| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. | |
| * | |
| * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by | |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. | |
| * | |
| * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
| * license provided above. | |
| * | |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by | |
| * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
| * license. | |
| * | |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
| * | |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
| * | |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
| * to make use of the Contribution. | |
| * | |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
| * OTHERWISE. | |
| */ | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ec_key.h> | |
| #include <openssl/ecdsa.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" | |
| static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *ssl); | |
| static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl); | |
| int ssl3_connect(SSL *ssl) { | |
| BUF_MEM *buf = NULL; | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| int state, skip = 0; | |
| assert(ssl->handshake_func == ssl3_connect); | |
| assert(!ssl->server); | |
| for (;;) { | |
| state = ssl->state; | |
| switch (ssl->state) { | |
| case SSL_ST_CONNECT: | |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); | |
| if (ssl->init_buf == NULL) { | |
| buf = BUF_MEM_new(); | |
| if (buf == NULL || | |
| !BUF_MEM_reserve(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->init_buf = buf; | |
| buf = NULL; | |
| } | |
| ssl->init_num = 0; | |
| if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(ssl)) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) || ssl->d1->send_cookie) { | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; | |
| } else { | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; | |
| break; | |
| case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: | |
| assert(SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)); | |
| ret = dtls1_get_hello_verify(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->d1->send_cookie) { | |
| ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; | |
| } else { | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->hit) { | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
| } else { | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: | |
| if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) { | |
| ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT: | |
| if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| ret = ssl3_verify_server_cert(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: | |
| if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_server_hello_done(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C: | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request) { | |
| ret = ssl3_send_cert_verify(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE: | |
| ret = ssl->method->send_change_cipher_spec(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; | |
| if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: | |
| if (ssl->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { | |
| ret = ssl3_send_next_proto(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B: | |
| if (ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { | |
| ret = ssl3_send_channel_id(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: | |
| ret = ssl3_send_finished(ssl, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A, | |
| SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; | |
| if (ssl->hit) { | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; | |
| } else { | |
| /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it involves ChannelID, then | |
| * record the handshake hashes at this point in the session so that | |
| * any resumption of this session with ChannelID can sign those | |
| * hashes. */ | |
| ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if ((SSL_get_mode(ssl) & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_FALSE_START) && | |
| ssl3_can_false_start(ssl) && | |
| /* No False Start on renegotiation (would complicate the state | |
| * machine). */ | |
| !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_FALSE_START; | |
| } else { | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_FALSE_START: | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 1; | |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); | |
| ret = 1; | |
| goto end; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: | |
| if (ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected) { | |
| ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| skip = 1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: | |
| ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (!tls1_change_cipher_state(ssl, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: | |
| ret = ssl3_get_finished(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->method->received_flight(ssl); | |
| if (ssl->hit) { | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE; | |
| } else { | |
| ssl->state = SSL_ST_OK; | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: | |
| if (BIO_flush(ssl->wbio) <= 0) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = ssl->s3->tmp.next_state; | |
| if (ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK) { | |
| ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl); | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| case SSL_ST_OK: | |
| /* clean a few things up */ | |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(ssl); | |
| BUF_MEM_free(ssl->init_buf); | |
| ssl->init_buf = NULL; | |
| ssl->init_num = 0; | |
| /* Remove write buffering now. */ | |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); | |
| const int is_initial_handshake = !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.in_false_start = 0; | |
| ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1; | |
| if (is_initial_handshake) { | |
| /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ | |
| ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
| ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; | |
| ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); | |
| goto end; | |
| default: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); | |
| ret = -1; | |
| goto end; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip && ssl->state != state) { | |
| int new_state = ssl->state; | |
| ssl->state = state; | |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1); | |
| ssl->state = new_state; | |
| } | |
| skip = 0; | |
| } | |
| end: | |
| BUF_MEM_free(buf); | |
| ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_write_client_cipher_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, | |
| uint16_t min_version, | |
| uint16_t max_version) { | |
| /* Prepare disabled cipher masks. */ | |
| ssl_set_client_disabled(ssl); | |
| CBB child; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &child)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); | |
| int any_enabled = 0; | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); | |
| /* Skip disabled ciphers */ | |
| if ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & ssl->cert->mask_k) || | |
| (cipher->algorithm_auth & ssl->cert->mask_a)) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(cipher) > max_version || | |
| SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(cipher) < min_version) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| any_enabled = 1; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, ssl_cipher_get_value(cipher))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* If all ciphers were disabled, return the error to the caller. */ | |
| if (!any_enabled) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* For SSLv3, the SCSV is added. Otherwise the renegotiation extension is | |
| * added. */ | |
| if (ssl->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && | |
| !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* The renegotiation extension is required to be at index zero. */ | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.extensions.sent |= (1u << 0); | |
| } | |
| if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) && | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&child, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xffff)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return CBB_flush(out); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B) { | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| /* The handshake buffer is reset on every ClientHello. Notably, in DTLS, we | |
| * may send multiple ClientHellos if we receive HelloVerifyRequest. */ | |
| if (!ssl3_init_handshake_buffer(ssl)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| CBB_zero(&cbb); | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A); | |
| if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { | |
| ssl->version = ssl->method->version_to_wire(max_version); | |
| /* Only set |ssl->client_version| on the initial handshake. Renegotiations, | |
| * although locked to a version, reuse the value. When using the plain RSA | |
| * key exchange, the ClientHello version is checked in the premaster secret. | |
| * Some servers fail when this value changes. */ | |
| ssl->client_version = ssl->version; | |
| } | |
| /* If the configured session has expired or was created at a disabled | |
| * version, drop it. */ | |
| if (ssl->session != NULL) { | |
| uint16_t session_version = | |
| ssl->method->version_from_wire(ssl->session->ssl_version); | |
| if (ssl->session->session_id_length == 0 || ssl->session->not_resumable || | |
| ssl->session->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ssl->session->time) || | |
| session_version < min_version || session_version > max_version) { | |
| SSL_set_session(ssl, NULL); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* If resending the ClientHello in DTLS after a HelloVerifyRequest, don't | |
| * renegerate the client_random. The random must be reused. */ | |
| if ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) || !ssl->d1->send_cookie) && | |
| !ssl_fill_hello_random(ssl->s3->client_random, | |
| sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random), 0 /* client */)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */ | |
| int has_session = ssl->session != NULL && | |
| !ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete; | |
| CBB body, child; | |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl->client_version) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&body, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || | |
| (has_session && | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->session->session_id, | |
| ssl->session->session_id_length))) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { | |
| if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->d1->cookie, ssl->d1->cookie_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| size_t header_len = | |
| SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl) ? DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH : SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| if (!ssl3_write_client_cipher_list(ssl, &body, min_version, max_version) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&body, 1 /* one compression method */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0 /* null compression */) || | |
| !ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(ssl, &body, header_len + CBB_len(&body)) || | |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| err: | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| static int dtls1_get_hello_verify(SSL *ssl) { | |
| long n; | |
| int al, ok = 0; | |
| CBS hello_verify_request, cookie; | |
| uint16_t server_version; | |
| n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { | |
| ssl->d1->send_cookie = 0; | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, ssl->init_msg, n); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &server_version) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie) || | |
| CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&cookie) > sizeof(ssl->d1->cookie)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(ssl->d1->cookie, CBS_data(&cookie), CBS_len(&cookie)); | |
| ssl->d1->cookie_len = CBS_len(&cookie); | |
| ssl->d1->send_cookie = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *ssl) { | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; | |
| CERT *ct = ssl->cert; | |
| int al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ok; | |
| long n; | |
| CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; | |
| uint16_t server_wire_version, server_version, cipher_suite; | |
| uint8_t compression_method; | |
| n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, ssl_hash_message, | |
| &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| uint32_t err = ERR_peek_error(); | |
| if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_SSL && | |
| ERR_GET_REASON(err) == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE) { | |
| /* Add a dedicated error code to the queue for a handshake_failure alert | |
| * in response to ClientHello. This matches NSS's client behavior and | |
| * gives a better error on a (probable) failure to negotiate initial | |
| * parameters. Note: this error code comes after the original one. | |
| * | |
| * See https://crbug.com/446505. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE_ON_CLIENT_HELLO); | |
| } | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&server_hello, ssl->init_msg, n); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_wire_version) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || | |
| CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| server_version = ssl->method->version_from_wire(server_wire_version); | |
| assert(ssl->s3->have_version == ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete); | |
| if (!ssl->s3->have_version) { | |
| uint16_t min_version, max_version; | |
| if (!ssl_get_version_range(ssl, &min_version, &max_version) || | |
| server_version < min_version || server_version > max_version) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); | |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->version = server_wire_version; | |
| ssl->s3->enc_method = ssl3_get_enc_method(server_version); | |
| assert(ssl->s3->enc_method != NULL); | |
| /* At this point, the connection's version is known and ssl->version is | |
| * fixed. Begin enforcing the record-layer version. */ | |
| ssl->s3->have_version = 1; | |
| } else if (server_wire_version != ssl->version) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); | |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Copy over the server random. */ | |
| memcpy(ssl->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| assert(ssl->session == NULL || ssl->session->session_id_length > 0); | |
| if (!ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete && ssl->session != NULL && | |
| CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, ssl->session->session_id, | |
| ssl->session->session_id_length)) { | |
| if (ssl->sid_ctx_length != ssl->session->sid_ctx_length || | |
| memcmp(ssl->session->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length)) { | |
| /* actually a client application bug */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, | |
| SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->hit = 1; | |
| } else { | |
| /* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to | |
| * fill out. */ | |
| ssl->hit = 0; | |
| if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 0 /* client */)) { | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Note: session_id could be empty. */ | |
| ssl->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); | |
| memcpy(ssl->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), | |
| CBS_len(&session_id)); | |
| } | |
| c = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); | |
| if (c == NULL) { | |
| /* unknown cipher */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* If the cipher is disabled then we didn't sent it in the ClientHello, so if | |
| * the server selected it, it's an error. */ | |
| if ((c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k) || (c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) || | |
| SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(c) > ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) || | |
| SSL_CIPHER_get_max_version(c) < ssl3_protocol_version(ssl)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| sk = ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(ssl); | |
| if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) { | |
| /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->hit) { | |
| if (ssl->session->cipher != c) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->session->ssl_version != ssl->version) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_VERSION_NOT_RETURNED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| ssl->session->cipher = c; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; | |
| /* Now that the cipher is known, initialize the handshake hash. */ | |
| if (!ssl3_init_handshake_hash(ssl)) { | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* If doing a full handshake with TLS 1.2, the server may request a client | |
| * certificate which requires hashing the handshake transcript under a | |
| * different hash. Otherwise, the handshake buffer may be released. */ | |
| if (ssl->hit || ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION || | |
| !ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); | |
| } | |
| /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ | |
| if (compression_method != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* TLS extensions */ | |
| if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(ssl, &server_hello)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) { | |
| /* wrong packet length */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->hit && | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret != | |
| ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| if (ssl->session->extended_master_secret) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_EMS_SESSION_WITHOUT_EMS_EXTENSION); | |
| } else { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_RESUMED_NON_EMS_SESSION_WITH_EMS_EXTENSION); | |
| } | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_check_leaf_certificate returns one if |leaf| is a suitable leaf server | |
| * certificate for |ssl|. Otherwise, it returns zero and pushes an error on the | |
| * error queue. */ | |
| static int ssl3_check_leaf_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *leaf) { | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */ | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
| int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher); | |
| assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE); | |
| if (pkey->type != expected_type) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key | |
| * usages be checked in other cases as well? */ | |
| /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ | |
| X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0); | |
| if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
| !(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!tls1_check_ec_cert(ssl, leaf)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int al, ok, ret = -1; | |
| unsigned long n; | |
| X509 *x = NULL; | |
| STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| CBS cbs, certificate_list; | |
| const uint8_t *data; | |
| n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, ssl_hash_message, | |
| &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, n); | |
| sk = sk_X509_new_null(); | |
| if (sk == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&certificate_list) == 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) { | |
| CBS certificate; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */ | |
| data = CBS_data(&certificate); | |
| x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate)); | |
| if (x == NULL) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| x = NULL; | |
| } | |
| X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); | |
| if (!ssl3_check_leaf_certificate(ssl, leaf)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* NOTE: Unlike the server half, the client's copy of |cert_chain| includes | |
| * the leaf. */ | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(ssl->session->cert_chain, X509_free); | |
| ssl->session->cert_chain = sk; | |
| sk = NULL; | |
| X509_free(ssl->session->peer); | |
| ssl->session->peer = X509_up_ref(leaf); | |
| ssl->session->verify_result = ssl->verify_result; | |
| ret = 1; | |
| if (0) { | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| } | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| X509_free(x); | |
| sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ok, al; | |
| long n; | |
| CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; | |
| uint8_t status_type; | |
| n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) { | |
| /* A server may send status_request in ServerHello and then change | |
| * its mind about sending CertificateStatus. */ | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBS_init(&certificate_status, ssl->init_msg, n); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || | |
| status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || | |
| !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || | |
| CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &ssl->session->ocsp_response, | |
| &ssl->session->ocsp_response_length)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_verify_server_cert(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = ssl_verify_cert_chain(ssl, ssl->session->cert_chain); | |
| if (ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE && ret <= 0) { | |
| int al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(ssl->verify_result); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); | |
| } else { | |
| ret = 1; | |
| ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep ssl->verify_result */ | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { | |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | |
| int al, ok; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| DH *dh = NULL; | |
| EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; | |
| EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; | |
| long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { | |
| if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange may be omitted to send no | |
| * identity hint. */ | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This should be reset in one place with the rest of the | |
| * handshake state. */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint = NULL; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature over. */ | |
| CBS server_key_exchange; | |
| CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, ssl->init_msg, n); | |
| CBS server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; | |
| uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
| uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { | |
| CBS psk_identity_hint; | |
| /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a psk_identity_hint. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, | |
| &psk_identity_hint)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in | |
| * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum length of a PSK | |
| * identity hint can be as long as the maximum length of a PSK identity. | |
| * Also do not allow NULL characters; identities are saved as C strings. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint rather than | |
| * a specific identity. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || | |
| CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Save the identity hint as a C string. */ | |
| if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { | |
| CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) || | |
| CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) || | |
| CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) || | |
| CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| dh = DH_new(); | |
| if (dh == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL); | |
| dh->g = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL); | |
| if (dh->p == NULL || dh->g == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->session->key_exchange_info = DH_num_bits(dh); | |
| if (ssl->session->key_exchange_info < 1024) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); | |
| goto err; | |
| } else if (ssl->session->key_exchange_info > 4096) { | |
| /* Overly large DHE groups are prohibitively expensive, so enforce a limit | |
| * to prevent a server from causing us to perform too expensive of a | |
| * computation. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DH_P_TOO_LONG); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_dhe(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, dh); | |
| dh = NULL; | |
| /* Save the peer public key for later. */ | |
| size_t peer_key_len; | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&dh_Ys, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* |dh_Ys| was initialized with CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len | |
| * fits in a uint16_t. */ | |
| assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len; | |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) { | |
| /* Parse the server parameters. */ | |
| uint8_t group_type; | |
| uint16_t group_id; | |
| CBS point; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_key_exchange, &group_type) || | |
| group_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &group_id) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->session->key_exchange_info = group_id; | |
| /* Ensure the group is consistent with preferences. */ | |
| if (!tls1_check_group_id(ssl, group_id)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Initialize ECDH and save the peer public key for later. */ | |
| size_t peer_key_len; | |
| if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_init(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, group_id) || | |
| !CBS_stow(&point, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* |point| was initialized with CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len | |
| * fits in a uint16_t. */ | |
| assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len; | |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kCECPQ1) { | |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_init_for_cecpq1(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx); | |
| CBS key; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &key)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| size_t peer_key_len; | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&key, &ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, &peer_key_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* |key| was initialized with CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed, so peer_key_len | |
| * fits in a uint16_t. */ | |
| assert(sizeof(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len) == 2 && peer_key_len <= 0xffff); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len = (uint16_t)peer_key_len; | |
| } else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the signature, if any, while | |
| * |server_key_exchange_orig| contains the entire message. From that, derive | |
| * a CBS containing just the parameter. */ | |
| CBS parameter; | |
| CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), | |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); | |
| /* ServerKeyExchange should be signed by the server's public key. */ | |
| if (ssl_cipher_uses_certificate_auth(ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { | |
| pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ssl->session->peer); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| uint16_t signature_algorithm = 0; | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_key_exchange, &signature_algorithm)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &al, signature_algorithm, pkey)) { | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm; | |
| } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { | |
| signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_RSA_PKCS1_MD5_SHA1; | |
| } else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { | |
| signature_algorithm = SSL_SIGN_ECDSA_SHA1; | |
| } | |
| /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the signature. */ | |
| CBS signature; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || | |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(signature_algorithm); | |
| if (md == NULL) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| int sig_ok = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&md_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->client_random, | |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, ssl->s3->server_random, | |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(¶meter), | |
| CBS_len(¶meter)) && | |
| EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), | |
| CBS_len(&signature)); | |
| #if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE) | |
| sig_ok = 1; | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| #endif | |
| if (!sig_ok) { | |
| /* bad signature */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| /* PSK ciphers are the only supported certificate-less ciphers. */ | |
| assert(alg_a == SSL_aPSK); | |
| if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| DH_free(dh); | |
| EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); | |
| EC_KEY_free(ecdh); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) { | |
| return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ok, ret = 0; | |
| X509_NAME *xn = NULL; | |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; | |
| long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, -1, ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE) { | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; | |
| /* If we get here we don't need the handshake buffer as we won't be doing | |
| * client auth. */ | |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, n); | |
| ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); | |
| if (ca_sk == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* get the certificate types */ | |
| CBS certificate_types; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, &ssl->s3->tmp.certificate_types, | |
| &ssl->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| CBS supported_signature_algorithms; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) || | |
| !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* get the CA RDNs */ | |
| CBS certificate_authorities; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0) { | |
| CBS distinguished_name; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities, | |
| &distinguished_name)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); | |
| /* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */ | |
| xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name)); | |
| if (xn == NULL || | |
| data != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| xn = NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ssl->s3->tmp.ca_names, X509_NAME_free); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.ca_names = ca_sk; | |
| ca_sk = NULL; | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| X509_NAME_free(xn); | |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_get_server_hello_done(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ok; | |
| long n; | |
| n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO_DONE, | |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| if (n > 0) { | |
| /* should contain no data */ | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_has_client_certificate returns true if a client certificate is | |
| * configured. */ | |
| static int ssl3_has_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { | |
| return ssl->cert && ssl->cert->x509 && ssl_has_private_key(ssl); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, X509 **out_x509, | |
| EVP_PKEY **out_pkey) { | |
| if (ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, out_x509, out_pkey); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| assert(*out_x509 != NULL); | |
| assert(*out_pkey != NULL); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { | |
| /* Call cert_cb to update the certificate. */ | |
| if (ssl->cert->cert_cb) { | |
| int ret = ssl->cert->cert_cb(ssl, ssl->cert->cert_cb_arg); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (ret == 0) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_has_client_certificate(ssl)) { | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; | |
| } else { | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { | |
| /* Call client_cert_cb to update the certificate. */ | |
| X509 *x509 = NULL; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; | |
| int ret = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int setup_error = ret == 1 && (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) || | |
| !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)); | |
| X509_free(x509); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| if (setup_error) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { | |
| if (!ssl3_has_client_certificate(ssl)) { | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; | |
| /* Without a client certificate, the handshake buffer may be released. */ | |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); | |
| if (ssl->version == SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| /* In SSL 3.0, send no certificate by skipping both messages. */ | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| CBB cbb, body; | |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&body, 0 /* no certificates */) || | |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } else if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(ssl)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D); | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(sizeof(size_t) >= sizeof(unsigned), | |
| SIZE_T_IS_SMALLER_THAN_UNSIGNED); | |
| static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B) { | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A); | |
| uint8_t *pms = NULL; | |
| size_t pms_len = 0; | |
| CBB cbb, body; | |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, | |
| SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t alg_k = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
| uint32_t alg_a = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
| /* If using a PSK key exchange, prepare the pre-shared key. */ | |
| unsigned psk_len = 0; | |
| uint8_t psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; | |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { | |
| if (ssl->psk_client_callback == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; | |
| memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); | |
| psk_len = ssl->psk_client_callback( | |
| ssl, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_psk_identity_hint, identity, sizeof(identity), | |
| psk, sizeof(psk)); | |
| if (psk_len == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| assert(psk_len <= PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->session->psk_identity); | |
| ssl->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); | |
| if (ssl->session->psk_identity == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Write out psk_identity. */ | |
| CBB child; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, (const uint8_t *)identity, | |
| OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity))) || | |
| !CBB_flush(&body)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Depending on the key exchange method, compute |pms| and |pms_len|. */ | |
| if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { | |
| pms_len = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; | |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); | |
| if (pms == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(ssl->session->peer); | |
| if (pkey == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); | |
| if (rsa == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| pms[0] = ssl->client_version >> 8; | |
| pms[1] = ssl->client_version & 0xff; | |
| if (!RAND_bytes(&pms[2], SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH - 2)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBB child, *enc_pms = &body; | |
| size_t enc_pms_len; | |
| /* In TLS, there is a length prefix. */ | |
| if (ssl->version > SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| enc_pms = &child; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *ptr; | |
| if (!CBB_reserve(enc_pms, &ptr, RSA_size(rsa)) || | |
| !RSA_encrypt(rsa, &enc_pms_len, ptr, RSA_size(rsa), pms, pms_len, | |
| RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) || | |
| /* Log the premaster secret, if logging is enabled. */ | |
| !ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(ssl, ptr, enc_pms_len, pms, pms_len) || | |
| !CBB_did_write(enc_pms, enc_pms_len) || | |
| !CBB_flush(&body)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kDHE|SSL_kCECPQ1)) { | |
| /* Generate a keypair and serialize the public half. */ | |
| CBB child; | |
| if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_add_key(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &body, &child)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Compute the premaster. */ | |
| uint8_t alert; | |
| if (!SSL_ECDH_CTX_accept(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx, &child, &pms, &pms_len, | |
| &alert, ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key, | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key_len)) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_flush(&body)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* The key exchange state may now be discarded. */ | |
| SSL_ECDH_CTX_cleanup(&ssl->s3->tmp.ecdh_ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.peer_key = NULL; | |
| } else if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { | |
| /* For plain PSK, other_secret is a block of 0s with the same length as | |
| * the pre-shared key. */ | |
| pms_len = psk_len; | |
| pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pms_len); | |
| if (pms == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memset(pms, 0, pms_len); | |
| } else { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* For a PSK cipher suite, other_secret is combined with the pre-shared | |
| * key. */ | |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) { | |
| CBB pms_cbb, child; | |
| uint8_t *new_pms; | |
| size_t new_pms_len; | |
| CBB_zero(&pms_cbb); | |
| if (!CBB_init(&pms_cbb, 2 + psk_len + 2 + pms_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, pms, pms_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&pms_cbb, &child) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, psk, psk_len) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&pms_cbb, &new_pms, &new_pms_len)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&pms_cbb); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); | |
| pms = new_pms; | |
| pms_len = new_pms_len; | |
| } | |
| /* The message must be added to the finished hash before calculating the | |
| * master secret. */ | |
| if (!ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; | |
| ssl->session->master_key_length = | |
| tls1_generate_master_secret(ssl, ssl->session->master_key, pms, pms_len); | |
| if (ssl->session->master_key_length == 0) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->session->extended_master_secret = ssl->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret; | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| err: | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| if (pms != NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pms_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(pms); | |
| } | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_send_cert_verify(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C) { | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl_has_private_key(ssl)); | |
| CBB cbb, body, child; | |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, | |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| uint16_t signature_algorithm = tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(ssl); | |
| if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| /* Write out the digest type in TLS 1.2. */ | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Set aside space for the signature. */ | |
| const size_t max_sig_len = ssl_private_key_max_signature_len(ssl); | |
| uint8_t *ptr; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || | |
| !CBB_reserve(&child, &ptr, max_sig_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| size_t sig_len; | |
| enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result; | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { | |
| /* Compute the digest. In TLS 1.1 and below, the digest type is also | |
| * selected here. */ | |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t digest_len; | |
| if (!ssl3_cert_verify_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_len, signature_algorithm)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* The handshake buffer is no longer necessary. */ | |
| ssl3_free_handshake_buffer(ssl); | |
| /* Sign the digest. */ | |
| sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len, | |
| signature_algorithm, digest, digest_len); | |
| } else { | |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B); | |
| sign_result = | |
| ssl_private_key_sign_complete(ssl, ptr, &sig_len, max_sig_len); | |
| } | |
| switch (sign_result) { | |
| case ssl_private_key_success: | |
| break; | |
| case ssl_private_key_failure: | |
| goto err; | |
| case ssl_private_key_retry: | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION; | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) || | |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_C; | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| err: | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B) { | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A); | |
| static const uint8_t kZero[32] = {0}; | |
| size_t padding_len = 32 - ((ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len + 2) % 32); | |
| CBB cbb, body, child; | |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated, | |
| ssl->s3->next_proto_negotiated_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&child, kZero, padding_len) || | |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B) { | |
| return ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A); | |
| if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL && | |
| ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb != NULL) { | |
| EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; | |
| ssl->ctx->channel_id_cb(ssl, &key); | |
| if (key != NULL && | |
| !SSL_set1_tls_channel_id(ssl, key)) { | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(key); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(key); | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private == NULL) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| EC_KEY *ec_key = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ssl->tlsext_channel_id_private); | |
| if (ec_key == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| BIGNUM *x = BN_new(); | |
| BIGNUM *y = BN_new(); | |
| ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; | |
| if (x == NULL || y == NULL || | |
| !EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec_key), | |
| EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec_key), | |
| x, y, NULL)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t digest_len; | |
| if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(ssl, digest, &digest_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, digest_len, ec_key); | |
| if (sig == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBB cbb, body, child; | |
| if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, | |
| SSL3_MT_CHANNEL_ID_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&body, TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) || | |
| !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, x) || !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, y) || | |
| !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->r) || | |
| !BN_bn2cbb_padded(&child, 32, sig->s) || | |
| !ssl->method->finish_message(ssl, &cbb)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B; | |
| ret = ssl->method->write_message(ssl); | |
| err: | |
| BN_free(x); | |
| BN_free(y); | |
| ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ok, al; | |
| long n = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl, SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET, | |
| ssl_hash_message, &ok); | |
| if (!ok) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; | |
| uint32_t ticket_lifetime_hint; | |
| CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, ssl->init_msg, n); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &ticket_lifetime_hint) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || | |
| CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&ticket) == 0) { | |
| /* RFC 5077 allows a server to change its mind and send no ticket after | |
| * negotiating the extension. The value of |tlsext_ticket_expected| is | |
| * checked in |ssl_update_cache| so is cleared here to avoid an unnecessary | |
| * update. */ | |
| ssl->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl->hit) { | |
| /* The server is sending a new ticket for an existing session. Sessions are | |
| * immutable once established, so duplicate all but the ticket of the | |
| * existing session. */ | |
| uint8_t *bytes; | |
| size_t bytes_len; | |
| if (!SSL_SESSION_to_bytes_for_ticket(ssl->session, &bytes, &bytes_len)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| SSL_SESSION *new_session = SSL_SESSION_from_bytes(bytes, bytes_len); | |
| OPENSSL_free(bytes); | |
| if (new_session == NULL) { | |
| /* This should never happen. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| SSL_SESSION_free(ssl->session); | |
| ssl->session = new_session; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &ssl->session->tlsext_tick, | |
| &ssl->session->tlsext_ticklen)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = ticket_lifetime_hint; | |
| /* Generate a session ID for this session based on the session ticket. We use | |
| * the session ID mechanism for detecting ticket resumption. This also fits in | |
| * with assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL.*/ | |
| if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), ssl->session->session_id, | |
| &ssl->session->session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| return -1; | |
| } |