| commit | fd86eaa868534ac480b0ae391d6e86c121835a53 | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Wed Jun 17 15:13:16 2020 -0400 |
| committer | CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> | Fri Jun 19 16:55:51 2020 +0000 |
| tree | d5c58efecfc4d3b2d7d289e746dda238d14c5848 | |
| parent | cbac9c3a2d20a05d5c634eaab8f8b07589838d57 [diff] |
Fix x509v3_cache_extensions error-handling. This imports https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10756 from upstream with a number of changes: - Add tests. - Rather than blindly return false in cert_self_signed, make that function a tri-state return. This gives better error-reporting when the leaf certificate has a bad extension and reduces the risk of confusing the verifier. - Give x509v3_cache_extensions a return value rather than expecting everyone to check EXFLAG_INVALID. Switch X509_check_purpose calls to it when applicable. - Rather than setting EXFLAG_INVALID on bad CRLs, fail the parse altogether. We're already in the d2i callback. (Nothing checks EXFLAG_INVALID on CRLs.) - I've intentionally left the error unchecked in X509_cmp. OpenSSL's strategy is to return -2, but that's not a consistent comparison and may mess up sorts that depend on transitivity. This retains the current behavior where we consider all undigestable certs as equal to each other (modulo the opportunistic TBSCertificate double-check which should work most of the time). This is terrible, so I've filed https://crbug.com/boringssl/355 to track fixes here. That last fix caught that I misread the spec when I generated kKnownCriticalCRL and kUnknownCriticalCRL2. This fixes those and uses the old kKnownCriticalCRL as a test for invalid extensions. (Those CRLs were assembled by hand, so they don't indicate any software has been encoding them wrong.) Update-Note: The X.509 verifier now correctly rejects syntax errors in important certificate extensions. This may break some malformed certificates which were incorrectly accepted before. Bug: 345 Change-Id: Ifb3a98ba62cd296920546bc718fda524bd55c024 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/41745 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
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