| commit | f49081b4ef4e99bae452e05170d8433807bd70e9 | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Mon Dec 16 12:22:37 2024 -0500 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Mon Dec 16 12:11:26 2024 -0800 |
| tree | f383ebf6600f57d60ed85518de2b827794968e74 | |
| parent | 1ec7a4ed6926f0f779553630ed7a78917e6f86b6 [diff] |
Run ML-KEM and ML-DSA through constant-time validation We did this for Dilithium, but the tests themselves got lost for ML-DSA. This is just a matter of adding some declassifies so that the tests can survive running through with secret data marked secret. As for what to mark secret, I opted to mark: - Any internal secret output from the PRNG since that aligns better with crbug.com/42290551. Though it probably introduces a bunch of false positives on the TLS side because we haven't actually run all that through this yet. - Any *uniformly* secret inputs in test vectors. That is, seeds, but *not* the serialized long-form private keys (which ought to become seeds anyway). This is because a portion of those serializations include public keys and it's tricky to declassify that before the public key parser gets confused. To simplify comparisons, I added a Declassified() helper in test_util.h. I considered just making == on Bytes automatically declassify, but then we won't notice when we forget to, e.g. declassify ciphertext, so making the test do it explicitly seemed worthwhile? Change-Id: I2c53e25ca843ef876f2a89c15131a5b2b425603f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/74387 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
To file a security issue, use the Chromium process and mention in the report this is for BoringSSL. You can ignore the parts of the process that are specific to Chromium/Chrome.
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: