Make CBB_len relative to its argument.

Rather than the length of the top-level CBB, which is kind of odd when ASN.1
length prefixes are not yet determined, return the number of bytes written to
the CBB so far. This can be computed without increasing the size of CBB at all.
Have offset and pending_*.

This means functions which take in a CBB as argument will not be sensitive to
whether the CBB is a top-level or child CBB. The extensions logic had to be
careful to only ever compare differences of lengths, which was awkward.

The reversal will also allow for the following pattern in the future, once
CBB_add_space is split into, say, CBB_reserve and CBB_did_write and we add a
CBB_data:

  uint8_t *signature;
  size_t signature_len = 0;
  if (!CBB_add_asn1(out, &cert, CBB_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
      /* Emit the TBSCertificate. */
      !CBB_add_asn1(&cert, &tbs_cert, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
      !CBB_add_tbs_cert_stuff(&tbs_cert, stuff) ||
      !CBB_flush(&cert) ||
      /* Feed it into md_ctx. */
      !EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) ||
      !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&md_ctx, CBB_data(&cert), CBB_len(&cert)) ||
      /* Emit the signature algorithm. */
      !CBB_add_asn1(&cert, &sig_alg, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
      !CBB_add_sigalg_stuff(&sig_alg, other_stuff) ||
      /* Emit the signature. */
      !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &signature_len) ||
      !CBB_reserve(&cert, &signature, signature_len) ||
      !EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, signature, &signature_len) ||
      !CBB_did_write(&cert, signature_len)) {
    goto err;
  }

(Were TBSCertificate not the first field, we'd still have to sample
CBB_len(&cert), but at least that's reasonable straight-forward. The
alternative would be if CBB_data and CBB_len somehow worked on
recently-invalidated CBBs, but that would go wrong once the invalidated CBB's
parent flushed and possibly shifts everything.)

And similar for signing ServerKeyExchange.

Change-Id: I7761e492ae472d7632875b5666b6088970261b14
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6681
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
4 files changed
tree: f4ae2b6183ecfe101cb758e666a1eeb15efb89a8
  1. .clang-format
  2. .gitignore
  3. BUILDING.md
  4. CMakeLists.txt
  5. FUZZING.md
  6. LICENSE
  7. PORTING.md
  8. README.md
  9. STYLE.md
  10. codereview.settings
  11. crypto/
  12. decrepit/
  13. fuzz/
  14. include/
  15. ssl/
  16. tool/
  17. util/
README.md

BoringSSL

BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.

Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.

Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.

BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.

Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.

There are other files in this directory which might be helpful:

  • PORTING.md: how to port OpenSSL-using code to BoringSSL.
  • BUILDING.md: how to build BoringSSL
  • STYLE.md: rules and guidelines for coding style.
  • include/openssl: public headers with API documentation in comments. Also available online.
  • FUZZING.md: information about fuzzing BoringSSL.