| /* |
| * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project |
| * 2004. |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * licensing@OpenSSL.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/stack.h> |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509v3.h> |
| |
| #include "../internal.h" |
| #include "../x509/internal.h" |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| /* |
| * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during |
| * evaluation. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * #define OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG |
| |
| static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev, |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node, int indent) |
| { |
| if ((lev->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK)) |
| BIO_puts(err, " Not Mapped\n"); |
| else { |
| int i; |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *pset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| BIO_puts(err, " Expected: "); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(pset); i++) { |
| oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(pset, i); |
| if (i) |
| BIO_puts(err, ", "); |
| i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(err, oid); |
| } |
| BIO_puts(err, "\n"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| int i; |
| BIO *err; |
| err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE); |
| if (!curr) |
| curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel; |
| else |
| curr++; |
| BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str); |
| BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels); |
| for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) { |
| BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n", |
| plev - tree->levels, plev->flags); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i); |
| X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2); |
| expected_print(err, plev, node, 2); |
| BIO_printf(err, " Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags); |
| } |
| if (plev->anyPolicy) |
| X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2); |
| } |
| |
| BIO_free(err); |
| |
| } |
| #else |
| |
| # define tree_print(a,b,c) /* */ |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| /*- |
| * Initialize policy tree. Return values: |
| * 0 Some internal error occurred. |
| * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates. |
| * 1 Tree initialized OK. |
| * 2 Policy tree is empty. |
| * 5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true. |
| * 6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true. |
| */ |
| |
| static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level; |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL; |
| X509 *x; |
| int ret = 1; |
| int i, n; |
| int explicit_policy; |
| int any_skip; |
| int map_skip; |
| *ptree = NULL; |
| n = sk_X509_num(certs); |
| |
| #if 0 |
| /* Disable policy mapping for now... */ |
| flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
| #endif |
| |
| if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) |
| explicit_policy = 0; |
| else |
| explicit_policy = n + 1; |
| |
| if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
| any_skip = 0; |
| else |
| any_skip = n + 1; |
| |
| if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| map_skip = 0; |
| else |
| map_skip = n + 1; |
| |
| /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */ |
| if (n == 1) |
| return 1; |
| /* |
| * First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust |
| * anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate |
| * explicit_policy value at this point. |
| */ |
| for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { |
| x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1); |
| cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */ |
| if (cache == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| /* |
| * If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue |
| */ |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) |
| ret = -1; |
| /* |
| * Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and |
| * haven't already set an inconsistent code note it. |
| */ |
| else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data) |
| ret = 2; |
| if (explicit_policy > 0) { |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| explicit_policy--; |
| if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1) |
| && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy)) |
| explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (ret != 1) { |
| if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy) |
| return 6; |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we get this far initialize the tree */ |
| |
| tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE)); |
| |
| if (!tree) |
| return 0; |
| |
| tree->flags = 0; |
| tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n); |
| tree->nlevel = 0; |
| tree->extra_data = NULL; |
| tree->auth_policies = NULL; |
| tree->user_policies = NULL; |
| |
| if (!tree->levels) { |
| OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL)); |
| |
| tree->nlevel = n; |
| |
| level = tree->levels; |
| |
| /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */ |
| |
| data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0); |
| |
| if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree)) |
| goto bad_tree; |
| |
| for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) { |
| level++; |
| x = sk_X509_value(certs, i); |
| cache = policy_cache_set(x); |
| X509_up_ref(x); |
| level->cert = x; |
| |
| if (!cache->anyPolicy) |
| level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| |
| /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */ |
| if (any_skip == 0) { |
| /* |
| * Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the |
| * last in the chain. |
| */ |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0)) |
| level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY; |
| } else { |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| any_skip--; |
| if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) |
| && (cache->any_skip < any_skip)) |
| any_skip = cache->any_skip; |
| } |
| |
| if (map_skip == 0) |
| level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP; |
| else { |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) |
| map_skip--; |
| if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) |
| && (cache->map_skip < map_skip)) |
| map_skip = cache->map_skip; |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| *ptree = tree; |
| |
| if (explicit_policy) |
| return 1; |
| else |
| return 5; |
| |
| bad_tree: |
| |
| X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *data) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| int matched = 0; |
| size_t i; |
| /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { |
| if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| matched = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { |
| if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This corresponds to RFC 3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from |
| * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match. |
| */ |
| |
| static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) { |
| data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); |
| /* |
| * If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding |
| * CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would |
| * be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be |
| * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link |
| * because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune |
| * it later. |
| */ |
| #if 0 |
| if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY) |
| && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)) |
| continue; |
| #endif |
| /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ |
| if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This corresponds to RFC 3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched |
| * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy. |
| */ |
| |
| static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| const ASN1_OBJECT *id, |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| if (id == NULL) |
| id = node->data->valid_policy; |
| /* |
| * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched |
| * node. |
| */ |
| data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node)); |
| |
| if (data == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
| data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
| data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
| if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) { |
| policy_data_free(data); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| size_t i; |
| |
| if ((last->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) |
| || !(node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED)) { |
| /* If no policy mapping: matched if one child present */ |
| if (node->nchild) |
| return 1; |
| if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, NULL, node, tree)) |
| return 0; |
| /* Add it */ |
| } else { |
| /* If mapping: matched if one child per expected policy set */ |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *expset = node->data->expected_policy_set; |
| if ((size_t)node->nchild == sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset)) |
| return 1; |
| /* Locate unmatched nodes */ |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(expset); i++) { |
| ASN1_OBJECT *oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(expset, i); |
| if (level_find_node(curr, node, oid)) |
| continue; |
| if (!tree_add_unmatched(curr, cache, oid, node, tree)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, |
| X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| /* |
| * X509_POLICY_DATA *data; |
| */ |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); |
| |
| if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| #if 0 |
| |
| /* |
| * Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes. |
| * Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node |
| * may have multiple children |
| */ |
| if (node->nchild) |
| continue; |
| |
| /* |
| * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from |
| * unmatched node. |
| */ |
| data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy, |
| node_critical(node)); |
| |
| if (data == NULL) |
| return 0; |
| /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ |
| data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; |
| data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; |
| if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) { |
| policy_data_free(data); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| } |
| /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ |
| if (last->anyPolicy) { |
| if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level |
| * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever |
| * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty. |
| */ |
| |
| static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| int i; |
| nodes = curr->nodes; |
| if (curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) { |
| for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| /* Delete any mapped data: see RFC 3280 XXXX */ |
| if (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAP_MASK) { |
| node->parent->nchild--; |
| OPENSSL_free(node); |
| (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| --curr; |
| nodes = curr->nodes; |
| for (i = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); |
| if (node->nchild == 0) { |
| node->parent->nchild--; |
| OPENSSL_free(node); |
| (void)sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_delete(nodes, i); |
| } |
| } |
| if (curr->anyPolicy && !curr->anyPolicy->nchild) { |
| if (curr->anyPolicy->parent) |
| curr->anyPolicy->parent->nchild--; |
| OPENSSL_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| curr->anyPolicy = NULL; |
| } |
| if (curr == tree->levels) { |
| /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */ |
| if (!curr->anyPolicy) |
| return 2; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes, |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy) |
| { |
| if (!*pnodes) { |
| *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new(); |
| if (!*pnodes) |
| return 0; |
| } else { |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_sort(*pnodes); |
| if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, NULL, pcy)) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter |
| * is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user |
| * set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to |
| * the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set |
| * of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return |
| * value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed. |
| */ |
| |
| static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node, *anyptr; |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **addnodes; |
| int i; |
| size_t j; |
| curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel - 1; |
| |
| /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */ |
| if (curr->anyPolicy) { |
| if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy)) |
| return 0; |
| addnodes = pnodes; |
| } else |
| /* Add policies to authority set */ |
| addnodes = &tree->auth_policies; |
| |
| curr = tree->levels; |
| for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++) { |
| /* |
| * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower |
| * levels so end search. |
| */ |
| if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy)) |
| break; |
| curr++; |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) { |
| node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j); |
| if ((node->parent == anyptr) |
| && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (addnodes == pnodes) |
| return 2; |
| |
| *pnodes = tree->auth_policies; |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *node; |
| ASN1_OBJECT *oid; |
| |
| X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy; |
| X509_POLICY_DATA *extra; |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this |
| * will happen if it is a leaf node. |
| */ |
| |
| if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0) |
| return 1; |
| |
| anyPolicy = tree->levels[tree->nlevel - 1].anyPolicy; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| if (OBJ_obj2nid(oid) == NID_any_policy) { |
| tree->flags |= POLICY_FLAG_ANY_POLICY; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids); i++) { |
| oid = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(policy_oids, i); |
| node = tree_find_sk(auth_nodes, oid); |
| if (!node) { |
| if (!anyPolicy) |
| continue; |
| /* |
| * Create a new node with policy ID from user set and qualifiers |
| * from anyPolicy. |
| */ |
| extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy)); |
| if (!extra) |
| return 0; |
| extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; |
| extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS |
| | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; |
| node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); |
| } |
| if (!tree->user_policies) { |
| tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); |
| if (!tree->user_policies) |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(tree->user_policies, node)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| int ret, i; |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr = tree->levels + 1; |
| const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache; |
| |
| for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); |
| if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) |
| && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree)) |
| return 0; |
| tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr); |
| ret = tree_prune(tree, curr); |
| if (ret != 1) |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node) |
| { |
| if (node->data && (node->data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE)) |
| OPENSSL_free(node); |
| } |
| |
| void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) |
| { |
| X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (!tree) |
| return; |
| |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(tree->auth_policies); |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free); |
| |
| for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { |
| if (curr->cert) |
| X509_free(curr->cert); |
| if (curr->nodes) |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free); |
| if (curr->anyPolicy) |
| policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy); |
| } |
| |
| if (tree->extra_data) |
| sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free); |
| |
| OPENSSL_free(tree->levels); |
| OPENSSL_free(tree); |
| |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Application policy checking function. |
| * Return codes: |
| * 0 Internal Error. |
| * 1 Successful. |
| * -1 One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions |
| * -2 User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true. |
| */ |
| |
| int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy, |
| STACK_OF(X509) *certs, |
| STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| int calc_ret; |
| X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL; |
| *ptree = NULL; |
| |
| *pexplicit_policy = 0; |
| ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags); |
| |
| switch (ret) { |
| |
| /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */ |
| case 2: |
| return 1; |
| |
| /* Some internal error */ |
| case -1: |
| return -1; |
| |
| /* Some internal error */ |
| case 0: |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */ |
| |
| case 6: |
| *pexplicit_policy = 1; |
| return -2; |
| |
| /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */ |
| case 5: |
| *pexplicit_policy = 1; |
| break; |
| |
| /* Tree OK: continue */ |
| |
| case 1: |
| if (!tree) |
| /* |
| * tree_init() returns success and a null tree |
| * if it's just looking at a trust anchor. |
| * I'm not sure that returning success here is |
| * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this |
| * as an internal error which our caller |
| * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong. |
| */ |
| return 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tree) |
| goto error; |
| ret = tree_evaluate(tree); |
| |
| tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL); |
| |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto error; |
| |
| /* Return value 2 means tree empty */ |
| if (ret == 2) { |
| X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| if (*pexplicit_policy) |
| return -2; |
| else |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Tree is not empty: continue */ |
| |
| calc_ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes); |
| |
| if (!calc_ret) |
| goto error; |
| |
| ret = tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes); |
| |
| if (calc_ret == 2) |
| sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes); |
| |
| if (!ret) |
| goto error; |
| |
| |
| if (tree) |
| *ptree = tree; |
| |
| if (*pexplicit_policy) { |
| nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree); |
| if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0) |
| return -2; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| error: |
| |
| X509_policy_tree_free(tree); |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| } |
