Enforce max_early_data_size on the server.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I8b754ba17b3e0beee425929e4b53785b2e95f0ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15164
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/internal.h b/ssl/internal.h
index 4d148c6..1ed7e15 100644
--- a/ssl/internal.h
+++ b/ssl/internal.h
@@ -1121,6 +1121,10 @@
/* client_version is the value sent or received in the ClientHello version. */
uint16_t client_version;
+
+ /* early_data_read is the amount of early data that has been read by the
+ * record layer. */
+ uint16_t early_data_read;
} /* SSL_HANDSHAKE */;
SSL_HANDSHAKE *ssl_handshake_new(SSL *ssl);
@@ -1964,6 +1968,11 @@
#define SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED 0
#define SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED 1
+/* kMaxEarlyDataAccepted is the advertised number of plaintext bytes of early
+ * data that will be accepted. This value should be slightly below
+ * kMaxEarlyDataSkipped in tls_record.c, which is measured in ciphertext. */
+static const size_t kMaxEarlyDataAccepted = 14336;
+
CERT *ssl_cert_new(const SSL_X509_METHOD *x509_method);
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c);
