update main-with-bazel from master branch
diff --git a/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
index c5a6477..c45be7a 100644
--- a/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
+++ b/src/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
@@ -60,7 +60,6 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
-#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
@@ -78,11 +77,6 @@
static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len);
static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf);
-static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
- char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth);
-
-static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen);
-
static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
char *inf, char *cst,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
@@ -97,7 +91,7 @@
const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
- int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
+ int utype, const ASN1_ITEM *it);
static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
const unsigned char **in, long len,
const ASN1_ITEM *it,
@@ -685,9 +679,8 @@
{
int ret = 0, utype;
long plen;
- char cst, inf, free_cont = 0;
+ char cst, inf;
const unsigned char *p;
- BUF_MEM buf = {0, NULL, 0 };
const unsigned char *cont = NULL;
long len;
if (!pval) {
@@ -763,33 +756,11 @@
p += plen;
}
} else if (cst) {
- if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN
- || utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER
- || utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) {
- /* These types only have primitive encodings. */
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Free any returned 'buf' content */
- free_cont = 1;
- /*
- * Should really check the internal tags are correct but some things
- * may get this wrong. The relevant specs say that constructed string
- * types should be OCTET STRINGs internally irrespective of the type.
- * So instead just check for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag.
- */
- if (!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0)) {
- goto err;
- }
- len = buf.length;
- /* Append a final null to string */
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
- buf.data[len] = 0;
- cont = (const unsigned char *)buf.data;
+ /* This parser historically supported BER constructed strings. We no
+ * longer do and will gradually tighten this parser into a DER
+ * parser. BER types should use |CBS_asn1_ber_to_der|. */
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE);
+ return 0;
} else {
cont = p;
len = plen;
@@ -797,22 +768,19 @@
}
/* We now have content length and type: translate into a structure */
- /* asn1_ex_c2i may reuse allocated buffer, and so sets free_cont to 0 */
- if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, &free_cont, it))
+ if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, it))
goto err;
*in = p;
ret = 1;
err:
- if (free_cont && buf.data)
- OPENSSL_free(buf.data);
return ret;
}
/* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */
static int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
- int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
+ int utype, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *stmp;
@@ -916,20 +884,11 @@
stmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval;
stmp->type = utype;
}
- /* If we've already allocated a buffer use it */
- if (*free_cont) {
- if (stmp->data)
- OPENSSL_free(stmp->data);
- stmp->data = (unsigned char *)cont; /* UGLY CAST! RL */
- stmp->length = len;
- *free_cont = 0;
- } else {
- if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, cont, len)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
- *pval = NULL;
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, cont, len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ ASN1_STRING_free(stmp);
+ *pval = NULL;
+ goto err;
}
break;
}
@@ -1000,92 +959,6 @@
return 1;
}
-/*
- * This function collects the asn1 data from a constructred string type into
- * a buffer. The values of 'in' and 'len' should refer to the contents of the
- * constructed type and 'inf' should be set if it is indefinite length.
- */
-
-/*
- * This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 string
- * types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set to zero no
- * recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate examples
- * exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough.
- */
-#define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5
-
-static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len,
- char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth)
-{
- const unsigned char *p, *q;
- long plen;
- char cst, ininf;
- p = *in;
- inf &= 1;
- /*
- * If no buffer and not indefinite length constructed just pass over the
- * encoded data
- */
- if (!buf && !inf) {
- *in += len;
- return 1;
- }
- while (len > 0) {
- q = p;
- /* Check for EOC */
- if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) {
- /*
- * EOC is illegal outside indefinite length constructed form
- */
- if (!inf) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC);
- return 0;
- }
- inf = 0;
- break;
- }
-
- if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &ininf, &cst, &p,
- len, tag, aclass, 0, NULL)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* If indefinite length constructed update max length */
- if (cst) {
- if (depth >= ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING);
- return 0;
- }
- if (!asn1_collect(buf, &p, plen, ininf, tag, aclass, depth + 1))
- return 0;
- } else if (plen && !collect_data(buf, &p, plen))
- return 0;
- len -= p - q;
- }
- if (inf) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC);
- return 0;
- }
- *in = p;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen)
-{
- int len;
- if (buf) {
- len = buf->length;
- if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, len + plen)) {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(ASN1, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- return 0;
- }
- OPENSSL_memcpy(buf->data + len, *p, plen);
- }
- *p += plen;
- return 1;
-}
-
/* Check for ASN1 EOC and swallow it if found */
static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len)
diff --git a/src/crypto/bytestring/ber.c b/src/crypto/bytestring/ber.c
index df88432..fd35e97 100644
--- a/src/crypto/bytestring/ber.c
+++ b/src/crypto/bytestring/ber.c
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@
// ignores the constructed bit.
static int is_string_type(unsigned tag) {
switch (tag & ~CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
+ // TODO(davidben): Reject constructed BIT STRINGs. The current handling
+ // matches OpenSSL but is incorrect. See
+ // https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/12810.
case CBS_ASN1_BITSTRING:
case CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING:
case CBS_ASN1_UTF8STRING:
diff --git a/src/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc b/src/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
index 36d2a27..477e5a1 100644
--- a/src/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
+++ b/src/crypto/x509/x509_test.cc
@@ -3463,3 +3463,38 @@
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags(param, X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST);
}));
}
+
+// kConstructedBitString is an X.509 certificate where the signature is encoded
+// as a BER constructed BIT STRING. Note that, while OpenSSL's parser accepts
+// this input, it interprets the value incorrectly.
+static const char kConstructedBitString[] = R"(
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBJTCBxqADAgECAgIE0jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0MCAX
+DTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6ke
+DUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMQMA4w
+DAYDVR0TBAUwAwEB/zAKBggqhkjOPQQDAiNOAyQAMEYCIQCp0iIX5s30KXjihR4g
+KnJpd3seqGlVRqCVgrD0KGYDJgA1QAIhAKkx0vR82QU0NtHDD11KX/LuQF2T+2nX
+oeKp5LKAbMVi
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+)";
+
+// kConstructedOctetString is an X.509 certificate where an extension is encoded
+// as a BER constructed OCTET STRING.
+static const char kConstructedOctetString[] = R"(
+-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
+MIIBJDCByqADAgECAgIE0jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0MCAX
+DTAwMDEwMTAwMDAwMFoYDzIxMDAwMTAxMDAwMDAwWjAPMQ0wCwYDVQQDEwRUZXN0
+MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE5itp4r9ln5e+Lx4NlIpM1Zdrt6ke
+DUb73ampHp3culoB59aXqAoY+cPEox5W4nyDSNsWGhz1HX7xlC1Lz3IiwaMUMBIw
+EAYDVR0TJAkEAzADAQQCAf8wCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSQAwRgIhAKnSIhfmzfQpeOKF
+HiAqcml3ex6oaVVGoJWCsPQoZjVAAiEAqTHS9HzZBTQ20cMPXUpf8u5AXZP7adeh
+4qnksoBsxWI=
+-----END CERTIFICATE-----
+)";
+
+TEST(X509Test, BER) {
+ // Constructed strings are forbidden in DER.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kConstructedBitString));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(CertFromPEM(kConstructedOctetString));
+}
