Google Git
Sign in
boringssl / boringssl / 9ac494a171014fa0f06dbf2b0e08abf1d7ec85aa
commit9ac494a171014fa0f06dbf2b0e08abf1d7ec85aa[log] [tgz]
authorDavid Benjamin <davidben@google.com>Thu Oct 24 12:55:26 2024 -0400
committerBoringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com>Tue Oct 29 03:18:25 2024 +0000
tree3248d7f7e912bc6a5662b91a1660ad53d3818e22
parent197a654639aa39a86782b06abebdeccbfa197e2b [diff]
Remove now redundant check for extra DTLS messages in epoch 1

This dates to
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/8988, which was
several iterations back of the message read API. We now catch extra
Finished by way of:

In DTLS 1.2, there is no key change at the end of the handshake:

- If the fragment was received before the handshake was over, we queue
  it up and then the handshake makes sure incoming messages are clear
  before completing.

- If the fragment was received after the handshake was over, we reject
  almost all handshake fragments post-handshake. (This will need to be
  rejiggered.

In DTLS 1.3, there is a key change at the end of the handshake

- If the fragment was received before the handshake was over, key
  changes require incoming messages are clear and we reject it.

- If the fragment was received after the handshake was over, we
  currently do not notice. We do not retain the old epoch and just drop
  the record. (This is fine, since we won't actually process it.) But
  when we implement DTLS 1.3 key changes properly, we might end up
  picking it up.

Bug: 42290594
Change-Id: I52621f209321a0eb1ce59aa36db68922206d529f
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/72447
Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
2 files changed
tree: 3248d7f7e912bc6a5662b91a1660ad53d3818e22
  1. .bcr/
  2. .github/
  3. cmake/
  4. crypto/
  5. decrepit/
  6. docs/
  7. fuzz/
  8. gen/
  9. include/
  10. infra/
  11. pki/
  12. rust/
  13. ssl/
  14. third_party/
  15. tool/
  16. util/
  17. .bazelignore
  18. .bazelrc
  19. .clang-format
  20. .gitignore
  21. API-CONVENTIONS.md
  22. BREAKING-CHANGES.md
  23. BUILD.bazel
  24. build.json
  25. BUILDING.md
  26. CMakeLists.txt
  27. codereview.settings
  28. CONTRIBUTING.md
  29. FUZZING.md
  30. go.mod
  31. go.sum
  32. INCORPORATING.md
  33. LICENSE
  34. MODULE.bazel
  35. MODULE.bazel.lock
  36. PORTING.md
  37. PrivacyInfo.xcprivacy
  38. README.md
  39. SANDBOXING.md
  40. STYLE.md
README.md

BoringSSL

BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.

Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.

Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.

BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.

Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.

Project links:

To file a security issue, use the Chromium process and mention in the report this is for BoringSSL. You can ignore the parts of the process that are specific to Chromium/Chrome.

There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: