| /* | |
| * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu | |
| * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| /* TODO(davidben): 28 comes from the size of IP + UDP header. Is this reasonable | |
| * for these values? Notably, why is kMinMTU a function of the transport | |
| * protocol's overhead rather than, say, what's needed to hold a minimally-sized | |
| * handshake fragment plus protocol overhead. */ | |
| /* kMinMTU is the minimum acceptable MTU value. */ | |
| static const unsigned int kMinMTU = 256 - 28; | |
| /* kDefaultMTU is the default MTU value to use if neither the user nor | |
| * the underlying BIO supplies one. */ | |
| static const unsigned int kDefaultMTU = 1500 - 28; | |
| /* Receiving handshake messages. */ | |
| static void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) { | |
| if (frag == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag); | |
| } | |
| static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(size_t frag_len) { | |
| hm_fragment *frag = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment)); | |
| if (frag == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| memset(frag, 0, sizeof(hm_fragment)); | |
| /* If the handshake message is empty, |frag->fragment| and |frag->reassembly| | |
| * are NULL. */ | |
| if (frag_len > 0) { | |
| frag->fragment = OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len); | |
| if (frag->fragment == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Initialize reassembly bitmask. */ | |
| if (frag_len + 7 < frag_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| size_t bitmask_len = (frag_len + 7) / 8; | |
| frag->reassembly = OPENSSL_malloc(bitmask_len); | |
| if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| memset(frag->reassembly, 0, bitmask_len); | |
| } | |
| return frag; | |
| err: | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* bit_range returns a |uint8_t| with bits |start|, inclusive, to |end|, | |
| * exclusive, set. */ | |
| static uint8_t bit_range(size_t start, size_t end) { | |
| return (uint8_t)(~((1u << start) - 1) & ((1u << end) - 1)); | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_hm_fragment_mark marks bytes |start|, inclusive, to |end|, exclusive, | |
| * as received in |frag|. If |frag| becomes complete, it clears | |
| * |frag->reassembly|. The range must be within the bounds of |frag|'s message | |
| * and |frag->reassembly| must not be NULL. */ | |
| static void dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(hm_fragment *frag, size_t start, | |
| size_t end) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| size_t msg_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len; | |
| if (frag->reassembly == NULL || start > end || end > msg_len) { | |
| assert(0); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| /* A zero-length message will never have a pending reassembly. */ | |
| assert(msg_len > 0); | |
| if ((start >> 3) == (end >> 3)) { | |
| frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, end & 7); | |
| } else { | |
| frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, 8); | |
| for (i = (start >> 3) + 1; i < (end >> 3); i++) { | |
| frag->reassembly[i] = 0xff; | |
| } | |
| if ((end & 7) != 0) { | |
| frag->reassembly[end >> 3] |= bit_range(0, end & 7); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Check if the fragment is complete. */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < (msg_len >> 3); i++) { | |
| if (frag->reassembly[i] != 0xff) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if ((msg_len & 7) != 0 && | |
| frag->reassembly[msg_len >> 3] != bit_range(0, msg_len & 7)) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); | |
| frag->reassembly = NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_is_next_message_complete returns one if the next handshake message is | |
| * complete and zero otherwise. */ | |
| static int dtls1_is_next_message_complete(SSL *ssl) { | |
| hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % | |
| SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT]; | |
| return frag != NULL && frag->reassembly == NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_get_incoming_message returns the incoming message corresponding to | |
| * |msg_hdr|. If none exists, it creates a new one and inserts it in the | |
| * queue. Otherwise, it checks |msg_hdr| is consistent with the existing one. It | |
| * returns NULL on failure. The caller does not take ownership of the result. */ | |
| static hm_fragment *dtls1_get_incoming_message( | |
| SSL *ssl, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { | |
| if (msg_hdr->seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq || | |
| msg_hdr->seq - ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| size_t idx = msg_hdr->seq % SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; | |
| hm_fragment *frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx]; | |
| if (frag != NULL) { | |
| assert(frag->msg_header.seq == msg_hdr->seq); | |
| /* The new fragment must be compatible with the previous fragments from this | |
| * message. */ | |
| if (frag->msg_header.type != msg_hdr->type || | |
| frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_FRAGMENT_MISMATCH); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return frag; | |
| } | |
| /* This is the first fragment from this message. */ | |
| frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len); | |
| if (frag == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(&frag->msg_header, msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); | |
| ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx] = frag; | |
| return frag; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_process_handshake_record reads a handshake record and processes it. It | |
| * returns one if the record was successfully processed and 0 or -1 on error. */ | |
| static int dtls1_process_handshake_record(SSL *ssl) { | |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec; | |
| start: | |
| if (rr->length == 0) { | |
| int ret = dtls1_get_record(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Cross-epoch records are discarded, but we may receive out-of-order | |
| * application data between ChangeCipherSpec and Finished or a ChangeCipherSpec | |
| * before the appropriate point in the handshake. Those must be silently | |
| * discarded. | |
| * | |
| * However, only allow the out-of-order records in the correct epoch. | |
| * Application data must come in the encrypted epoch, and ChangeCipherSpec in | |
| * the unencrypted epoch (we never renegotiate). Other cases fall through and | |
| * fail with a fatal error. */ | |
| if ((rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
| ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx != NULL) || | |
| (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && | |
| ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx == NULL)) { | |
| rr->length = 0; | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| CBS cbs; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, rr->data, rr->length); | |
| while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) { | |
| /* Read a handshake fragment. */ | |
| struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; | |
| CBS body; | |
| if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| const size_t frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; | |
| const size_t frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; | |
| const size_t msg_len = msg_hdr.msg_len; | |
| if (frag_off > msg_len || frag_off + frag_len < frag_off || | |
| frag_off + frag_len > msg_len || | |
| msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (msg_hdr.seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq || | |
| msg_hdr.seq > | |
| (unsigned)ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq + SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) { | |
| /* Ignore fragments from the past, or ones too far in the future. */ | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_get_incoming_message(ssl, &msg_hdr); | |
| if (frag == NULL) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| assert(frag->msg_header.msg_len == msg_len); | |
| if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { | |
| /* The message is already assembled. */ | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| assert(msg_len > 0); | |
| /* Copy the body into the fragment. */ | |
| memcpy(frag->fragment + frag_off, CBS_data(&body), CBS_len(&body)); | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(frag, frag_off, frag_off + frag_len); | |
| } | |
| rr->length = 0; | |
| ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_get_message reads a handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any | |
| * if |msg_type| == -1). Read an entire handshake message. Handshake messages | |
| * arrive in fragments. */ | |
| long dtls1_get_message(SSL *ssl, int msg_type, | |
| enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) { | |
| hm_fragment *frag = NULL; | |
| int al; | |
| /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused | |
| * by the absence of an optional handshake message */ | |
| if (ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { | |
| /* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the | |
| * ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous | |
| * call. */ | |
| assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message); | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; | |
| if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| *ok = 1; | |
| assert(ssl->init_buf->length >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| ssl->init_num = (int)ssl->init_buf->length - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| return ssl->init_num; | |
| } | |
| /* Process handshake records until the next message is ready. */ | |
| while (!dtls1_is_next_message_complete(ssl)) { | |
| int ret = dtls1_process_handshake_record(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| *ok = 0; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Pop an entry from the ring buffer. */ | |
| frag = ssl->d1->incoming_messages[ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % | |
| SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT]; | |
| ssl->d1->incoming_messages[ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq % | |
| SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT] = NULL; | |
| assert(frag != NULL); | |
| assert(frag->reassembly == NULL); | |
| assert(ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq); | |
| ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
| /* Reconstruct the assembled message. */ | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| CBB_zero(&cbb); | |
| if (!BUF_MEM_reserve(ssl->init_buf, (size_t)frag->msg_header.msg_len + | |
| DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) || | |
| !CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data, | |
| ssl->init_buf->max) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, frag->msg_header.type) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, frag->msg_header.msg_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, frag->msg_header.seq) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, 0 /* frag_off */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, frag->msg_header.msg_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, frag->fragment, frag->msg_header.msg_len) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &ssl->init_buf->length)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl->init_buf->length == | |
| (size_t)frag->msg_header.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This function has a lot of implicit outputs. Simplify the | |
| * |ssl_get_message| API. */ | |
| ssl->s3->tmp.message_type = frag->msg_header.type; | |
| ssl->init_msg = (uint8_t *)ssl->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| ssl->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len; | |
| if (msg_type >= 0 && ssl->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(ssl)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
| ssl->init_buf->data, | |
| ssl->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); | |
| *ok = 1; | |
| return ssl->init_num; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); | |
| *ok = 0; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| void dtls_clear_incoming_messages(SSL *ssl) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT; i++) { | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free(ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i]); | |
| ssl->d1->incoming_messages[i] = NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_parse_fragment(CBS *cbs, struct hm_header_st *out_hdr, | |
| CBS *out_body) { | |
| memset(out_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &out_hdr->type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->msg_len) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &out_hdr->seq) || | |
| !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->frag_off) || | |
| !CBS_get_u24(cbs, &out_hdr->frag_len) || | |
| !CBS_get_bytes(cbs, out_body, out_hdr->frag_len)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Sending handshake messages. */ | |
| static void dtls1_update_mtu(SSL *ssl) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): What is this code doing and do we need it? */ | |
| if (ssl->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && | |
| !(SSL_get_options(ssl) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { | |
| long mtu = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); | |
| if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) { | |
| ssl->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu; | |
| } else { | |
| ssl->d1->mtu = kDefaultMTU; | |
| BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, ssl->d1->mtu, NULL); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* The MTU should be above the minimum now. */ | |
| assert(ssl->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_max_record_size returns the maximum record body length that may be | |
| * written without exceeding the MTU. It accounts for any buffering installed on | |
| * the write BIO. If no record may be written, it returns zero. */ | |
| static size_t dtls1_max_record_size(SSL *ssl) { | |
| size_t ret = ssl->d1->mtu; | |
| size_t overhead = ssl_max_seal_overhead(ssl); | |
| if (ret <= overhead) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ret -= overhead; | |
| size_t pending = BIO_wpending(ssl->wbio); | |
| if (ret <= pending) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ret -= pending; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int dtls1_write_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, | |
| enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) { | |
| dtls1_update_mtu(ssl); | |
| /* During the handshake, wbio is buffered to pack messages together. Flush the | |
| * buffer if the ChangeCipherSpec would not fit in a packet. */ | |
| if (dtls1_max_record_size(ssl) == 0) { | |
| int ret = BIO_flush(ssl->wbio); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static const uint8_t kChangeCipherSpec[1] = {SSL3_MT_CCS}; | |
| int ret = | |
| dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec, | |
| sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec), use_epoch); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, ssl->version, | |
| SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, kChangeCipherSpec, | |
| sizeof(kChangeCipherSpec)); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_do_handshake_write writes handshake message |in| using the given epoch, | |
| * starting |offset| bytes into the message body. It returns one on success. On | |
| * error, it returns <= 0 and sets |*out_offset| to the number of bytes of body | |
| * that were successfully written. This may be used to retry the write | |
| * later. |in| must be a reassembled handshake message with the full DTLS | |
| * handshake header. */ | |
| static int dtls1_do_handshake_write(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_offset, | |
| const uint8_t *in, size_t offset, | |
| size_t len, | |
| enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch) { | |
| dtls1_update_mtu(ssl); | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| CBB_zero(&cbb); | |
| /* Allocate a temporary buffer to hold the message fragments to avoid | |
| * clobbering the message. */ | |
| uint8_t *buf = OPENSSL_malloc(ssl->d1->mtu); | |
| if (buf == NULL) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Although it may be sent as multiple fragments, a DTLS message must be sent | |
| * serialized as a single fragment for purposes of |ssl_do_msg_callback| and | |
| * the handshake hash. */ | |
| CBS cbs, body; | |
| struct hm_header_st hdr; | |
| CBS_init(&cbs, in, len); | |
| if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &hdr, &body) || | |
| hdr.frag_off != 0 || | |
| hdr.frag_len != CBS_len(&body) || | |
| hdr.msg_len != CBS_len(&body) || | |
| !CBS_skip(&body, offset) || | |
| CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| do { | |
| /* During the handshake, wbio is buffered to pack messages together. Flush | |
| * the buffer if there isn't enough room to make progress. */ | |
| if (dtls1_max_record_size(ssl) < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) { | |
| int flush_ret = BIO_flush(ssl->wbio); | |
| if (flush_ret <= 0) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
| ret = flush_ret; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| assert(BIO_wpending(ssl->wbio) == 0); | |
| } | |
| size_t todo = dtls1_max_record_size(ssl); | |
| if (todo < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) { | |
| /* To make forward progress, the MTU must, at minimum, fit the handshake | |
| * header and one byte of handshake body. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| todo -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| if (todo > CBS_len(&body)) { | |
| todo = CBS_len(&body); | |
| } | |
| if (todo >= (1u << 24)) { | |
| todo = (1u << 24) - 1; | |
| } | |
| size_t buf_len; | |
| if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, buf, ssl->d1->mtu) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(&cbb, hdr.type) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, hdr.msg_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, hdr.seq) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, offset) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, todo) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, CBS_data(&body), todo) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &buf_len)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| int write_ret = | |
| dtls1_write_record(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, buf, buf_len, use_epoch); | |
| if (write_ret <= 0) { | |
| ret = write_ret; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_skip(&body, todo)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| offset += todo; | |
| } while (CBS_len(&body) != 0); | |
| ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 1 /* write */, ssl->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, in, | |
| len); | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| *out_offset = offset; | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| OPENSSL_free(buf); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| void dtls_clear_outgoing_messages(SSL *ssl) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len; i++) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i].data); | |
| ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i].data = NULL; | |
| } | |
| ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len = 0; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_add_change_cipher_spec adds a ChangeCipherSpec to the current | |
| * handshake flight. */ | |
| static int dtls1_add_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg = | |
| &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len]; | |
| msg->data = NULL; | |
| msg->len = 0; | |
| msg->epoch = ssl->d1->w_epoch; | |
| msg->is_ccs = 1; | |
| ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len++; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int dtls1_add_message(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *data, size_t len) { | |
| if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_free(data); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg = | |
| &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len]; | |
| msg->data = data; | |
| msg->len = len; | |
| msg->epoch = ssl->d1->w_epoch; | |
| msg->is_ccs = 0; | |
| ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len++; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_init_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb, CBB *body, uint8_t type) { | |
| /* Pick a modest size hint to save most of the |realloc| calls. */ | |
| if (!CBB_init(cbb, 64) || | |
| !CBB_add_u8(cbb, type) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0 /* length (filled in later) */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(cbb, ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0 /* offset */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, body)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_finish_message(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) { | |
| uint8_t *msg = NULL; | |
| size_t len; | |
| if (!CBB_finish(cbb, &msg, &len) || | |
| len > 0xffffffffu || | |
| len < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| OPENSSL_free(msg); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Fix up the header. Copy the fragment length into the total message | |
| * length. */ | |
| memcpy(msg + 1, msg + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 3, 3); | |
| ssl3_update_handshake_hash(ssl, msg, len); | |
| ssl->d1->handshake_write_seq++; | |
| ssl->init_off = 0; | |
| return dtls1_add_message(ssl, msg, len); | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_write_message(SSL *ssl) { | |
| if (ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| const DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg = | |
| &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len - 1]; | |
| if (msg->is_ccs) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| size_t offset = ssl->init_off; | |
| int ret = dtls1_do_handshake_write(ssl, &offset, msg->data, offset, msg->len, | |
| dtls1_use_current_epoch); | |
| ssl->init_off = offset; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *ssl, | |
| const DTLS_OUTGOING_MESSAGE *msg) { | |
| /* DTLS renegotiation is unsupported, so only epochs 0 (NULL cipher) and 1 | |
| * (negotiated cipher) exist. */ | |
| assert(ssl->d1->w_epoch == 0 || ssl->d1->w_epoch == 1); | |
| assert(msg->epoch <= ssl->d1->w_epoch); | |
| enum dtls1_use_epoch_t use_epoch = dtls1_use_current_epoch; | |
| if (ssl->d1->w_epoch == 1 && msg->epoch == 0) { | |
| use_epoch = dtls1_use_previous_epoch; | |
| } | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This cannot handle non-blocking writes. */ | |
| int ret; | |
| if (msg->is_ccs) { | |
| ret = dtls1_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl, use_epoch); | |
| } else { | |
| size_t offset = 0; | |
| ret = dtls1_do_handshake_write(ssl, &offset, msg->data, offset, msg->len, | |
| use_epoch); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_retransmit_outgoing_messages(SSL *ssl) { | |
| /* Ensure we are packing handshake messages. */ | |
| const int was_buffered = ssl_is_wbio_buffered(ssl); | |
| assert(was_buffered == SSL_in_init(ssl)); | |
| if (!was_buffered && !ssl_init_wbio_buffer(ssl)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl_is_wbio_buffered(ssl)); | |
| int ret = -1; | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < ssl->d1->outgoing_messages_len; i++) { | |
| if (dtls1_retransmit_message(ssl, &ssl->d1->outgoing_messages[i]) <= 0) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = BIO_flush(ssl->wbio); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| ssl->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| err: | |
| if (!was_buffered) { | |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl); | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret = dtls1_write_change_cipher_spec(ssl, dtls1_use_current_epoch); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| dtls1_add_change_cipher_spec(ssl); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void) { | |
| return kMinMTU; | |
| } |