commit | 9ac494a171014fa0f06dbf2b0e08abf1d7ec85aa | [log] [tgz] |
---|---|---|
author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Thu Oct 24 12:55:26 2024 -0400 |
committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Tue Oct 29 03:18:25 2024 +0000 |
tree | 3248d7f7e912bc6a5662b91a1660ad53d3818e22 | |
parent | 197a654639aa39a86782b06abebdeccbfa197e2b [diff] |
Remove now redundant check for extra DTLS messages in epoch 1 This dates to https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/8988, which was several iterations back of the message read API. We now catch extra Finished by way of: In DTLS 1.2, there is no key change at the end of the handshake: - If the fragment was received before the handshake was over, we queue it up and then the handshake makes sure incoming messages are clear before completing. - If the fragment was received after the handshake was over, we reject almost all handshake fragments post-handshake. (This will need to be rejiggered. In DTLS 1.3, there is a key change at the end of the handshake - If the fragment was received before the handshake was over, key changes require incoming messages are clear and we reject it. - If the fragment was received after the handshake was over, we currently do not notice. We do not retain the old epoch and just drop the record. (This is fine, since we won't actually process it.) But when we implement DTLS 1.3 key changes properly, we might end up picking it up. Bug: 42290594 Change-Id: I52621f209321a0eb1ce59aa36db68922206d529f Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/72447 Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
To file a security issue, use the Chromium process and mention in the report this is for BoringSSL. You can ignore the parts of the process that are specific to Chromium/Chrome.
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: