| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/ssl.h> |
| |
| #include <assert.h> |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/err.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/sha.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| #include "internal.h" |
| |
| |
| /* ssl3_do_write sends |s->init_buf| in records of type 'type' |
| * (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC). It returns -1 on error, 1 |
| * on success or zero if the transmission is still incomplete. */ |
| int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { |
| int n; |
| |
| n = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num); |
| if (n < 0) { |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (n == s->init_num) { |
| if (s->msg_callback) { |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, |
| (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, |
| s->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| s->init_off += n; |
| s->init_num -= n; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b, const char *sender, int slen) { |
| uint8_t *p; |
| int n; |
| |
| if (s->state == a) { |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| n = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); |
| if (n == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = n; |
| memcpy(p, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n); |
| |
| /* Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. */ |
| if (!ssl_log_master_secret(s, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| s->session->master_key, |
| s->session->master_key_length)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ |
| if (s->server) { |
| assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n); |
| s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = n; |
| } else { |
| assert(n <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, n); |
| s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = n; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, n)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->state = b; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SEND_xxxxxx_HELLO_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen |
| * so far. */ |
| static void ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { |
| const char *sender; |
| int slen; |
| |
| /* If no new cipher setup then return immediately: other functions will set |
| * the appropriate error. */ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { |
| sender = s->enc_method->server_finished_label; |
| slen = s->enc_method->server_finished_label_len; |
| } else { |
| sender = s->enc_method->client_finished_label; |
| slen = s->enc_method->client_finished_label_len; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->enc_method->final_finish_mac( |
| s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_finished(SSL *s, int a, int b) { |
| int al, finished_len, ok; |
| long message_len; |
| uint8_t *p; |
| |
| message_len = |
| s->method->ssl_get_message(s, a, b, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, |
| ssl_dont_hash_message, &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) { |
| return message_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Snapshot the finished hash before incorporating the new message. */ |
| ssl3_take_mac(s); |
| if (!ssl3_hash_current_message(s)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* If this occurs, we have missed a message. |
| * TODO(davidben): Is this check now redundant with SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS? */ |
| if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; |
| |
| p = s->init_msg; |
| finished_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; |
| |
| if (finished_len != message_len) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(p, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len) != 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ |
| if (s->server) { |
| assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len); |
| s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finished_len; |
| } else { |
| assert(finished_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); |
| memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, finished_len); |
| s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finished_len; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| err: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* for these 2 messages, we need to |
| * ssl->enc_read_ctx re-init |
| * ssl->s3->read_sequence zero |
| * ssl->s3->read_mac_secret re-init |
| * ssl->session->read_sym_enc assign |
| * ssl->session->read_compression assign |
| * ssl->session->read_hash assign */ |
| int ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, int a, int b) { |
| if (s->state == a) { |
| *((uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data) = SSL3_MT_CCS; |
| s->init_num = 1; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| |
| s->state = b; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */ |
| return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s) { |
| uint8_t *p; |
| unsigned long l = 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); |
| |
| if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, &l)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| l -= 3 + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s); |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| l2n3(l, p); |
| l += 3; |
| return ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, l); |
| } |
| |
| /* Obtain handshake message of message type |msg_type| (any if |msg_type| == -1), |
| * maximum acceptable body length |max|. The first four bytes (msg_type and |
| * length) are read in state |header_state|, the body is read in state |body_state|. */ |
| long ssl3_get_message(SSL *s, int header_state, int body_state, int msg_type, |
| long max, enum ssl_hash_message_t hash_message, int *ok) { |
| uint8_t *p; |
| unsigned long l; |
| long n; |
| int al; |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { |
| /* A ssl_dont_hash_message call cannot be combined with reuse_message; the |
| * ssl_dont_hash_message would have to have been applied to the previous |
| * call. */ |
| assert(hash_message == ssl_hash_message); |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 0; |
| if (msg_type >= 0 && s->s3->tmp.message_type != msg_type) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| *ok = 1; |
| s->state = body_state; |
| s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4; |
| s->init_num = (int)s->s3->tmp.message_size; |
| return s->init_num; |
| } |
| |
| p = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; |
| |
| if (s->state == header_state) { |
| assert(s->init_num < 4); |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| while (s->init_num < 4) { |
| int bytes_read = ssl3_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], |
| 4 - s->init_num, 0); |
| if (bytes_read <= 0) { |
| *ok = 0; |
| return bytes_read; |
| } |
| s->init_num += bytes_read; |
| } |
| |
| static const uint8_t kHelloRequest[4] = {SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0}; |
| if (s->server || memcmp(p, kHelloRequest, sizeof(kHelloRequest)) != 0) { |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| /* The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- we are doing |
| * a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if their format is correct. |
| * Does not count for 'Finished' MAC. */ |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) { |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, 4, s, |
| s->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* s->init_num == 4 */ |
| |
| if (msg_type >= 0 && *p != msg_type) { |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); |
| |
| n2l3(p, l); |
| if (l > (unsigned long)max) { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (l && !BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, l + 4)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; |
| s->state = body_state; |
| |
| s->init_msg = (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data + 4; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* next state (body_state) */ |
| p = s->init_msg; |
| n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; |
| while (n > 0) { |
| int bytes_read = ssl3_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &p[s->init_num], n, |
| 0); |
| if (bytes_read <= 0) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| *ok = 0; |
| return bytes_read; |
| } |
| s->init_num += bytes_read; |
| n -= bytes_read; |
| } |
| |
| /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ |
| if (hash_message == ssl_hash_message && !ssl3_hash_current_message(s)) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (s->msg_callback) { |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, |
| (size_t)s->init_num + 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| } |
| *ok = 1; |
| return s->init_num; |
| |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| |
| err: |
| *ok = 0; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_hash_current_message(SSL *s) { |
| /* The handshake header (different size between DTLS and TLS) is included in |
| * the hash. */ |
| size_t header_len = s->init_msg - (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data; |
| return ssl3_update_handshake_hash(s, (uint8_t *)s->init_buf->data, |
| s->init_num + header_len); |
| } |
| |
| /* ssl3_cert_verify_hash is documented as needing EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE because that |
| * is sufficient pre-TLS1.2 as well. */ |
| OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE > MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, |
| combined_tls_hash_fits_in_max); |
| |
| int ssl3_cert_verify_hash(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, |
| const EVP_MD **out_md, int pkey_type) { |
| /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using |
| * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use |
| * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. */ |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { |
| EVP_MD_CTX mctx; |
| unsigned len; |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, *out_md, NULL) || |
| !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, s->s3->handshake_buffer->data, |
| s->s3->handshake_buffer->length) || |
| !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, out, &len)) { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_len = len; |
| } else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, out) == 0 || |
| s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out + MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH) == |
| 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_len = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| *out_md = EVP_md5_sha1(); |
| } else if (pkey_type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
| if (s->enc_method->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, out) == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| *out_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| *out_md = EVP_sha1(); |
| } else { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type) { |
| int al; |
| |
| switch (type) { |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER: |
| al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; |
| break; |
| |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY: |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD: |
| case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED: |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
| break; |
| |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE: |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| break; |
| |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED: |
| al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; |
| break; |
| |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED: |
| al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; |
| break; |
| |
| case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| break; |
| |
| case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT: |
| case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY: |
| case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE: |
| case X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG: |
| case X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED: |
| case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA: |
| al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; |
| break; |
| |
| case X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION: |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| break; |
| |
| case X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE: |
| al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| al = SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| return al; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_fill_hello_random(uint8_t *out, size_t len, int is_server) { |
| if (is_server) { |
| const uint32_t current_time = time(NULL); |
| uint8_t *p = out; |
| |
| if (len < 4) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| p[0] = current_time >> 24; |
| p[1] = current_time >> 16; |
| p[2] = current_time >> 8; |
| p[3] = current_time; |
| return RAND_bytes(p + 4, len - 4); |
| } else { |
| return RAND_bytes(out, len); |
| } |
| } |