blob: 0c5a7afcd0f2fbc023a351420d363ba59a6fb037 [file] [log] [blame]
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "../crypto/internal.h"
#include "internal.h"
int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) {
/* The ex_data index to go from |X509_STORE_CTX| to |SSL| always uses the
* reserved app_data slot. Before ex_data was introduced, app_data was used.
* Avoid breaking any software which assumes |X509_STORE_CTX_get_app_data|
* works. */
return 0;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) {
CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
return ret;
}
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) {
CERT *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(CERT));
if (ret == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(CERT));
if (cert->x509 != NULL) {
X509_up_ref(cert->x509);
ret->x509 = cert->x509;
}
if (cert->privatekey != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->privatekey);
ret->privatekey = cert->privatekey;
}
if (cert->chain) {
ret->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cert->chain);
if (!ret->chain) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
}
ret->key_method = cert->key_method;
ret->mask_k = cert->mask_k;
ret->mask_a = cert->mask_a;
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
ret->dh_tmp = DHparams_dup(cert->dh_tmp);
if (ret->dh_tmp == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
if (cert->sigalgs != NULL) {
ret->sigalgs =
BUF_memdup(cert->sigalgs, cert->num_sigalgs * sizeof(cert->sigalgs[0]));
if (ret->sigalgs == NULL) {
goto err;
}
}
ret->num_sigalgs = cert->num_sigalgs;
ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
if (cert->verify_store != NULL) {
X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store);
ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
}
return ret;
err:
ssl_cert_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *cert) {
if (cert == NULL) {
return;
}
X509_free(cert->x509);
cert->x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_free(cert->privatekey);
cert->privatekey = NULL;
sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free);
cert->chain = NULL;
cert->key_method = NULL;
}
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) {
if (c == NULL) {
return;
}
DH_free(c->dh_tmp);
ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
OPENSSL_free(c->sigalgs);
X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
OPENSSL_free(c);
}
int ssl_cert_set0_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
sk_X509_pop_free(cert->chain, X509_free);
cert->chain = chain;
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_set1_chain(CERT *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
if (chain == NULL) {
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, NULL);
}
dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
if (dchain == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(cert, dchain)) {
sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
if (cert->chain == NULL) {
cert->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
}
if (cert->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(cert->chain, x509)) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(CERT *cert, X509 *x509) {
if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(cert, x509)) {
return 0;
}
X509_up_ref(x509);
return 1;
}
void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) {
c->cert_cb = cb;
c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
}
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, long *out_verify_result,
STACK_OF(X509) *cert_chain) {
if (cert_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(cert_chain) == 0) {
return 0;
}
X509_STORE *verify_store = ssl->ctx->cert_store;
if (ssl->cert->verify_store != NULL) {
verify_store = ssl->cert->verify_store;
}
X509 *leaf = sk_X509_value(cert_chain, 0);
int ret = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, verify_store, leaf, cert_chain)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return 0;
}
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),
ssl)) {
goto err;
}
/* We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by the
* context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or vice
* versa. */
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(&ctx, ssl->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
/* Anything non-default in "param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(&ctx), ssl->param);
if (ssl->verify_callback) {
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx, ssl->verify_callback);
}
int verify_ret;
if (ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) {
verify_ret = ssl->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, ssl->ctx->app_verify_arg);
} else {
verify_ret = X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
}
*out_verify_result = ctx.error;
/* If |SSL_VERIFY_NONE|, the error is non-fatal, but we keep the result. */
if (verify_ret <= 0 && ssl->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, ssl_verify_alarm_type(ctx.error));
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
ERR_clear_error();
ret = 1;
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return ret;
}
static void set_client_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
*ca_list = name_list;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *list) {
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
return NULL;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(list); i++) {
X509_NAME *name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(list, i));
if (name == NULL || !sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
X509_NAME_free(name);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
return NULL;
}
}
return ret;
}
void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
set_client_CA_list(&ssl->client_CA, name_list);
}
void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) {
set_client_CA_list(&ctx->client_CA, name_list);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return ctx->client_CA;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *ssl) {
/* For historical reasons, this function is used both to query configuration
* state on a server as well as handshake state on a client. However, whether
* |ssl| is a client or server is not known until explicitly configured with
* |SSL_set_connect_state|. If |handshake_func| is NULL, |ssl| is in an
* indeterminate mode and |ssl->server| is unset. */
if (ssl->handshake_func != NULL && !ssl->server) {
return ssl->s3->tmp.ca_names;
}
if (ssl->client_CA != NULL) {
return ssl->client_CA;
}
return ssl->ctx->client_CA;
}
static int add_client_CA(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, X509 *x509) {
X509_NAME *name;
if (x509 == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (*sk == NULL) {
*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
if (*sk == NULL) {
return 0;
}
}
name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x509));
if (name == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
X509_NAME_free(name);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
return add_client_CA(&ssl->client_CA, x509);
}
int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
return add_client_CA(&ctx->client_CA, x509);
}
int ssl_has_certificate(const SSL *ssl) {
return ssl->cert->x509 != NULL && ssl_has_private_key(ssl);
}
STACK_OF(X509) *ssl_parse_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
uint8_t *out_leaf_sha256, CBS *cbs) {
STACK_OF(X509) *ret = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ret == NULL) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
X509 *x = NULL;
CBS certificate_list;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(cbs, &certificate_list)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
CBS certificate;
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
/* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */
if (sk_X509_num(ret) == 0 && out_leaf_sha256 != NULL) {
SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate), out_leaf_sha256);
}
/* A u24 length cannot overflow a long. */
const uint8_t *data = CBS_data(&certificate);
x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, (long)CBS_len(&certificate));
if (x == NULL || data != CBS_data(&certificate) + CBS_len(&certificate)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_push(ret, x)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
x = NULL;
}
return ret;
err:
X509_free(x);
sk_X509_pop_free(ret, X509_free);
return NULL;
}
int ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) {
int len = i2d_X509(x509, NULL);
if (len < 0) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *buf;
if (!CBB_add_space(cbb, &buf, len)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (buf != NULL && i2d_X509(x509, &buf) < 0) {
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int ssl_add_cert_with_length(CBB *cbb, X509 *x509) {
CBB child;
return CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child) &&
ssl_add_cert_to_cbb(&child, x509) &&
CBB_flush(cbb);
}
int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
return CBB_add_u24(cbb, 0);
}
CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
X509 *x = cert->x509;
CBB child;
if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
int no_chain = 0;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = cert->chain;
if ((ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || chain != NULL) {
no_chain = 1;
}
if (no_chain) {
if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) {
return 0;
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) {
return 0;
}
}
} else {
X509_STORE_CTX xs_ctx;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&xs_ctx, ssl->ctx->cert_store, x, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
return 0;
}
X509_verify_cert(&xs_ctx);
/* Don't leave errors in the queue */
ERR_clear_error();
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(xs_ctx.chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(xs_ctx.chain, i);
if (!ssl_add_cert_with_length(&child, x)) {
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
return 0;
}
}
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&xs_ctx);
}
return CBB_flush(cbb);
}
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) {
return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b);
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *
ssl_parse_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *cbs) {
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp);
X509_NAME *name = NULL;
if (ret == NULL) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
CBS child;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &child)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&child) > 0) {
CBS distinguished_name;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &distinguished_name)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
const uint8_t *ptr = CBS_data(&distinguished_name);
/* A u16 length cannot overflow a long. */
name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &ptr, (long)CBS_len(&distinguished_name));
if (name == NULL ||
ptr != CBS_data(&distinguished_name) + CBS_len(&distinguished_name)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
name = NULL;
}
return ret;
err:
X509_NAME_free(name);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
return NULL;
}
int ssl_add_client_CA_list(SSL *ssl, CBB *cbb) {
CBB child, name_cbb;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &child)) {
return 0;
}
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl);
if (sk == NULL) {
return CBB_flush(cbb);
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
int len = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
if (len < 0) {
return 0;
}
uint8_t *ptr;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&child, &name_cbb) ||
!CBB_add_space(&name_cbb, &ptr, (size_t)len) ||
(len > 0 && i2d_X509_NAME(name, &ptr) < 0)) {
return 0;
}
}
return CBB_flush(cbb);
}
int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, int *out_should_retry) {
if (ssl_has_certificate(ssl) || ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL) {
return 1;
}
X509 *x509 = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
int ret = ssl->ctx->client_cert_cb(ssl, &x509, &pkey);
if (ret < 0) {
*out_should_retry = 1;
return 0;
}
if (ret != 0) {
if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, pkey)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
*out_should_retry = 0;
return 0;
}
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return 1;
}
static int set_cert_store(X509_STORE **store_ptr, X509_STORE *new_store, int take_ref) {
X509_STORE_free(*store_ptr);
*store_ptr = new_store;
if (new_store != NULL && take_ref) {
X509_STORE_up_ref(new_store);
}
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 0);
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) {
return set_cert_store(&ctx->cert->verify_store, store, 1);
}
int SSL_set0_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) {
return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 0);
}
int SSL_set1_verify_cert_store(SSL *ssl, X509_STORE *store) {
return set_cert_store(&ssl->cert->verify_store, store, 1);
}
int SSL_CTX_set0_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ctx->cert, chain);
}
int SSL_CTX_set1_chain(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ctx->cert, chain);
}
int SSL_set0_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
return ssl_cert_set0_chain(ssl->cert, chain);
}
int SSL_set1_chain(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) {
return ssl_cert_set1_chain(ssl->cert, chain);
}
int SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509);
}
int SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ctx->cert, x509);
}
int SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x509) {
return SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, x509);
}
int SSL_add0_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509);
}
int SSL_add1_chain_cert(SSL *ssl, X509 *x509) {
return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(ssl->cert, x509);
}
int SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return SSL_CTX_set0_chain(ctx, NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_clear_extra_chain_certs(SSL_CTX *ctx) {
return SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx);
}
int SSL_clear_chain_certs(SSL *ssl) {
return SSL_set0_chain(ssl, NULL);
}
int SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
*out_chain = ctx->cert->chain;
return 1;
}
int SSL_CTX_get_extra_chain_certs(const SSL_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
return SSL_CTX_get0_chain_certs(ctx, out_chain);
}
int SSL_get0_chain_certs(const SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509) **out_chain) {
*out_chain = ssl->cert->chain;
return 1;
}
int ssl_check_leaf_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *leaf) {
int ret = 0;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(leaf);
if (pkey == NULL) {
goto err;
}
/* Check the certificate's type matches the cipher. */
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
int expected_type = ssl_cipher_get_key_type(cipher);
assert(expected_type != EVP_PKEY_NONE);
if (pkey->type != expected_type) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) {
/* TODO(davidben): This behavior is preserved from upstream. Should key
* usages be checked in other cases as well? */
/* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */
X509_check_purpose(leaf, -1, 0);
if ((leaf->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
!(leaf->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING);
goto err;
}
if (!tls1_check_ec_cert(ssl, leaf)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return ret;
}