| /* | |
| * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu | |
| * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| /* TODO(davidben): 28 comes from the size of IP + UDP header. Is this reasonable | |
| * for these values? Notably, why is kMinMTU a function of the transport | |
| * protocol's overhead rather than, say, what's needed to hold a minimally-sized | |
| * handshake fragment plus protocol overhead. */ | |
| /* kMinMTU is the minimum acceptable MTU value. */ | |
| static const unsigned int kMinMTU = 256 - 28; | |
| /* kDefaultMTU is the default MTU value to use if neither the user nor | |
| * the underlying BIO supplies one. */ | |
| static const unsigned int kDefaultMTU = 1500 - 28; | |
| /* kMaxHandshakeBuffer is the maximum number of handshake messages ahead of the | |
| * current one to buffer. */ | |
| static const unsigned int kHandshakeBufferSize = 10; | |
| static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, | |
| unsigned long frag_len); | |
| static unsigned char *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char *p); | |
| static hm_fragment *dtls1_hm_fragment_new(unsigned long frag_len, | |
| int reassembly) { | |
| hm_fragment *frag = NULL; | |
| uint8_t *buf = NULL; | |
| uint8_t *bitmask = NULL; | |
| frag = (hm_fragment *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(hm_fragment)); | |
| if (frag == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_hm_fragment_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| if (frag_len) { | |
| buf = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(frag_len); | |
| if (buf == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_hm_fragment_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* zero length fragment gets zero frag->fragment */ | |
| frag->fragment = buf; | |
| /* Initialize reassembly bitmask if necessary */ | |
| if (reassembly && frag_len > 0) { | |
| if (frag_len + 7 < frag_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_hm_fragment_new, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| size_t bitmask_len = (frag_len + 7) / 8; | |
| bitmask = (uint8_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(bitmask_len); | |
| if (bitmask == NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_hm_fragment_new, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| if (buf != NULL) { | |
| OPENSSL_free(buf); | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| memset(bitmask, 0, bitmask_len); | |
| } | |
| frag->reassembly = bitmask; | |
| return frag; | |
| } | |
| void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag) { | |
| if (frag == NULL) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment); | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag); | |
| } | |
| #if !defined(inline) | |
| #define inline __inline | |
| #endif | |
| /* bit_range returns a |uint8_t| with bits |start|, inclusive, to |end|, | |
| * exclusive, set. */ | |
| static inline uint8_t bit_range(size_t start, size_t end) { | |
| return (uint8_t)(~((1u << start) - 1) & ((1u << end) - 1)); | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_hm_fragment_mark marks bytes |start|, inclusive, to |end|, exclusive, | |
| * as received in |frag|. If |frag| becomes complete, it clears | |
| * |frag->reassembly|. The range must be within the bounds of |frag|'s message | |
| * and |frag->reassembly| must not be NULL. */ | |
| static void dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(hm_fragment *frag, size_t start, | |
| size_t end) { | |
| size_t i; | |
| size_t msg_len = frag->msg_header.msg_len; | |
| if (frag->reassembly == NULL || start > end || end > msg_len) { | |
| assert(0); | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| /* A zero-length message will never have a pending reassembly. */ | |
| assert(msg_len > 0); | |
| if ((start >> 3) == (end >> 3)) { | |
| frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, end & 7); | |
| } else { | |
| frag->reassembly[start >> 3] |= bit_range(start & 7, 8); | |
| for (i = (start >> 3) + 1; i < (end >> 3); i++) { | |
| frag->reassembly[i] = 0xff; | |
| } | |
| if ((end & 7) != 0) { | |
| frag->reassembly[end >> 3] |= bit_range(0, end & 7); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Check if the fragment is complete. */ | |
| for (i = 0; i < (msg_len >> 3); i++) { | |
| if (frag->reassembly[i] != 0xff) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if ((msg_len & 7) != 0 && | |
| frag->reassembly[msg_len >> 3] != bit_range(0, msg_len & 7)) { | |
| return; | |
| } | |
| OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly); | |
| frag->reassembly = NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or | |
| * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ | |
| int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { | |
| int ret; | |
| int curr_mtu; | |
| unsigned int len, frag_off; | |
| size_t max_overhead = 0; | |
| /* AHA! Figure out the MTU, and stick to the right size */ | |
| if (s->d1->mtu < dtls1_min_mtu() && | |
| !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU)) { | |
| long mtu = BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU, 0, NULL); | |
| if (mtu >= 0 && mtu <= (1 << 30) && (unsigned)mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()) { | |
| s->d1->mtu = (unsigned)mtu; | |
| } else { | |
| s->d1->mtu = kDefaultMTU; | |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU, s->d1->mtu, NULL); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* should have something reasonable now */ | |
| assert(s->d1->mtu >= dtls1_min_mtu()); | |
| if (s->init_off == 0 && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
| assert(s->init_num == | |
| (int)s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| } | |
| /* Determine the maximum overhead of the current cipher. */ | |
| if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL) { | |
| max_overhead = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(s->aead_write_ctx->ctx.aead); | |
| if (s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record) { | |
| max_overhead += s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| frag_off = 0; | |
| while (s->init_num) { | |
| /* Account for data in the buffering BIO; multiple records may be packed | |
| * into a single packet during the handshake. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): This is buggy; if the MTU is larger than the buffer size, | |
| * the large record will be split across two packets. Moreover, in that | |
| * case, the |dtls1_write_bytes| call may not return synchronously. This | |
| * will break on retry as the |s->init_off| and |s->init_num| adjustment | |
| * will run a second time. */ | |
| curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) - | |
| DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - max_overhead; | |
| if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| /* Flush the buffer and continue with a fresh packet. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): If |BIO_flush| is not synchronous and requires multiple | |
| * calls to |dtls1_do_write|, |frag_off| will be wrong. */ | |
| ret = BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| assert(BIO_wpending(SSL_get_wbio(s)) == 0); | |
| curr_mtu = s->d1->mtu - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - max_overhead; | |
| } | |
| /* XDTLS: this function is too long. split out the CCS part */ | |
| if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
| /* If this isn't the first fragment, reserve space to prepend a new | |
| * fragment header. This will override the body of a previous fragment. */ | |
| if (s->init_off != 0) { | |
| assert(s->init_off > DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| s->init_off -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| s->init_num += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| } | |
| if (curr_mtu <= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| /* To make forward progress, the MTU must, at minimum, fit the handshake | |
| * header and one byte of handshake body. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_do_write, SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (s->init_num > curr_mtu) { | |
| len = curr_mtu; | |
| } else { | |
| len = s->init_num; | |
| } | |
| assert(len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| dtls1_fix_message_header(s, frag_off, len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| dtls1_write_message_header( | |
| s, (uint8_t *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off]); | |
| } else { | |
| assert(type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
| /* ChangeCipherSpec cannot be fragmented. */ | |
| if (s->init_num > curr_mtu) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_do_write, SSL_R_MTU_TOO_SMALL); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| len = s->init_num; | |
| } | |
| ret = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], len); | |
| if (ret < 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* bad if this assert fails, only part of the handshake message got sent. | |
| * But why would this happen? */ | |
| assert(len == (unsigned int)ret); | |
| if (ret == s->init_num) { | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, | |
| (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, | |
| s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| s->init_off = 0; /* done writing this message */ | |
| s->init_num = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| s->init_off += ret; | |
| s->init_num -= ret; | |
| frag_off += (ret -= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| } | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_is_next_message_complete returns one if the next handshake message is | |
| * complete and zero otherwise. */ | |
| static int dtls1_is_next_message_complete(SSL *s) { | |
| pitem *item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->buffered_messages); | |
| if (item == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| hm_fragment *frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; | |
| assert(s->d1->handshake_read_seq <= frag->msg_header.seq); | |
| return s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq && | |
| frag->reassembly == NULL; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_discard_fragment_body discards a handshake fragment body of length | |
| * |frag_len|. It returns one on success and zero on error. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): This function will go away when ssl_read_bytes is gone from | |
| * the DTLS side. */ | |
| static int dtls1_discard_fragment_body(SSL *s, size_t frag_len) { | |
| uint8_t discard[256]; | |
| while (frag_len > 0) { | |
| size_t chunk = frag_len < sizeof(discard) ? frag_len : sizeof(discard); | |
| int ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, discard, chunk, | |
| 0); | |
| if (ret != chunk) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| frag_len -= chunk; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_get_buffered_message returns the buffered message corresponding to | |
| * |msg_hdr|. If none exists, it creates a new one and inserts it in the | |
| * queue. Otherwise, it checks |msg_hdr| is consistent with the existing one. It | |
| * returns NULL on failure. The caller does not take ownership of the result. */ | |
| static hm_fragment *dtls1_get_buffered_message( | |
| SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { | |
| uint8_t seq64be[8]; | |
| memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); | |
| seq64be[6] = (uint8_t)(msg_hdr->seq >> 8); | |
| seq64be[7] = (uint8_t)msg_hdr->seq; | |
| pitem *item = pqueue_find(s->d1->buffered_messages, seq64be); | |
| hm_fragment *frag; | |
| if (item == NULL) { | |
| /* This is the first fragment from this message. */ | |
| frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr->msg_len, | |
| 1 /* reassembly buffer needed */); | |
| if (frag == NULL) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(&frag->msg_header, msg_hdr, sizeof(*msg_hdr)); | |
| item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); | |
| if (item == NULL) { | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item); | |
| /* |pqueue_insert| fails iff a duplicate item is inserted, but |item| cannot | |
| * be a duplicate. */ | |
| assert(item != NULL); | |
| } else { | |
| frag = item->data; | |
| assert(frag->msg_header.seq == msg_hdr->seq); | |
| if (frag->msg_header.type != msg_hdr->type || | |
| frag->msg_header.msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) { | |
| /* The new fragment must be compatible with the previous fragments from | |
| * this message. */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_get_buffered_message, | |
| SSL_R_FRAGMENT_MISMATCH); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return frag; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes | |
| * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may | |
| * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */ | |
| static size_t dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s) { | |
| size_t max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; | |
| if (max_len < s->max_cert_list) { | |
| return s->max_cert_list; | |
| } | |
| return max_len; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_process_fragment reads a handshake fragment and processes it. It | |
| * returns one if a fragment was successfully processed and 0 or -1 on error. */ | |
| static int dtls1_process_fragment(SSL *s) { | |
| /* Read handshake message header. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): ssl_read_bytes allows splitting the fragment header and | |
| * body across two records. Change this interface to consume the fragment in | |
| * one pass. */ | |
| uint8_t header[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; | |
| int ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, header, | |
| DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| if (ret != DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_fragment, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* Parse the message fragment header. */ | |
| struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; | |
| dtls1_get_message_header(header, &msg_hdr); | |
| const size_t frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off; | |
| const size_t frag_len = msg_hdr.frag_len; | |
| const size_t msg_len = msg_hdr.msg_len; | |
| if (frag_off > msg_len || frag_off + frag_len < frag_off || | |
| frag_off + frag_len > msg_len || | |
| msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_fragment, | |
| SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (msg_hdr.seq < s->d1->handshake_read_seq || | |
| msg_hdr.seq > (unsigned)s->d1->handshake_read_seq + | |
| kHandshakeBufferSize) { | |
| /* Ignore fragments from the past, or ones too far in the future. */ | |
| if (!dtls1_discard_fragment_body(s, frag_len)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_get_buffered_message(s, &msg_hdr); | |
| if (frag == NULL) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| assert(frag->msg_header.msg_len == msg_len); | |
| if (frag->reassembly == NULL) { | |
| /* The message is already assembled. */ | |
| if (!dtls1_discard_fragment_body(s, frag_len)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| assert(msg_len > 0); | |
| /* Read the body of the fragment. */ | |
| ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes( | |
| s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, frag->fragment + frag_off, frag_len, 0); | |
| if (ret != frag_len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_process_fragment, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(frag, frag_off, frag_off + frag_len); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* dtls1_get_message reads a handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any | |
| * if |msg_type| == -1), maximum acceptable body length |max|. Read an entire | |
| * handshake message. Handshake messages arrive in fragments. */ | |
| long dtls1_get_message(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int msg_type, long max, | |
| enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) { | |
| pitem *item = NULL; | |
| hm_fragment *frag = NULL; | |
| int al; | |
| /* s3->tmp is used to store messages that are unexpected, caused | |
| * by the absence of an optional handshake message */ | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { | |
| /* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the | |
| * ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous | |
| * call. */ | |
| assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message); | |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; | |
| if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| *ok = 1; | |
| s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; | |
| return s->init_num; | |
| } | |
| /* Process fragments until one is found. */ | |
| while (!dtls1_is_next_message_complete(s)) { | |
| int ret = dtls1_process_fragment(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| *ok = 0; | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Read out the next complete handshake message. */ | |
| item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_messages); | |
| assert(item != NULL); | |
| frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; | |
| assert(s->d1->handshake_read_seq == frag->msg_header.seq); | |
| assert(frag->reassembly == NULL); | |
| if (frag->msg_header.msg_len > (size_t)max) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_get_message, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| CBB cbb; | |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, | |
| (size_t)frag->msg_header.msg_len + | |
| DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) || | |
| !CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->max)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_get_message, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Reconstruct the assembled message. */ | |
| size_t len; | |
| if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, frag->msg_header.type) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, frag->msg_header.msg_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_u16(&cbb, frag->msg_header.seq) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, 0 /* frag_off */) || | |
| !CBB_add_u24(&cbb, frag->msg_header.msg_len) || | |
| !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, frag->fragment, frag->msg_header.msg_len) || | |
| !CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &len)) { | |
| CBB_cleanup(&cbb); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_get_message, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| assert(len == (size_t)frag->msg_header.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH); | |
| s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This function has a lot of implicit outputs. Simplify the | |
| * |ssl_get_message| API. */ | |
| s->s3->tmp.message_type = frag->msg_header.type; | |
| s->s3->tmp.message_size = frag->msg_header.msg_len; | |
| s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len; | |
| if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, dtls1_get_message, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(s)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, | |
| s->init_num + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, | |
| s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| pitem_free(item); | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); | |
| s->state = stn; | |
| *ok = 1; | |
| return s->init_num; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| pitem_free(item); | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); | |
| *ok = 0; | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* for these 2 messages, we need to | |
| * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init | |
| * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero | |
| * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init | |
| * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign | |
| * ssl->session->read_compression assign | |
| * ssl->session->read_hash assign */ | |
| int dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) { | |
| uint8_t *p; | |
| if (s->state == a) { | |
| p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; | |
| *p++ = SSL3_MT_CCS; | |
| s->d1->handshake_write_seq = s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq; | |
| s->init_num = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| s->init_off = 0; | |
| dtls1_set_message_header(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0, s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, | |
| 0); | |
| /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ | |
| dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1); | |
| s->state = b; | |
| } | |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ | |
| return dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code) { | |
| if (code > 0) { | |
| assert(0); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (!dtls1_is_timer_expired(s)) { | |
| /* not a timeout, none of our business, let higher layers handle this. In | |
| * fact, it's probably an error */ | |
| return code; | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_in_init(s)) { | |
| /* done, no need to send a retransmit */ | |
| BIO_set_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_FLAGS_READ); | |
| return code; | |
| } | |
| return DTLSv1_handle_timeout(s); | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs) { | |
| /* The index of the retransmission queue actually is the message sequence | |
| * number, since the queue only contains messages of a single handshake. | |
| * However, the ChangeCipherSpec has no message sequence number and so using | |
| * only the sequence will result in the CCS and Finished having the same | |
| * index. To prevent this, the sequence number is multiplied by 2. In case of | |
| * a CCS 1 is subtracted. This does not only differ CSS and Finished, it also | |
| * maintains the order of the index (important for priority queues) and fits | |
| * in the unsigned short variable. */ | |
| return seq * 2 - is_ccs; | |
| } | |
| static int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, hm_fragment *frag) { | |
| int ret; | |
| /* XDTLS: for now assuming that read/writes are blocking */ | |
| unsigned long header_length; | |
| uint8_t save_write_sequence[8]; | |
| /* assert(s->init_num == 0); | |
| assert(s->init_off == 0); */ | |
| if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs) { | |
| header_length = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| } else { | |
| header_length = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(s->init_buf->data, frag->fragment, | |
| frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length); | |
| s->init_num = frag->msg_header.msg_len + header_length; | |
| dtls1_set_message_header(s, frag->msg_header.type, | |
| frag->msg_header.msg_len, frag->msg_header.seq, | |
| 0, frag->msg_header.frag_len); | |
| /* Save current state. */ | |
| SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_write_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx; | |
| uint16_t epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; | |
| /* DTLS renegotiation is unsupported, so only epochs 0 (NULL cipher) and 1 | |
| * (negotiated cipher) exist. */ | |
| assert(epoch == 0 || epoch == 1); | |
| assert(frag->msg_header.epoch <= epoch); | |
| const int fragment_from_previous_epoch = (epoch == 1 && | |
| frag->msg_header.epoch == 0); | |
| if (fragment_from_previous_epoch) { | |
| /* Rewind to the previous epoch. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Instead of swapping out connection-global state, this | |
| * logic should pass a "use previous epoch" parameter down to lower-level | |
| * functions. */ | |
| s->d1->w_epoch = frag->msg_header.epoch; | |
| s->aead_write_ctx = NULL; | |
| memcpy(save_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, | |
| sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); | |
| memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->d1->last_write_sequence, | |
| sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); | |
| } else { | |
| /* Otherwise the messages must be from the same epoch. */ | |
| assert(frag->msg_header.epoch == epoch); | |
| } | |
| ret = dtls1_do_write(s, frag->msg_header.is_ccs ? SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC | |
| : SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); | |
| if (fragment_from_previous_epoch) { | |
| /* Restore the current epoch. */ | |
| s->aead_write_ctx = aead_write_ctx; | |
| s->d1->w_epoch = epoch; | |
| memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, s->s3->write_sequence, | |
| sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); | |
| memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, save_write_sequence, | |
| sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); | |
| } | |
| (void)BIO_flush(SSL_get_wbio(s)); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s) { | |
| pqueue sent = s->d1->sent_messages; | |
| piterator iter = pqueue_iterator(sent); | |
| pitem *item; | |
| for (item = pqueue_next(&iter); item != NULL; item = pqueue_next(&iter)) { | |
| hm_fragment *frag = (hm_fragment *)item->data; | |
| if (dtls1_retransmit_message(s, frag) <= 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int is_ccs) { | |
| pitem *item; | |
| hm_fragment *frag; | |
| uint8_t seq64be[8]; | |
| /* this function is called immediately after a message has | |
| * been serialized */ | |
| assert(s->init_off == 0); | |
| frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(s->init_num, 0); | |
| if (!frag) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(frag->fragment, s->init_buf->data, s->init_num); | |
| if (is_ccs) { | |
| assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH == | |
| (unsigned int)s->init_num); | |
| } else { | |
| assert(s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH == | |
| (unsigned int)s->init_num); | |
| } | |
| frag->msg_header.msg_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; | |
| frag->msg_header.seq = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.seq; | |
| frag->msg_header.type = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.type; | |
| frag->msg_header.frag_off = 0; | |
| frag->msg_header.frag_len = s->d1->w_msg_hdr.msg_len; | |
| frag->msg_header.is_ccs = is_ccs; | |
| frag->msg_header.epoch = s->d1->w_epoch; | |
| memset(seq64be, 0, sizeof(seq64be)); | |
| seq64be[6] = (uint8_t)( | |
| dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs) >> | |
| 8); | |
| seq64be[7] = (uint8_t)( | |
| dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, frag->msg_header.is_ccs)); | |
| item = pitem_new(seq64be, frag); | |
| if (item == NULL) { | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| pqueue_insert(s->d1->sent_messages, item); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* call this function when the buffered messages are no longer needed */ | |
| void dtls1_clear_record_buffer(SSL *s) { | |
| pitem *item; | |
| for (item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages); item != NULL; | |
| item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->sent_messages)) { | |
| dtls1_hm_fragment_free((hm_fragment *)item->data); | |
| pitem_free(item); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* don't actually do the writing, wait till the MTU has been retrieved */ | |
| void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, uint8_t mt, unsigned long len, | |
| unsigned short seq_num, unsigned long frag_off, | |
| unsigned long frag_len) { | |
| struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; | |
| msg_hdr->type = mt; | |
| msg_hdr->msg_len = len; | |
| msg_hdr->seq = seq_num; | |
| msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; | |
| msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; | |
| } | |
| static void dtls1_fix_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned long frag_off, | |
| unsigned long frag_len) { | |
| struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; | |
| msg_hdr->frag_off = frag_off; | |
| msg_hdr->frag_len = frag_len; | |
| } | |
| static uint8_t *dtls1_write_message_header(SSL *s, uint8_t *p) { | |
| struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr = &s->d1->w_msg_hdr; | |
| *p++ = msg_hdr->type; | |
| l2n3(msg_hdr->msg_len, p); | |
| s2n(msg_hdr->seq, p); | |
| l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_off, p); | |
| l2n3(msg_hdr->frag_len, p); | |
| return p; | |
| } | |
| unsigned int dtls1_min_mtu(void) { | |
| return kMinMTU; | |
| } | |
| void dtls1_get_message_header(uint8_t *data, | |
| struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) { | |
| memset(msg_hdr, 0x00, sizeof(struct hm_header_st)); | |
| msg_hdr->type = *(data++); | |
| n2l3(data, msg_hdr->msg_len); | |
| n2s(data, msg_hdr->seq); | |
| n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_off); | |
| n2l3(data, msg_hdr->frag_len); | |
| } | |
| int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s) { | |
| int ret; | |
| ret = ssl3_shutdown(s); | |
| return ret; | |
| } |