| commit | aa8d3b5a53ecff9befb7b0edcbbe56bb94dd3ae0 | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Sat Feb 11 09:51:23 2023 -0500 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Wed Feb 22 20:05:39 2023 +0000 |
| tree | 60def8895ff7422f5e7d4ceadaca98cd4c95bdba | |
| parent | 7c860a4f8e0ddd33bed326dfa7903c9c2ba12433 [diff] |
Reject zero ECDSA keys in EC_KEY_set_private_key We already reject values that are out of bounds. Also we were using the wrong error, so fix that. Zero should additionally be rejected, otherwise, when signing an all-zero digest (impossible unless your system signs untrusted, pre-hashed inputs), ECDSA can infinite loop. Thanks to Guido Vranken who reported an analogous issue with DSA in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/20268 When EC_KEYs are obtained through the parser, this CL is a no-op. The corresponding public key is the point at infinity, which we'll reject at both parse time and in EC_KEY_check_key. But as EC_KEY runs into OpenSSL's usual API design flaw (mutable, field-by-field setters over constructor functions for immutable objects), we should reject this in EC_KEY_set_private_key too. Update-Note: Systems that manually construct an EC_KEY (i.e. not from parsing), and either omit the public key or don't call EC_KEY_check_key will start rejecting the zero private key. If such a system *also* signs untrusted digests, this fixes an infinite loop in ECDSA. Change-Id: I3cc9cd2cc59eb6d16826beab3db71d66b23e83ff Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/57226 Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
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