> &roots, | |
| const std::vector<X509 *> &intermediates, | |
| const std::vector<X509_CRL *> &crls, unsigned long flags = 0, | |
| std::function<void(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *)> configure_callback = nullptr) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> roots_stack(CertsToStack(roots)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509)> intermediates_stack( | |
| CertsToStack(intermediates)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_CRL)> crls_stack(CRLsToStack(crls)); | |
| if (!roots_stack || | |
| !intermediates_stack || | |
| !crls_stack) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
| } | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE_CTX> ctx(X509_STORE_CTX_new()); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE> store(X509_STORE_new()); | |
| if (!ctx || | |
| !store) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
| } | |
| if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx.get(), store.get(), leaf, | |
| intermediates_stack.get())) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
| } | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx.get(), roots_stack.get()); | |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(ctx.get(), crls_stack.get()); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx.get()); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time_posix(param, kReferenceTime); | |
| if (configure_callback) { | |
| configure_callback(param); | |
| } | |
| if (flags) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(param, flags); | |
| } | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| if (X509_verify_cert(ctx.get()) != 1) { | |
| return X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx.get()); | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestVerify) { | |
| // cross_signing_root | |
| // | | |
| // root_cross_signed root | |
| // \ / | |
| // intermediate | |
| // | | | |
| // leaf leaf_no_key_usage | |
| // | | |
| // forgery | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cross_signing_root(CertFromPEM(kCrossSigningRootPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_cross_signed(CertFromPEM(kRootCrossSignedPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM(kIntermediatePEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_self_signed( | |
| CertFromPEM(kIntermediateSelfSignedPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_no_key_usage(CertFromPEM(kLeafNoKeyUsagePEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> forgery(CertFromPEM(kForgeryPEM)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cross_signing_root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root_cross_signed); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_self_signed); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(forgery); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_no_key_usage); | |
| // Most of these tests work with or without |X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST|, | |
| // though in different ways. | |
| for (bool trusted_first : {true, false}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(trusted_first); | |
| std::function<void(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *)> configure_callback; | |
| if (!trusted_first) { | |
| // Note we need the callback to clear the flag. Setting |flags| to zero | |
| // only skips setting new flags. | |
| configure_callback = [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST); | |
| }; | |
| } | |
| // No trust anchors configured. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), /*roots=*/{}, /*intermediates=*/{}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback)); | |
| ASSERT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), /*roots=*/{}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, configure_callback)); | |
| // Each chain works individually. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback)); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback)); | |
| // When both roots are available, we pick one or the other. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {cross_signing_root.get(), root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, configure_callback)); | |
| // This is the “altchains” test – we remove the cross-signing CA but include | |
| // the cross-sign in the intermediates. With |trusted_first|, we | |
| // preferentially stop path-building at |intermediate|. Without | |
| // |trusted_first|, the "altchains" logic repairs it. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, configure_callback)); | |
| // If |X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS| is set and |trusted_first| is disabled, we | |
| // get stuck on |root_cross_signed|. If either feature is enabled, we can | |
| // build the path. | |
| // | |
| // This test exists to confirm our current behavior, but these modes are | |
| // just workarounds for not having an actual path-building verifier. If we | |
| // fix it, this test can be removed. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(trusted_first ? X509_V_OK | |
| : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS, configure_callback)); | |
| // |forgery| is signed by |leaf_no_key_usage|, but is rejected because the | |
| // leaf is not a CA. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, | |
| Verify(forgery.get(), {intermediate_self_signed.get()}, | |
| {leaf_no_key_usage.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, | |
| configure_callback)); | |
| // Test that one cannot skip Basic Constraints checking with a contorted set | |
| // of roots and intermediates. This is a regression test for CVE-2015-1793. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, | |
| Verify(forgery.get(), | |
| {intermediate_self_signed.get(), root_cross_signed.get()}, | |
| {leaf_no_key_usage.get(), intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, configure_callback)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) | |
| // Verifying the same |X509| objects on two threads should be safe. | |
| TEST(X509Test, VerifyThreads) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM(kIntermediatePEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| const size_t kNumThreads = 10; | |
| std::vector<std::thread> threads; | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumThreads; i++) { | |
| threads.emplace_back([&] { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{})); | |
| }); | |
| } | |
| for (auto &thread : threads) { | |
| thread.join(); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| #endif // OPENSSL_THREADS | |
| static const char kHostname[] = "example.com"; | |
| static const char kWrongHostname[] = "example2.com"; | |
| static const char kEmail[] = "test@example.com"; | |
| static const char kWrongEmail[] = "test2@example.com"; | |
| static const uint8_t kIP[4] = {127, 0, 0, 1}; | |
| static const uint8_t kWrongIP[4] = {127, 0, 0, 2}; | |
| static const char kIPString[] = "127.0.0.1"; | |
| static const char kWrongIPString[] = "127.0.0.2"; | |
| TEST(X509Test, ZeroLengthsWithX509PARAM) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesLeaf)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| std::vector<X509_CRL *> empty_crls; | |
| struct X509Test { | |
| const char *correct_value; | |
| size_t correct_value_len; | |
| const char *incorrect_value; | |
| size_t incorrect_value_len; | |
| int (*func)(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *, const char *, size_t); | |
| int mismatch_error; | |
| }; | |
| const std::vector<X509Test> kTests = { | |
| {kHostname, strlen(kHostname), kWrongHostname, strlen(kWrongHostname), | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH}, | |
| {kEmail, strlen(kEmail), kWrongEmail, strlen(kWrongEmail), | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH}, | |
| }; | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kTests.size(); i++) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(i); | |
| const X509Test &test = kTests[i]; | |
| // The correct value should work. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(test.func(param, test.correct_value, | |
| test.correct_value_len)); | |
| })); | |
| // The wrong value should trigger a verification error. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(test.mismatch_error, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(test.func(param, test.incorrect_value, | |
| test.incorrect_value_len)); | |
| })); | |
| // Passing zero as the length, unlike OpenSSL, should trigger an error and | |
| // should cause verification to fail. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, test.correct_value, 0)); | |
| })); | |
| // Passing an empty value should be an error when setting and should cause | |
| // verification to fail. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, nullptr, 0)); | |
| })); | |
| // Passing a value with embedded NULs should also be an error and should | |
| // also cause verification to fail. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [&test](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(test.func(param, "a", 2)); | |
| })); | |
| } | |
| // IP addresses work slightly differently: | |
| // The correct value should still work. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip( | |
| param, kIP, sizeof(kIP))); | |
| })); | |
| // Incorrect values should still fail. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, kWrongIP, | |
| sizeof(kWrongIP))); | |
| })); | |
| // Zero length values should trigger an error when setting and cause | |
| // verification to always fail. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, kIP, 0)); | |
| })); | |
| // ... and so should NULL values. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, empty_crls, 0, | |
| [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip(param, nullptr, 0)); | |
| })); | |
| // Zero bytes in an IP address are, of course, fine. This is tested above | |
| // because |kIP| contains zeros. | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, ZeroLengthsWithCheckFunctions) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesLeaf)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kHostname, strlen(kHostname), 0, nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kWrongHostname, | |
| strlen(kWrongHostname), 0, nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kEmail, strlen(kEmail), 0)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, | |
| X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kWrongEmail, strlen(kWrongEmail), 0)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kIP, sizeof(kIP), 0)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kWrongIP, sizeof(kWrongIP), 0)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_ip_asc(leaf.get(), kIPString, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip_asc(leaf.get(), kWrongIPString, 0)); | |
| // OpenSSL supports passing zero as the length for host and email. We do not | |
| // and it should always fail. | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kHostname, 0, 0, nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_host(leaf.get(), kWrongHostname, 0, 0, nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kEmail, 0, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_email(leaf.get(), kWrongEmail, 0, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kIP, 0, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(1, X509_check_ip(leaf.get(), kWrongIP, 0, 0)); | |
| // Unlike all the other functions, |X509_check_ip_asc| doesn't take a length, | |
| // so it cannot be zero. | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestCRL) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kCRLTestRoot)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kCRLTestLeaf)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> basic_crl(CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> revoked_crl(CRLFromPEM(kRevokedCRL)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> bad_issuer_crl(CRLFromPEM(kBadIssuerCRL)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> known_critical_crl(CRLFromPEM(kKnownCriticalCRL)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> unknown_critical_crl( | |
| CRLFromPEM(kUnknownCriticalCRL)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> unknown_critical_crl2( | |
| CRLFromPEM(kUnknownCriticalCRL2)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> algorithm_mismatch_crl( | |
| CRLFromPEM(kAlgorithmMismatchCRL)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> algorithm_mismatch_crl2( | |
| CRLFromPEM(kAlgorithmMismatchCRL2)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(basic_crl); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(revoked_crl); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bad_issuer_crl); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(known_critical_crl); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(unknown_critical_crl); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(unknown_critical_crl2); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(algorithm_mismatch_crl); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(algorithm_mismatch_crl2); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, | |
| {basic_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, | |
| {basic_crl.get(), revoked_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| std::vector<X509_CRL *> empty_crls; | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, empty_crls, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, | |
| {bad_issuer_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, | |
| {known_critical_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, | |
| {unknown_critical_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, | |
| {unknown_critical_crl2.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, | |
| {algorithm_mismatch_crl.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, | |
| {algorithm_mismatch_crl2.get()}, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)); | |
| // The CRL is valid for a month. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, {basic_crl.get()}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK, [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time_posix( | |
| param, kReferenceTime + 2 * 30 * 24 * 3600); | |
| })); | |
| // X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME suppresses the validity check. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {root.get()}, {basic_crl.get()}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME, | |
| [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time_posix( | |
| param, kReferenceTime + 2 * 30 * 24 * 3600); | |
| })); | |
| // Parsing kBadExtensionCRL should fail. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CRLFromPEM(kBadExtensionCRL)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, ManyNamesAndConstraints) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_constraints(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/many_constraints.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(many_constraints); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names1( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/many_names1.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(many_names1); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names2( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/many_names2.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(many_names2); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> many_names3( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/many_names3.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(many_names3); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names1( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/some_names1.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(some_names1); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names2( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/some_names2.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(some_names2); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> some_names3( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/some_names3.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(some_names3); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, | |
| Verify(many_names1.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, | |
| {many_constraints.get()}, {})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, | |
| Verify(many_names2.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, | |
| {many_constraints.get()}, {})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, | |
| Verify(many_names3.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, | |
| {many_constraints.get()}, {})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names1.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, | |
| {many_constraints.get()}, {})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names2.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, | |
| {many_constraints.get()}, {})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(some_names3.get(), {many_constraints.get()}, | |
| {many_constraints.get()}, {})); | |
| } | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> MakeGeneralName(int type, | |
| const std::string &value) { | |
| if (type != GEN_EMAIL && type != GEN_DNS && type != GEN_URI) { | |
| // This function only supports the IA5String types. | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_IA5STRING> str(ASN1_IA5STRING_new()); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> name(GENERAL_NAME_new()); | |
| if (!str || !name || | |
| !ASN1_STRING_set(str.get(), value.data(), value.size())) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| name->type = type; | |
| name->d.ia5 = str.release(); | |
| return name; | |
| } | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<X509> MakeTestCert(const char *issuer, | |
| const char *subject, EVP_PKEY *key, | |
| bool is_ca) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(X509_new()); | |
| if (!cert || // | |
| !X509_set_version(cert.get(), X509_VERSION_3) || | |
| !X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( | |
| X509_get_issuer_name(cert.get()), "CN", MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(issuer), -1, -1, 0) || | |
| !X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( | |
| X509_get_subject_name(cert.get()), "CN", MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(subject), -1, -1, 0) || | |
| !X509_set_pubkey(cert.get(), key) || | |
| !ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(cert.get()), kReferenceTime, -1, 0) || | |
| !ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(cert.get()), kReferenceTime, 1, 0)) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BASIC_CONSTRAINTS> bc(BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_new()); | |
| if (!bc) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| bc->ca = is_ca ? 0xff : 0x00; | |
| if (!X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert.get(), NID_basic_constraints, bc.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/1, /*flags=*/0)) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| return cert; | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, NameConstraints) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kP256Key); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(key); | |
| const struct { | |
| int type; | |
| std::string name; | |
| std::string constraint; | |
| int result; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| // Empty string matches everything. | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", "", X509_V_OK}, | |
| // Name constraints match the entire subtree. | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", "example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", "EXAMPLE.COM", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", "xample.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", "unrelated.much.longer.name.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| // A leading dot means at least one component must be added. | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", ".example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", "foo.example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", ".foo.example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", ".xample.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_DNS, "foo.example.com", ".unrelated.much.longer.name.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| // NUL bytes, if not rejected, should not confuse the matching logic. | |
| {GEN_DNS, std::string({'a', '\0', 'a'}), std::string({'a', '\0', 'b'}), | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| // Names must be emails. | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "not-an-email.example", "not-an-email.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX}, | |
| // A leading dot matches all local names and all subdomains | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@bar.example.com", ".example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@bar.example.com", ".EXAMPLE.COM", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@bar.example.com", ".bar.example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| // Without a leading dot, the host must match exactly. | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@example.com", "example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@example.com", "EXAMPLE.COM", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@bar.example.com", "example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| // If the constraint specifies a mailbox, it specifies the whole thing. | |
| // The halves are compared insensitively. | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@example.com", "foo@example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@example.com", "foo@EXAMPLE.COM", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@example.com", "FOO@example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@example.com", "bar@example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| // OpenSSL ignores a stray leading @. | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@example.com", "@example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@example.com", "@EXAMPLE.COM", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_EMAIL, "foo@bar.example.com", "@example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| // Basic syntax check. | |
| {GEN_URI, "not-a-url", "not-a-url", X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo:not-a-url", "not-a-url", | |
| X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo:/not-a-url", "not-a-url", | |
| X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo:///not-a-url", "not-a-url", | |
| X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://:not-a-url", "not-a-url", | |
| X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://", "not-a-url", X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX}, | |
| // Hosts are an exact match. | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com", "example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com:443", "example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com/whatever", "example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com", "example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com:443", "example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com/whatever", "example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com", "xample.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com:443", "xample.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com/whatever", "xample.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com", "some-other-name.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com:443", "some-other-name.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com/whatever", "some-other-name.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| // A leading dot allows components to be added. | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com", ".example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com:443", ".example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com/whatever", ".example.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com", ".example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com:443", ".example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://bar.example.com/whatever", ".example.com", X509_V_OK}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com", ".some-other-name.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com:443", ".some-other-name.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com/whatever", ".some-other-name.example", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com", ".xample.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com:443", ".xample.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| {GEN_URI, "foo://example.com/whatever", ".xample.com", | |
| X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION}, | |
| }; | |
| for (const auto &t : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.type); | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.name); | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.constraint); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> name = MakeGeneralName(t.type, t.name); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAMES> names(GENERAL_NAMES_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(names); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bssl::PushToStack(names.get(), std::move(name))); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<NAME_CONSTRAINTS> nc(NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(nc); | |
| nc->permittedSubtrees = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null(); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(nc->permittedSubtrees); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_SUBTREE> subtree(GENERAL_SUBTREE_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(subtree); | |
| GENERAL_NAME_free(subtree->base); | |
| subtree->base = MakeGeneralName(t.type, t.constraint).release(); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(subtree->base); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bssl::PushToStack(nc->permittedSubtrees, std::move(subtree))); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root", "Root", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_add1_ext_i2d(root.get(), NID_name_constraints, nc.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/1, /*flags=*/0)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(root.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root", "Leaf", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/false); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_add1_ext_i2d(leaf.get(), NID_subject_alt_name, names.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/0, /*flags=*/0)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(leaf.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| int ret = Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {}, {}, 0); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(t.result, ret) << X509_verify_cert_error_string(ret); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, PrintGeneralName) { | |
| // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/430): Add more tests. Also fix the | |
| // external projects that use this to extract the SAN list and unexport. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> gen = MakeGeneralName(GEN_DNS, "example.com"); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(gen); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)> values( | |
| i2v_GENERAL_NAME(nullptr, gen.get(), nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(values); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(1u, sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values.get())); | |
| const CONF_VALUE *value = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values.get(), 0); | |
| EXPECT_STREQ(value->name, "DNS"); | |
| EXPECT_STREQ(value->value, "example.com"); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestPSS) { | |
| static const char *kGoodCerts[] = { | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha384.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha512.pem", | |
| // We accept inputs with and without explicit NULLs. See RFC 4055, | |
| // section 2.1. | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_omit_nulls.pem", | |
| // Although invalid, we tolerate an explicit trailerField value. See the | |
| // certificates in cl/362617931. | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_explicit_trailer.pem", | |
| }; | |
| for (const char *path : kGoodCerts) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(path); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert = CertFromPEM(GetTestData(path).c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| } | |
| static const char *kBadCerts[] = { | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha1_explicit.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha1_mgf1_syntax_error.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha1.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha224.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_mgf1_sha384.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_mgf1_syntax_error.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_salt_overflow.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_salt31.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_unknown_mgf.pem", | |
| "crypto/x509/test/pss_sha256_wrong_trailer.pem", | |
| }; | |
| for (const char *path : kBadCerts) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(path); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert = CertFromPEM(GetTestData(path).c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestPSSBadParameters) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kBadPSSCertPEM)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kEd25519Cert)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestEd25519BadParameters) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kEd25519CertNull)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestX25519) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kX25519Cert)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_id(pkey.get()), EVP_PKEY_X25519); | |
| constexpr uint8_t kExpectedPublicValue[] = { | |
| 0x85, 0x20, 0xf0, 0x09, 0x89, 0x30, 0xa7, 0x54, 0x74, 0x8b, 0x7d, | |
| 0xdc, 0xb4, 0x3e, 0xf7, 0x5a, 0x0d, 0xbf, 0x3a, 0x0d, 0x26, 0x38, | |
| 0x1a, 0xf4, 0xeb, 0xa4, 0xa9, 0x8e, 0xaa, 0x9b, 0x4e, 0x6a, | |
| }; | |
| uint8_t public_value[sizeof(kExpectedPublicValue)]; | |
| size_t public_value_size = sizeof(public_value); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey.get(), public_value, | |
| &public_value_size)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kExpectedPublicValue), | |
| Bytes(public_value, public_value_size)); | |
| } | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ReencodeCertificate(X509 *cert) { | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int len = i2d_X509(cert, &der); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); | |
| if (len <= 0) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *inp = der; | |
| return bssl::UniquePtr<X509>(d2i_X509(nullptr, &inp, len)); | |
| } | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> ReencodeCRL(X509_CRL *crl) { | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int len = i2d_X509_CRL(crl, &der); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); | |
| if (len <= 0) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *inp = der; | |
| return bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL>(d2i_X509_CRL(nullptr, &inp, len)); | |
| } | |
| static bssl::UniquePtr<X509_REQ> ReencodeCSR(X509_REQ *req) { | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int len = i2d_X509_REQ(req, &der); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); | |
| if (len <= 0) { | |
| return nullptr; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *inp = der; | |
| return bssl::UniquePtr<X509_REQ>(d2i_X509_REQ(nullptr, &inp, len)); | |
| } | |
| static bool SignatureRoundTrips(EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { | |
| // Make a certificate like signed with |md_ctx|'s settings.' | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM)); | |
| if (!cert || !X509_sign_ctx(cert.get(), md_ctx)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // Ensure that |pkey| may still be used to verify the resulting signature. All | |
| // settings in |md_ctx| must have been serialized appropriately. | |
| if (!X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey)) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| // Re-encode the certificate. X509 objects contain a cached TBSCertificate | |
| // encoding and |X509_sign_ctx| should have dropped that cache. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> copy = ReencodeCertificate(cert.get()); | |
| return copy && X509_verify(copy.get(), pkey); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, RSASign) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| // Test PKCS#1 v1.5. | |
| bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| // RSA-PSS with salt length matching hash length should work when passing in | |
| // -1 or the value explicitly. | |
| md_ctx.Reset(); | |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL, | |
| pkey.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, -1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| md_ctx.Reset(); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL, | |
| pkey.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, 32)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| // RSA-PSS with SHA-1 is not supported. | |
| md_ctx.Reset(); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha1(), NULL, | |
| pkey.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, -1)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert = CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_sign_ctx(cert.get(), md_ctx.get())); | |
| // RSA-PSS with mismatched hashes is not supported. | |
| md_ctx.Reset(); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL, | |
| pkey.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, -1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(pkey_ctx, EVP_sha512())); | |
| cert = CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_sign_ctx(cert.get(), md_ctx.get())); | |
| // RSA-PSS with the wrong salt length is not supported. | |
| md_ctx.Reset(); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), &pkey_ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL, | |
| pkey.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, 33)); | |
| cert = CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_sign_ctx(cert.get(), md_ctx.get())); | |
| } | |
| // Test the APIs for signing a certificate, particularly whether they correctly | |
| // handle the TBSCertificate cache. | |
| TEST(X509Test, SignCertificate) { | |
| const int kSignatureNID = NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption; | |
| const EVP_MD *kSignatureHash = EVP_sha384(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_ALGOR> algor(X509_ALGOR_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(algor); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_ALGOR_set0(algor.get(), OBJ_nid2obj(kSignatureNID), | |
| V_ASN1_NULL, nullptr)); | |
| // Test both signing with |X509_sign| and constructing a signature manually. | |
| for (bool sign_manual : {true, false}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(sign_manual); | |
| // Test certificates made both from other certificates and |X509_new|, in | |
| // case there are bugs in filling in fields from different states. (Parsed | |
| // certificates contain a TBSCertificate cache, and |X509_new| initializes | |
| // fields based on complex ASN.1 template logic.) | |
| for (bool new_cert : {true, false}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(new_cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert; | |
| if (new_cert) { | |
| cert.reset(X509_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| // Fill in some fields for the certificate arbitrarily. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_set_version(cert.get(), X509_VERSION_3)); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE( | |
| ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(X509_get_serialNumber(cert.get()), 1)); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(cert.get()), 0)); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE( | |
| X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(cert.get()), 60 * 60 * 24)); | |
| X509_NAME *subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert.get()); | |
| X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(subject, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("Test"), | |
| -1, -1, 0); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_set_issuer_name(cert.get(), subject)); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_set_pubkey(cert.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| } else { | |
| // Extract fields from a parsed certificate. | |
| cert = CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| // We should test with a different algorithm from what is already in the | |
| // certificate. | |
| EXPECT_NE(kSignatureNID, X509_get_signature_nid(cert.get())); | |
| } | |
| if (sign_manual) { | |
| // Fill in the signature algorithm. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_set1_signature_algo(cert.get(), algor.get())); | |
| // Extract the TBSCertificiate. | |
| uint8_t *tbs_cert = nullptr; | |
| int tbs_cert_len = i2d_re_X509_tbs(cert.get(), &tbs_cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_tbs_cert(tbs_cert); | |
| ASSERT_GT(tbs_cert_len, 0); | |
| // Generate a signature externally and fill it in. | |
| bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, kSignatureHash, | |
| nullptr, pkey.get())); | |
| size_t sig_len; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, &sig_len, tbs_cert, | |
| tbs_cert_len)); | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> sig(sig_len); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx.get(), sig.data(), &sig_len, tbs_cert, | |
| tbs_cert_len)); | |
| sig.resize(sig_len); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| X509_set1_signature_value(cert.get(), sig.data(), sig.size())); | |
| } else { | |
| int ret = X509_sign(cert.get(), pkey.get(), EVP_sha384()); | |
| ASSERT_GT(ret, 0); | |
| // |X509_sign| returns the length of the signature on success. | |
| const ASN1_BIT_STRING *sig; | |
| X509_get0_signature(&sig, /*out_alg=*/nullptr, cert.get()); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ret, ASN1_STRING_length(sig)); | |
| } | |
| // Check the signature. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| // Re-encode the certificate. X509 objects contain a cached TBSCertificate | |
| // encoding and re-signing should have dropped that cache. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> copy = ReencodeCertificate(cert.get()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(copy); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(copy.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Test the APIs for signing a CRL, particularly whether they correctly handle | |
| // the TBSCertList cache. | |
| TEST(X509Test, SignCRL) { | |
| const int kSignatureNID = NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption; | |
| const EVP_MD *kSignatureHash = EVP_sha384(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_ALGOR> algor(X509_ALGOR_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(algor); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_ALGOR_set0(algor.get(), OBJ_nid2obj(kSignatureNID), | |
| V_ASN1_NULL, nullptr)); | |
| // Test both signing with |X509_CRL_sign| and constructing a signature | |
| // manually. | |
| for (bool sign_manual : {true, false}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(sign_manual); | |
| // Test CRLs made both from other CRLs and |X509_CRL_new|, in case there are | |
| // bugs in filling in fields from different states. (Parsed CRLs contain a | |
| // TBSCertList cache, and |X509_CRL_new| initializes fields based on complex | |
| // ASN.1 template logic.) | |
| for (bool new_crl : {true, false}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(new_crl); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> crl; | |
| if (new_crl) { | |
| crl.reset(X509_CRL_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(crl); | |
| // Fill in some fields for the certificate arbitrarily. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_CRL_set_version(crl.get(), X509_CRL_VERSION_2)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_TIME> last_update(ASN1_TIME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(last_update); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TIME_set_posix(last_update.get(), kReferenceTime)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl.get(), last_update.get())); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> issuer(X509_NAME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(issuer); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( | |
| issuer.get(), "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("Test"), -1, -1, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl.get(), issuer.get())); | |
| } else { | |
| // Extract fields from a parsed CRL. | |
| crl = CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(crl); | |
| // We should test with a different algorithm from what is already in the | |
| // CRL. | |
| EXPECT_NE(kSignatureNID, X509_CRL_get_signature_nid(crl.get())); | |
| } | |
| if (sign_manual) { | |
| // Fill in the signature algorithm. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_CRL_set1_signature_algo(crl.get(), algor.get())); | |
| // Extract the TBSCertList. | |
| uint8_t *tbs = nullptr; | |
| int tbs_len = i2d_re_X509_CRL_tbs(crl.get(), &tbs); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_tbs(tbs); | |
| ASSERT_GT(tbs_len, 0); | |
| // Generate a signature externally and fill it in. | |
| bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, kSignatureHash, | |
| nullptr, pkey.get())); | |
| size_t sig_len; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, &sig_len, tbs, tbs_len)); | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> sig(sig_len); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx.get(), sig.data(), &sig_len, tbs, tbs_len)); | |
| sig.resize(sig_len); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| X509_CRL_set1_signature_value(crl.get(), sig.data(), sig.size())); | |
| } else { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_CRL_sign(crl.get(), pkey.get(), EVP_sha384())); | |
| } | |
| // Check the signature. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_CRL_verify(crl.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| // Re-encode the CRL. X509_CRL objects contain a cached TBSCertList | |
| // encoding and re-signing should have dropped that cache. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> copy = ReencodeCRL(crl.get()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(copy); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_CRL_verify(copy.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static const char kTestCSR[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- | |
| MIICVDCCATwCAQAwDzENMAsGA1UEAwwEVGVzdDCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD | |
| ggEPADCCAQoCggEBAK+UkwcNJfRhg5MzIQzxDdrqF9a76jNoK/BwCflKYFX7QEqf | |
| rsLkI0J+m60fUD0v50LnKwbGoMFKZ1R/3cBNXLcdXb7ZP/ZJ7A7QwUrL+W9n3sov | |
| U8/HSU3rHbg+V5L6egSZYuhDHoXKi33HDOL4DVUzMoU1ykmP4QwF1wUXHLqvqjbU | |
| teQBoJWO53/XOGQu8bX04muCFnHZWT2Ubqol70JwPU2PqDU1EBlgUFO79NEmflev | |
| b++H8tu42UCDUZXD9k5weftjneO4cud3IsUX6mDsyf7k1e2mxsS4TSZsJcG0iLBX | |
| HSr1udXazQsjlAKjJkoI3cWshF6LGRWssAtbGiUCAwEAAaAAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB | |
| CwUAA4IBAQAniYZL+amXu+wED+AwBZz+zPuxY16bveF27/gxcs/jq6hVpEQvMxfO | |
| jfAGeDRtAU7DMxdJPjvWwwNe2JlTMSRoVDMYaiKqB5yxIYa2cjQvp7swSxuFJwbG | |
| T8h7/d7yqem6NYYzgYsNOE5QJyNu/PsIEdvzrysfDAnREiT2ituOcVpiqUZq3DTj | |
| NaTd1GNG3j4E87ZUmayUJD5nH91UNzKvJbpfo+bLyfy73x4QeU0SRitsZmbSBTAi | |
| s9+zmCErxzMlAdJHGzxPkXmtvBnUzGRIsAD5h/DjYNUmQJkB60yplt84ZgThhx54 | |
| rZGEJG3+X9OuhczVKGJyg+3gU7oDbecc | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- | |
| )"; | |
| // Test the APIs for signing a CSR, particularly whether they correctly handle | |
| // the CertificationRequestInfo cache. | |
| TEST(X509Test, SignCSR) { | |
| const int kSignatureNID = NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption; | |
| const EVP_MD *kSignatureHash = EVP_sha384(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_ALGOR> algor(X509_ALGOR_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(algor); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_ALGOR_set0(algor.get(), OBJ_nid2obj(kSignatureNID), | |
| V_ASN1_NULL, nullptr)); | |
| // Test both signing with |X509_REQ_sign| and constructing a signature | |
| // manually. | |
| for (bool sign_manual : {true, false}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(sign_manual); | |
| // Test CSRs made both from other CSRs and |X509_REQ_new|, in case there are | |
| // bugs in filling in fields from different states. (Parsed CSRs contain a | |
| // CertificationRequestInfo cache, and |X509_REQ_new| initializes fields | |
| // based on complex ASN.1 template logic.) | |
| for (bool new_csr : {true, false}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(new_csr); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_REQ> csr; | |
| if (new_csr) { | |
| csr.reset(X509_REQ_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(csr); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> subject(X509_NAME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(subject); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( | |
| subject.get(), "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("New CSR"), -1, -1, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_REQ_set_subject_name(csr.get(), subject.get())); | |
| } else { | |
| // Extract fields from a parsed CSR. | |
| csr = CSRFromPEM(kTestCSR); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(csr); | |
| } | |
| // Override the public key from the CSR unconditionally. Unlike | |
| // certificates and CRLs, CSRs do not contain a signed copy of the | |
| // signature algorithm, so we use a different field to confirm | |
| // |i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs| clears the cache as expected. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_REQ_set_pubkey(csr.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| if (sign_manual) { | |
| // Fill in the signature algorithm. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_REQ_set1_signature_algo(csr.get(), algor.get())); | |
| // Extract the CertificationRequestInfo. | |
| uint8_t *tbs = nullptr; | |
| int tbs_len = i2d_re_X509_REQ_tbs(csr.get(), &tbs); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_tbs(tbs); | |
| ASSERT_GT(tbs_len, 0); | |
| // Generate a signature externally and fill it in. | |
| bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, kSignatureHash, | |
| nullptr, pkey.get())); | |
| size_t sig_len; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, &sig_len, tbs, tbs_len)); | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> sig(sig_len); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| EVP_DigestSign(md_ctx.get(), sig.data(), &sig_len, tbs, tbs_len)); | |
| sig.resize(sig_len); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| X509_REQ_set1_signature_value(csr.get(), sig.data(), sig.size())); | |
| } else { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_REQ_sign(csr.get(), pkey.get(), EVP_sha384())); | |
| } | |
| // Check the signature. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_REQ_verify(csr.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| // Re-encode the CSR. X509_REQ objects contain a cached | |
| // CertificationRequestInfo encoding and re-signing should have dropped | |
| // that cache. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_REQ> copy = ReencodeCSR(csr.get()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(copy); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_REQ_verify(copy.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| // Check the signature was over the new public key. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> copy_pubkey(X509_REQ_get_pubkey(copy.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(copy_pubkey); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_PKEY_cmp(pkey.get(), copy_pubkey.get())); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, Ed25519Sign) { | |
| uint8_t pub_bytes[32], priv_bytes[64]; | |
| ED25519_keypair(pub_bytes, priv_bytes); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pub( | |
| EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, nullptr, pub_bytes, 32)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pub); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> priv( | |
| EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_ED25519, nullptr, priv_bytes, 32)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(priv); | |
| bssl::ScopedEVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| EVP_DigestSignInit(md_ctx.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, priv.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(SignatureRoundTrips(md_ctx.get(), pub.get())); | |
| } | |
| static bool PEMToDER(bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> *out, size_t *out_len, | |
| const char *pem) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, strlen(pem))); | |
| if (!bio) { | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| char *name, *header; | |
| uint8_t *data; | |
| long data_len; | |
| if (!PEM_read_bio(bio.get(), &name, &header, &data, &data_len)) { | |
| fprintf(stderr, "failed to read PEM data.\n"); | |
| return false; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(name); | |
| OPENSSL_free(header); | |
| out->reset(data); | |
| *out_len = data_len; | |
| return true; | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestFromBuffer) { | |
| size_t data_len; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(buf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| const uint8_t *enc_pointer = root->cert_info->enc.enc; | |
| const uint8_t *buf_pointer = CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf.get()); | |
| ASSERT_GE(enc_pointer, buf_pointer); | |
| ASSERT_LT(enc_pointer, buf_pointer + CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf.get())); | |
| buf.reset(); | |
| /* This ensures the X509 took a reference to |buf|, otherwise this will be a | |
| * reference to free memory and ASAN should notice. */ | |
| ASSERT_EQ(0x30, enc_pointer[0]); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferWithTrailingData) { | |
| size_t data_len; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); | |
| std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> trailing_data(new uint8_t[data_len + 1]); | |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(trailing_data.get(), data.get(), data_len); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf_trailing_data( | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(trailing_data.get(), data_len + 1, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(buf_trailing_data); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_trailing_data( | |
| X509_parse_from_buffer(buf_trailing_data.get())); | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(root_trailing_data); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferModified) { | |
| size_t data_len; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(buf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> fourty_two(ASN1_INTEGER_new()); | |
| ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(fourty_two.get(), 42); | |
| X509_set_serialNumber(root.get(), fourty_two.get()); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<long>(data_len), i2d_X509(root.get(), nullptr)); | |
| // Re-encode the TBSCertificate. | |
| i2d_re_X509_tbs(root.get(), nullptr); | |
| ASSERT_NE(static_cast<long>(data_len), i2d_X509(root.get(), nullptr)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestFromBufferReused) { | |
| size_t data_len; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data.get(), data_len, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(buf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| size_t data2_len; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data2; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data2, &data2_len, kLeafPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(buffers_alias(root->cert_info->enc.enc, root->cert_info->enc.len, | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf.get()), | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf.get()))); | |
| // Historically, this function tested the interaction betweeen | |
| // |X509_parse_from_buffer| and object reuse. We no longer support object | |
| // reuse, so |d2i_X509| will replace |raw| with a new object. However, we | |
| // retain this test to verify that releasing objects from |d2i_X509| works | |
| // correctly. | |
| X509 *raw = root.release(); | |
| const uint8_t *inp = data2.get(); | |
| X509 *ret = d2i_X509(&raw, &inp, data2_len); | |
| root.reset(raw); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(root.get(), ret); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, root->cert_info->enc.buf); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(buffers_alias(root->cert_info->enc.enc, root->cert_info->enc.len, | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(buf.get()), | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(buf.get()))); | |
| // Free |data2| and ensure that |root| took its own copy. Otherwise the | |
| // following will trigger a use-after-free. | |
| data2.reset(); | |
| uint8_t *i2d = nullptr; | |
| int i2d_len = i2d_X509(root.get(), &i2d); | |
| ASSERT_GE(i2d_len, 0); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> i2d_storage(i2d); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data2, &data2_len, kLeafPEM)); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<long>(data2_len), i2d_len); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(0, OPENSSL_memcmp(data2.get(), i2d, i2d_len)); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(nullptr, root->cert_info->enc.buf); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestFailedParseFromBuffer) { | |
| static const uint8_t kNonsense[] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf( | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(kNonsense, sizeof(kNonsense), nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(buf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(X509_parse_from_buffer(buf.get())); | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(cert); | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| // Test a buffer with trailing data. | |
| size_t data_len; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> data; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(PEMToDER(&data, &data_len, kRootCAPEM)); | |
| std::unique_ptr<uint8_t[]> data_with_trailing_byte(new uint8_t[data_len + 1]); | |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(data_with_trailing_byte.get(), data.get(), data_len); | |
| data_with_trailing_byte[data_len] = 0; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> buf_with_trailing_byte( | |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_new(data_with_trailing_byte.get(), data_len + 1, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(buf_with_trailing_byte); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root( | |
| X509_parse_from_buffer(buf_with_trailing_byte.get())); | |
| ASSERT_FALSE(root); | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, TestPrintUTCTIME) { | |
| static const struct { | |
| const char *val, *want; | |
| } asn1_utctime_tests[] = { | |
| {"", "Bad time value"}, | |
| // Correct RFC 5280 form. Test years < 2000 and > 2000. | |
| {"090303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2009 GMT"}, | |
| {"900303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 1990 GMT"}, | |
| {"000303125425Z", "Mar 3 12:54:25 2000 GMT"}, | |
| // Correct form, bad values. | |
| {"000000000000Z", "Bad time value"}, | |
| {"999999999999Z", "Bad time value"}, | |
| // Missing components. | |
| {"090303125425", "Bad time value"}, | |
| {"9003031254", "Bad time value"}, | |
| {"9003031254Z", "Bad time value"}, | |
| // GENERALIZEDTIME confused for UTCTIME. | |
| {"20090303125425Z", "Bad time value"}, | |
| // Legal ASN.1, but not legal RFC 5280. | |
| {"9003031254+0800", "Bad time value"}, | |
| {"9003031254-0800", "Bad time value"}, | |
| // Trailing garbage. | |
| {"9003031254Z ", "Bad time value"}, | |
| }; | |
| for (auto t : asn1_utctime_tests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.val); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_UTCTIME> tm(ASN1_UTCTIME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(tm); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| // Use this instead of ASN1_UTCTIME_set() because some callers get | |
| // type-confused and pass ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME to ASN1_UTCTIME_print(). | |
| // ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string() is stricter, and would reject the inputs in | |
| // question. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_STRING_set(tm.get(), t.val, strlen(t.val))); | |
| const int ok = ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio.get(), tm.get()); | |
| const uint8_t *contents; | |
| size_t len; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(bio.get(), &contents, &len)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ok, (strcmp(t.want, "Bad time value") != 0) ? 1 : 0); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(t.want, | |
| std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(contents), len)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, PrettyPrintIntegers) { | |
| static const char *kTests[] = { | |
| // Small numbers are pretty-printed in decimal. | |
| "0", | |
| "-1", | |
| "1", | |
| "42", | |
| "-42", | |
| "256", | |
| "-256", | |
| // Large numbers are pretty-printed in hex to avoid taking quadratic time. | |
| "0x0123456789", | |
| "-0x0123456789", | |
| }; | |
| for (const char *in : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(in); | |
| BIGNUM *bn = nullptr; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(BN_asc2bn(&bn, in)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIGNUM> free_bn(bn); | |
| { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> asn1(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(asn1); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<char> out(i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(nullptr, asn1.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(out.get()); | |
| EXPECT_STREQ(in, out.get()); | |
| } | |
| { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_ENUMERATED> asn1(BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(bn, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(asn1); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<char> out(i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(nullptr, asn1.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(out.get()); | |
| EXPECT_STREQ(in, out.get()); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, X509NameSet) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(X509_NAME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( | |
| name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("US"), | |
| -1, -1, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 1); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( | |
| name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("CA"), | |
| -1, -1, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 2); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( | |
| name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("UK"), | |
| -1, -1, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 3); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt( | |
| name.get(), "C", MBSTRING_ASC, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>("JP"), | |
| -1, 1, 0)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()), 4); | |
| // Check that the correct entries get incremented when inserting new entry. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 1)), 1); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 2)), 2); | |
| } | |
| // Tests that |X509_NAME_hash| and |X509_NAME_hash_old|'s values never change. | |
| // These functions figure into |X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir|'s on-disk format, so they | |
| // must remain stable. In particular, if we ever remove name canonicalization, | |
| // we'll need to preserve it for |X509_NAME_hash|. | |
| TEST(X509Test, NameHash) { | |
| struct { | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> name_der; | |
| unsigned long hash; | |
| unsigned long hash_old; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // UTF8String { "Test Name" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {{0x30, 0x14, 0x31, 0x12, 0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x0c, 0x09, 0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x4e, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x65}, | |
| 0xc90fba01, | |
| 0x8c0d4fea}, | |
| // This name canonicalizes to the same value, with OpenSSL's algorithm, as | |
| // the above input, so |hash| matches. |hash_old| doesn't use | |
| // canonicalization and does not match. | |
| // | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // BMPString { | |
| // u"\x09\n\x0b\x0c\x0d tEST\x09\n\x0b\x0c\x0d " | |
| // u"\x09\n\x0b\x0c\x0d nAME\x09\n\x0b\x0c\x0d " | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {{0x30, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x49, 0x30, 0x47, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x1e, 0x40, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x00, | |
| 0x0d, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x74, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, 0x53, 0x00, 0x54, | |
| 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, | |
| 0x20, 0x00, 0x09, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x0d, | |
| 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x00, 0x41, 0x00, 0x4d, 0x00, 0x45, 0x00, | |
| 0x09, 0x00, 0x0a, 0x00, 0x0b, 0x00, 0x0c, 0x00, 0x0d, 0x00, 0x20}, | |
| 0xc90fba01, | |
| 0xbe2dd8c8}, | |
| }; | |
| for (const auto &t : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(t.name_der)); | |
| const uint8_t *der = t.name_der.data(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name( | |
| d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &der, t.name_der.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(t.hash, X509_NAME_hash(name.get())); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(t.hash_old, X509_NAME_hash_old(name.get())); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, NoBasicConstraintsCertSign) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate( | |
| CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignIntermediate)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsCertSignLeaf)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| // The intermediate has keyUsage certSign, but is not marked as a CA in the | |
| // basicConstraints. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, NoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCA) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root(CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate( | |
| CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCAIntermediate)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kNoBasicConstraintsNetscapeCALeaf)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| // The intermediate has a Netscape certificate type of "SSL CA", but is not | |
| // marked as a CA in the basicConstraints. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, MismatchAlgorithms) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kSelfSignedMismatchAlgorithms)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey(X509_get_pubkey(cert.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(pkey); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), pkey.get())); | |
| uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, PEMX509Info) { | |
| std::string cert = kRootCAPEM; | |
| auto cert_obj = CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert_obj); | |
| std::string rsa = kRSAKey; | |
| auto rsa_obj = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(rsa_obj); | |
| std::string crl = kBasicCRL; | |
| auto crl_obj = CRLFromPEM(kBasicCRL); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(crl_obj); | |
| std::string unknown = | |
| "-----BEGIN UNKNOWN-----\n" | |
| "AAAA\n" | |
| "-----END UNKNOWN-----\n"; | |
| std::string invalid = | |
| "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" | |
| "AAAA\n" | |
| "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; | |
| // Each X509_INFO contains at most one certificate, CRL, etc. The format | |
| // creates a new X509_INFO when a repeated type is seen. | |
| std::string pem = | |
| // The first few entries have one of everything in different orders. | |
| cert + rsa + crl + | |
| rsa + crl + cert + | |
| // Unknown types are ignored. | |
| crl + unknown + cert + rsa + | |
| // Seeing a new certificate starts a new entry, so now we have a bunch of | |
| // certificate-only entries. | |
| cert + cert + cert + | |
| // The key folds into the certificate's entry. | |
| cert + rsa + | |
| // Doubled keys also start new entries. | |
| rsa + rsa + rsa + rsa + crl + | |
| // As do CRLs. | |
| crl + crl; | |
| const struct ExpectedInfo { | |
| const X509 *cert; | |
| const EVP_PKEY *key; | |
| const X509_CRL *crl; | |
| } kExpected[] = { | |
| {cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()}, | |
| {cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()}, | |
| {cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()}, | |
| {cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr}, | |
| {cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr}, | |
| {cert_obj.get(), nullptr, nullptr}, | |
| {cert_obj.get(), rsa_obj.get(), nullptr}, | |
| {nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr}, | |
| {nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr}, | |
| {nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), nullptr}, | |
| {nullptr, rsa_obj.get(), crl_obj.get()}, | |
| {nullptr, nullptr, crl_obj.get()}, | |
| {nullptr, nullptr, crl_obj.get()}, | |
| }; | |
| auto check_info = [](const ExpectedInfo *expected, const X509_INFO *info) { | |
| if (expected->cert != nullptr) { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_cmp(expected->cert, info->x509)); | |
| } else { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->x509); | |
| } | |
| if (expected->crl != nullptr) { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_CRL_cmp(expected->crl, info->crl)); | |
| } else { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->crl); | |
| } | |
| if (expected->key != nullptr) { | |
| ASSERT_NE(nullptr, info->x_pkey); | |
| // EVP_PKEY_cmp returns one if the keys are equal. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_PKEY_cmp(expected->key, info->x_pkey->dec_pkey)); | |
| } else { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, info->x_pkey); | |
| } | |
| }; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem.data(), pem.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_INFO)> infos( | |
| PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(infos); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get())); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected); i++) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(i); | |
| check_info(&kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i)); | |
| } | |
| // Passing an existing stack appends to it. | |
| bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(pem.data(), pem.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(infos.get(), | |
| PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), infos.get(), nullptr, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(2 * OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get())); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected); i++) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(i); | |
| check_info(&kExpected[i], sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i)); | |
| check_info( | |
| &kExpected[i], | |
| sk_X509_INFO_value(infos.get(), i + OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected))); | |
| } | |
| // Gracefully handle errors in both the append and fresh cases. | |
| std::string bad_pem = cert + cert + invalid; | |
| bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(bad_pem.data(), bad_pem.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<STACK_OF(X509_INFO)> infos2( | |
| PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), nullptr, nullptr, nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(infos2); | |
| bio.reset(BIO_new_mem_buf(bad_pem.data(), bad_pem.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE( | |
| PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio.get(), infos.get(), nullptr, nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(2 * OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kExpected), sk_X509_INFO_num(infos.get())); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOEmpty) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(nullptr, 0)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| // CPython expects |ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG| on EOF, to terminate a series of | |
| // certificates. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(x509); | |
| uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, ReadBIOOneByte) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf("\x30", 1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| // CPython expects |ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG| on EOF, to terminate a series of | |
| // certificates. This EOF appeared after some data, however, so we do not wish | |
| // to signal EOF. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(x509); | |
| uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, PartialBIOReturn) { | |
| // Create a filter BIO that only reads and writes one byte at a time. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO_METHOD> method(BIO_meth_new(0, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(method); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_meth_set_create(method.get(), [](BIO *b) -> int { | |
| BIO_set_init(b, 1); | |
| return 1; | |
| })); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| BIO_meth_set_read(method.get(), [](BIO *b, char *out, int len) -> int { | |
| return BIO_read(BIO_next(b), out, std::min(len, 1)); | |
| })); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_meth_set_write( | |
| method.get(), [](BIO *b, const char *in, int len) -> int { | |
| return BIO_write(BIO_next(b), in, std::min(len, 1)); | |
| })); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(method.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| BIO *mem_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(mem_bio); | |
| BIO_push(bio.get(), mem_bio); // BIO_push takes ownership. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int der_len = i2d_X509(cert.get(), &der); | |
| ASSERT_GT(der_len, 0); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); | |
| // Write the certificate into the BIO. Though we only write one byte at a | |
| // time, the write should succeed. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(1, i2d_X509_bio(bio.get(), cert.get())); | |
| const uint8_t *der2; | |
| size_t der2_len; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(mem_bio, &der2, &der2_len)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(der, static_cast<size_t>(der_len)), Bytes(der2, der2_len)); | |
| // Read the certificate back out of the BIO. Though we only read one byte at a | |
| // time, the read should succeed. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert2(d2i_X509_bio(bio.get(), nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert2); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_cmp(cert.get(), cert2.get())); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, CommonNameFallback) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_sans = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithSANs); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(with_sans); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> without_sans = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithoutSANs); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(without_sans); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_email = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithEmailSAN); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(with_email); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> with_ip = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameWithIPSAN); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(with_ip); | |
| auto verify_cert = [&](X509 *leaf, unsigned flags, const char *host) { | |
| return Verify(leaf, {root.get()}, {}, {}, 0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, host, strlen(host))); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, flags); | |
| }); | |
| }; | |
| // By default, the common name is ignored if the SAN list is present but | |
| // otherwise is checked. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host2.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host3.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(without_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_email.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_ip.get(), 0 /* no flags */, "foo.host1.test")); | |
| // X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT is ignored. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host2.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host3.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(without_sans.get(), | |
| X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_email.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_ip.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| // X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT implements the correct behavior: the | |
| // common name is never checked. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host2.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| verify_cert(with_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host3.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(without_sans.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_email.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(with_ip.get(), X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT, | |
| "foo.host1.test")); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, LooksLikeDNSName) { | |
| static const char *kValid[] = { | |
| "example.com", | |
| "eXample123-.com", | |
| "*.example.com", | |
| "exa_mple.com", | |
| "example.com.", | |
| "project-dev:us-central1:main", | |
| }; | |
| static const char *kInvalid[] = { | |
| "-eXample123-.com", | |
| "", | |
| ".", | |
| "*", | |
| "*.", | |
| "example..com", | |
| ".example.com", | |
| "example.com..", | |
| "*foo.example.com", | |
| "foo.*.example.com", | |
| "foo,bar", | |
| }; | |
| for (const char *str : kValid) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(str); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(x509v3_looks_like_dns_name( | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(str), strlen(str))); | |
| } | |
| for (const char *str : kInvalid) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(str); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(x509v3_looks_like_dns_name( | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(str), strlen(str))); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, CommonNameAndNameConstraints) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate = CertFromPEM(kConstrainedIntermediate); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> permitted = CertFromPEM(kCommonNamePermittedLeaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(permitted); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_permitted = | |
| CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotPermittedLeaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(not_permitted); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_permitted_with_sans = | |
| CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANsLeaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(not_permitted_with_sans); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> not_dns = CertFromPEM(kCommonNameNotDNSLeaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(not_dns); | |
| auto verify_cert = [&](X509 *leaf, unsigned flags, const char *host) { | |
| return Verify( | |
| leaf, {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, host, strlen(host))); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, flags); | |
| }); | |
| }; | |
| // Certificates which would otherwise trigger the common name fallback are | |
| // rejected whenever there are name constraints. We do this whether or not | |
| // the common name matches the constraints. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS, | |
| verify_cert(permitted.get(), 0 /* no flags */, kCommonNamePermitted)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS, | |
| verify_cert(not_permitted.get(), 0 /* no flags */, | |
| kCommonNameNotPermitted)); | |
| // This occurs even if the built-in name checks aren't used. The caller may | |
| // separately call |X509_check_host|. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NAME_CONSTRAINTS_WITHOUT_SANS, | |
| Verify(not_permitted.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, | |
| 0 /* no flags */, nullptr)); | |
| // If the leaf certificate has SANs, the common name fallback is always | |
| // disabled, so the name constraints do not apply. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(not_permitted_with_sans.get(), {root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get()}, {}, 0, nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(not_permitted_with_sans.get(), 0 /* no flags */, | |
| kCommonNameNotPermittedWithSANs)); | |
| // If the common name does not look like a DNS name, we apply neither name | |
| // constraints nor common name fallback. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(not_dns.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| {}, 0, nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| verify_cert(not_dns.get(), 0 /* no flags */, kCommonNameNotDNS)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, ServerGatedCryptoEKUs) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kSANTypesRoot); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ms_sgc = CertFromPEM(kMicrosoftSGCCert); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ms_sgc); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> ns_sgc = CertFromPEM(kNetscapeSGCCert); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ns_sgc); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> server_eku = CertFromPEM(kServerEKUCert); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(server_eku); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> server_eku_plus_ms_sgc = | |
| CertFromPEM(kServerEKUPlusMicrosoftSGCCert); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(server_eku_plus_ms_sgc); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> any_eku = CertFromPEM(kAnyEKU); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(any_eku); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> no_eku = CertFromPEM(kNoEKU); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(no_eku); | |
| auto verify_cert = [&root](X509 *leaf) { | |
| return Verify(leaf, {root.get()}, /*intermediates=*/{}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose( | |
| param, X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER)); | |
| }); | |
| }; | |
| // Neither the Microsoft nor Netscape SGC EKU should be sufficient for | |
| // |X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER|. The "any" EKU probably, technically, should be. | |
| // However, we've never accepted it and it's not acceptable in leaf | |
| // certificates by the Baseline, so perhaps we don't need this complexity. | |
| for (X509 *leaf : {ms_sgc.get(), ns_sgc.get(), any_eku.get()}) { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, verify_cert(leaf)); | |
| } | |
| // The server-auth EKU is sufficient, and it doesn't matter if an SGC EKU is | |
| // also included. Lastly, not specifying an EKU is also valid. | |
| for (X509 *leaf : {server_eku.get(), server_eku_plus_ms_sgc.get(), | |
| no_eku.get()}) { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, verify_cert(leaf)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Test that invalid extensions are rejected by, if not the parser, at least the | |
| // verifier. | |
| TEST(X509Test, InvalidExtensions) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root.pem").c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate = CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate.pem") | |
| .c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf = CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf.pem").c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| // Sanity-check that the baseline chain is accepted. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {})); | |
| static const char *kExtensions[] = { | |
| "authority_key_identifier", | |
| "basic_constraints", | |
| "ext_key_usage", | |
| "key_usage", | |
| "name_constraints", | |
| "subject_alt_name", | |
| "subject_key_identifier", | |
| }; | |
| for (const char *ext : kExtensions) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(ext); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> invalid_root = CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData((std::string("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_root_") + | |
| ext + ".pem") | |
| .c_str()) | |
| .c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(invalid_root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> invalid_intermediate = CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData( | |
| (std::string("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_intermediate_") + | |
| ext + ".pem") | |
| .c_str()) | |
| .c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(invalid_intermediate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> invalid_leaf = CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData((std::string("crypto/x509/test/invalid_extension_leaf_") + | |
| ext + ".pem") | |
| .c_str()) | |
| .c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(invalid_leaf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> trailing_leaf = CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData((std::string("crypto/x509/test/trailing_data_leaf_") + | |
| ext + ".pem") | |
| .c_str()) | |
| .c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(trailing_leaf); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(invalid_leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(trailing_leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {})); | |
| // If the invalid extension is on an intermediate or root, | |
| // |X509_verify_cert| notices by way of being unable to build a path to | |
| // a valid issuer. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {invalid_intermediate.get()}, {})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {invalid_root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {})); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // kExplicitDefaultVersionPEM is an X.509v1 certificate with the version number | |
| // encoded explicitly, rather than omitted as required by DER. | |
| static const char kExplicitDefaultVersionPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBfTCCASSgAwIBAAIJANlMBNpJfb/rMAkGByqGSM49BAEwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMC | |
| QVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdp | |
| dHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDA0MjMyMzIxNTdaFw0xNDA1MjMyMzIxNTdaMEUxCzAJ | |
| BgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5l | |
| dCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2ni | |
| v2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYa | |
| HPUdfvGULUvPciLBMAkGByqGSM49BAEDSAAwRQIhAPKgNV5ROjbDgnmb7idQhY5w | |
| BnSVV9IpdAD0vhWHXcQHAiB8HnkUaiGD8Hp0aHlfFJmaaLTxy54VXuYfMlJhXnXJ | |
| FA== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kNegativeVersionPEM is an X.509 certificate with a negative version number. | |
| static const char kNegativeVersionPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBfTCCASSgAwIB/wIJANlMBNpJfb/rMAkGByqGSM49BAEwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMC | |
| QVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdp | |
| dHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDA0MjMyMzIxNTdaFw0xNDA1MjMyMzIxNTdaMEUxCzAJ | |
| BgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5l | |
| dCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2ni | |
| v2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYa | |
| HPUdfvGULUvPciLBMAkGByqGSM49BAEDSAAwRQIhAPKgNV5ROjbDgnmb7idQhY5w | |
| BnSVV9IpdAD0vhWHXcQHAiB8HnkUaiGD8Hp0aHlfFJmaaLTxy54VXuYfMlJhXnXJ | |
| FA== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kFutureVersionPEM is an X.509 certificate with a version number value of | |
| // three, which is not defined. (v3 has value two). | |
| static const char kFutureVersionPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBfTCCASSgAwIBAwIJANlMBNpJfb/rMAkGByqGSM49BAEwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMC | |
| QVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdp | |
| dHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDA0MjMyMzIxNTdaFw0xNDA1MjMyMzIxNTdaMEUxCzAJ | |
| BgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5l | |
| dCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2ni | |
| v2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYa | |
| HPUdfvGULUvPciLBMAkGByqGSM49BAEDSAAwRQIhAPKgNV5ROjbDgnmb7idQhY5w | |
| BnSVV9IpdAD0vhWHXcQHAiB8HnkUaiGD8Hp0aHlfFJmaaLTxy54VXuYfMlJhXnXJ | |
| FA== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kOverflowVersionPEM is an X.509 certificate with a version field which | |
| // overflows |uint64_t|. | |
| static const char kOverflowVersionPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBoDCCAUegJgIkAP////////////////////////////////////////////// | |
| AgkA2UwE2kl9v+swCQYHKoZIzj0EATBFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwK | |
| U29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lkZ2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMB4X | |
| DTE0MDQyMzIzMjE1N1oXDTE0MDUyMzIzMjE1N1owRTELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzAR | |
| BgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5 | |
| IEx0ZDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8eDZSKTNWX | |
| a7epHg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQtS89yIsEw | |
| CQYHKoZIzj0EAQNIADBFAiEA8qA1XlE6NsOCeZvuJ1CFjnAGdJVX0il0APS+FYdd | |
| xAcCIHweeRRqIYPwenRoeV8UmZpotPHLnhVe5h8yUmFedckU | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kV1WithExtensionsPEM is an X.509v1 certificate with extensions. | |
| static const char kV1WithExtensionsPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIByjCCAXECCQDZTATaSX2/6zAJBgcqhkjOPQQBMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMRMw | |
| EQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0 | |
| eSBMdGQwHhcNMTQwNDIzMjMyMTU3WhcNMTQwNTIzMjMyMTU3WjBFMQswCQYDVQQG | |
| EwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lk | |
| Z2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+ | |
| Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7x | |
| lC1Lz3IiwaNQME4wHQYDVR0OBBYEFKuE0qyrlfCCThZ4B1VXX+QmjYLRMB8GA1Ud | |
| IwQYMBaAFKuE0qyrlfCCThZ4B1VXX+QmjYLRMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCQYHKoZI | |
| zj0EAQNIADBFAiEA8qA1XlE6NsOCeZvuJ1CFjnAGdJVX0il0APS+FYddxAcCIHwe | |
| eRRqIYPwenRoeV8UmZpotPHLnhVe5h8yUmFedckU | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kV2WithExtensionsPEM is an X.509v2 certificate with extensions. | |
| static const char kV2WithExtensionsPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBzzCCAXagAwIBAQIJANlMBNpJfb/rMAkGByqGSM49BAEwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMC | |
| QVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdp | |
| dHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDA0MjMyMzIxNTdaFw0xNDA1MjMyMzIxNTdaMEUxCzAJ | |
| BgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5l | |
| dCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2ni | |
| v2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYa | |
| HPUdfvGULUvPciLBo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUq4TSrKuV8IJOFngHVVdf5CaNgtEw | |
| HwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUq4TSrKuV8IJOFngHVVdf5CaNgtEwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAJ | |
| BgcqhkjOPQQBA0gAMEUCIQDyoDVeUTo2w4J5m+4nUIWOcAZ0lVfSKXQA9L4Vh13E | |
| BwIgfB55FGohg/B6dGh5XxSZmmi08cueFV7mHzJSYV51yRQ= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kV1WithIssuerUniqueIDPEM is an X.509v1 certificate with an issuerUniqueID. | |
| static const char kV1WithIssuerUniqueIDPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBgzCCASoCCQDZTATaSX2/6zAJBgcqhkjOPQQBMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMRMw | |
| EQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0 | |
| eSBMdGQwHhcNMTQwNDIzMjMyMTU3WhcNMTQwNTIzMjMyMTU3WjBFMQswCQYDVQQG | |
| EwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lk | |
| Z2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+ | |
| Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7x | |
| lC1Lz3IiwYEJAAEjRWeJq83vMAkGByqGSM49BAEDSAAwRQIhAPKgNV5ROjbDgnmb | |
| 7idQhY5wBnSVV9IpdAD0vhWHXcQHAiB8HnkUaiGD8Hp0aHlfFJmaaLTxy54VXuYf | |
| MlJhXnXJFA== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kV1WithSubjectUniqueIDPEM is an X.509v1 certificate with an issuerUniqueID. | |
| static const char kV1WithSubjectUniqueIDPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBgzCCASoCCQDZTATaSX2/6zAJBgcqhkjOPQQBMEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkFVMRMw | |
| EQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5ldCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0 | |
| eSBMdGQwHhcNMTQwNDIzMjMyMTU3WhcNMTQwNTIzMjMyMTU3WjBFMQswCQYDVQQG | |
| EwJBVTETMBEGA1UECAwKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEhMB8GA1UECgwYSW50ZXJuZXQgV2lk | |
| Z2l0cyBQdHkgTHRkMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+ | |
| Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7x | |
| lC1Lz3IiwYIJAAEjRWeJq83vMAkGByqGSM49BAEDSAAwRQIhAPKgNV5ROjbDgnmb | |
| 7idQhY5wBnSVV9IpdAD0vhWHXcQHAiB8HnkUaiGD8Hp0aHlfFJmaaLTxy54VXuYf | |
| MlJhXnXJFA== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kV1CRLWithExtensionsPEM is a v1 CRL with extensions. | |
| static const char kV1CRLWithExtensionsPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBpDCBjTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UECAwK | |
| Q2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJQm9y | |
| aW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNVHRQE | |
| AwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnrBKKgvd9x9zwK9rtUvVeFeJ7+LNZEAc | |
| +a5oxpPNEsJx6hXoApYEbzXMxuWBQoCs5iEBycSGudct21L+MVf27M38KrWoeOkq | |
| 0a2siqViQZO2Fb/SUFR0k9zb8xl86Zf65lgPplALun0bV/HT7MJcl04Tc4osdsAR | |
| eBs5nqTGNEd5AlC1iKHvQZkM//MD51DspKnDpsDiUVi54h9C1SpfZmX8H2Vvdiyu | |
| 0fZ/bPAM3VAGawatf/SyWfBMyKpoPXEG39oAzmjjOj8en82psn7m474IGaho/vBb | |
| hl1ms5qQiLYPjm4YELtnXQoFyC72tBjbdFd/ZE9k4CNKDbxFUXFbkw== | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kExplicitDefaultVersionCRLPEM is a v1 CRL with an explicitly-encoded version | |
| // field. | |
| static const char kExplicitDefaultVersionCRLPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBlzCBgAIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaMA0GCSqGSIb3 | |
| DQEBCwUAA4IBAQCesEoqC933H3PAr2u1S9V4V4nv4s1kQBz5rmjGk80SwnHqFegC | |
| lgRvNczG5YFCgKzmIQHJxIa51y3bUv4xV/bszfwqtah46SrRrayKpWJBk7YVv9JQ | |
| VHST3NvzGXzpl/rmWA+mUAu6fRtX8dPswlyXThNziix2wBF4GzmepMY0R3kCULWI | |
| oe9BmQz/8wPnUOykqcOmwOJRWLniH0LVKl9mZfwfZW92LK7R9n9s8AzdUAZrBq1/ | |
| 9LJZ8EzIqmg9cQbf2gDOaOM6Px6fzamyfubjvggZqGj+8FuGXWazmpCItg+ObhgQ | |
| u2ddCgXILva0GNt0V39kT2TgI0oNvEVRcVuT | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kV3CRLPEM is a v3 CRL. CRL versions only go up to v2. | |
| static const char kV3CRLPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN X509 CRL----- | |
| MIIBpzCBkAIBAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UE | |
| CAwKQ2FsaWZvcm5pYTEWMBQGA1UEBwwNTW91bnRhaW4gVmlldzESMBAGA1UECgwJ | |
| Qm9yaW5nU1NMFw0xNjA5MjYxNTEwNTVaFw0xNjEwMjYxNTEwNTVaoA4wDDAKBgNV | |
| HRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAnrBKKgvd9x9zwK9rtUvVeFeJ7+LN | |
| ZEAc+a5oxpPNEsJx6hXoApYEbzXMxuWBQoCs5iEBycSGudct21L+MVf27M38KrWo | |
| eOkq0a2siqViQZO2Fb/SUFR0k9zb8xl86Zf65lgPplALun0bV/HT7MJcl04Tc4os | |
| dsAReBs5nqTGNEd5AlC1iKHvQZkM//MD51DspKnDpsDiUVi54h9C1SpfZmX8H2Vv | |
| diyu0fZ/bPAM3VAGawatf/SyWfBMyKpoPXEG39oAzmjjOj8en82psn7m474IGaho | |
| /vBbhl1ms5qQiLYPjm4YELtnXQoFyC72tBjbdFd/ZE9k4CNKDbxFUXFbkw== | |
| -----END X509 CRL----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kV2CSRPEM is a v2 CSR. CSR versions only go up to v1. | |
| static const char kV2CSRPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- | |
| MIHJMHECAQEwDzENMAsGA1UEAwwEVGVzdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEH | |
| A0IABJjsayyAQod1J7UJYNT8AH4WWxLdKV0ozhrIz6hCzBAze7AqXWOSH8G+1EWC | |
| pSfL3oMQNtBdJS0kpXXaUqEAgTSgADAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiAUXVaEYATg | |
| 4Cc917T73KBImxh6xyhsA5pKuYpq1S4m9wIhAK+G93HR4ur7Ghel6+zUTvIAsj9e | |
| rsn4lSYsqI4OI4ei | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kV3CSRPEM is a v3 CSR. CSR versions only go up to v1. | |
| static const char kV3CSRPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- | |
| MIHJMHECAQIwDzENMAsGA1UEAwwEVGVzdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEH | |
| A0IABJjsayyAQod1J7UJYNT8AH4WWxLdKV0ozhrIz6hCzBAze7AqXWOSH8G+1EWC | |
| pSfL3oMQNtBdJS0kpXXaUqEAgTSgADAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiAUXVaEYATg | |
| 4Cc917T73KBImxh6xyhsA5pKuYpq1S4m9wIhAK+G93HR4ur7Ghel6+zUTvIAsj9e | |
| rsn4lSYsqI4OI4ei | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE REQUEST----- | |
| )"; | |
| // Test that the library enforces versions are valid and match the fields | |
| // present. | |
| TEST(X509Test, InvalidVersion) { | |
| // kExplicitDefaultVersionPEM is invalid but, for now, we accept it. See | |
| // https://crbug.com/boringssl/364. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(CertFromPEM(kExplicitDefaultVersionPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(CRLFromPEM(kExplicitDefaultVersionCRLPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kNegativeVersionPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kFutureVersionPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kOverflowVersionPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kV1WithExtensionsPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kV2WithExtensionsPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kV1WithIssuerUniqueIDPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kV1WithSubjectUniqueIDPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CRLFromPEM(kV1CRLWithExtensionsPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CRLFromPEM(kV3CRLPEM)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CSRFromPEM(kV2CSRPEM)); | |
| // kV3CSRPEM is invalid but, for now, we accept it. See | |
| // https://github.com/certbot/certbot/pull/9334 | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(CSRFromPEM(kV3CSRPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(X509_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(x509); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_set_version(x509.get(), -1)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_set_version(x509.get(), X509_VERSION_3 + 1)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_set_version(x509.get(), 9999)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_CRL> crl(X509_CRL_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(crl); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_CRL_set_version(crl.get(), -1)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_CRL_set_version(crl.get(), X509_CRL_VERSION_2 + 1)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_CRL_set_version(crl.get(), 9999)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_REQ> req(X509_REQ_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(req); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_REQ_set_version(req.get(), -1)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_REQ_set_version(req.get(), X509_REQ_VERSION_1 + 1)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_REQ_set_version(req.get(), 9999)); | |
| } | |
| // Unlike upstream OpenSSL, we require a non-null store in | |
| // |X509_STORE_CTX_init|. | |
| TEST(X509Test, NullStore) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf(CertFromPEM(kLeafPEM)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE_CTX> ctx(X509_STORE_CTX_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ctx); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx.get(), nullptr, leaf.get(), nullptr)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, BasicConstraints) { | |
| const uint32_t kFlagMask = EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS | EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| static const struct { | |
| const char *file; | |
| uint32_t flags; | |
| int path_len; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| {"basic_constraints_none.pem", 0, -1}, | |
| {"basic_constraints_ca.pem", EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS, -1}, | |
| {"basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_0.pem", EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS, 0}, | |
| {"basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_1.pem", EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS, 1}, | |
| {"basic_constraints_ca_pathlen_10.pem", EXFLAG_CA | EXFLAG_BCONS, 10}, | |
| {"basic_constraints_leaf.pem", EXFLAG_BCONS, -1}, | |
| {"invalid_extension_leaf_basic_constraints.pem", EXFLAG_INVALID, -1}, | |
| }; | |
| for (const auto &test : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(test.file); | |
| std::string path = "crypto/x509/test/"; | |
| path += test.file; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert = CertFromPEM(GetTestData(path.c_str()).c_str()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(test.flags, X509_get_extension_flags(cert.get()) & kFlagMask); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(test.path_len, X509_get_pathlen(cert.get())); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // The following strings are test certificates signed by kP256Key and kRSAKey, | |
| // with missing, NULL, or invalid algorithm parameters. | |
| static const char kP256NoParam[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBIDCBxqADAgECAgIE0jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0MCAX | |
| DTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0 | |
| MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6ke | |
| DUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMQMA4w | |
| DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNJADBGAiEAqdIiF+bN9Cl44oUeICpy | |
| aXd7HqhpVUaglYKw9ChmNUACIQCpMdL0fNkFNDbRww9dSl/y7kBdk/tp16HiqeSy | |
| gGzFYg== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kP256NullParam[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBJDCByKADAgECAgIE0jAMBggqhkjOPQQDAgUAMA8xDTALBgNVBAMTBFRlc3Qw | |
| IBcNMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWhgPMjEwMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaMA8xDTALBgNVBAMTBFRl | |
| c3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2niv2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3 | |
| qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYaHPUdfvGULUvPciLBoxAw | |
| DjAMBgNVHRMEBTADAQH/MAwGCCqGSM49BAMCBQADSQAwRgIhAKILHmyo+F3Cn/VX | |
| UUeSXOQQKX5aLzsQitwwmNF3ZgH3AiEAsYHcrVj/ftmoQIORARkQ/+PrqntXev8r | |
| t6uPxHrmpUY= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kP256InvalidParam[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBMTCBz6ADAgECAgIE0jATBggqhkjOPQQDAgQHZ2FyYmFnZTAPMQ0wCwYDVQQD | |
| EwRUZXN0MCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYD | |
| VQQDEwRUZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4N | |
| lIpM1Zdrt6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1L | |
| z3IiwaMQMA4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zATBggqhkjOPQQDAgQHZ2FyYmFnZQNIADBF | |
| AiAglpDf/YhN89LeJ2WAs/F0SJIrsuhS4uoInIz6WXUiuQIhAIu5Pwhp5E3Pbo8y | |
| fLULTZnynuQUULQkRcF7S7T2WpIL | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kRSANoParam[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBWzCBx6ADAgECAgIE0jALBgkqhkiG9w0BAQswDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVzdDAg | |
| Fw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVz | |
| dDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8eDZSKTNWXa7ep | |
| Hg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQtS89yIsGjEDAO | |
| MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCwYJKoZIhvcNAQELA4GBAC1f8W3W0Ao7CPfIBQYDSbPh | |
| brZpbxdBU5x27JOS7iSa+Lc9pEH5VCX9vIypHVHXLPEfZ38yIt11eiyrmZB6w62N | |
| l9kIeZ6FVPmC30d3sXx70Jjs+ZX9yt7kD1gLyNAQQfeYfa4rORAZT1n2YitD74NY | |
| TWUH2ieFP3l+ecj1SeQR | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kRSANullParam[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBXzCByaADAgECAgIE0jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0 | |
| MCAXDTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRU | |
| ZXN0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdr | |
| t6keDUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMQ | |
| MA4wDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOBgQAzVcfIv+Rq1KrMXqIL | |
| fPq/cWZjgqFZA1RGaGElNaqp+rkJfamq5tDGzckWpebrK+jjRN7yIlcWDtPpy3Gy | |
| seZfvtBDR0TwJm0S/pQl8prKB4wgALcwe3bmi56Rq85nzY5ZLNcP16LQxL+jAAua | |
| SwmQUz4bRpckRBj+sIyp1We+pg== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| static const char kRSAInvalidParam[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBbTCB0KADAgECAgIE0jAUBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsEB2dhcmJhZ2UwDzENMAsGA1UE | |
| AxMEVGVzdDAgFw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowDzENMAsG | |
| A1UEAxMEVGVzdDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8e | |
| DZSKTNWXa7epHg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQt | |
| S89yIsGjEDAOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wFAYJKoZIhvcNAQELBAdnYXJiYWdlA4GB | |
| AHTJ6cWWjCNrZhqiWWVI3jdK+h5xpRG8jGMXxR4JnjtoYRRusJLOXhmapwCB6fA0 | |
| 4vc+66O27v36yDmQX+tIc/hDrTpKNJptU8q3n2VagREvoHhkOTYkcCeS8vmnMtn8 | |
| 5OMNZ/ajVwOssw61GcAlScRqEHkZFBoGp7e+QpgB2tf9 | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| TEST(X509Test, AlgorithmParameters) { | |
| // P-256 parameters should be omitted, but we accept NULL ones. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kP256Key); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(key); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert = CertFromPEM(kP256NoParam); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get())); | |
| cert = CertFromPEM(kP256NullParam); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get())); | |
| cert = CertFromPEM(kP256InvalidParam); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get())); | |
| uint32_t err = ERR_get_error(); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); | |
| // RSA parameters should be NULL, but we accept omitted ones. | |
| key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kRSAKey); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(key); | |
| cert = CertFromPEM(kRSANoParam); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get())); | |
| cert = CertFromPEM(kRSANullParam); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get())); | |
| cert = CertFromPEM(kRSAInvalidParam); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_verify(cert.get(), key.get())); | |
| err = ERR_get_error(); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_GET_LIB(err)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_R_INVALID_PARAMETER, ERR_GET_REASON(err)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, GeneralName) { | |
| const std::vector<uint8_t> kNames[] = { | |
| // [0] { | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } | |
| // [0] { | |
| // SEQUENCE {} | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00}, | |
| // [0] { | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } | |
| // [0] { | |
| // [APPLICATION 0] {} | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa0, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x60, 0x00}, | |
| // [0] { | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } | |
| // [0] { | |
| // UTF8String { "a" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [0] { | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 } | |
| // [0] { | |
| // UTF8String { "a" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x02, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [0] { | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } | |
| // [0] { | |
| // UTF8String { "b" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62}, | |
| // [0] { | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } | |
| // [0] { | |
| // BOOLEAN { TRUE } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff}, | |
| // [0] { | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } | |
| // [0] { | |
| // BOOLEAN { FALSE } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa0, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x01, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00}, | |
| // [1 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } | |
| {0x81, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [1 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } | |
| {0x81, 0x01, 0x62}, | |
| // [2 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } | |
| {0x82, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [2 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } | |
| {0x82, 0x01, 0x62}, | |
| // [3] {} | |
| {0xa3, 0x00}, | |
| // [4] { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // UTF8String { "a" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, | |
| 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [4] { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // UTF8String { "b" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa4, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, | |
| 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62}, | |
| // [5] { | |
| // [1] { | |
| // UTF8String { "a" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [5] { | |
| // [1] { | |
| // UTF8String { "b" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa5, 0x05, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62}, | |
| // [5] { | |
| // [0] { | |
| // UTF8String {} | |
| // } | |
| // [1] { | |
| // UTF8String { "a" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa5, 0x09, 0xa0, 0x02, 0x0c, 0x00, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [5] { | |
| // [0] { | |
| // UTF8String { "a" } | |
| // } | |
| // [1] { | |
| // UTF8String { "a" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [5] { | |
| // [0] { | |
| // UTF8String { "b" } | |
| // } | |
| // [1] { | |
| // UTF8String { "a" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| {0xa5, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x62, 0xa1, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [6 PRIMITIVE] { "a" } | |
| {0x86, 0x01, 0x61}, | |
| // [6 PRIMITIVE] { "b" } | |
| {0x86, 0x01, 0x62}, | |
| // [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111` } | |
| {0x87, 0x04, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, | |
| // [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222`} | |
| {0x87, 0x04, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22}, | |
| // [7 PRIMITIVE] { `11111111111111111111111111111111` } | |
| {0x87, 0x10, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, | |
| 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11, 0x11}, | |
| // [7 PRIMITIVE] { `22222222222222222222222222222222` } | |
| {0x87, 0x10, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, | |
| 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22, 0x22}, | |
| // [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1 } | |
| {0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, | |
| 0x09, 0x02, 0x01}, | |
| // [8 PRIMITIVE] { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2 } | |
| {0x88, 0x0d, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, | |
| 0x09, 0x02, 0x02}, | |
| }; | |
| // Every name should be equal to itself and not equal to any others. | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kNames); i++) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(kNames[i])); | |
| const uint8_t *ptr = kNames[i].data(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> a( | |
| d2i_GENERAL_NAME(nullptr, &ptr, kNames[i].size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(a); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(ptr, kNames[i].data() + kNames[i].size()); | |
| uint8_t *enc = nullptr; | |
| int enc_len = i2d_GENERAL_NAME(a.get(), &enc); | |
| ASSERT_GE(enc_len, 0); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_enc(enc); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(enc, enc_len), Bytes(kNames[i])); | |
| for (size_t j = 0; j < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(kNames); j++) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(kNames[j])); | |
| ptr = kNames[j].data(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> b( | |
| d2i_GENERAL_NAME(nullptr, &ptr, kNames[j].size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(b); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(ptr, kNames[j].data() + kNames[j].size()); | |
| if (i == j) { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(a.get(), b.get()), 0); | |
| } else { | |
| EXPECT_NE(GENERAL_NAME_cmp(a.get(), b.get()), 0); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Test that extracting fields of an |X509_ALGOR| works correctly. | |
| TEST(X509Test, X509AlgorExtract) { | |
| static const char kTestOID[] = "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2"; | |
| const struct { | |
| int param_type; | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> param_der; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| // No parameter. | |
| {V_ASN1_UNDEF, {}}, | |
| // BOOLEAN { TRUE } | |
| {V_ASN1_BOOLEAN, {0x01, 0x01, 0xff}}, | |
| // BOOLEAN { FALSE } | |
| {V_ASN1_BOOLEAN, {0x01, 0x01, 0x00}}, | |
| // OCTET_STRING { "a" } | |
| {V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, {0x04, 0x01, 0x61}}, | |
| // BIT_STRING { `01` `00` } | |
| {V_ASN1_BIT_STRING, {0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00}}, | |
| // INTEGER { -1 } | |
| {V_ASN1_INTEGER, {0x02, 0x01, 0xff}}, | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2 } | |
| {V_ASN1_OBJECT, | |
| {0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, | |
| 0x09, 0x02}}, | |
| // NULL {} | |
| {V_ASN1_NULL, {0x05, 0x00}}, | |
| // SEQUENCE {} | |
| {V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, {0x30, 0x00}}, | |
| // SET {} | |
| {V_ASN1_SET, {0x31, 0x00}}, | |
| // [0] { UTF8String { "a" } } | |
| {V_ASN1_OTHER, {0xa0, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x61}}, | |
| }; | |
| for (const auto &t : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(t.param_der)); | |
| // Assemble an AlgorithmIdentifier with the parameter. | |
| bssl::ScopedCBB cbb; | |
| CBB seq, oid; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_init(cbb.get(), 64)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_asn1(cbb.get(), &seq, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_asn1(&seq, &oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_asn1_oid_from_text(&oid, kTestOID, strlen(kTestOID))); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_bytes(&seq, t.param_der.data(), t.param_der.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_flush(cbb.get())); | |
| const uint8_t *ptr = CBB_data(cbb.get()); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_ALGOR> alg( | |
| d2i_X509_ALGOR(nullptr, &ptr, CBB_len(cbb.get()))); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(alg); | |
| const ASN1_OBJECT *obj; | |
| int param_type; | |
| const void *param_value; | |
| X509_ALGOR_get0(&obj, ¶m_type, ¶m_value, alg.get()); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(param_type, t.param_type); | |
| char oid_buf[sizeof(kTestOID)]; | |
| ASSERT_EQ(int(sizeof(oid_buf) - 1), | |
| OBJ_obj2txt(oid_buf, sizeof(oid_buf), obj, | |
| /*always_return_oid=*/1)); | |
| EXPECT_STREQ(oid_buf, kTestOID); | |
| // |param_type| and |param_value| must be consistent with |ASN1_TYPE|. | |
| if (param_type == V_ASN1_UNDEF) { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, param_value); | |
| } else { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_TYPE> param(ASN1_TYPE_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(param); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TYPE_set1(param.get(), param_type, param_value)); | |
| uint8_t *param_der = nullptr; | |
| int param_len = i2d_ASN1_TYPE(param.get(), ¶m_der); | |
| ASSERT_GE(param_len, 0); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_param_der(param_der); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(param_der, param_len), Bytes(t.param_der)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // Test the various |X509_ATTRIBUTE| creation functions. | |
| TEST(X509Test, Attribute) { | |
| // The friendlyName attribute has a BMPString value. See RFC 2985, | |
| // section 5.5.1. | |
| static const uint8_t kTest1[] = {0x26, 0x03}; // U+2603 SNOWMAN | |
| static const uint8_t kTest1UTF8[] = {0xe2, 0x98, 0x83}; | |
| static const uint8_t kTest2[] = {0, 't', 0, 'e', 0, 's', 0, 't'}; | |
| auto check_attribute = [&](X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, bool has_test2) { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(NID_friendlyName, OBJ_obj2nid(X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(attr))); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(has_test2 ? 2 : 1, X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(attr)); | |
| // The first attribute should contain |kTest1|. | |
| const ASN1_TYPE *value = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 0); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(value); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, value->type); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kTest1), | |
| Bytes(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(value->value.bmpstring), | |
| ASN1_STRING_length(value->value.bmpstring))); | |
| // |X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data| requires the type match. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE( | |
| X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(attr, 0, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, nullptr)); | |
| const ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmpstring = static_cast<const ASN1_BMPSTRING *>( | |
| X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(attr, 0, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bmpstring); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kTest1), Bytes(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(bmpstring), | |
| ASN1_STRING_length(bmpstring))); | |
| if (has_test2) { | |
| value = X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 1); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(value); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, value->type); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kTest2), | |
| Bytes(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(value->value.bmpstring), | |
| ASN1_STRING_length(value->value.bmpstring))); | |
| } else { | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 1)); | |
| } | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(attr, 2)); | |
| }; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_STRING> str(ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_BMPSTRING)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(str); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_STRING_set(str.get(), kTest1, sizeof(kTest1))); | |
| // Test |X509_ATTRIBUTE_create|. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_ATTRIBUTE> attr( | |
| X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(NID_friendlyName, V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, str.get())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(attr); | |
| str.release(); // |X509_ATTRIBUTE_create| takes ownership on success. | |
| check_attribute(attr.get(), /*has_test2=*/false); | |
| // Test the |MBSTRING_*| form of |X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data|. | |
| attr.reset(X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(attr); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(attr.get(), OBJ_nid2obj(NID_friendlyName))); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(attr.get(), MBSTRING_UTF8, kTest1UTF8, | |
| sizeof(kTest1UTF8))); | |
| check_attribute(attr.get(), /*has_test2=*/false); | |
| // Test the |ASN1_STRING| form of |X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data|. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(attr.get(), V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, kTest2, | |
| sizeof(kTest2))); | |
| check_attribute(attr.get(), /*has_test2=*/true); | |
| // Test the |ASN1_TYPE| form of |X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data|. | |
| attr.reset(X509_ATTRIBUTE_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(attr); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(attr.get(), OBJ_nid2obj(NID_friendlyName))); | |
| str.reset(ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_BMPSTRING)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(str); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_STRING_set(str.get(), kTest1, sizeof(kTest1))); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(attr.get(), V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, str.get(), -1)); | |
| check_attribute(attr.get(), /*has_test2=*/false); | |
| } | |
| // Test that, by default, |X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST| is set, which means we'll | |
| // skip over server-sent expired intermediates when there is a local trust | |
| // anchor that works better. | |
| TEST(X509Test, TrustedFirst) { | |
| // Generate the following certificates: | |
| // | |
| // Root 2 (in store, expired) | |
| // | | |
| // Root 1 (in store) Root 1 (cross-sign) | |
| // \ / | |
| // Intermediate | |
| // | | |
| // Leaf | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kP256Key); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(key); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root2 = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root 2", "Root 2", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root2); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(root2.get()), kReferenceTime, | |
| /*offset_day=*/0, | |
| /*offset_sec=*/-1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(root2.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root1 = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root 1", "Root 1", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root1); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(root1.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root1_cross = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root 2", "Root 1", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root1_cross); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(root1_cross.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root 1", "Intermediate", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(intermediate.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf = | |
| MakeTestCert("Intermediate", "Leaf", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/false); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(leaf.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| // As a control, confirm that |leaf| -> |intermediate| -> |root1| is valid, | |
| // but the path through |root1_cross| is expired. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root1.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root2.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get(), root1_cross.get()}, {})); | |
| // By default, we should find the |leaf| -> |intermediate| -> |root2| chain, | |
| // skipping |root1_cross|. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root1.get(), root2.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get(), root1_cross.get()}, {})); | |
| // When |X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST| is disabled, we get stuck on the expired | |
| // intermediate. Note we need the callback to clear the flag. Setting |flags| | |
| // to zero only skips setting new flags. | |
| // | |
| // This test exists to confirm our current behavior, but these modes are just | |
| // workarounds for not having an actual path-building verifier. If we fix it, | |
| // this test can be removed. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root1.get(), root2.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get(), root1_cross.get()}, {}, /*flags=*/0, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(param, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST); | |
| })); | |
| // Even when |X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST| is disabled, if |root2| is not | |
| // trusted, the alt chains logic recovers the path. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root1.get()}, {intermediate.get(), root1_cross.get()}, | |
| {}, /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST); | |
| })); | |
| } | |
| // Test that notBefore and notAfter checks work correctly. | |
| TEST(X509Test, Expiry) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kP256Key); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(key); | |
| // The following are measured in seconds relative to kReferenceTime. The | |
| // validity periods are staggered so we can independently test both leaf and | |
| // root time checks. | |
| const int64_t kSecondsInDay = 24 * 3600; | |
| const int64_t kRootStart = -30 * kSecondsInDay; | |
| const int64_t kIntermediateStart = -20 * kSecondsInDay; | |
| const int64_t kLeafStart = -10 * kSecondsInDay; | |
| const int64_t kIntermediateEnd = 10 * kSecondsInDay; | |
| const int64_t kLeafEnd = 20 * kSecondsInDay; | |
| const int64_t kRootEnd = 30 * kSecondsInDay; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root", "Root", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(root.get()), kReferenceTime, | |
| /*offset_day=*/0, | |
| /*offset_sec=*/kRootStart)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(root.get()), kReferenceTime, | |
| /*offset_day=*/0, | |
| /*offset_sec=*/kRootEnd)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(root.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root", "Intermediate", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(intermediate.get()), | |
| kReferenceTime, | |
| /*offset_day=*/0, | |
| /*offset_sec=*/kIntermediateStart)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(intermediate.get()), | |
| kReferenceTime, | |
| /*offset_day=*/0, | |
| /*offset_sec=*/kIntermediateEnd)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(intermediate.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf = | |
| MakeTestCert("Intermediate", "Leaf", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/false); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(leaf.get()), kReferenceTime, | |
| /*offset_day=*/0, | |
| /*offset_sec=*/kLeafStart)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_TIME_adj(X509_getm_notAfter(leaf.get()), kReferenceTime, | |
| /*offset_day=*/0, | |
| /*offset_sec=*/kLeafEnd)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(leaf.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| struct VerifyAt { | |
| int64_t time; | |
| void operator()(X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) const { | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time_posix(param, time); | |
| } | |
| }; | |
| for (bool check_time : {true, false}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(check_time); | |
| unsigned long flags = check_time ? 0 : X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME; | |
| int not_yet_valid = check_time ? X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID : X509_V_OK; | |
| int has_expired = check_time ? X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED : X509_V_OK; | |
| EXPECT_EQ(not_yet_valid, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, flags, | |
| VerifyAt{kReferenceTime + kRootStart - 1})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(not_yet_valid, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, flags, | |
| VerifyAt{kReferenceTime + kIntermediateStart - 1})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(not_yet_valid, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, flags, | |
| VerifyAt{kReferenceTime + kLeafStart - 1})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| {}, flags, VerifyAt{kReferenceTime})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(has_expired, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, flags, | |
| VerifyAt{kReferenceTime + kRootEnd + 1})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(has_expired, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, flags, | |
| VerifyAt{kReferenceTime + kIntermediateEnd + 1})); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(has_expired, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, {}, flags, | |
| VerifyAt{kReferenceTime + kLeafEnd + 1})); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // kConstructedBitString is an X.509 certificate where the signature is encoded | |
| // as a BER constructed BIT STRING. Note that, while OpenSSL's parser accepts | |
| // this input, it interprets the value incorrectly. | |
| static const char kConstructedBitString[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBJTCBxqADAgECAgIE0jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0MCAX | |
| DTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0 | |
| MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6ke | |
| DUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMQMA4w | |
| DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAiNOAyQAMEYCIQCp0iIX5s30KXjihR4g | |
| KnJpd3seqGlVRqCVgrD0KGYDJgA1QAIhAKkx0vR82QU0NtHDD11KX/LuQF2T+2nX | |
| oeKp5LKAbMVi | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kConstructedOctetString is an X.509 certificate where an extension is encoded | |
| // as a BER constructed OCTET STRING. | |
| static const char kConstructedOctetString[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBJDCByqADAgECAgIE0jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0MCAX | |
| DTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0 | |
| MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6ke | |
| DUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMUMBIw | |
| EAYDVR0TJAkEAzADAQQCAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAKnSIhfmzfQpeOKF | |
| HiAqcml3ex6oaVVGoJWCsPQoZjVAAiEAqTHS9HzZBTQ20cMPXUpf8u5AXZP7adeh | |
| 4qnksoBsxWI= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kIndefiniteLength is an X.509 certificate where the outermost SEQUENCE uses | |
| // BER indefinite-length encoding. | |
| static const char kIndefiniteLength[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIAwgcagAwIBAgICBNIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVzdDAgFw0w | |
| MDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVzdDBZ | |
| MBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8eDZSKTNWXa7epHg1G | |
| +92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQtS89yIsGjEDAOMAwG | |
| A1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAKnSIhfmzfQpeOKFHiAqcml3 | |
| ex6oaVVGoJWCsPQoZjVAAiEAqTHS9HzZBTQ20cMPXUpf8u5AXZP7adeh4qnksoBs | |
| xWIAAA== | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kNonZeroPadding is an X.09 certificate where the BIT STRING signature field | |
| // has non-zero padding values. | |
| static const char kNonZeroPadding[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIB0DCCAXagAwIBAgIJANlMBNpJfb/rMAkGByqGSM49BAEwRTELMAkGA1UEBhMC | |
| QVUxEzARBgNVBAgMClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoMGEludGVybmV0IFdpZGdp | |
| dHMgUHR5IEx0ZDAeFw0xNDA0MjMyMzIxNTdaFw0xNDA1MjMyMzIxNTdaMEUxCzAJ | |
| BgNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIDApTb21lLVN0YXRlMSEwHwYDVQQKDBhJbnRlcm5l | |
| dCBXaWRnaXRzIFB0eSBMdGQwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATmK2ni | |
| v2Wfl74vHg2UikzVl2u3qR4NRvvdqakendy6WgHn1peoChj5w8SjHlbifINI2xYa | |
| HPUdfvGULUvPciLBo1AwTjAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUq4TSrKuV8IJOFngHVVdf5CaNgtEw | |
| HwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUq4TSrKuV8IJOFngHVVdf5CaNgtEwDAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAJ | |
| BgcqhkjOPQQBA0kBMEUCIQDyoDVeUTo2w4J5m+4nUIWOcAZ0lVfSKXQA9L4Vh13E | |
| BwIgfB55FGohg/B6dGh5XxSZmmi08cueFV7mHzJSYV51yRQB | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kHighTagNumber is an X.509 certificate where the outermost SEQUENCE tag uses | |
| // high tag number form. | |
| static const char kHighTagNumber[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| PxCCASAwgcagAwIBAgICBNIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVzdDAg | |
| Fw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVz | |
| dDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8eDZSKTNWXa7ep | |
| Hg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQtS89yIsGjEDAO | |
| MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAKnSIhfmzfQpeOKFHiAq | |
| cml3ex6oaVVGoJWCsPQoZjVAAiEAqTHS9HzZBTQ20cMPXUpf8u5AXZP7adeh4qnk | |
| soBsxWI= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kNonMinimalLengthOuter is an X.509 certificate where the outermost SEQUENCE | |
| // has a non-minimal length. | |
| static const char kNonMinimalLengthOuter[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIMAASAwgcagAwIBAgICBNIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVzdDAg | |
| Fw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVz | |
| dDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8eDZSKTNWXa7ep | |
| Hg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQtS89yIsGjEDAO | |
| MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAKnSIhfmzfQpeOKFHiAq | |
| cml3ex6oaVVGoJWCsPQoZjVAAiEAqTHS9HzZBTQ20cMPXUpf8u5AXZP7adeh4qnk | |
| soBsxWI= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kNonMinimalLengthSignature is an X.509 certificate where the signature has a | |
| // non-minimal length. | |
| static const char kNonMinimalLengthSignature[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBITCBxqADAgECAgIE0jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0MCAX | |
| DTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0 | |
| MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6ke | |
| DUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMQMA4w | |
| DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgOBSQAwRgIhAKnSIhfmzfQpeOKFHiAq | |
| cml3ex6oaVVGoJWCsPQoZjVAAiEAqTHS9HzZBTQ20cMPXUpf8u5AXZP7adeh4qnk | |
| soBsxWI= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| // kNonMinimalLengthSerial is an X.509 certificate where the serial number has a | |
| // non-minimal length. | |
| static const char kNonMinimalLengthSerial[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIIBITCBx6ADAgECAoECBNIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVzdDAg | |
| Fw0wMDAxMDEwMDAwMDBaGA8yMTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFowDzENMAsGA1UEAxMEVGVz | |
| dDBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABOYraeK/ZZ+Xvi8eDZSKTNWXa7ep | |
| Hg1G+92pqR6d3LpaAefWl6gKGPnDxKMeVuJ8g0jbFhoc9R1+8ZQtS89yIsGjEDAO | |
| MAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAKnSIhfmzfQpeOKFHiAq | |
| cml3ex6oaVVGoJWCsPQoZjVAAiEAqTHS9HzZBTQ20cMPXUpf8u5AXZP7adeh4qnk | |
| soBsxWI= | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| TEST(X509Test, BER) { | |
| // Constructed strings are forbidden in DER. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kConstructedBitString)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kConstructedOctetString)); | |
| // Indefinite lengths are forbidden in DER. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kIndefiniteLength)); | |
| // Padding bits in BIT STRINGs must be zero in BER. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kNonZeroPadding)); | |
| // Tags must be minimal in both BER and DER, though many BER decoders | |
| // incorrectly support non-minimal tags. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kHighTagNumber)); | |
| // Lengths must be minimal in DER. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kNonMinimalLengthOuter)); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kNonMinimalLengthSerial)); | |
| // We, for now, accept a non-minimal length in the signature field. See | |
| // b/18228011. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(CertFromPEM(kNonMinimalLengthSignature)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, Names) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kP256Key); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(key); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root", "Root", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(root.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| struct { | |
| std::vector<std::pair<int, std::string>> cert_subject; | |
| std::vector<std::string> cert_dns_names; | |
| std::vector<std::string> cert_emails; | |
| std::vector<std::string> valid_dns_names; | |
| std::vector<std::string> invalid_dns_names; | |
| std::vector<std::string> valid_emails; | |
| std::vector<std::string> invalid_emails; | |
| unsigned flags; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| // DNS names only match DNS names and do so case-insensitively. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{"example.com", "WWW.EXAMPLE.COM"}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"example.com", "EXAMPLE.COM", "www.example.com", "WWW.EXAMPLE.COM"}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{"test.example.com", "example.org"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{"test@example.com", "example.com"}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // DNS wildcards match exactly one component. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{"*.example.com", "*.EXAMPLE.ORG"}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"www.example.com", "WWW.EXAMPLE.COM", "www.example.org", | |
| "WWW.EXAMPLE.ORG"}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{"example.com", "test.www.example.com"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{"test@example.com", "www.example.com"}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // DNS wildcards can be disabled. | |
| // TODO(davidben): Can we remove this feature? Does anyone use it? | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{"example.com", "*.example.com"}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{"example.com"}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{"www.example.com"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS, | |
| }, | |
| // Invalid DNS wildcards do not match. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"a.*", "**.b.example", "*c.example", "d*.example", "e*e.example", | |
| "*", ".", "..", "*."}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"a.example", "test.b.example", "cc.example", "dd.example", | |
| "eee.example", "f", "g."}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // IDNs match like any other DNS labels. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"xn--rger-koa.a.example", "*.xn--rger-koa.b.example", | |
| "www.xn--rger-koa.c.example"}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"xn--rger-koa.a.example", "www.xn--rger-koa.b.example", | |
| "www.xn--rger-koa.c.example"}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"www.xn--rger-koa.a.example", "xn--rger-koa.b.example", | |
| "www.xn--rger-koa.d.example"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // For now, DNS names are also extracted out of the common name, but only | |
| // there is no SAN list. | |
| // TODO(https://crbug.com/boringssl/464): Remove this. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{{NID_commonName, "a.example"}, | |
| {NID_commonName, "*.b.example"}}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"a.example", "A.EXAMPLE", "test.b.example", "TEST.B.EXAMPLE"}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{{NID_commonName, "a.example"}, | |
| {NID_commonName, "*.b.example"}}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{"example.com"}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/ | |
| {"a.example", "A.EXAMPLE", "test.b.example", "TEST.B.EXAMPLE"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // Other subject RDNs do not provide DNS names. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{{NID_organizationName, "example.com"}}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{"example.com"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // Input DNS names cannot have wildcards. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{"www.example.com"}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{"*.example.com"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // OpenSSL has some non-standard wildcard syntax for input DNS names. We | |
| // do not support this. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{"www.a.example", "*.b.test"}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/ | |
| {".www.a.example", ".www.b.test", ".a.example", ".b.test", ".example", | |
| ".test"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // Emails match case-sensitively before the '@' and case-insensitively | |
| // after. They do not match DNS names. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{"test@a.example", "TEST@B.EXAMPLE"}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{"a.example", "b.example"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/ | |
| {"test@a.example", "test@A.EXAMPLE", "TEST@b.example", | |
| "TEST@B.EXAMPLE"}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/ | |
| {"TEST@a.example", "test@B.EXAMPLE", "another-test@a.example", | |
| "est@a.example"}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // Emails may also be found in the subject. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{{NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "test@a.example"}, | |
| {NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "TEST@B.EXAMPLE"}}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{"a.example", "b.example"}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/ | |
| {"test@a.example", "test@A.EXAMPLE", "TEST@b.example", | |
| "TEST@B.EXAMPLE"}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/ | |
| {"TEST@a.example", "test@B.EXAMPLE", "another-test@a.example", | |
| "est@a.example"}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // There are no email wildcard names. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{"test@*.a.example", "@b.example", "*@c.example"}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/ | |
| {"test@test.a.example", "test@b.example", "test@c.example"}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| // Unrelated RDNs can be skipped when looking in the subject. | |
| { | |
| /*cert_subject=*/{{NID_organizationName, "Acme Corporation"}, | |
| {NID_commonName, "a.example"}, | |
| {NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, "test@b.example"}, | |
| {NID_countryName, "US"}}, | |
| /*cert_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*cert_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_dns_names=*/{"a.example"}, | |
| /*invalid_dns_names=*/{}, | |
| /*valid_emails=*/{"test@b.example"}, | |
| /*invalid_emails=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, | |
| }, | |
| }; | |
| size_t i = 0; | |
| for (const auto &t : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(i++); | |
| // Issue a test certificate. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert = | |
| MakeTestCert("Root", "Leaf", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/false); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| if (!t.cert_subject.empty()) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> subject(X509_NAME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(subject); | |
| for (const auto &entry : t.cert_subject) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| subject.get(), entry.first, MBSTRING_ASC, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>(entry.second.data()), | |
| entry.second.size(), /*loc=*/-1, /*set=*/0)); | |
| } | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_set_subject_name(cert.get(), subject.get())); | |
| } | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAMES> sans(sk_GENERAL_NAME_new_null()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(sans); | |
| for (const auto &dns : t.cert_dns_names) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> name(GENERAL_NAME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| name->type = GEN_DNS; | |
| name->d.dNSName = ASN1_IA5STRING_new(); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name->d.dNSName); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_STRING_set(name->d.dNSName, dns.data(), dns.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bssl::PushToStack(sans.get(), std::move(name))); | |
| } | |
| for (const auto &email : t.cert_emails) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<GENERAL_NAME> name(GENERAL_NAME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| name->type = GEN_EMAIL; | |
| name->d.rfc822Name = ASN1_IA5STRING_new(); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name->d.rfc822Name); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE( | |
| ASN1_STRING_set(name->d.rfc822Name, email.data(), email.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bssl::PushToStack(sans.get(), std::move(name))); | |
| } | |
| if (sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(sans.get()) != 0) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_add1_ext_i2d(cert.get(), NID_subject_alt_name, | |
| sans.get(), /*crit=*/0, /*flags=*/0)); | |
| } | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_sign(cert.get(), key.get(), EVP_sha256())); | |
| for (const auto &dns : t.valid_dns_names) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(dns); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_check_host(cert.get(), dns.data(), dns.size(), t.flags, | |
| /*peername=*/nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(cert.get(), {root.get()}, /*intermediates=*/{}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host( | |
| param, dns.data(), dns.size())); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, t.flags); | |
| })); | |
| } | |
| for (const auto &dns : t.invalid_dns_names) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(dns); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_check_host(cert.get(), dns.data(), dns.size(), t.flags, | |
| /*peername=*/nullptr)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, | |
| Verify(cert.get(), {root.get()}, /*intermediates=*/{}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host( | |
| param, dns.data(), dns.size())); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, t.flags); | |
| })); | |
| } | |
| for (const auto &email : t.valid_emails) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(email); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_check_email(cert.get(), email.data(), email.size(), t.flags)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(cert.get(), {root.get()}, /*intermediates=*/{}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email( | |
| param, email.data(), email.size())); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, t.flags); | |
| })); | |
| } | |
| for (const auto &email : t.invalid_emails) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(email); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 0, X509_check_email(cert.get(), email.data(), email.size(), t.flags)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, | |
| Verify(cert.get(), {root.get()}, /*intermediates=*/{}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_email( | |
| param, email.data(), email.size())); | |
| X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(param, t.flags); | |
| })); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, AddDuplicates) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_STORE> store(X509_STORE_new()); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> a(CertFromPEM(kCrossSigningRootPEM)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> b(CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(store); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(a); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(b); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_STORE_add_cert(store.get(), a.get())); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_STORE_add_cert(store.get(), b.get())); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_STORE_add_cert(store.get(), a.get())); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_STORE_add_cert(store.get(), b.get())); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_STORE_add_cert(store.get(), a.get())); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_STORE_add_cert(store.get(), b.get())); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(sk_X509_OBJECT_num(X509_STORE_get0_objects(store.get())), 2u); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, BytesToHex) { | |
| struct { | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> bytes; | |
| const char *hex; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| {{}, ""}, | |
| {{0x00}, "00"}, | |
| {{0x00, 0x11, 0x22}, "00:11:22"}, | |
| {{0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef}, | |
| "01:23:45:67:89:AB:CD:EF"}, | |
| }; | |
| for (const auto &t : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(t.bytes)); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<char> hex( | |
| x509v3_bytes_to_hex(t.bytes.data(), t.bytes.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(hex); | |
| EXPECT_STREQ(hex.get(), t.hex); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, NamePrint) { | |
| // kTestName is a DER-encoded X.509 that covers many cases. | |
| // | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # countryName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.6 } | |
| // PrintableString { "US" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // # Sets may be multi-valued, with different attributes. Try to keep this | |
| // # in DER set order, in case we ever enforce this in the parser. | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # stateOrProvinceName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.8 } | |
| // PrintableString { "Some State" } | |
| // } | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # stateOrProvinceName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.8 } | |
| // UTF8String { "Some Other State \xe2\x98\x83" } | |
| // } | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # stateOrProvinceName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.8 } | |
| // BMPString { u"Another State \u2603" } | |
| // } | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # A custom OID | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2 } | |
| // UniversalString { U"\u2603" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // # Custom OIDs may have non-string values. | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.3 } | |
| // SEQUENCE { INTEGER { 1 } INTEGER { 2 } } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # organizationName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.10 } | |
| // PrintableString { "Org Name" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // # Embed common delimiter forms to test how well they get escaped. | |
| // UTF8String { "Common | |
| // Name/CN=A/CN=B,CN=A,CN=B+CN=A+CN=B;CN=A;CN=B\nCN=A\n" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // # Test escaping of leading and trailing spaces. | |
| // UTF8String { " spaces " } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| static const uint8_t kTestName[] = { | |
| 0x30, 0x82, 0x01, 0x00, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, | |
| 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x6d, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, | |
| 0x04, 0x08, 0x13, 0x0a, 0x53, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x53, 0x74, 0x61, | |
| 0x74, 0x65, 0x30, 0x1b, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08, 0x0c, 0x14, 0x53, | |
| 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4f, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x53, 0x74, | |
| 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0xe2, 0x98, 0x83, 0x30, 0x25, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, | |
| 0x04, 0x08, 0x1e, 0x1e, 0x00, 0x41, 0x00, 0x6e, 0x00, 0x6f, 0x00, 0x74, | |
| 0x00, 0x68, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, 0x72, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x53, 0x00, 0x74, | |
| 0x00, 0x61, 0x00, 0x74, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, 0x20, 0x26, 0x03, 0x30, 0x14, | |
| 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, | |
| 0x09, 0x02, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x03, 0x31, 0x18, 0x30, 0x16, | |
| 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, | |
| 0x09, 0x03, 0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x31, 0x11, | |
| 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a, 0x13, 0x08, 0x4f, 0x72, 0x67, | |
| 0x20, 0x4e, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x31, 0x42, 0x30, 0x40, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, | |
| 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x39, 0x43, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x4e, | |
| 0x61, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2f, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0x41, 0x2f, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x3d, | |
| 0x42, 0x2c, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0x41, 0x2c, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0x42, 0x2b, | |
| 0x43, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0x41, 0x2b, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0x42, 0x3b, 0x43, 0x4e, | |
| 0x3d, 0x41, 0x3b, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0x42, 0x0a, 0x43, 0x4e, 0x3d, 0x41, | |
| 0x0a, 0x31, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x08, | |
| 0x20, 0x73, 0x70, 0x61, 0x63, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20}; | |
| const uint8_t *ptr = kTestName; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name( | |
| d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &ptr, sizeof(kTestName))); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ptr, kTestName + sizeof(kTestName)); | |
| struct { | |
| int indent; | |
| unsigned long flags; | |
| std::string printed; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| // RFC 2253 uses , and + separators and encodes the RDNs in reverse. | |
| // OpenSSL's implementation additionally happens to reverse the values | |
| // within each RDN. RFC 2253 says any order is permissible. | |
| {/*indent=*/0, | |
| /*flags=*/XN_FLAG_RFC2253, | |
| "CN=\\ spaces\\ ," | |
| "CN=Common " | |
| "Name/CN=A/CN=B\\,CN=A\\,CN=B\\+CN=A\\+CN=B\\;CN=A\\;CN=B\\0ACN=A\\0A," | |
| "O=Org Name," | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.3=#3006020101020102," | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2=#1C0400002603+" | |
| "ST=Another State \\E2\\98\\83+" | |
| "ST=Some Other State \\E2\\98\\83+" | |
| "ST=Some State," | |
| "C=US"}, | |
| {/*indent=*/2, | |
| /*flags=*/XN_FLAG_RFC2253, | |
| " " | |
| "CN=\\ spaces\\ ," | |
| "CN=Common " | |
| "Name/CN=A/CN=B\\,CN=A\\,CN=B\\+CN=A\\+CN=B\\;CN=A\\;CN=B\\0ACN=A\\0A," | |
| "O=Org Name," | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.3=#3006020101020102," | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2=#1C0400002603+" | |
| "ST=Another State \\E2\\98\\83+" | |
| "ST=Some Other State \\E2\\98\\83+" | |
| "ST=Some State," | |
| "C=US"}, | |
| // |XN_FLAG_ONELINE| is an OpenSSL-specific single-line format. It also | |
| // omits |XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS|, so unknown OIDs that use known | |
| // string types will still be decoded. (This may drop important | |
| // information if the unknown OID distinguishes between string types.) It | |
| // also passes |ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE|. | |
| {/*indent=*/0, | |
| /*flags=*/XN_FLAG_ONELINE, | |
| "C = US, " | |
| "ST = Some State + " | |
| "ST = Some Other State \\E2\\98\\83 + " | |
| "ST = Another State \\E2\\98\\83 + " | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2 = \\E2\\98\\83, " | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.3 = #3006020101020102, " | |
| "O = Org Name, " | |
| "CN = \"Common " | |
| "Name/CN=A/CN=B,CN=A,CN=B+CN=A+CN=B;CN=A;CN=B\\0ACN=A\\0A\", " | |
| "CN = \" spaces \""}, | |
| // Callers can also customize the output, with both |XN_FLAG_*| and | |
| // |ASN1_STRFLGS_*|. |XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC| uses semicolon separators. | |
| {/*indent=*/0, | |
| /*flags=*/XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC | ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | | |
| ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE, | |
| "C=US; " | |
| "ST=Some State + " | |
| "ST=Some Other State \\E2\\98\\83 + " | |
| "ST=Another State \\E2\\98\\83 + " | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2=\\E2\\98\\83; " | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.3=#3006020101020102; " | |
| "O=Org Name; " | |
| "CN=\"Common " | |
| "Name/CN=A/CN=B,CN=A,CN=B+CN=A+CN=B;CN=A;CN=B\\0ACN=A\\0A\"; " | |
| "CN=\" spaces \""}, | |
| // Node uses these parameters. | |
| {/*indent=*/0, | |
| /*flags=*/ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | | |
| ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE | XN_FLAG_FN_SN, | |
| "C=US\n" | |
| "ST=Some State + " | |
| "ST=Some Other State \xE2\x98\x83 + " | |
| "ST=Another State \xE2\x98\x83 + " | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2=\xE2\x98\x83\n" | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.3=0\\06\\02\\01\\01\\02\\01\\02\n" | |
| "O=Org Name\n" | |
| "CN=Common " | |
| "Name/CN=A/CN=B\\,CN=A\\,CN=B\\+CN=A\\+CN=B\\;CN=A\\;CN=B\\0ACN=A\\0A\n" | |
| "CN=\\ spaces\\ "}, | |
| // |XN_FLAG_COMPAT| matches |X509_NAME_print|, rather than | |
| // |X509_NAME_print_ex|. | |
| // | |
| // TODO(davidben): This works by post-processing the output of | |
| // |X509_NAME_oneline|, which uses "/"" separators, and replacing with | |
| // ", ". The escaping is ambiguous and the post-processing is buggy, so | |
| // some of the trailing slashes are still present and some internal | |
| // slashes are mis-converted. | |
| {/*indent=*/0, | |
| /*flags=*/XN_FLAG_COMPAT, | |
| "C=US, " | |
| "ST=Some State, " | |
| "ST=Some Other State \\xE2\\x98\\x83, " | |
| "ST=\\x00A\\x00n\\x00o\\x00t\\x00h\\x00e\\x00r\\x00 " | |
| "\\x00S\\x00t\\x00a\\x00t\\x00e\\x00 &\\x03/" | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2=\\x00\\x00&\\x03/" | |
| "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.3=0\\x06\\x02\\x01\\x01\\x02\\x01\\x02, " | |
| "O=Org Name, " | |
| "CN=Common Name, " | |
| "CN=A, CN=B,CN=A,CN=B+CN=A+CN=B;CN=A;CN=B\\x0ACN=A\\x0A, " | |
| "CN= spaces "}, | |
| }; | |
| for (const auto &t : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.printed); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| int len = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio.get(), name.get(), t.indent, t.flags); | |
| ASSERT_GT(len, 0); | |
| const uint8_t *printed; | |
| size_t printed_len; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(bio.get(), &printed, &printed_len)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(std::string(printed, printed + printed_len), t.printed); | |
| if (t.flags != XN_FLAG_COMPAT) { | |
| // TODO(davidben): |XN_FLAG_COMPAT| does not return the length. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(len), printed_len); | |
| // Passing a null |BIO| measures the output instead. | |
| len = X509_NAME_print_ex(nullptr, name.get(), t.indent, t.flags); | |
| EXPECT_GT(len, 0); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(len), printed_len); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // TODO(davidben): This escapes the underlying bytes in the string, but that | |
| // is ambiguous without capturing the type. Should this escape like | |
| // |ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT| instead? | |
| static const char *kOnelineComponents[] = { | |
| "/C=US", | |
| "/ST=Some State", | |
| "/ST=Some Other State \\xE2\\x98\\x83", | |
| ("/ST=\\x00A\\x00n\\x00o\\x00t\\x00h\\x00e\\x00r\\x00 " | |
| "\\x00S\\x00t\\x00a\\x00t\\x00e\\x00 &\\x03"), | |
| "/1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2=\\x00\\x00&\\x03", | |
| "/1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.3=0\\x06\\x02\\x01\\x01\\x02\\x01\\x02", | |
| "/O=Org Name", | |
| "/CN=Common Name/CN=A/CN=B,CN=A,CN=B+CN=A+CN=B;CN=A;CN=B\\x0ACN=A\\x0A", | |
| "/CN= spaces ", | |
| }; | |
| std::string oneline_expected; | |
| for (const auto& component : kOnelineComponents) { | |
| oneline_expected += component; | |
| } | |
| // Given null buffer, |X509_NAME_oneline| allocates a new output. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<char> oneline(X509_NAME_oneline(name.get(), nullptr, 0)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oneline); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(oneline.get(), oneline_expected); | |
| // Otherwise it writes to the specified buffer. Note one extra byte is needed | |
| // for the trailing NUL. | |
| char buf[1024]; | |
| ASSERT_GE(sizeof(buf), oneline_expected.size() + 2); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(buf, | |
| X509_NAME_oneline(name.get(), buf, oneline_expected.size() + 1)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(buf, oneline_expected); | |
| memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); | |
| ASSERT_EQ(buf, | |
| X509_NAME_oneline(name.get(), buf, oneline_expected.size() + 2)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(buf, oneline_expected); | |
| // If the length is too small, |X509_NAME_oneline| truncates at name | |
| // entry boundaries. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(nullptr, X509_NAME_oneline(name.get(), buf, 0)); | |
| for (size_t len = 1; len < oneline_expected.size(); len++) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(len); | |
| memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(buf, X509_NAME_oneline(name.get(), buf, len)); | |
| std::string truncated; | |
| for (const auto& component : kOnelineComponents) { | |
| if (truncated.size() + strlen(component) + 1 > len) { | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| truncated += component; | |
| } | |
| EXPECT_EQ(buf, truncated); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| // kLargeSerialPEM is a certificate with a large serial number. | |
| static const char kLargeSerialPEM[] = R"( | |
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- | |
| MIICZjCCAc+gAwIBAgIQASNFZ4mrze8BI0VniavN7zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADA2 | |
| MRowGAYDVQQKExFCb3JpbmdTU0wgVEVTVElORzEYMBYGA1UEAxMPSW50ZXJtZWRp | |
| YXRlIENBMCAXDTE1MDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAyMRowGAYD | |
| VQQKExFCb3JpbmdTU0wgVEVTVElORzEUMBIGA1UEAxMLZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wgZ8w | |
| DQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBAMPRTRliCpKEnug6OzI0rJVcQep5p+aT | |
| 9sCg+pj+HVyg/DYTwqZ6qJRKhM+MbkhdJuU7FyqlsBeCeM/OjwMjcY0yEB/xJg1i | |
| ygfuBztTLuPnHxtSuKwae5MeqSofp3j97sRMnuLcKlHxu8rXoOCAS9BO50uKnPwU | |
| Ee1iEVqR92FPAgMBAAGjdzB1MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr | |
| BgEFBQcDAQYIKwYBBQUHAwIwDAYDVR0TAQH/BAIwADAZBgNVHQ4EEgQQo3mm9u6v | |
| uaVeN4wRgDTidTAbBgNVHSMEFDASgBCMGmiotXbbXVd7H40UsgajMA0GCSqGSIb3 | |
| DQEBCwUAA4GBAGP+n4kKGn/8uddYLWTXbUsz+KLuEXNDMyu3vRufLjTpIbP2MCNo | |
| 85fhLeC3fzKuGOk+6QGVLOBBcWDrrLqrmqnWdBMPULDo2QoF71a4GVjeJh+ax/tZ | |
| PyeGVPUK21TE0LDIxf2a11d1CJw582MgZQIPk4tXk+AcU9EqIceKgECG | |
| -----END CERTIFICATE----- | |
| )"; | |
| TEST(X509Test, Print) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> cert(CertFromPEM(kLargeSerialPEM)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cert); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(X509_print_ex(bio.get(), cert.get(), 0, 0)); | |
| // Nothing should be left in the error queue. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0u, ERR_peek_error()); | |
| // This output is not guaranteed to be stable, but we assert on it to make | |
| // sure something is printed. | |
| const uint8_t *data; | |
| size_t data_len; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(bio.get(), &data, &data_len)); | |
| std::string print(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), data_len); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(print, R"(Certificate: | |
| Data: | |
| Version: 3 (0x2) | |
| Serial Number: | |
| 01:23:45:67:89:ab:cd:ef:01:23:45:67:89:ab:cd:ef | |
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption | |
| Issuer: O=BoringSSL TESTING, CN=Intermediate CA | |
| Validity | |
| Not Before: Jan 1 00:00:00 2015 GMT | |
| Not After : Jan 1 00:00:00 2100 GMT | |
| Subject: O=BoringSSL TESTING, CN=example.com | |
| Subject Public Key Info: | |
| Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption | |
| Public-Key: (1024 bit) | |
| Modulus: | |
| 00:c3:d1:4d:19:62:0a:92:84:9e:e8:3a:3b:32:34: | |
| ac:95:5c:41:ea:79:a7:e6:93:f6:c0:a0:fa:98:fe: | |
| 1d:5c:a0:fc:36:13:c2:a6:7a:a8:94:4a:84:cf:8c: | |
| 6e:48:5d:26:e5:3b:17:2a:a5:b0:17:82:78:cf:ce: | |
| 8f:03:23:71:8d:32:10:1f:f1:26:0d:62:ca:07:ee: | |
| 07:3b:53:2e:e3:e7:1f:1b:52:b8:ac:1a:7b:93:1e: | |
| a9:2a:1f:a7:78:fd:ee:c4:4c:9e:e2:dc:2a:51:f1: | |
| bb:ca:d7:a0:e0:80:4b:d0:4e:e7:4b:8a:9c:fc:14: | |
| 11:ed:62:11:5a:91:f7:61:4f | |
| Exponent: 65537 (0x10001) | |
| X509v3 extensions: | |
| X509v3 Key Usage: critical | |
| Digital Signature, Key Encipherment | |
| X509v3 Extended Key Usage: | |
| TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication | |
| X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical | |
| CA:FALSE | |
| X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: | |
| A3:79:A6:F6:EE:AF:B9:A5:5E:37:8C:11:80:34:E2:75 | |
| X509v3 Authority Key Identifier: | |
| keyid:8C:1A:68:A8:B5:76:DB:5D:57:7B:1F:8D:14:B2:06:A3 | |
| Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption | |
| 63:fe:9f:89:0a:1a:7f:fc:b9:d7:58:2d:64:d7:6d:4b:33:f8: | |
| a2:ee:11:73:43:33:2b:b7:bd:1b:9f:2e:34:e9:21:b3:f6:30: | |
| 23:68:f3:97:e1:2d:e0:b7:7f:32:ae:18:e9:3e:e9:01:95:2c: | |
| e0:41:71:60:eb:ac:ba:ab:9a:a9:d6:74:13:0f:50:b0:e8:d9: | |
| 0a:05:ef:56:b8:19:58:de:26:1f:9a:c7:fb:59:3f:27:86:54: | |
| f5:0a:db:54:c4:d0:b0:c8:c5:fd:9a:d7:57:75:08:9c:39:f3: | |
| 63:20:65:02:0f:93:8b:57:93:e0:1c:53:d1:2a:21:c7:8a:80: | |
| 40:86 | |
| )"); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, AddExt) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509(X509_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(x509); | |
| struct Extension { | |
| int nid; | |
| bool critical; | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> data; | |
| }; | |
| auto expect_extensions = [&](const std::vector<Extension> &exts) { | |
| ASSERT_EQ(static_cast<size_t>(X509_get_ext_count(x509.get())), exts.size()); | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < exts.size(); i++) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(i); | |
| const X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext(x509.get(), static_cast<int>(i)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext)), exts[i].nid); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext), exts[i].critical ? 1 : 0); | |
| const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(data), ASN1_STRING_length(data)), | |
| Bytes(exts[i].data)); | |
| } | |
| }; | |
| // Make a few sample extensions. | |
| // SEQUENCE {} | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> basic1_der = {0x30, 0x00}; | |
| const uint8_t *inp = basic1_der.data(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BASIC_CONSTRAINTS> basic1_obj( | |
| d2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(nullptr, &inp, basic1_der.size())); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(inp, basic1_der.data() + basic1_der.size()); | |
| // SEQUENCE { BOOLEAN { TRUE } } | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> basic2_der = {0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff}; | |
| inp = basic2_der.data(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BASIC_CONSTRAINTS> basic2_obj( | |
| d2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS(nullptr, &inp, basic2_der.size())); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(inp, basic2_der.data() + basic2_der.size()); | |
| // OCTET_STRING {} | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> skid1_der = {0x04, 0x00}; | |
| inp = skid1_der.data(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> skid1_obj( | |
| d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(nullptr, &inp, skid1_der.size())); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(inp, skid1_der.data() + skid1_der.size()); | |
| // OCTET_STRING { "a" } | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> skid2_der = {0x04, 0x01, 0x61}; | |
| inp = skid2_der.data(); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> skid2_obj( | |
| d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(nullptr, &inp, skid2_der.size())); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(inp, skid2_der.data() + skid2_der.size()); | |
| // Initially, the extension list is empty. | |
| expect_extensions({}); | |
| // Adding extensions works with the default settings. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic1_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_basic_constraints, true, basic1_der}}); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_subject_key_identifier, | |
| skid1_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/0, X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_basic_constraints, true, basic1_der}, | |
| {NID_subject_key_identifier, false, skid1_der}}); | |
| // By default, we cannot add duplicates. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 0, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic2_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/0, X509V3_ADD_DEFAULT)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_basic_constraints, true, basic1_der}, | |
| {NID_subject_key_identifier, false, skid1_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING| silently keeps the existing extension if already | |
| // present. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic2_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/0, X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_basic_constraints, true, basic1_der}, | |
| {NID_subject_key_identifier, false, skid1_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_REPLACE| replaces it. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic2_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/0, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_basic_constraints, false, basic2_der}, | |
| {NID_subject_key_identifier, false, skid1_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING| also replaces matches. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_subject_key_identifier, | |
| skid2_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_basic_constraints, false, basic2_der}, | |
| {NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_DELETE| ignores the value and deletes the extension. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, nullptr, 0, | |
| X509V3_ADD_DELETE)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); | |
| // Not finding an extension to delete is an error. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, nullptr, 0, | |
| X509V3_ADD_DELETE)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING| fails if it cannot find a match. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 0, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic1_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE_EXISTING)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_REPLACE| adds a new extension if not preseent. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic1_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_REPLACE)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}, | |
| {NID_basic_constraints, true, basic1_der}}); | |
| // Delete the extension again. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, nullptr, 0, | |
| X509V3_ADD_DELETE)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING| adds a new extension if not preseent. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic1_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_KEEP_EXISTING)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}, | |
| {NID_basic_constraints, true, basic1_der}}); | |
| // Delete the extension again. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, nullptr, 0, | |
| X509V3_ADD_DELETE)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_APPEND| adds a new extension if not present. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic1_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/1, X509V3_ADD_APPEND)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}, | |
| {NID_basic_constraints, true, basic1_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_APPEND| keeps adding duplicates (invalid) even if present. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| 1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, basic2_obj.get(), | |
| /*crit=*/0, X509V3_ADD_APPEND)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}, | |
| {NID_basic_constraints, true, basic1_der}, | |
| {NID_basic_constraints, false, basic2_der}}); | |
| // |X509V3_ADD_DELETE| only deletes one extension at a time. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, nullptr, 0, | |
| X509V3_ADD_DELETE)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}, | |
| {NID_basic_constraints, false, basic2_der}}); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(1, X509_add1_ext_i2d(x509.get(), NID_basic_constraints, nullptr, 0, | |
| X509V3_ADD_DELETE)); | |
| expect_extensions({{NID_subject_key_identifier, true, skid2_der}}); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, NameEntry) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(X509_NAME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| auto check_name = [&](const char *expected_rfc2253) { | |
| // Check RDN indices are self-consistent. | |
| int num = X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get()); | |
| if (num > 0) { | |
| // RDN indices must start at zero. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0, X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 0))); | |
| } | |
| for (int i = 1; i < num; i++) { | |
| int prev = X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), i - 1)); | |
| int current = X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), i)); | |
| // RDN indices must increase consecutively. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(prev == current || prev + 1 == current) | |
| << "Entry " << i << " has RDN index " << current | |
| << " which is inconsistent with previous index " << prev; | |
| } | |
| // Check the name based on the RFC 2253 serialization. Note the RFC 2253 | |
| // serialization is in reverse. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| EXPECT_GE(X509_NAME_print_ex(bio.get(), name.get(), 0, XN_FLAG_RFC2253), 0); | |
| const uint8_t *data; | |
| size_t len; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(BIO_mem_contents(bio.get(), &data, &len)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(expected_rfc2253, std::string(data, data + len)); | |
| }; | |
| check_name(""); | |
| // |loc| = -1, |set| = 0 appends as new RDNs. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| name.get(), NID_organizationName, MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("Org"), /*len=*/-1, /*loc=*/-1, | |
| /*set=*/0)); | |
| check_name("O=Org"); | |
| // |loc| = -1, |set| = 0 appends as new RDNs. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| name.get(), NID_commonName, MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("Name"), /*len=*/-1, /*loc=*/-1, | |
| /*set=*/0)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org"); | |
| // Inserting in the middle of the set, but with |set| = 0 inserts a new RDN | |
| // and fixes the "set" values as needed. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| name.get(), NID_organizationalUnitName, MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("Unit"), /*len=*/-1, /*loc=*/1, | |
| /*set=*/0)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,OU=Unit,O=Org"); | |
| // |set = -1| adds to the previous entry's RDN. (Although putting O and OU at | |
| // the same level makes little sense, the test is written this way to check | |
| // the function isn't using attribute types to order things.) | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| name.get(), NID_organizationName, MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("Org2"), /*len=*/-1, /*loc=*/2, | |
| /*set=*/-1)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org2+OU=Unit,O=Org"); | |
| // |set| = 1 adds to the next entry's RDN. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| name.get(), NID_commonName, MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("Name2"), /*len=*/-1, /*loc=*/2, | |
| /*set=*/-1)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org2+CN=Name2+OU=Unit,O=Org"); | |
| // If there is no previous RDN, |set| = -1 makes a new RDN. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| name.get(), NID_countryName, MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("US"), /*len=*/-1, /*loc=*/0, | |
| /*set=*/-1)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org2+CN=Name2+OU=Unit,O=Org,C=US"); | |
| // Likewise if there is no next RDN. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| name.get(), NID_commonName, MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("Name3"), /*len=*/-1, /*loc=*/-1, | |
| /*set=*/1)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name3,CN=Name,O=Org2+CN=Name2+OU=Unit,O=Org,C=US"); | |
| // If |set| = 0 and we insert in the middle of an existing RDN, it adds an | |
| // RDN boundary after the entry but not before. This is a quirk of how the | |
| // function is implemented and hopefully not something any caller depends on. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID( | |
| name.get(), NID_commonName, MBSTRING_UTF8, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char *>("Name4"), /*len=*/-1, /*loc=*/3, | |
| /*set=*/0)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name3,CN=Name,O=Org2+CN=Name2,CN=Name4+OU=Unit,O=Org,C=US"); | |
| // Entries may be deleted. | |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(X509_NAME_delete_entry(name.get(), 7)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org2+CN=Name2,CN=Name4+OU=Unit,O=Org,C=US"); | |
| // When deleting the only attribute in an RDN, index invariants should still | |
| // hold. | |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(X509_NAME_delete_entry(name.get(), 0)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org2+CN=Name2,CN=Name4+OU=Unit,O=Org"); | |
| // Index invariants also hold when deleting attributes from non-singular RDNs. | |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(X509_NAME_delete_entry(name.get(), 1)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org2+CN=Name2,CN=Name4,O=Org"); | |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(X509_NAME_delete_entry(name.get(), 1)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org2+CN=Name2,O=Org"); | |
| // Same as above, but delete the second attribute first. | |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(X509_NAME_delete_entry(name.get(), 2)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,CN=Name2,O=Org"); | |
| X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(X509_NAME_delete_entry(name.get(), 1)); | |
| check_name("CN=Name,O=Org"); | |
| } | |
| // Tests that non-integer types are rejected when passed as an argument to | |
| // X509_set_serialNumber(). | |
| TEST(X509Test, SetSerialNumberChecksASN1StringType) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root = CertFromPEM(kRootCAPEM); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| // Passing an IA5String to X509_set_serialNumber() should fail. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_IA5STRING> str(ASN1_IA5STRING_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(str); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_set_serialNumber(root.get(), str.get())); | |
| // Passing a negative serial number is allowed. While invalid, we do accept | |
| // them and some callers rely in this for tests. | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_INTEGER> serial(ASN1_INTEGER_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(serial); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(serial.get(), -1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_set_serialNumber(root.get(), serial.get())); | |
| int64_t val; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&val, X509_get0_serialNumber(root.get()))); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(-1, val); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, Policy) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid1( | |
| OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1", /*dont_search_names=*/1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oid1); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid2( | |
| OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2", /*dont_search_names=*/1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oid2); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid3( | |
| OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.3", /*dont_search_names=*/1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oid3); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid4( | |
| OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.4", /*dont_search_names=*/1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oid4); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid5( | |
| OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.5", /*dont_search_names=*/1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oid5); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_root.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root_cross_inhibit_mapping(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_root_cross_inhibit_mapping.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root_cross_inhibit_mapping); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root2( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_root2.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root2); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_any(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_any.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_any); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_duplicate(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_duplicate.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_duplicate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_invalid(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_invalid.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_invalid); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_mapped(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_mapped.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_mapped); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_mapped_any(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_mapped_any.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_mapped_any); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_mapped_oid3(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_mapped_oid3.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_mapped_oid3); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_require(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_require); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_require1(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require1.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_require1); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_require2(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require2.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_require2); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_require_duplicate(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require_duplicate.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_require_duplicate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate_require_no_policies(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData( | |
| "crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate_require_no_policies.pem") | |
| .c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_require_no_policies); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_any( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_any.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_any); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_duplicate(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_duplicate.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_duplicate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_invalid(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_invalid.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_invalid); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_none(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_none.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_none); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_oid1(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid1.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_oid1); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_oid2(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid2.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_oid2); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_oid3(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid3.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_oid3); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_oid4(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid4.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_oid4); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_oid5(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_oid5.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_oid5); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_require(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_require.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_require); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_require1(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_require1.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_require1); | |
| auto set_policies = [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, | |
| std::vector<const ASN1_OBJECT *> oids) { | |
| for (const ASN1_OBJECT *oid : oids) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> copy(OBJ_dup(oid)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(copy); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(param, copy.get())); | |
| copy.release(); // |X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy| takes ownership on | |
| // success. | |
| } | |
| }; | |
| // The chain is good for |oid1| and |oid2|, but not |oid3|. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid2.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get(), oid2.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get(), oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // The policy extension cannot be parsed. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_invalid.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf_invalid.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf_invalid.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{})); | |
| // There is a duplicate policy in the policy extension. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_duplicate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // The policy extension in the leaf cannot be parsed. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf_duplicate.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // Without |X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY|, the policy tree is built and | |
| // intersected with user-specified policies, but it is not required to result | |
| // in any valid policies. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // However, a CA with policy constraints can require an explicit policy. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate_require.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_require.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // requireExplicitPolicy applies even if the application does not configure a | |
| // user-initial-policy-set. If the validation results in no policies, the | |
| // chain is invalid. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_none.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_require.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{})); | |
| // A leaf can also set requireExplicitPolicy. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf_require.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, /*flags=*/0)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_require.get(), {root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_require.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // requireExplicitPolicy is a count of certificates to skip. If the value is | |
| // not zero by the end of the chain, it doesn't count. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_require1.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_require2.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf_require1.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // If multiple certificates specify the constraint, the more constrained value | |
| // wins. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_require1.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_require1.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_require.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_require2.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // An intermediate that requires an explicit policy, but then specifies no | |
| // policies should fail verification as a result. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate_require_no_policies.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // A constrained intermediate's policy extension has a duplicate policy, which | |
| // is invalid. Historically this, and the above case, leaked memory. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate_require_duplicate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| /*flags=*/0, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // The leaf asserts anyPolicy, but the intermediate does not. The resulting | |
| // valid policies are the intersection. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf_any.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_any.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // The intermediate asserts anyPolicy, but the leaf does not. The resulting | |
| // valid policies are the intersection. | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_any.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_any.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // Both assert anyPolicy. All policies are valid. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf_any.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_any.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf_any.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_any.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // With just a trust anchor, policy checking silently succeeds. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(root.get(), {root.get()}, {}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| for (bool use_any : {false, true}) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(use_any); | |
| X509 *cert = | |
| use_any ? intermediate_mapped_any.get() : intermediate_mapped.get(); | |
| // OID3 is mapped to {OID1, OID2}, which means OID1 and OID2 (or both) are | |
| // acceptable for OID3. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_oid1.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_oid2.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // If the intermediate's policies were anyPolicy, OID3 at the leaf, despite | |
| // being mapped, is still acceptable as OID3 at the root. Despite the OID3 | |
| // having expected_policy_set = {OID1, OID2}, it can match the anyPolicy | |
| // node instead. | |
| // | |
| // If the intermediate's policies listed OIDs explicitly, OID3 at the leaf | |
| // is not acceptable as OID3 at the root. OID3 has expected_polciy_set = | |
| // {OID1, OID2} and no other node allows OID3. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(use_any ? X509_V_OK : X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_oid3.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // If the intermediate's policies were anyPolicy, OID1 at the leaf is no | |
| // longer acceptable as OID1 at the root because policies only match | |
| // anyPolicy when they match no other policy. | |
| // | |
| // If the intermediate's policies listed OIDs explicitly, OID1 at the leaf | |
| // is acceptable as OID1 at the root because it will match both OID1 and | |
| // OID3 (mapped) policies. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(use_any ? X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY : X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf_oid1.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // All pairs of OID4 and OID5 are mapped together, so either can stand for | |
| // the other. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_oid4.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid4.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_oid4.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid5.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_oid5.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid4.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_oid5.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid5.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_oid4.get(), {root.get()}, {cert}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid4.get(), oid5.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| } | |
| // Although |intermediate_mapped_oid3| contains many mappings, it only accepts | |
| // OID3. Nodes should not be created for the other mappings. | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_OK, Verify(leaf_oid1.get(), {root.get()}, | |
| {intermediate_mapped_oid3.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_oid4.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_mapped_oid3.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid4.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| // Policy mapping can be inhibited, either by the caller or a certificate in | |
| // the chain, in which case mapped policies are unassertable (apart from some | |
| // anyPolicy edge cases). | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_oid1.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate_mapped_oid3.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY | X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| Verify(leaf_oid1.get(), {root2.get()}, | |
| {intermediate_mapped_oid3.get(), root_cross_inhibit_mapping.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid3.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| } | |
| #if defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) | |
| // A similar test to the above, but ensures the various bits of intermediate | |
| // state are computed safely. | |
| TEST(X509Test, PolicyThreads) { | |
| const size_t kNumThreads = 10; | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid1( | |
| OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.1", /*dont_search_names=*/1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oid1); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid2( | |
| OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.2", /*dont_search_names=*/1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oid2); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> oid3( | |
| OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2.3", /*dont_search_names=*/1)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(oid3); | |
| auto set_policies = [](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param, | |
| std::vector<const ASN1_OBJECT *> oids) { | |
| for (const ASN1_OBJECT *oid : oids) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<ASN1_OBJECT> copy(OBJ_dup(oid)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(copy); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(param, copy.get())); | |
| copy.release(); // |X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy| takes ownership on | |
| // success. | |
| } | |
| }; | |
| { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_root.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf); | |
| std::vector<std::thread> threads; | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumThreads; i++) { | |
| threads.emplace_back([&] { | |
| EXPECT_EQ( | |
| X509_V_OK, | |
| Verify(leaf.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, /*crls=*/{}, | |
| X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| }); | |
| } | |
| for (auto &thread : threads) { | |
| thread.join(); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> root( | |
| CertFromPEM(GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_root.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(root); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> intermediate(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_intermediate.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> leaf_invalid(CertFromPEM( | |
| GetTestData("crypto/x509/test/policy_leaf_invalid.pem").c_str())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(leaf_invalid); | |
| std::vector<std::thread> threads; | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < kNumThreads; i++) { | |
| threads.emplace_back([&] { | |
| EXPECT_EQ(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION, | |
| Verify(leaf_invalid.get(), {root.get()}, {intermediate.get()}, | |
| /*crls=*/{}, X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY, | |
| [&](X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { | |
| set_policies(param, {oid1.get()}); | |
| })); | |
| }); | |
| } | |
| for (auto &thread : threads) { | |
| thread.join(); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| #endif // OPENSSL_THREADS | |
| TEST(X509Test, ExtensionFromConf) { | |
| static const char kTestOID[] = "1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.2"; | |
| const struct { | |
| const char *name; | |
| std::string value; | |
| // conf is the serialized confdb, or nullptr if none is to be provided. | |
| const char *conf; | |
| // expected is the resulting extension, encoded in DER, or the empty string | |
| // if an error is expected. | |
| std::vector<uint8_t> expected; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| // Many extensions have built-in syntax. | |
| {"basicConstraints", | |
| "critical,CA:true", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x05, | |
| 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff}}, | |
| {"basicConstraints", | |
| "critical,CA:true,pathlen:1", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x12, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, | |
| 0x04, 0x08, 0x30, 0x06, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01}}, | |
| // key:value tuples can be repeated and just override the previous value. | |
| {"basicConstraints", | |
| "critical,CA:true,pathlen:100,pathlen:1", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x12, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, | |
| 0x04, 0x08, 0x30, 0x06, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01}}, | |
| // Extension contents may be referenced from a config section. | |
| {"basicConstraints", | |
| "critical,@section", | |
| "[section]\nCA = true\n", | |
| {0x30, 0x0f, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff, 0x04, 0x05, | |
| 0x30, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff}}, | |
| // If no config is provided, this should fail. | |
| {"basicConstraints", "critical,@section", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // issuingDistributionPoint takes a list of name:value pairs. Omitting the | |
| // value is not allowed. | |
| {"issuingDistributionPoint", "fullname", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"issuingDistributionPoint", | |
| "relativename:name", | |
| "[name]\nCN=Hello\n", | |
| {0x30, 0x1b, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x14, 0x30, | |
| 0x12, 0xa0, 0x10, 0xa1, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, | |
| 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x05, 0x48, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| // relativename referencing a section which doesn't exist. | |
| {"issuingDistributionPoint", | |
| "relativename:wrong_section_name", | |
| "[name]\nCN=Hello\n", | |
| {}}, | |
| // relativename must be a single RDN. By default, the section-based name | |
| // syntax puts each attribute into its own RDN. | |
| {"issuingDistributionPoint", | |
| "relativename:name", | |
| "[name]\nCN=Hello\nC=US\n", | |
| {}}, | |
| // A single RDN with multiple attributes is allowed. | |
| {"issuingDistributionPoint", | |
| "relativename:name", | |
| "[name]\nCN=Hello\n+C=US\n", | |
| {0x30, 0x26, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x1f, 0x30, | |
| 0x1d, 0xa0, 0x1b, 0xa1, 0x19, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, | |
| 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x03, | |
| 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x05, 0x48, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| // Duplicate reason keys are an error. Reaching this case is interesting. | |
| // The value can a string like "key:value,key:value", or it can be | |
| // "@section" and reference a config section. If using a string, duplicate | |
| // keys are possible, but then it is impossible to put commas in the | |
| // value, as onlysomereasons expects. If using a section reference, it is | |
| // impossible to have a duplicate key because the config file parser | |
| // overrides the old value. | |
| {"issuingDistributionPoint", | |
| "onlysomereasons:keyCompromise", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x06, 0x30, 0x04, 0x83, | |
| 0x02, 0x06, 0x40}}, | |
| {"issuingDistributionPoint", | |
| "onlysomereasons:keyCompromise,onlysomereasons:CACompromise\n", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {}}, | |
| // subjectAltName has a series of string-based inputs for each name type. | |
| {"subjectAltName", | |
| "email:foo@example.com, URI:https://example.com, DNS:example.com, " | |
| "RID:1.2.3.4, IP:127.0.0.1, IP:::1, dirName:section, " | |
| "otherName:1.2.3.4;BOOLEAN:TRUE", | |
| "[section]\nCN=Test\n", | |
| {0x30, 0x78, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x11, 0x04, 0x71, 0x30, 0x6f, 0x81, | |
| 0x0f, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x40, 0x65, 0x78, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x65, | |
| 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x86, 0x13, 0x68, 0x74, 0x74, 0x70, 0x73, 0x3a, | |
| 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x65, 0x78, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x63, 0x6f, | |
| 0x6d, 0x82, 0x0b, 0x65, 0x78, 0x61, 0x6d, 0x70, 0x6c, 0x65, 0x2e, 0x63, | |
| 0x6f, 0x6d, 0x88, 0x03, 0x2a, 0x03, 0x04, 0x87, 0x04, 0x7f, 0x00, 0x00, | |
| 0x01, 0x87, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, | |
| 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xa4, 0x11, 0x30, 0x0f, 0x31, | |
| 0x0d, 0x30, 0x0b, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x04, 0x54, 0x65, | |
| 0x73, 0x74, 0xa0, 0x0a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2a, 0x03, 0x04, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x01, | |
| 0x01, 0xff}}, | |
| // Syntax errors in each case, where they exist. (The string types just | |
| // copy the string in as-is.) | |
| {"subjectAltName", "RID:not_an_oid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"subjectAltName", "IP:not_an_ip", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"subjectAltName", "dirName:no_conf_db", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"subjectAltName", "dirName:missing_section", "[section]\nCN=Test\n", {}}, | |
| {"subjectAltName", "otherName:missing_semicolon", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"subjectAltName", "otherName:1.2.3.4", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"subjectAltName", "otherName:invalid_oid;BOOLEAN:TRUE", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"subjectAltName", "otherName:1.2.3.4;invalid_value", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"policyMappings", | |
| "1.1.1.1:2.2.2.2", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x15, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x21, 0x04, 0x0e, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x30, | |
| 0x0a, 0x06, 0x03, 0x29, 0x01, 0x01, 0x06, 0x03, 0x52, 0x02, 0x02}}, | |
| {"policyMappings", "invalid_oid:2.2.2.2", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {"policyMappings", "1.1.1.1:invalid_oid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // The "DER:" prefix just specifies an arbitrary byte string. Colons | |
| // separators are ignored. | |
| {kTestOID, "DER:0001020304", nullptr, {0x30, 0x15, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, | |
| 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, | |
| 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "DER:00:01:02:03:04", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x15, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "DER:invalid hex", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // The "ASN1:" prefix implements a complex language for describing ASN.1 | |
| // structures. See | |
| // https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man3/ASN1_generate_nconf.html | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:BOOLEAN:TRUE", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0xff}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:BOOL:yes", nullptr, {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, | |
| 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x01, 0x01, 0xff}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:BOOLEAN:NO", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:BOOLEAN", // Missing value | |
| nullptr, | |
| {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:BOOLEAN:invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:BOOLEAN:TRUE,invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:NULL", nullptr, {0x30, 0x12, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, | |
| 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, | |
| 0x02, 0x04, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:NULL,invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:NULL:invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // Missing value. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:INTEGER", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:INTEGER:", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:INTEGER,invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // INTEGER may be decimal or hexadecimal. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:INT:-0x10", nullptr, {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, | |
| 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x02, 0x01, 0xf0}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:INT:-10", nullptr, {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, | |
| 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x02, 0x01, 0xf6}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:INT:0", nullptr, {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, | |
| 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x02, 0x01, 0x00}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:INTEGER:10", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x0a}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:INTEGER:0x10", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x10}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:ENUM:0", nullptr, {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, | |
| 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x0a, 0x01, 0x00}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:ENUMERATED:0", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0a, 0x01, 0x00}}, | |
| // OIDs may be spelled out or specified by name. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:OBJECT:invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:OBJECT:basicConstraints", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x15, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:OBJECT:2.5.29.19", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x15, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:OID:2.5.29.19", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x15, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1d, 0x13}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:UTC:invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:UTC:20001231235959Z", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:UTCTIME:invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:UTC:001231235959Z", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x0f, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x30, | |
| 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x35, 0x39, 0x35, 0x39, 0x5a}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:UTCTIME:001231235959Z", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x1f, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x0f, 0x17, 0x0d, 0x30, 0x30, | |
| 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x35, 0x39, 0x35, 0x39, 0x5a}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:GENTIME:invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:GENTIME:001231235959Z", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:GENERALIZEDTIME:invalid", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:GENTIME:20001231235959Z", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x21, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x11, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x32, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, | |
| 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x35, 0x39, 0x35, 0x39, 0x5a}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:GENERALIZEDTIME:20001231235959Z", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x21, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x11, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x32, 0x30, 0x30, 0x30, | |
| 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x35, 0x39, 0x35, 0x39, 0x5a}}, | |
| // The default input format for string types is ASCII, which is then | |
| // converted into the target string type. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:UTF8:hello", nullptr, {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, | |
| 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, | |
| 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, 0x0c, 0x05, | |
| 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:UTF8String:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x0c, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:UNIV:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x26, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x16, 0x1c, 0x14, | |
| 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x68, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, 0x00, | |
| 0x00, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:UNIVERSALSTRING:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x26, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x16, 0x1c, 0x14, | |
| 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x68, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, 0x00, | |
| 0x00, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:BMP:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x0c, 0x1e, 0x0a, | |
| 0x00, 0x68, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:BMPSTRING:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x0c, 0x1e, 0x0a, | |
| 0x00, 0x68, 0x00, 0x65, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x6c, 0x00, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:IA5:hello", nullptr, {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, | |
| 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, | |
| 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, 0x16, 0x05, | |
| 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:IA5STRING:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x16, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:PRINTABLE:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x13, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:PRINTABLESTRING:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x13, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:T61:hello", nullptr, {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, | |
| 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, | |
| 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, 0x14, 0x05, | |
| 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:T61STRING:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x14, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:TELETEXSTRING:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x14, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| // FORMAT:UTF8 switches the input format to UTF-8. This should be | |
| // converted to the destination string, or rejected if invalid. | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,UTF8:\xe2\x98\x83", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x15, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x0c, 0x03, 0xe2, 0x98, 0x83}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,UNIV:\xe2\x98\x83", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x16, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, | |
| 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, | |
| 0x04, 0x06, 0x1c, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x26, 0x03}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,BMP:\xe2\x98\x83", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x04, 0x1e, 0x02, 0x26, 0x03}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,IA5:\xe2\x98\x83", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,IA5:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x16, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,PRINTABLE:\xe2\x98\x83", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,PRINTABLE:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x13, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,T61:\xe2\x98\x83", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,T61:\xc3\xb7", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x13, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, 0x14, 0x01, 0xf7}}, | |
| // Invalid UTF-8. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,UTF8:\xff", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // We don't support these string types. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:NUMERIC:0", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:NUMERICSTRING:0", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:VISIBLE:hello", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:VISIBLESTRING:hello", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:GeneralString:hello", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // OCTET STRING and BIT STRING also default to ASCII, but also accept HEX. | |
| // BIT STRING interprets OCTET STRING formats by having zero unused bits. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:OCT:hello", nullptr, {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, | |
| 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, | |
| 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, 0x04, 0x05, | |
| 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:OCTETSTRING:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x04, 0x05, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:HEX,OCT:0123abcd", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x16, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, | |
| 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, | |
| 0x04, 0x06, 0x04, 0x04, 0x01, 0x23, 0xab, 0xcd}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:BITSTR:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, | |
| 0x03, 0x06, 0x00, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:BITSTRING:hello", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x08, | |
| 0x03, 0x06, 0x00, 0x68, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x6f}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:HEX,BITSTR:0123abcd", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x17, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x07, | |
| 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x01, 0x23, 0xab, 0xcd}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:HEX,OCT:invalid hex", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // BIT STRING additionally supports a BITLIST type, which specifies a | |
| // list of bits to set. | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,BITSTR:1,5", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x04, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x44}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,BITSTR:1,invalid,5", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // Negative bit inidices are not allowed. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,BITSTR:-1", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // We cap bit indices at 256. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,BITSTR:257", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,BITSTR:256", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x34, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x24, 0x03, 0x22, 0x07, 0x00, | |
| 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, | |
| 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, | |
| 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80}}, | |
| // Unsupported formats for string types. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,IA5:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,UTF8:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,OCT:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:BITLIST,UTC:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:HEX,IA5:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:HEX,UTF8:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:HEX,UTC:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,OCT:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:UTF8,UTC:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // Invalid format type. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:FORMAT:invalid,IA5:abcd", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // SEQUENCE and SET encode empty values when there is no value. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:SEQ", nullptr, {0x30, 0x12, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, | |
| 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, | |
| 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:SET", nullptr, {0x30, 0x12, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, | |
| 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, | |
| 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x02, 0x31, 0x00}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:SEQUENCE", nullptr, {0x30, 0x12, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, | |
| 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, | |
| 0x02, 0x04, 0x02, 0x30, 0x00}}, | |
| // Otherwise, they require a corresponding section in the config database | |
| // to encode values. This can be nested recursively. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:SEQ:missing_confdb", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:SET:missing_confdb", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:SEQ:seq", | |
| R"( | |
| [seq] | |
| val1 = NULL | |
| val2 = IA5:a | |
| val3 = SET:set | |
| [set] | |
| # Config names do not matter, only the order. | |
| val4 = INT:1 | |
| val3 = INT:2 | |
| val2 = SEQ:empty | |
| val1 = INT:3 | |
| [empty] | |
| )", | |
| {0x30, 0x24, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x14, 0x30, 0x12, | |
| 0x05, 0x00, 0x16, 0x01, 0x61, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, | |
| 0x02, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x01, 0x03, 0x30, 0x00}}, | |
| // There is a recursion limit to stop infinite recursion. | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:SEQ:seq1", | |
| R"( | |
| [seq1] | |
| val = SEQ:seq2 | |
| [seq2] | |
| val = SEQ:seq1 | |
| )", | |
| {}}, | |
| // Various modifiers wrap with explicit tagging or universal types. | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:EXP:0,EXP:16U,EXP:100A,EXP:1000C,OCTWRAP,SEQWRAP,SETWRAP,BITWRAP," | |
| "NULL", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x26, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x16, 0xa0, 0x14, | |
| 0x30, 0x12, 0x7f, 0x64, 0x0f, 0xbf, 0x87, 0x68, 0x0b, 0x04, | |
| 0x09, 0x30, 0x07, 0x31, 0x05, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00}}, | |
| // Invalid tag numbers. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:EXP:-1,NULL", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:EXP:1?,NULL", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // Fits in |uint32_t| but exceeds |CBS_ASN1_TAG_NUMBER_MASK|, the largest | |
| // tag number we support. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:EXP:536870912,NULL", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // Implicit tagging may also be applied to the underlying type, or the | |
| // wrapping modifiers. | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:IMP:1A,OCTWRAP,IMP:10,SEQWRAP,IMP:100,SETWRAP,IMP:1000,BITWRAP," | |
| "IMP:10000,NULL", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x20, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, | |
| 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x10, 0x41, 0x0e, 0xaa, 0x0c, 0xbf, 0x64, | |
| 0x09, 0x9f, 0x87, 0x68, 0x05, 0x00, 0x9f, 0xce, 0x10, 0x00}}, | |
| // Implicit tagging may not be applied to explicit tagging or itself. | |
| // There's no rule against this in ASN.1, but OpenSSL does not allow it | |
| // here. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:IMP:1,EXP:1,NULL", nullptr, {}}, | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:IMP:1,IMP:1,NULL", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // [UNIVERSAL 0] is reserved. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:0U,NULL", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // Leading and trailing spaces on name:value pairs are removed. However, | |
| // while these pairs are delimited by commas, a type will consumes | |
| // everything after it, including commas, and spaces. So this is the | |
| // string " a, b ". | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1: EXP:0 , IA5: a, b ", | |
| nullptr, | |
| {0x30, 0x1a, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x0a, 0xa0, 0x08, | |
| 0x16, 0x06, 0x20, 0x61, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x62, 0x20}}, | |
| // Modifiers without a final type. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:EXP:1", nullptr, {}}, | |
| // Put it all together to describe a test Ed25519 key (wrapped inside an | |
| // X.509 extension). | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:SEQUENCE:pkcs8", | |
| R"( | |
| [pkcs8] | |
| vers = INT:0 | |
| alg = SEQWRAP,OID:1.3.101.112 | |
| key = FORMAT:HEX,OCTWRAP,OCT:9d61b19deffd5a60ba844af492ec2cc44449c5697b326919703bac031cae7f60 | |
| )", | |
| {0x30, 0x40, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, | |
| 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x30, 0x30, 0x2e, 0x02, 0x01, | |
| 0x00, 0x30, 0x05, 0x06, 0x03, 0x2b, 0x65, 0x70, 0x04, 0x22, 0x04, | |
| 0x20, 0x9d, 0x61, 0xb1, 0x9d, 0xef, 0xfd, 0x5a, 0x60, 0xba, 0x84, | |
| 0x4a, 0xf4, 0x92, 0xec, 0x2c, 0xc4, 0x44, 0x49, 0xc5, 0x69, 0x7b, | |
| 0x32, 0x69, 0x19, 0x70, 0x3b, 0xac, 0x03, 0x1c, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x60}}, | |
| // Sections can be referenced multiple times. | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:SEQUENCE:seq1", | |
| R"( | |
| [seq1] | |
| val1 = SEQUENCE:seq2 | |
| val2 = SEQUENCE:seq2 | |
| [seq2] | |
| val1 = INT:1 | |
| val2 = INT:2 | |
| )", | |
| {0x30, 0x22, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, | |
| 0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x02, 0x04, 0x12, | |
| 0x30, 0x10, 0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, | |
| 0x02, 0x30, 0x06, 0x02, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02}}, | |
| // But we cap this before it blows up exponentially. | |
| {kTestOID, | |
| "ASN1:SEQ:seq1", | |
| R"( | |
| [seq1] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq2 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq2 | |
| [seq2] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq3 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq3 | |
| [seq3] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq4 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq4 | |
| [seq4] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq5 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq5 | |
| [seq5] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq6 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq6 | |
| [seq6] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq7 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq7 | |
| [seq7] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq8 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq8 | |
| [seq8] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq9 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq9 | |
| [seq9] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq10 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq10 | |
| [seq10] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq11 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq11 | |
| [seq11] | |
| val1 = SEQ:seq12 | |
| val2 = SEQ:seq12 | |
| [seq12] | |
| val1 = IA5:AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA | |
| val2 = IA5:BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB | |
| )", | |
| {}}, | |
| // Integer sizes are capped to mitigate quadratic behavior. | |
| {kTestOID, "ASN1:INT:" + std::string(16384, '9'), nullptr, {}}, | |
| }; | |
| for (const auto &t : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.name); | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.value); | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.conf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CONF> conf; | |
| if (t.conf != nullptr) { | |
| conf.reset(NCONF_new(nullptr)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(conf); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<BIO> bio(BIO_new_mem_buf(t.conf, strlen(t.conf))); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(bio); | |
| long error_line; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(NCONF_load_bio(conf.get(), bio.get(), &error_line)) | |
| << "Failed to load config at line " << error_line; | |
| } | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_EXTENSION> ext( | |
| X509V3_EXT_nconf(conf.get(), nullptr, t.name, t.value.c_str())); | |
| if (t.expected.empty()) { | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(ext); | |
| } else { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ext); | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int len = i2d_X509_EXTENSION(ext.get(), &der); | |
| ASSERT_GE(len, 0); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(t.expected), Bytes(der, len)); | |
| } | |
| // Repeat the test with an explicit |X509V3_CTX|. | |
| X509V3_CTX ctx; | |
| X509V3_set_ctx(&ctx, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, 0); | |
| X509V3_set_nconf(&ctx, conf.get()); | |
| ext.reset(X509V3_EXT_nconf(conf.get(), &ctx, t.name, t.value.c_str())); | |
| if (t.expected.empty()) { | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(ext); | |
| } else { | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(ext); | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int len = i2d_X509_EXTENSION(ext.get(), &der); | |
| ASSERT_GE(len, 0); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(t.expected), Bytes(der, len)); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, AddUnserializableExtension) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> key = PrivateKeyFromPEM(kP256Key); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(key); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509> x509 = | |
| MakeTestCert("Issuer", "Subject", key.get(), /*is_ca=*/true); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(x509); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_EXTENSION> ext(X509_EXTENSION_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(X509_EXTENSION_set_object(ext.get(), OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef))); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(X509_add_ext(x509.get(), ext.get(), /*loc=*/-1)); | |
| } | |
| // Test that, when constructing an |X509_NAME|, names are sorted by DER order. | |
| TEST(X509Test, SortRDN) { | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name(X509_NAME_new()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| auto append_entry_new_rdn = [&](const char *str) { | |
| return X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name.get(), NID_commonName, MBSTRING_ASC, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(str), | |
| strlen(str), /*loc=*/-1, /*set=*/0); | |
| }; | |
| auto append_entry_prev_rdn = [&](const char *str) { | |
| return X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name.get(), NID_commonName, MBSTRING_ASC, | |
| reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(str), | |
| strlen(str), /*loc=*/-1, /*set=*/-1); | |
| }; | |
| // This is the sort order to expect. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_new_rdn("A")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("B")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("AA")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("AB")); | |
| // The same RDN, with entries added in a different order. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_new_rdn("AB")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("AA")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("B")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("A")); | |
| // The same RDN, with entries added in a different order. | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_new_rdn("A")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("AA")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("B")); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(append_entry_prev_rdn("AB")); | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int der_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name.get(), &der); | |
| ASSERT_GT(der_len, 0); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // SET { | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // UTF8String { "A" } | |
| // } | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // UTF8String { "B" } | |
| // } | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // UTF8String { "AA" } | |
| // } | |
| // SEQUENCE { | |
| // # commonName | |
| // OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 2.5.4.3 } | |
| // UTF8String { "AB" } | |
| // } | |
| // } | |
| // ...two more copies of the above SET... | |
| // } | |
| static uint8_t kExpected[] = { | |
| 0x30, 0x81, 0x84, 0x31, 0x2a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x0c, 0x01, 0x41, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, | |
| 0x42, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x41, 0x41, | |
| 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x41, 0x42, 0x31, | |
| 0x2a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x41, 0x30, | |
| 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x42, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, | |
| 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x41, 0x41, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, | |
| 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x02, 0x41, 0x42, 0x31, 0x2a, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, | |
| 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x41, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, | |
| 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, 0x01, 0x42, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, | |
| 0x0c, 0x02, 0x41, 0x41, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x0c, | |
| 0x02, 0x41, 0x42}; | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(kExpected), Bytes(der, der_len)); | |
| } | |
| TEST(X509Test, NameAttributeValues) { | |
| // 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.0. We use an unrecognized OID because using an | |
| // arbitrary ASN.1 type as the value for commonName is invalid. Our parser | |
| // does not check this, but best to avoid unrelated errors in tests, in case | |
| // we decide to later. | |
| static const uint8_t kOID[] = {0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, | |
| 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x00}; | |
| const struct { | |
| CBS_ASN1_TAG der_tag; | |
| std::string der_contents; | |
| int str_type; | |
| std::string str_contents; | |
| } kTests[] = { | |
| // String types are parsed as string types. | |
| {CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING, std::string("\0", 1), V_ASN1_BIT_STRING, ""}, | |
| {CBS_ASN1_UTF8STRING, "abc", V_ASN1_UTF8STRING, "abc"}, | |
| {CBS_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, "123", V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING, "123"}, | |
| {CBS_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, "abc", V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, "abc"}, | |
| {CBS_ASN1_T61STRING, "abc", V_ASN1_T61STRING, "abc"}, | |
| {CBS_ASN1_IA5STRING, "abc", V_ASN1_IA5STRING, "abc"}, | |
| {CBS_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, std::string("\0\0\0a", 4), | |
| V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, std::string("\0\0\0a", 4)}, | |
| {CBS_ASN1_BMPSTRING, std::string("\0a", 2), V_ASN1_BMPSTRING, | |
| std::string("\0a", 2)}, | |
| // ENUMERATED is supported but, currently, INTEGER is not. | |
| {CBS_ASN1_ENUMERATED, "\x01", V_ASN1_ENUMERATED, "\x01"}, | |
| // SEQUENCE is supported but, currently, SET is not. Note the | |
| // |ASN1_STRING| representation will include the tag and length. | |
| {CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE, "", V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, std::string("\x30\x00", 2)}, | |
| // These types are not actually supported by the library but, | |
| // historically, we would parse them, and not other unsupported types, due | |
| // to quirks of |ASN1_tag2bit|. | |
| {7, "", V_ASN1_OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR, ""}, | |
| {8, "", V_ASN1_EXTERNAL, ""}, | |
| {9, "", V_ASN1_REAL, ""}, | |
| {11, "", 11 /* EMBEDDED PDV */, ""}, | |
| {13, "", 13 /* RELATIVE-OID */, ""}, | |
| {14, "", 14 /* TIME */, ""}, | |
| {15, "", 15 /* not a type; reserved value */, ""}, | |
| {29, "", 29 /* CHARACTER STRING */, ""}, | |
| // TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/412): Attribute values are an ANY DEFINED BY | |
| // type, so we actually shoudl be accepting all ASN.1 types. We currently | |
| // do not and only accept the above types. Extend this test when we fix | |
| // this. | |
| }; | |
| for (const auto &t : kTests) { | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(t.der_tag); | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(t.der_contents)); | |
| // Construct an X.509 name containing a single RDN with a single attribute: | |
| // kOID with the specified value. | |
| bssl::ScopedCBB cbb; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_init(cbb.get(), 128)); | |
| CBB seq, rdn, attr, attr_type, attr_value; | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_asn1(cbb.get(), &seq, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_asn1(&seq, &rdn, CBS_ASN1_SET)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_asn1(&rdn, &attr, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_asn1(&attr, &attr_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_bytes(&attr_type, kOID, sizeof(kOID))); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_asn1(&attr, &attr_value, t.der_tag)); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_add_bytes( | |
| &attr_value, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(t.der_contents.data()), | |
| t.der_contents.size())); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(CBB_flush(cbb.get())); | |
| SCOPED_TRACE(Bytes(CBB_data(cbb.get()), CBB_len(cbb.get()))); | |
| // The input should parse. | |
| const uint8_t *inp = CBB_data(cbb.get()); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<X509_NAME> name( | |
| d2i_X509_NAME(nullptr, &inp, CBB_len(cbb.get()))); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(name); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(inp, CBB_data(cbb.get()) + CBB_len(cbb.get())) | |
| << "input was not fully consumed"; | |
| // Check there is a single attribute with the expected in-memory | |
| // representation. | |
| ASSERT_EQ(1, X509_NAME_entry_count(name.get())); | |
| const X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name.get(), 0); | |
| const ASN1_OBJECT *obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(entry); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(OBJ_get0_data(obj), OBJ_length(obj)), Bytes(kOID)); | |
| const ASN1_STRING *value = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(ASN1_STRING_type(value), t.str_type); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(value), ASN1_STRING_length(value)), | |
| Bytes(t.str_contents)); | |
| // The name should re-encode with the same input. | |
| uint8_t *der = nullptr; | |
| int der_len = i2d_X509_NAME(name.get(), &der); | |
| ASSERT_GE(der_len, 0); | |
| bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_der(der); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(Bytes(der, der_len), | |
| (Bytes(CBB_data(cbb.get()), CBB_len(cbb.get())))); | |
| } | |
| } |