| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ | |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len); | |
| /* kMaxWarningAlerts is the number of consecutive warning alerts that will be | |
| * processed. */ | |
| static const uint8_t kMaxWarningAlerts = 4; | |
| /* ssl3_get_record reads a new input record. On success, it places it in | |
| * |ssl->s3->rrec| and returns one. Otherwise it returns <= 0 on error or if | |
| * more data is needed. */ | |
| static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *ssl) { | |
| int ret; | |
| again: | |
| /* Ensure the buffer is large enough to decrypt in-place. */ | |
| ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| assert(ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) >= ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl)); | |
| uint8_t *out = ssl_read_buffer(ssl) + ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl); | |
| size_t max_out = ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl) - ssl_record_prefix_len(ssl); | |
| uint8_t type, alert; | |
| size_t len, consumed; | |
| switch (tls_open_record(ssl, &type, out, &len, &consumed, &alert, max_out, | |
| ssl_read_buffer(ssl), ssl_read_buffer_len(ssl))) { | |
| case ssl_open_record_success: | |
| ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed); | |
| if (len > 0xffff) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec; | |
| rr->type = type; | |
| rr->length = (uint16_t)len; | |
| rr->off = 0; | |
| rr->data = out; | |
| return 1; | |
| case ssl_open_record_partial: | |
| ret = ssl_read_buffer_extend_to(ssl, consumed); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| goto again; | |
| case ssl_open_record_discard: | |
| ssl_read_buffer_consume(ssl, consumed); | |
| goto again; | |
| case ssl_open_record_error: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| assert(0); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int len) { | |
| return ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len); | |
| } | |
| /* Call this to write data in records of type |type|. It will return <= 0 if | |
| * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ | |
| int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { | |
| const uint8_t *buf = buf_; | |
| unsigned int tot, n, nw; | |
| int i; | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); | |
| tot = s->s3->wnum; | |
| s->s3->wnum = 0; | |
| if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s) && !SSL_in_false_start(s)) { | |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out than | |
| * the the original len from a write which didn't complete for non-blocking | |
| * I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for this in | |
| * ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be possible to | |
| * end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then promptly send | |
| * beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and report the error in | |
| * a way the user will notice. */ | |
| if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| n = (len - tot); | |
| for (;;) { | |
| /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put into a | |
| * record. */ | |
| unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment; | |
| if (n > max) { | |
| nw = max; | |
| } else { | |
| nw = n; | |
| } | |
| i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &buf[tot], nw); | |
| if (i <= 0) { | |
| s->s3->wnum = tot; | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| if (i == (int)n || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
| (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { | |
| return tot + i; | |
| } | |
| n -= i; | |
| tot += i; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, | |
| unsigned int len) { | |
| if (s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len || | |
| (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf && | |
| !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || | |
| s->s3->wpend_type != type) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ret = ssl_write_buffer_flush(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| return s->s3->wpend_ret; | |
| } | |
| /* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. */ | |
| static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned len) { | |
| /* If there is still data from the previous record, flush it. */ | |
| if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) { | |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); | |
| } | |
| /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ | |
| if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { | |
| int ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ | |
| } | |
| if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (len == 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| size_t max_out = len + ssl_max_seal_overhead(s); | |
| if (max_out < len) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| uint8_t *out; | |
| size_t ciphertext_len; | |
| if (!ssl_write_buffer_init(s, &out, max_out) || | |
| !tls_seal_record(s, out, &ciphertext_len, max_out, type, buf, len)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ssl_write_buffer_set_len(s, ciphertext_len); | |
| /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries | |
| * later */ | |
| s->s3->wpend_tot = len; | |
| s->s3->wpend_buf = buf; | |
| s->s3->wpend_type = type; | |
| s->s3->wpend_ret = len; | |
| /* we now just need to write the buffer */ | |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec informs the record layer that a | |
| * ChangeCipherSpec record is required at this point. If a Handshake record is | |
| * received before ChangeCipherSpec, the connection will fail. Moreover, if | |
| * there are unprocessed handshake bytes, the handshake will also fail and the | |
| * function returns zero. Otherwise, the function returns one. */ | |
| int ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0 || s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNPROCESSED_HANDSHAKE_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) { | |
| return ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, peek); | |
| } | |
| void ssl3_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, 0, NULL, 0, 0); | |
| } | |
| static int ssl3_can_renegotiate(SSL *ssl) { | |
| switch (ssl->renegotiate_mode) { | |
| case ssl_renegotiate_never: | |
| return 0; | |
| case ssl_renegotiate_once: | |
| return ssl->s3->total_renegotiations == 0; | |
| case ssl_renegotiate_freely: | |
| return 1; | |
| case ssl_renegotiate_ignore: | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| assert(0); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. | |
| * 'type' is one of the following: | |
| * | |
| * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) | |
| * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) | |
| * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) | |
| * | |
| * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first | |
| * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). | |
| * | |
| * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as | |
| * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really | |
| * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. | |
| * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store | |
| * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol | |
| * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): | |
| * Change cipher spec protocol | |
| * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored | |
| * Alert protocol | |
| * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) | |
| * Handshake protocol | |
| * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have | |
| * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages | |
| * here, anything else is handled by higher layers | |
| * Application data protocol | |
| * none of our business | |
| */ | |
| int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) { | |
| int al, i, ret; | |
| unsigned int n; | |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL; | |
| if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) || | |
| (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) { | |
| /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ | |
| uint8_t *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
| uint8_t *dst = buf; | |
| unsigned int k; | |
| /* peek == 0 */ | |
| n = 0; | |
| while (len > 0 && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) { | |
| *dst++ = *src++; | |
| len--; | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; | |
| n++; | |
| } | |
| /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ | |
| for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) { | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; | |
| } | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ | |
| /* This may require multiple iterations. False Start will cause | |
| * |s->handshake_func| to signal success one step early, but the handshake | |
| * must be completely finished before other modes are accepted. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Move this check up to a higher level. */ | |
| while (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { | |
| assert(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA); | |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| start: | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
| * s->s3->rrec.data - data | |
| * s->s3->rrec.off - offset into 'data' for next read | |
| * s->s3->rrec.length - number of bytes. */ | |
| rr = &s->s3->rrec; | |
| /* get new packet if necessary */ | |
| if (rr->length == 0) { | |
| ret = ssl3_get_record(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ | |
| /* |change_cipher_spec is set when we receive a ChangeCipherSpec and reset by | |
| * ssl3_get_finished. */ | |
| if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && | |
| rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* If we are expecting a ChangeCipherSpec, it is illegal to receive a | |
| * Handshake record. */ | |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_RECORD_BEFORE_CCS); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in | |
| * 'peek' mode) */ | |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { | |
| rr->length = 0; | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (type != 0 && type == rr->type) { | |
| s->s3->warning_alert_count = 0; | |
| /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ | |
| /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are doing a | |
| * handshake for the first time */ | |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
| s->aead_read_ctx == NULL) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Is this check redundant with the handshake_func | |
| * check? */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Discard empty records. */ | |
| if (rr->length == 0) { | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| if (len <= 0) { | |
| return len; | |
| } | |
| if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) { | |
| n = rr->length; | |
| } else { | |
| n = (unsigned int)len; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); | |
| if (!peek) { | |
| rr->length -= n; | |
| rr->off += n; | |
| if (rr->length == 0) { | |
| rr->off = 0; | |
| /* The record has been consumed, so we may now clear the buffer. */ | |
| ssl_read_buffer_discard(s); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| /* Process unexpected records. */ | |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
| /* If peer renegotiations are disabled, all out-of-order handshake records | |
| * are fatal. Renegotiations as a server are never supported. */ | |
| if (s->server || !ssl3_can_renegotiate(s)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* HelloRequests may be fragmented across multiple records. */ | |
| const size_t size = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment); | |
| const size_t avail = size - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; | |
| const size_t todo = (rr->length < avail) ? rr->length : avail; | |
| memcpy(s->s3->handshake_fragment + s->s3->handshake_fragment_len, | |
| &rr->data[rr->off], todo); | |
| rr->off += todo; | |
| rr->length -= todo; | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len += todo; | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < size) { | |
| goto start; /* fragment was too small */ | |
| } | |
| /* Parse out and consume a HelloRequest. */ | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] != SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST || | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0 || | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0 || | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s) || !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { | |
| /* This cannot happen. If a handshake is in progress, |type| must be | |
| * |SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE|. */ | |
| assert(0); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->renegotiate_mode == ssl_renegotiate_ignore) { | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| /* Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application | |
| * protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require | |
| * the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake | |
| * record while an application_data record is being written. */ | |
| if (ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Begin a new handshake. */ | |
| s->s3->total_renegotiations++; | |
| s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; | |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* The handshake completed synchronously. Continue reading records. */ | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| /* If an alert record, process one alert out of the record. Note that we allow | |
| * a single record to contain multiple alerts. */ | |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
| /* Alerts may not be fragmented. */ | |
| if (rr->length < 2) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &rr->data[rr->off], 2, s, | |
| s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t alert_level = rr->data[rr->off++]; | |
| const uint8_t alert_descr = rr->data[rr->off++]; | |
| rr->length -= 2; | |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->info_callback; | |
| } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
| } | |
| if (cb != NULL) { | |
| uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; | |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert); | |
| } | |
| if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { | |
| s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; | |
| if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { | |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested renegotiation and | |
| * the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal alert because if | |
| * application tried to renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and | |
| * expects it to succeed. | |
| * | |
| * In future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if the | |
| * peer refused it where we carry on. */ | |
| else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->warning_alert_count++; | |
| if (s->s3->warning_alert_count > kMaxWarningAlerts) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | |
| char tmp[16]; | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); | |
| BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr); | |
| ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); | |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
| return 0; | |
| } else { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { | |
| /* close_notify has been sent, so discard all records other than alerts. */ | |
| rr->length = 0; | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
| /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly what the | |
| * record payload has to look like */ | |
| if (rr->length != 1 || rr->off != 0 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS; | |
| rr->length = 0; | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, | |
| s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
| if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } else { | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* We already handled these. */ | |
| assert(rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && | |
| rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { | |
| int i; | |
| if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) { | |
| i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; | |
| } else { | |
| i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { | |
| if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { | |
| /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
| if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(s, i)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { | |
| /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ | |
| desc = s->enc_method->alert_value(desc); | |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) { | |
| /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ | |
| desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| } | |
| if (desc < 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ | |
| if (level == 2 && s->session != NULL) { | |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
| } | |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
| s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; | |
| s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; | |
| if (!ssl_write_buffer_is_pending(s)) { | |
| /* Nothing is being written out, so the alert may be dispatched | |
| * immediately. */ | |
| return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
| } | |
| /* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in the | |
| * future */ | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { | |
| int i, j; | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int value) = NULL; | |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; | |
| i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2); | |
| if (i <= 0) { | |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
| } else { | |
| /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the message | |
| * does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not worry too much. */ | |
| if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | |
| BIO_flush(s->wbio); | |
| } | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, | |
| s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->info_callback; | |
| } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
| } | |
| if (cb != NULL) { | |
| j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; | |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return i; | |
| } |