Make it more obvious when epoch 0 is closed in DTLS As soon as we receive any records from epoch 1, we stop accepting anything from epoch 0. This is important because, were epoch 0 still open after the handshake, an attacker could inject a cleartext DTLS packet with some errors in it and try to cause the handshake to fail. DTLS needs special handling for such packet injections because, until TLS, it can't rely on the attacker having to guess a TCP sequence number. Epoch 0 is special here because it is cleartext. Bad records from other epochs won't get past the record layer, and the DTLS record layer silently drops invalid records instead of letting them through. While we did handle this fine, there were no tests that we did, and it's actually slightly non-obvious why we're fine. We actually save epoch 0 under prev_read_epoch, so one would think it's still active. However, epoch 0 uses the DTLS 1.2 record header and parse_dtls12_record doesn't consider prev_read_epoch, so it's actually a no-op. (Confirmed that the tests pass with and without the change, but they fail if I patch parse_dtls12_record to consider both epochs.) Change-Id: I5f769f9228819a7089148a3587f564260ec54ee7 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/105648 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Presubmit-BoringSSL-Verified: boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> Reviewed-by: Lily Chen <chlily@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
To file a security issue, use the Chromium process and mention in the report this is for BoringSSL. You can ignore the parts of the process that are specific to Chromium/Chrome.
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: