)]}'
{
  "commit": "ad36a4fc4a825b7874fde30c95a196b71ae044a8",
  "tree": "c702378349eeee6622e851f21ef8b96341950890",
  "parents": [
    "0aa300b9ba9d66b914793ad18c5b469163e58905"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "David Benjamin",
    "email": "davidben@google.com",
    "time": "Sat Apr 13 17:40:13 2024 -0400"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "Boringssl LUCI CQ",
    "email": "boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
    "time": "Mon Apr 22 15:46:08 2024 +0000"
  },
  "message": "Make SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback constant time\n\nWe encode the secrets in hex. When we do so, we should not leak them\nbased on memory access patterns. Of course, the caller is presumably\ngoing to leak them anyway, because this is the SSLKEYLOGFILE callback.\n\nBut it\u0027s plausible that the caller might have registered the callback\nunconditionally and then, in the callback, decide whether to discard the\ndata. In that case, we should not introduce a side channel.\n\nChange-Id: If6358a3081c658038232b4610603967cb38659b4\nReviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/67829\nReviewed-by: Bob Beck \u003cbbe@google.com\u003e\nCommit-Queue: David Benjamin \u003cdavidben@google.com\u003e\n",
  "tree_diff": [
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "97f1c89f00a55a288aacea085644e39ff89d39f6",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "include/openssl/ssl.h",
      "new_id": "04c191fa62834cb77e9d3d4ba0096d7b94ca9878",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "include/openssl/ssl.h"
    },
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "98f97ebb28a06dfde00082922a1aff24f8aa154c",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "ssl/ssl_lib.cc",
      "new_id": "ec0ee893e58d49890f5545d02b533d07e362309c",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "ssl/ssl_lib.cc"
    }
  ]
}