| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <stdlib.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *tick, int ticklen, | |
| const uint8_t *sess_id, int sesslen, | |
| SSL_SESSION **psess); | |
| static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s); | |
| static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s); | |
| const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { | |
| tls1_enc, | |
| tls1_prf, | |
| tls1_setup_key_block, | |
| tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
| tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
| tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
| tls1_cert_verify_mac, | |
| TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
| TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
| tls1_alert_code, | |
| tls1_export_keying_material, | |
| 0, | |
| }; | |
| const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = { | |
| tls1_enc, | |
| tls1_prf, | |
| tls1_setup_key_block, | |
| tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
| tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
| tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
| tls1_cert_verify_mac, | |
| TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
| TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
| tls1_alert_code, | |
| tls1_export_keying_material, | |
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV, | |
| }; | |
| const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = { | |
| tls1_enc, | |
| tls1_prf, | |
| tls1_setup_key_block, | |
| tls1_generate_master_secret, | |
| tls1_change_cipher_state, | |
| tls1_final_finish_mac, | |
| tls1_cert_verify_mac, | |
| TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
| TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | |
| tls1_alert_code, | |
| tls1_export_keying_material, | |
| SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF | |
| |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS, | |
| }; | |
| static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) { | |
| uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1); | |
| uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2); | |
| if (u1 < u2) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } else if (u1 > u2) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } else { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be | |
| * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. | |
| * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those | |
| * out. */ | |
| static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) { | |
| CBS extensions = *cbs; | |
| size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0; | |
| uint16_t *extension_types = NULL; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| /* First pass: count the extensions. */ | |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) { | |
| uint16_t type; | |
| CBS extension; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| num_extensions++; | |
| } | |
| if (num_extensions == 0) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| extension_types = | |
| (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions); | |
| if (extension_types == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions, | |
| ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */ | |
| extensions = *cbs; | |
| for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) { | |
| CBS extension; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| /* This should not happen. */ | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0); | |
| /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */ | |
| qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t); | |
| for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) { | |
| if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| done: | |
| OPENSSL_free(extension_types); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) { | |
| CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions; | |
| CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len); | |
| if (/* Skip client version. */ | |
| !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2) || | |
| /* Skip client nonce. */ | |
| !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32) || | |
| /* Extract session_id. */ | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id); | |
| ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id); | |
| /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl)) { | |
| CBS cookie; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Extract cipher_suites. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) || | |
| CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites); | |
| ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites); | |
| /* Extract compression_methods. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) || | |
| CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods); | |
| ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods); | |
| /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any | |
| * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) { | |
| ctx->extensions = NULL; | |
| ctx->extensions_len = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) || | |
| !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) || | |
| CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions); | |
| ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| char SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get( | |
| const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, uint16_t extension_type, | |
| const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) { | |
| CBS extensions; | |
| CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len); | |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { | |
| uint16_t type; | |
| CBS extension; | |
| /* Decode the next extension. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (type == extension_type) { | |
| *out_data = CBS_data(&extension); | |
| *out_len = CBS_len(&extension); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| struct tls_curve { | |
| uint16_t curve_id; | |
| int nid; | |
| }; | |
| /* ECC curves from RFC4492. */ | |
| static const struct tls_curve tls_curves[] = { | |
| {21, NID_secp224r1}, | |
| {23, NID_X9_62_prime256v1}, | |
| {24, NID_secp384r1}, | |
| {25, NID_secp521r1}, | |
| }; | |
| static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] = { | |
| TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed, | |
| }; | |
| static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = { | |
| 23, /* X9_62_prime256v1 */ | |
| 24, /* secp384r1 */ | |
| }; | |
| int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tls_curves) / sizeof(tls_curves[0]); i++) { | |
| if (curve_id == tls_curves[i].curve_id) { | |
| return tls_curves[i].nid; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NID_undef; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(uint16_t *out_curve_id, int nid) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tls_curves) / sizeof(tls_curves[0]); i++) { | |
| if (nid == tls_curves[i].nid) { | |
| *out_curve_id = tls_curves[i].curve_id; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the | |
| * list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero, return the | |
| * peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */ | |
| static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_peer_curves, | |
| const uint16_t **out_curve_ids, | |
| size_t *out_curve_ids_len) { | |
| if (get_peer_curves) { | |
| /* Only clients send a curve list, so this function is only called | |
| * on the server. */ | |
| assert(s->server); | |
| *out_curve_ids = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist; | |
| *out_curve_ids_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length; | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; | |
| *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; | |
| if (!*out_curve_ids) { | |
| *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default; | |
| *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id) { | |
| uint8_t curve_type; | |
| uint16_t curve_id; | |
| const uint16_t *curves; | |
| size_t curves_len, i; | |
| /* Only support named curves. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) || | |
| curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE || | |
| !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len); | |
| for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) { | |
| if (curve_id == curves[i]) { | |
| *out_curve_id = curve_id; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s) { | |
| const uint16_t *curves, *peer_curves, *pref, *supp; | |
| size_t curves_len, peer_curves_len, pref_len, supp_len, i, j; | |
| /* Can't do anything on client side */ | |
| if (s->server == 0) { | |
| return NID_undef; | |
| } | |
| tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0 /* local curves */, &curves, &curves_len); | |
| tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1 /* peer curves */, &peer_curves, &peer_curves_len); | |
| if (peer_curves_len == 0) { | |
| /* Clients are not required to send a supported_curves extension. In this | |
| * case, the server is free to pick any curve it likes. See RFC 4492, | |
| * section 4, paragraph 3. */ | |
| return (curves_len == 0) ? NID_undef : tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curves[0]); | |
| } | |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) { | |
| pref = curves; | |
| pref_len = curves_len; | |
| supp = peer_curves; | |
| supp_len = peer_curves_len; | |
| } else { | |
| pref = peer_curves; | |
| pref_len = peer_curves_len; | |
| supp = curves; | |
| supp_len = curves_len; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < pref_len; i++) { | |
| for (j = 0; j < supp_len; j++) { | |
| if (pref[i] == supp[j]) { | |
| return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NID_undef; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len, | |
| const int *curves, size_t ncurves) { | |
| uint16_t *curve_ids; | |
| size_t i; | |
| curve_ids = (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t)); | |
| if (curve_ids == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) { | |
| if (!tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&curve_ids[i], curves[i])) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(curve_ids); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids); | |
| *out_curve_ids = curve_ids; | |
| *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the | |
| * TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on | |
| * success and zero on failure. */ | |
| static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id, | |
| uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) { | |
| int nid; | |
| uint16_t id; | |
| const EC_GROUP *grp; | |
| if (ec == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec); | |
| if (grp == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Determine curve ID */ | |
| nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp); | |
| if (!tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&id, nid)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not supported. */ | |
| *out_curve_id = id; | |
| if (out_comp_id) { | |
| if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) { | |
| *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; | |
| } else { | |
| *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_check_point_format returns one if |comp_id| is consistent with the | |
| * peer's point format preferences. */ | |
| static int tls1_check_point_format(SSL *s, uint8_t comp_id) { | |
| uint8_t *p = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist; | |
| size_t plen = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length; | |
| size_t i; | |
| /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is | |
| * supported (see RFC4492). */ | |
| if (p == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < plen; i++) { | |
| if (comp_id == p[i]) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our | |
| * and the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our | |
| * preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */ | |
| static int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id) { | |
| const uint16_t *curves; | |
| size_t curves_len, i, get_peer_curves; | |
| /* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */ | |
| for (get_peer_curves = 0; get_peer_curves <= 1; get_peer_curves++) { | |
| if (get_peer_curves && !s->server) { | |
| /* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a client, only | |
| * check our list. */ | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| tls1_get_curvelist(s, get_peer_curves, &curves, &curves_len); | |
| if (get_peer_curves && curves_len == 0) { | |
| /* Clients are not required to send a supported_curves extension. In this | |
| * case, the server is free to pick any curve it likes. See RFC 4492, | |
| * section 4, paragraph 3. */ | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) { | |
| if (curves[i] == curve_id) { | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (i == curves_len) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const uint8_t **pformats, | |
| size_t *pformatslen) { | |
| /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default */ | |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { | |
| *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | |
| *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | |
| } else { | |
| *pformats = ecformats_default; | |
| *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x) { | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); | |
| uint16_t curve_id; | |
| uint8_t comp_id; | |
| if (!pkey || | |
| pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC || | |
| !tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec) || | |
| !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) || | |
| !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id)) { | |
| goto done; | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| done: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s) { | |
| if (s->cert->ecdh_nid != NID_undef) { | |
| /* If the curve is preconfigured, ECDH is acceptable iff the peer supports | |
| * the curve. */ | |
| uint16_t curve_id; | |
| return tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(&curve_id, s->cert->ecdh_nid) && | |
| tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id); | |
| } | |
| if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) { | |
| /* Assume the callback will provide an acceptable curve. */ | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Otherwise, the curve gets selected automatically. ECDH is acceptable iff | |
| * there is a shared curve. */ | |
| return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef; | |
| } | |
| /* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this | |
| * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */ | |
| #define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, | |
| #define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, | |
| #define tlsext_sigalg(md) tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) | |
| static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = { | |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) | |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) | |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) | |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) | |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) | |
| }; | |
| size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const uint8_t **psigs) { | |
| /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */ | |
| if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) { | |
| *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs; | |
| return s->cert->client_sigalgslen; | |
| } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) { | |
| *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs; | |
| return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen; | |
| } else { | |
| *psigs = tls12_sigalgs; | |
| return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of |cbs|. It | |
| * checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported signature algorithms and, | |
| * if so, writes the relevant digest into |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it | |
| * returns 0 and writes an alert into |*out_alert|. */ | |
| int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, SSL *s, | |
| CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { | |
| const uint8_t *sent_sigs; | |
| size_t sent_sigslen, i; | |
| int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey); | |
| uint8_t hash, signature; | |
| /* Should never happen */ | |
| if (sigalg == -1) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) || | |
| !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Check key type is consistent with signature */ | |
| if (sigalg != signature) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { | |
| uint16_t curve_id; | |
| uint8_t comp_id; | |
| /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */ | |
| if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (s->server && (!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) || | |
| !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Check signature matches a type we sent */ | |
| sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs); | |
| for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) { | |
| if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1]) { | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Allow fallback to SHA-1. */ | |
| if (i == sent_sigslen && hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash); | |
| if (*out_md == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't | |
| * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike | |
| * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global | |
| * settings. */ | |
| void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) { | |
| CERT *c = s->cert; | |
| const uint8_t *sigalgs; | |
| size_t i, sigalgslen; | |
| int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0; | |
| c->mask_a = 0; | |
| c->mask_k = 0; | |
| /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */ | |
| if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) { | |
| c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2; | |
| } else { | |
| c->mask_ssl = 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA, | |
| * DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */ | |
| sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs); | |
| for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) { | |
| switch (sigalgs[1]) { | |
| case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: | |
| have_rsa = 1; | |
| break; | |
| case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: | |
| have_ecdsa = 1; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature algorithms. */ | |
| if (!have_rsa) { | |
| c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; | |
| } | |
| if (!have_ecdsa) { | |
| c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; | |
| } | |
| /* with PSK there must be client callback set */ | |
| if (!s->psk_client_callback) { | |
| c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; | |
| c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to | |
| * compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding | |
| * is to be done. */ | |
| uint8_t *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *limit, | |
| size_t header_len) { | |
| int extdatalen = 0; | |
| uint8_t *ret = buf; | |
| uint8_t *orig = buf; | |
| /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ | |
| int using_ecc = 0; | |
| if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| uint32_t alg_k, alg_a; | |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { | |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); | |
| alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; | |
| alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; | |
| if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) { | |
| using_ecc = 1; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ | |
| if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) { | |
| return orig; | |
| } | |
| ret += 2; | |
| if (ret >= limit) { | |
| return NULL; /* should never occur. */ | |
| } | |
| if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
| /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ | |
| unsigned long size_str; | |
| long lenmax; | |
| /* check for enough space. | |
| 4 for the servername type and entension length | |
| 2 for servernamelist length | |
| 1 for the hostname type | |
| 2 for hostname length | |
| + hostname length */ | |
| lenmax = limit - ret - 9; | |
| size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname); | |
| if (lenmax < 0 || size_str > (unsigned long)lenmax) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* extension type and length */ | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); | |
| s2n(size_str + 5, ret); | |
| /* length of servername list */ | |
| s2n(size_str + 3, ret); | |
| /* hostname type, length and hostname */ | |
| *(ret++) = (uint8_t)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; | |
| s2n(size_str, ret); | |
| memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); | |
| ret += size_str; | |
| } | |
| /* Add RI if renegotiating */ | |
| if (s->renegotiate) { | |
| int el; | |
| if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); | |
| s2n(el, ret); | |
| if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| ret += el; | |
| } | |
| /* Add extended master secret. */ | |
| if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { | |
| int ticklen = 0; | |
| if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) { | |
| ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; | |
| } | |
| /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for | |
| * ticket. */ | |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); | |
| s2n(ticklen, ret); | |
| if (ticklen) { | |
| memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); | |
| ret += ticklen; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (ssl3_version_from_wire(s, s->client_version) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { | |
| size_t salglen; | |
| const uint8_t *salg; | |
| salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg); | |
| if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); | |
| s2n(salglen + 2, ret); | |
| s2n(salglen, ret); | |
| memcpy(ret, salg, salglen); | |
| ret += salglen; | |
| } | |
| if (s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) { | |
| /* The status_request extension is excessively extensible at every layer. | |
| * On the client, only support requesting OCSP responses with an empty | |
| * responder_id_list and no extensions. */ | |
| if (limit - ret - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | |
| s2n(1 + 2 + 2, ret); | |
| /* status_type */ | |
| *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; | |
| /* responder_id_list - empty */ | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| /* request_extensions - empty */ | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len && | |
| !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support for | |
| * Next Protocol Negotiation */ | |
| if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { | |
| /* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support for | |
| * certificate timestamps. */ | |
| if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, ret); | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { | |
| if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); | |
| s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); | |
| s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret); | |
| memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len); | |
| ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len; | |
| } | |
| if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support for | |
| * Channel ID. */ | |
| if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new) { | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, ret); | |
| } else { | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, ret); | |
| } | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { | |
| int el; | |
| ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); | |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); | |
| s2n(el, ret); | |
| if (!ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| ret += el; | |
| } | |
| if (using_ecc) { | |
| /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ | |
| long lenmax; | |
| const uint8_t *formats; | |
| const uint16_t *curves; | |
| size_t formats_len, curves_len, i; | |
| tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len); | |
| lenmax = limit - ret - 5; | |
| if (lenmax < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (formats_len > 255) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); | |
| s2n(formats_len + 1, ret); | |
| *(ret++) = (uint8_t)formats_len; | |
| memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len); | |
| ret += formats_len; | |
| /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ | |
| tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len); | |
| lenmax = limit - ret - 6; | |
| if (lenmax < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (curves_len * 2 > (size_t)lenmax) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (curves_len * 2 > 65532) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); | |
| s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret); | |
| s2n(curves_len * 2, ret); | |
| for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) { | |
| s2n(curves[i], ret); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (header_len > 0) { | |
| size_t clienthello_minsize = 0; | |
| header_len += ret - orig; | |
| if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) { | |
| /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 | |
| * | |
| * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions | |
| * it MUST always appear last. */ | |
| clienthello_minsize = 0x200; | |
| } | |
| if (s->fastradio_padding) { | |
| /* Pad the ClientHello record to 1024 bytes to fast forward the radio | |
| * into DCH (high data rate) state in 3G networks. Note that when | |
| * fastradio_padding is enabled, even if the header_len is less than 255 | |
| * bytes, the padding will be applied regardless. This is slightly | |
| * different from the TLS padding extension suggested in | |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 */ | |
| clienthello_minsize = 0x400; | |
| } | |
| if (header_len < clienthello_minsize) { | |
| size_t padding_len = clienthello_minsize - header_len; | |
| /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include least | |
| * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application | |
| * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */ | |
| if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) { | |
| padding_len -= 4; | |
| } else { | |
| padding_len = 1; | |
| } | |
| if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); | |
| s2n(padding_len, ret); | |
| memset(ret, 0, padding_len); | |
| ret += padding_len; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| extdatalen = ret - orig - 2; | |
| if (extdatalen == 0) { | |
| return orig; | |
| } | |
| s2n(extdatalen, orig); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *limit) { | |
| int extdatalen = 0; | |
| uint8_t *orig = buf; | |
| uint8_t *ret = buf; | |
| int next_proto_neg_seen; | |
| uint32_t alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
| uint32_t alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
| int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); | |
| using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != NULL); | |
| /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ | |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) { | |
| return orig; | |
| } | |
| ret += 2; | |
| if (ret >= limit) { | |
| return NULL; /* should never happen. */ | |
| } | |
| if (!s->hit && s->should_ack_sni && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { | |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { | |
| int el; | |
| if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); | |
| s2n(el, ret); | |
| if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| ret += el; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) { | |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret); | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (using_ecc) { | |
| const uint8_t *plist; | |
| size_t plistlen; | |
| /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ | |
| long lenmax; | |
| tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen); | |
| lenmax = limit - ret - 5; | |
| if (lenmax < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (plistlen > 255) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); | |
| s2n(plistlen + 1, ret); | |
| *(ret++) = (uint8_t)plistlen; | |
| memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen); | |
| ret += plistlen; | |
| } | |
| /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ | |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { | |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) { | |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| if (s->srtp_profile) { | |
| int el; | |
| ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); | |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); | |
| s2n(el, ret); | |
| if (!ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| ret += el; | |
| } | |
| next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; | |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
| if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { | |
| const uint8_t *npa; | |
| unsigned int npalen; | |
| int r; | |
| r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb( | |
| s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); | |
| if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); | |
| s2n(npalen, ret); | |
| memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); | |
| ret += npalen; | |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->alpn_selected) { | |
| const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected; | |
| size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; | |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret); | |
| s2n(3 + len, ret); | |
| s2n(1 + len, ret); | |
| *ret++ = len; | |
| memcpy(ret, selected, len); | |
| ret += len; | |
| } | |
| /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it | |
| * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */ | |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) { | |
| if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) { | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, ret); | |
| } else { | |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, ret); | |
| } | |
| s2n(0, ret); | |
| } | |
| extdatalen = ret - orig - 2; | |
| if (extdatalen == 0) { | |
| return orig; | |
| } | |
| s2n(extdatalen, orig); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a | |
| * ClientHello. | |
| * cbs: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length. | |
| * out_alert: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a zero | |
| * return. | |
| * | |
| * returns: 1 on success. */ | |
| static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) { | |
| CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name_list_copy; | |
| const uint8_t *selected; | |
| uint8_t selected_len; | |
| int r; | |
| if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) || | |
| CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) { | |
| goto parse_error; | |
| } | |
| /* Validate the protocol list. */ | |
| protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list; | |
| while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) { | |
| CBS protocol_name; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name)) { | |
| goto parse_error; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb( | |
| s, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list), | |
| CBS_len(&protocol_name_list), s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg); | |
| if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); | |
| s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len); | |
| if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| parse_error: | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) { | |
| int renegotiate_seen = 0; | |
| CBS extensions; | |
| s->should_ack_sni = 0; | |
| s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
| s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0; | |
| s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0; | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); | |
| s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; | |
| /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs); | |
| s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL; | |
| s->cert->peer_sigalgslen = 0; | |
| /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs); | |
| s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL; | |
| s->cert->shared_sigalgslen = 0; | |
| /* Clear ECC extensions */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist); | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL; | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist); | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL; | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; | |
| /* There may be no extensions. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) { | |
| goto ri_check; | |
| } | |
| /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) || | |
| !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { | |
| uint16_t type; | |
| CBS extension; | |
| /* Decode the next extension. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* The servername extension is treated as follows: | |
| - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | |
| - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, in | |
| which case an fatal alert is generated. | |
| - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | |
| - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | |
| to allow the application to position itself to the right context. | |
| - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | |
| it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | |
| Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time | |
| set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | |
| case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | |
| a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | |
| presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | |
| the value of the Host: field. | |
| - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | |
| if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the | |
| session, | |
| i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. | |
| - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. */ | |
| if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { | |
| CBS server_name_list; | |
| char have_seen_host_name = 0; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */ | |
| while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0) { | |
| uint8_t name_type; | |
| CBS host_name; | |
| /* Decode the NameType. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Only host_name is supported. */ | |
| if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (have_seen_host_name) { | |
| /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain more than one name of the same | |
| * name_type. */ | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| have_seen_host_name = 1; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) || | |
| CBS_len(&host_name) < 1) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name || | |
| CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!s->hit) { | |
| assert(s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL); | |
| if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) { | |
| /* This should be impossible. */ | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Copy the hostname as a string. */ | |
| if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->should_ack_sni = 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { | |
| CBS ec_point_format_list; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist, | |
| &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { | |
| CBS elliptic_curve_list; | |
| size_t i, num_curves; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 || | |
| (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 || | |
| CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist); | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = | |
| (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list)); | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2; | |
| for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) { | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list, | |
| &s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i])) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
| if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| renegotiate_seen = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { | |
| CBS supported_signature_algorithms; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, | |
| &supported_signature_algorithms) || | |
| CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It contains a list of | |
| * SignatureAndHashAlgorithms which are two bytes each. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 || | |
| (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal error. */ | |
| if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext, | |
| SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS); | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && | |
| s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL && | |
| !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| /* The extension must be empty. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a renegotiation. | |
| * | |
| * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we probably shouldn't | |
| * rely that it couldn't be set on the initial renegotation too in | |
| * certain cases (when there's some other reason to disallow resuming an | |
| * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing anything like that, | |
| * but this might change). | |
| * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake in this connection | |
| * is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 0. (We are talking about a check | |
| * that will happen in the Hello protocol round, well before a new | |
| * Finished message could have been computed.) */ | |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation && | |
| s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { | |
| if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */ | |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled && | |
| !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| /* The extension must be empty. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new && | |
| s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| /* The extension must be empty. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; | |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { | |
| if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret && | |
| s->version != SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ri_check: | |
| /* Need RI if renegotiating */ | |
| if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && | |
| !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext, | |
| SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) { | |
| int alert = -1; | |
| if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext, | |
| SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No | |
| * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly | |
| * fill the length of the block. */ | |
| static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs) { | |
| CBS copy = *cbs; | |
| while (CBS_len(©) != 0) { | |
| CBS proto; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(©, &proto) || CBS_len(&proto) == 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) { | |
| int tlsext_servername = 0; | |
| int renegotiate_seen = 0; | |
| CBS extensions; | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Move all of these to some per-handshake state that gets | |
| * systematically reset on a new handshake; perhaps allocate it fresh each | |
| * time so it's not even kept around post-handshake. */ | |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; | |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
| s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0; | |
| s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0; | |
| s->srtp_profile = NULL; | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); | |
| s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL; | |
| /* Clear ECC extensions */ | |
| OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist); | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL; | |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | |
| /* There may be no extensions. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) { | |
| goto ri_check; | |
| } | |
| /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) || | |
| !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) { | |
| uint16_t type; | |
| CBS extension; | |
| /* Decode the next extension. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) || | |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { | |
| /* The extension must be empty. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */ | |
| if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| tlsext_servername = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { | |
| CBS ec_point_format_list; | |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist, | |
| &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { | |
| if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) { | |
| /* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if we've requested a | |
| * status request message. */ | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */ | |
| s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && | |
| s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && | |
| !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| uint8_t *selected; | |
| uint8_t selected_len; | |
| /* We must have requested it. */ | |
| if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* The data must be valid. */ | |
| if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb( | |
| s, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&extension), | |
| CBS_len(&extension), | |
| s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len); | |
| if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; | |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) { | |
| CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name; | |
| /* We must have requested it. */ | |
| if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have | |
| * exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed. */ | |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) || | |
| CBS_len(&extension) != 0 || | |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) || | |
| CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &s->s3->alpn_selected, | |
| &s->s3->alpn_selected_len)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1; | |
| s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) { | |
| if (CBS_len(&extension) == 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */ | |
| if (!s->hit && | |
| !CBS_stow(&extension, &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list, | |
| &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { | |
| if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| renegotiate_seen = 1; | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { | |
| if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) { | |
| if (/* It is invalid for the server to select EMS and | |
| SSLv3. */ | |
| s->version == SSL3_VERSION || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1 && s->tlsext_hostname) { | |
| if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { | |
| s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); | |
| if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ri_check: | |
| /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid an | |
| * attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello because the | |
| * client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. However this would | |
| * mean we could not connect to any server which doesn't support RI so for | |
| * the immediate future tolerate RI absence on initial connect only. */ | |
| if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) && | |
| !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { | |
| *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext, | |
| SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; } | |
| int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; } | |
| static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { | |
| int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
| int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
| /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in | |
| * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */ | |
| if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { | |
| ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
| s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
| } else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && | |
| s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { | |
| ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback( | |
| s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
| } | |
| switch (ret) { | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| return -1; | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
| return 1; | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | |
| s->should_ack_sni = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { | |
| int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | |
| int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | |
| /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, | |
| * then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it must contain | |
| * uncompressed. */ | |
| uint32_t alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | |
| uint32_t alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | |
| if (((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) && | |
| !tls1_check_point_format(s, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext, | |
| SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; | |
| if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { | |
| ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, | |
| s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
| } else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && | |
| s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) { | |
| ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback( | |
| s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | |
| } | |
| switch (ret) { | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| return -1; | |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); | |
| return 1; | |
| default: | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) { | |
| int alert = -1; | |
| if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) { | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext, | |
| SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the | |
| * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle | |
| * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. | |
| * | |
| * ctx: contains the early callback context, which is the result of a | |
| * shallow parse of the ClientHello. | |
| * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to | |
| * point to the resulting session. | |
| * | |
| * Returns: | |
| * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. | |
| * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). | |
| * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports | |
| * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. | |
| * 2: a ticket was offered but couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal | |
| * error. | |
| * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. | |
| * | |
| * Side effects: | |
| * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue | |
| * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support | |
| * but the client either doesn't have a session ticket or we couldn't use | |
| * the one it gave us, or if s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew | |
| * the client's ticket. Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. | |
| */ | |
| int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, | |
| SSL_SESSION **ret) { | |
| *ret = NULL; | |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; | |
| const uint8_t *data; | |
| size_t len; | |
| int r; | |
| /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful | |
| * resumption. */ | |
| if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || | |
| (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION && !ctx->extensions) || | |
| !SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, | |
| &data, &len)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (len == 0) { | |
| /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have one. */ | |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len, | |
| ret); | |
| switch (r) { | |
| case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ | |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
| return 2; | |
| case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ | |
| return r; | |
| case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ | |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | |
| return 3; | |
| default: /* fatal error */ | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. | |
| * | |
| * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. | |
| * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. | |
| * sess_id: points at the session ID. | |
| * sesslen: the length of the session ID. | |
| * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to | |
| * point to the resulting session. | |
| * | |
| * Returns: | |
| * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. | |
| * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. | |
| * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. | |
| * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. */ | |
| static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *etick, int eticklen, | |
| const uint8_t *sess_id, int sesslen, | |
| SSL_SESSION **psess) { | |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; | |
| uint8_t *sdec; | |
| const uint8_t *p; | |
| int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; | |
| uint8_t tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| HMAC_CTX hctx; | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; | |
| SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; | |
| /* Ensure there is room for the key name and the largest IV | |
| * |tlsext_ticket_key_cb| may try to consume. The real limit may be lower, but | |
| * the maximum IV length should be well under the minimum size for the | |
| * session material and HMAC. */ | |
| if (eticklen < 16 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { | |
| return 2; | |
| } | |
| /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ | |
| HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
| if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { | |
| uint8_t *nctick = (uint8_t *)etick; | |
| int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, &ctx, &hctx, | |
| 0 /* decrypt */); | |
| if (rv < 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (rv == 0) { | |
| return 2; | |
| } | |
| if (rv == 2) { | |
| renew_ticket = 1; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| /* Check key name matches */ | |
| if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) { | |
| return 2; | |
| } | |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), | |
| NULL) || | |
| !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, | |
| tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16)) { | |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* First, check the MAC. The MAC is at the end of the ticket. */ | |
| mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); | |
| if ((size_t) eticklen < 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx) + 1 + mlen) { | |
| /* The ticket must be large enough for key name, IV, data, and MAC. */ | |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return 2; | |
| } | |
| eticklen -= mlen; | |
| /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ | |
| HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); | |
| HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); | |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return 2; | |
| } | |
| /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ | |
| /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ | |
| p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | |
| eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | |
| sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); | |
| if (!sdec) { | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); | |
| if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
| return 2; | |
| } | |
| slen += mlen; | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| p = sdec; | |
| sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); | |
| OPENSSL_free(sdec); | |
| if (sess) { | |
| /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect that the | |
| * ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session structure. If it | |
| * is empty set length to zero as required by standard. */ | |
| if (sesslen) { | |
| memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); | |
| } | |
| sess->session_id_length = sesslen; | |
| *psess = sess; | |
| if (renew_ticket) { | |
| return 4; | |
| } | |
| return 3; | |
| } | |
| ERR_clear_error(); | |
| /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */ | |
| return 2; | |
| } | |
| /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ | |
| typedef struct { | |
| int nid; | |
| int id; | |
| } tls12_lookup; | |
| static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, | |
| {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, | |
| {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, | |
| {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, | |
| {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, | |
| {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}}; | |
| static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, | |
| {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}}; | |
| static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { | |
| if (table[i].nid == nid) { | |
| return table[i].id; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { | |
| if (table[i].id == id) { | |
| return table[i].nid; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NID_undef; | |
| } | |
| int tls12_get_sigandhash(uint8_t *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) { | |
| int sig_id, md_id; | |
| if (!md) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, | |
| sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); | |
| if (md_id == -1) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); | |
| if (sig_id == -1) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| p[0] = (uint8_t)md_id; | |
| p[1] = (uint8_t)sig_id; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) { | |
| return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, | |
| sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); | |
| } | |
| const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(uint8_t hash_alg) { | |
| switch (hash_alg) { | |
| case TLSEXT_hash_md5: | |
| return EVP_md5(); | |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: | |
| return EVP_sha1(); | |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: | |
| return EVP_sha224(); | |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: | |
| return EVP_sha256(); | |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: | |
| return EVP_sha384(); | |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: | |
| return EVP_sha512(); | |
| default: | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* tls12_get_pkey_type returns the EVP_PKEY type corresponding to TLS signature | |
| * algorithm |sig_alg|. It returns -1 if the type is unknown. */ | |
| static int tls12_get_pkey_type(uint8_t sig_alg) { | |
| switch (sig_alg) { | |
| case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: | |
| return EVP_PKEY_RSA; | |
| case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: | |
| return EVP_PKEY_EC; | |
| default: | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */ | |
| static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid, | |
| int *psignhash_nid, const uint8_t *data) { | |
| int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0; | |
| if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) { | |
| hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md, | |
| sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); | |
| if (phash_nid) { | |
| *phash_nid = hash_nid; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) { | |
| sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig, | |
| sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); | |
| if (psign_nid) { | |
| *psign_nid = sign_nid; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (psignhash_nid) { | |
| if (sign_nid && hash_nid) { | |
| OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid); | |
| } else { | |
| *psignhash_nid = NID_undef; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */ | |
| static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, const uint8_t *pref, | |
| size_t preflen, const uint8_t *allow, | |
| size_t allowlen) { | |
| const uint8_t *ptmp, *atmp; | |
| size_t i, j, nmatch = 0; | |
| for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) { | |
| /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */ | |
| if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL || | |
| tls12_get_pkey_type(ptmp[1]) == -1) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) { | |
| if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) { | |
| nmatch++; | |
| if (shsig) { | |
| shsig->rhash = ptmp[0]; | |
| shsig->rsign = ptmp[1]; | |
| tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, &shsig->sign_nid, | |
| &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp); | |
| shsig++; | |
| } | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return nmatch; | |
| } | |
| /* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */ | |
| static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) { | |
| const uint8_t *pref, *allow, *conf; | |
| size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen; | |
| size_t nmatch; | |
| TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL; | |
| CERT *c = s->cert; | |
| OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs); | |
| c->shared_sigalgs = NULL; | |
| c->shared_sigalgslen = 0; | |
| /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */ | |
| if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs) { | |
| conf = c->client_sigalgs; | |
| conflen = c->client_sigalgslen; | |
| } else if (c->conf_sigalgs) { | |
| conf = c->conf_sigalgs; | |
| conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen; | |
| } else { | |
| conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf); | |
| } | |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) { | |
| pref = conf; | |
| preflen = conflen; | |
| allow = c->peer_sigalgs; | |
| allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen; | |
| } else { | |
| allow = conf; | |
| allowlen = conflen; | |
| pref = c->peer_sigalgs; | |
| preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen; | |
| } | |
| nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); | |
| if (!nmatch) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS)); | |
| if (!salgs) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen); | |
| c->shared_sigalgs = salgs; | |
| c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ | |
| int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs) { | |
| CERT *c = s->cert; | |
| /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */ | |
| if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0 || | |
| !CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen) || | |
| !tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const EVP_MD *tls1_choose_signing_digest(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { | |
| CERT *c = s->cert; | |
| int type = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); | |
| size_t i; | |
| /* Select the first shared digest supported by our key. */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) { | |
| const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rhash); | |
| if (md == NULL || | |
| tls12_get_pkey_type(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rsign) != type || | |
| !EVP_PKEY_supports_digest(pkey, md)) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| return md; | |
| } | |
| /* If no suitable digest may be found, default to SHA-1. */ | |
| return EVP_sha1(); | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash, | |
| uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash) { | |
| const uint8_t *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs; | |
| if (psig == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (idx >= 0) { | |
| idx <<= 1; | |
| if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| psig += idx; | |
| if (rhash) { | |
| *rhash = psig[0]; | |
| } | |
| if (rsig) { | |
| *rsig = psig[1]; | |
| } | |
| tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig); | |
| } | |
| return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2; | |
| } | |
| int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, | |
| int *psignhash, uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash) { | |
| TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs; | |
| if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| shsigalgs += idx; | |
| if (phash) { | |
| *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid; | |
| } | |
| if (psign) { | |
| *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid; | |
| } | |
| if (psignhash) { | |
| *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid; | |
| } | |
| if (rsig) { | |
| *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign; | |
| } | |
| if (rhash) { | |
| *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash; | |
| } | |
| return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the | |
| * given SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */ | |
| int tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s) { | |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | |
| uint8_t temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| unsigned temp_digest_len; | |
| int i; | |
| static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature"; | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && | |
| !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic)); | |
| if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) { | |
| static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption"; | |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic)); | |
| if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash, | |
| s->session->original_handshake_hash_len); | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])) { | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len); | |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len); | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake | |
| * hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */ | |
| int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) { | |
| int digest_len; | |
| /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because the | |
| * handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full | |
| * handshake. */ | |
| if (s->hit) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been | |
| * negotiated. */ | |
| if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| digest_len = | |
| tls1_handshake_digest(s, s->session->original_handshake_hash, | |
| sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash)); | |
| if (digest_len < 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, | |
| int client) { | |
| uint8_t *sigalgs, *sptr; | |
| int rhash, rsign; | |
| size_t i; | |
| if (salglen & 1) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen); | |
| if (sigalgs == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) { | |
| rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md, | |
| sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); | |
| rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig, | |
| sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); | |
| if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| *sptr++ = rhash; | |
| *sptr++ = rsign; | |
| } | |
| if (client) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); | |
| c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs; | |
| c->client_sigalgslen = salglen; | |
| } else { | |
| OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); | |
| c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs; | |
| c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_free(sigalgs); | |
| return 0; | |
| } |