Update the Estonian workaround comments.
Target date for removal of the workaround is 6 months.
BUG=532048
Change-Id: I402f75e46736936725575559cd8eb194115ab0df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/5910
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_asn1.c b/crypto/bn/bn_asn1.c
index a148afc..c84884c 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_asn1.c
@@ -63,8 +63,7 @@
* moduli. They last five years and are common enough that we need to work
* around this bug. See https://crbug.com/532048.
*
- * TODO(davidben): Remove this code and callers in September 2019 when all the
- * bad certificates have expired. */
+ * TODO(davidben): Remove this code and callers in March 2016. */
return BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&child), CBS_len(&child), ret) != NULL;
}
diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_rsa_asn1.c b/crypto/evp/p_rsa_asn1.c
index 94a967a..891e256 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/p_rsa_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/p_rsa_asn1.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
* use negative moduli. They last five years and are common enough that we
* need to work around this bug. See https://crbug.com/532048.
*
- * TODO(davidben): Switch this to the strict version in September 2019 or when
+ * TODO(davidben): Switch this to the strict version in March 2016 or when
* Chromium can force client certificates down a different codepath, whichever
* comes first. */
CBS cbs;
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
index 3f20acb..100b2b4 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_asn1.c
@@ -120,8 +120,7 @@
* use negative moduli. They last five years and are common enough that we
* need to work around this bug. See https://crbug.com/532048.
*
- * TODO(davidben): Remove this code and callers in September 2019 when all the
- * bad certificates have expired. */
+ * TODO(davidben): Remove this code and callers in March 2016. */
return parse_public_key(cbs, 1 /* buggy */);
}