| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by | |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source | |
| * license. | |
| * | |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of | |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites | |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. | |
| * | |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in | |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received | |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. | |
| * | |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not | |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third | |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights | |
| * to make use of the Contribution. | |
| * | |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN | |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA | |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY | |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR | |
| * OTHERWISE. */ | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> | |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" | |
| /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ | |
| static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, | |
| int sec_len, | |
| const void *seed1, int seed1_len, | |
| const void *seed2, int seed2_len, | |
| const void *seed3, int seed3_len, | |
| const void *seed4, int seed4_len, | |
| const void *seed5, int seed5_len, | |
| unsigned char *out, int olen) | |
| { | |
| int chunk; | |
| size_t j; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp, ctx_init; | |
| EVP_PKEY *mac_key; | |
| unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| size_t A1_len; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| chunk=EVP_MD_size(md); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_init); | |
| mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); | |
| if (!mac_key) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_init,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,&ctx_init)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| A1_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; | |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| for (;;) | |
| { | |
| /* Reinit mac contexts */ | |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,&ctx_init)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (olen>chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx_tmp,&ctx)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| if (olen > chunk) | |
| { | |
| j = olen; | |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j)) | |
| goto err; | |
| out+=j; | |
| olen-=j; | |
| /* calc the next A1 value */ | |
| A1_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; | |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| else /* last one */ | |
| { | |
| A1_len = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE; | |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len)) | |
| goto err; | |
| memcpy(out,A1,olen); | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_init); | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1)); | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ | |
| static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, | |
| const void *seed1, int seed1_len, | |
| const void *seed2, int seed2_len, | |
| const void *seed3, int seed3_len, | |
| const void *seed4, int seed4_len, | |
| const void *seed5, int seed5_len, | |
| const unsigned char *sec, int slen, | |
| unsigned char *out1, | |
| unsigned char *out2, int olen) | |
| { | |
| int len,i,idx,count; | |
| const unsigned char *S1; | |
| long m; | |
| const EVP_MD *md; | |
| int ret = 0; | |
| /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ | |
| count=0; | |
| for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { | |
| if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++; | |
| } | |
| len=slen/count; | |
| if (count == 1) | |
| slen = 0; | |
| S1=sec; | |
| memset(out1,0,olen); | |
| for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) { | |
| if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { | |
| if (!md) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1), | |
| seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len, | |
| out2,olen)) | |
| goto err; | |
| S1+=len; | |
| for (i=0; i<olen; i++) | |
| { | |
| out1[i]^=out2[i]; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, | |
| unsigned char *tmp, int num) | |
| { | |
| int ret; | |
| ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), | |
| TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, | |
| s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, | |
| s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, | |
| NULL,0,NULL,0, | |
| s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, | |
| km,tmp,num); | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t", | |
| s->session->master_key_length); | |
| { | |
| int i; | |
| for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) | |
| { | |
| printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]); | |
| } | |
| printf("\n"); } | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_aead_ctx_init allocates |*aead_ctx|, if needed and returns 1. It | |
| * returns 0 on malloc error. */ | |
| static int tls1_aead_ctx_init(SSL_AEAD_CTX **aead_ctx) | |
| { | |
| if (*aead_ctx != NULL) | |
| EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup(&(*aead_ctx)->ctx); | |
| else | |
| { | |
| *aead_ctx = (SSL_AEAD_CTX*) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_AEAD_CTX)); | |
| if (*aead_ctx == NULL) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_aead_ctx_init, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(SSL *s, char is_read, | |
| const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len, | |
| const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len, | |
| const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_len) | |
| { | |
| const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead; | |
| SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead_ctx; | |
| /* mac_key_and_key is used to merge the MAC and cipher keys for an AEAD | |
| * which simulates pre-AEAD cipher suites. It needs to be large enough | |
| * to cope with the largest pair of keys. */ | |
| uint8_t mac_key_and_key[32 /* HMAC(SHA256) */ + 32 /* AES-256 */]; | |
| if (mac_secret_len > 0) | |
| { | |
| /* This is a "stateful" AEAD (for compatibility with pre-AEAD | |
| * cipher suites). */ | |
| if (mac_secret_len + key_len > sizeof(mac_key_and_key)) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(mac_key_and_key, mac_secret, mac_secret_len); | |
| memcpy(mac_key_and_key + mac_secret_len, key, key_len); | |
| key = mac_key_and_key; | |
| key_len += mac_secret_len; | |
| } | |
| if (is_read) | |
| { | |
| if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_read_ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| aead_ctx = s->aead_read_ctx; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| if (!tls1_aead_ctx_init(&s->aead_write_ctx)) | |
| return 0; | |
| aead_ctx = s->aead_write_ctx; | |
| } | |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(&aead_ctx->ctx, aead, key, key_len, | |
| EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL /* engine */)) | |
| return 0; | |
| if (iv_len > sizeof(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce)) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(aead_ctx->fixed_nonce, iv, iv_len); | |
| aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len = iv_len; | |
| aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 8; /* correct for all true AEADs so far. */ | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_STATEFUL_AEAD) | |
| aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len = 0; | |
| aead_ctx->variable_nonce_included_in_record = | |
| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_VARIABLE_NONCE_INCLUDED_IN_RECORD) != 0; | |
| if (aead_ctx->variable_nonce_len + aead_ctx->fixed_nonce_len != EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead)) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_aead, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| aead_ctx->tag_len = EVP_AEAD_max_overhead(aead); | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher performs the work needed to switch cipher | |
| * states when using EVP_CIPHER. The argument |is_read| is true iff this | |
| * function is being called due to reading, as opposed to writing, a | |
| * ChangeCipherSpec message. In order to support export ciphersuites, | |
| * use_client_keys indicates whether the key material provided is in the | |
| * "client write" direction. */ | |
| static int tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher( | |
| SSL *s, char is_read, char use_client_keys, | |
| const unsigned char *mac_secret, unsigned mac_secret_len, | |
| const unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len, | |
| const unsigned char *iv, unsigned iv_len) | |
| { | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cipher_ctx; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; | |
| if (is_read) | |
| { | |
| if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
| else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| cipher_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx; | |
| mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); | |
| memcpy(s->s3->read_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len); | |
| s->s3->read_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| /* When updating the write contexts for DTLS, we do not wish to | |
| * free the old ones because DTLS stores pointers to them in | |
| * order to implement retransmission. */ | |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
| else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) | |
| goto err; | |
| else | |
| /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */ | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
| cipher_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) | |
| { | |
| /* This is the same as ssl_replace_hash, but doesn't | |
| * free the old |s->write_hash|. */ | |
| mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); | |
| if (!mac_ctx) | |
| goto err; | |
| s->write_hash = mac_ctx; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); | |
| memcpy(s->s3->write_mac_secret, mac_secret, mac_secret_len); | |
| s->s3->write_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_len; | |
| } | |
| EVP_PKEY *mac_key = | |
| EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type, | |
| NULL, mac_secret, mac_secret_len); | |
| if (!mac_key) | |
| return 0; | |
| EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, s->s3->tmp.new_hash, NULL, mac_key); | |
| EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); | |
| EVP_CipherInit_ex(cipher_ctx, cipher, NULL /* engine */, key, iv, !is_read); | |
| return 1; | |
| err: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) | |
| { | |
| /* is_read is true if we have just read a ChangeCipherSpec message - | |
| * i.e. we need to update the read cipherspec. Otherwise we have just | |
| * written one. */ | |
| const char is_read = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0; | |
| /* use_client_keys is true if we wish to use the keys for the "client | |
| * write" direction. This is the case if we're a client sending a | |
| * ChangeCipherSpec, or a server reading a client's ChangeCipherSpec. */ | |
| const char use_client_keys = which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE || | |
| which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; | |
| const unsigned char *client_write_mac_secret, *server_write_mac_secret, *mac_secret; | |
| const unsigned char *client_write_key, *server_write_key, *key; | |
| const unsigned char *client_write_iv, *server_write_iv, *iv; | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; | |
| const EVP_AEAD *aead = s->s3->tmp.new_aead; | |
| unsigned key_len, iv_len, mac_secret_len; | |
| const unsigned char *key_data; | |
| /* Reset sequence number to zero. */ | |
| if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | |
| memset(is_read ? s->s3->read_sequence : s->s3->write_sequence, 0, 8); | |
| /* key_arg is used for SSLv2. We don't need it for TLS. */ | |
| s->session->key_arg_length = 0; | |
| mac_secret_len = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; | |
| if (aead != NULL) | |
| { | |
| key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); | |
| /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD | |
| * cipher suites) the key length reported by | |
| * |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key bytes. */ | |
| if (key_len < mac_secret_len) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| key_len -= mac_secret_len; | |
| iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); | |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) | |
| iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; | |
| else | |
| iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); | |
| } | |
| key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block; | |
| client_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len; | |
| server_write_mac_secret = key_data; key_data += mac_secret_len; | |
| client_write_key = key_data; key_data += key_len; | |
| server_write_key = key_data; key_data += key_len; | |
| client_write_iv = key_data; key_data += iv_len; | |
| server_write_iv = key_data; key_data += iv_len; | |
| if (use_client_keys) | |
| { | |
| mac_secret = client_write_mac_secret; | |
| key = client_write_key; | |
| iv = client_write_iv; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| mac_secret = server_write_mac_secret; | |
| key = server_write_key; | |
| iv = server_write_iv; | |
| } | |
| if (key_data - s->s3->tmp.key_block != s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (aead != NULL) | |
| { | |
| if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_aead(s, is_read, | |
| key, key_len, iv, iv_len, | |
| mac_secret, mac_secret_len)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| if (!tls1_change_cipher_state_cipher(s, is_read, use_client_keys, | |
| mac_secret, mac_secret_len, | |
| key, key_len, | |
| iv, iv_len)) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL; | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *c = NULL; | |
| const EVP_MD *hash = NULL; | |
| const EVP_AEAD *aead = NULL; | |
| int num; | |
| int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0; | |
| int ret=0; | |
| unsigned key_len, iv_len; | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) | |
| return(1); | |
| if (s->session->cipher && | |
| ((s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_AEAD) || | |
| (s->session->cipher->algorithm2 & SSL_CIPHER_ALGORITHM2_STATEFUL_AEAD))) | |
| { | |
| if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_aead(s->session, &aead)) | |
| goto cipher_unavailable_err; | |
| key_len = EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead); | |
| iv_len = SSL_CIPHER_AEAD_FIXED_NONCE_LEN(s->session->cipher); | |
| if (!ssl_cipher_get_mac(s->session, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size)) | |
| goto cipher_unavailable_err; | |
| /* For "stateful" AEADs (i.e. compatibility with pre-AEAD | |
| * cipher suites) the key length reported by | |
| * |EVP_AEAD_key_length| will include the MAC key bytes. */ | |
| if (key_len < mac_secret_size) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_change_cipher_state, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| key_len -= mac_secret_size; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size)) | |
| goto cipher_unavailable_err; | |
| key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); | |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) | |
| iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; | |
| else | |
| iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.new_aead=aead; | |
| s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c; | |
| s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash; | |
| s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; | |
| s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; | |
| num=key_len+mac_secret_size+iv_len; | |
| num*=2; | |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); | |
| if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num; | |
| s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1; | |
| if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG | |
| printf("client random\n"); | |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } | |
| printf("server random\n"); | |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } | |
| printf("pre-master\n"); | |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } | |
| #endif | |
| if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num)) | |
| goto err; | |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG | |
| printf("\nkey block\n"); | |
| { int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } | |
| #endif | |
| if (s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION && | |
| (s->mode & SSL_MODE_CBC_RECORD_SPLITTING) != 0) | |
| { | |
| /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with | |
| * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) | |
| */ | |
| s->s3->need_record_splitting = 1; | |
| if (s->session->cipher != NULL) | |
| { | |
| if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) | |
| s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0; | |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 | |
| if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) | |
| s->s3->need_record_splitting = 0; | |
| #endif | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ret = 1; | |
| err: | |
| if (p2) | |
| { | |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num); | |
| OPENSSL_free(p2); | |
| } | |
| return(ret); | |
| cipher_unavailable_err: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_setup_key_block, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. | |
| * | |
| * Returns: | |
| * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too | |
| * short etc). | |
| * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. | |
| * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, | |
| * an internal error occured. | |
| */ | |
| int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) | |
| { | |
| SSL3_RECORD *rec; | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; | |
| unsigned long l; | |
| int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0; | |
| const EVP_CIPHER *enc; | |
| const SSL_AEAD_CTX *aead; | |
| if (send) | |
| rec = &s->s3->wrec; | |
| else | |
| rec = &s->s3->rrec; | |
| if (send) | |
| aead = s->aead_write_ctx; | |
| else | |
| aead = s->aead_read_ctx; | |
| if (aead) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char ad[13], *seq, *in, *out, nonce[16]; | |
| unsigned nonce_used; | |
| size_t n; | |
| seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence; | |
| if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; | |
| s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p); | |
| memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); | |
| memcpy(ad, dtlsseq, 8); | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| memcpy(ad, seq, 8); | |
| for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */ | |
| { | |
| ++seq[i]; | |
| if (seq[i] != 0) | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| ad[8] = rec->type; | |
| ad[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version>>8); | |
| ad[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); | |
| if (aead->fixed_nonce_len + aead->variable_nonce_len > sizeof(nonce) || | |
| aead->variable_nonce_len > 8) | |
| return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ | |
| memcpy(nonce, aead->fixed_nonce, aead->fixed_nonce_len); | |
| nonce_used = aead->fixed_nonce_len; | |
| if (send) | |
| { | |
| size_t len = rec->length; | |
| size_t eivlen = 0; | |
| in = rec->input; | |
| out = rec->data; | |
| /* When sending we use the sequence number as the | |
| * variable part of the nonce. */ | |
| if (aead->variable_nonce_len > 8) | |
| return -1; | |
| memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); | |
| nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; | |
| /* in do_ssl3_write, rec->input is moved forward by | |
| * variable_nonce_len in order to leave space for the | |
| * variable nonce. Thus we can copy the sequence number | |
| * bytes into place without overwriting any of the | |
| * plaintext. */ | |
| if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record) | |
| { | |
| memcpy(out, ad, aead->variable_nonce_len); | |
| len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; | |
| eivlen = aead->variable_nonce_len; | |
| } | |
| ad[11] = len >> 8; | |
| ad[12] = len & 0xff; | |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal( | |
| &aead->ctx, | |
| out + eivlen, &n, len + aead->tag_len, | |
| nonce, nonce_used, | |
| in + eivlen, len, | |
| ad, sizeof(ad))) | |
| { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record) | |
| n += aead->variable_nonce_len; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| /* receive */ | |
| size_t len = rec->length; | |
| if (rec->data != rec->input) | |
| return -1; /* internal error - should never happen. */ | |
| out = in = rec->input; | |
| if (len < aead->variable_nonce_len) | |
| return 0; | |
| memcpy(nonce + nonce_used, | |
| aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record ? in : ad, | |
| aead->variable_nonce_len); | |
| nonce_used += aead->variable_nonce_len; | |
| if (aead->variable_nonce_included_in_record) | |
| { | |
| in += aead->variable_nonce_len; | |
| len -= aead->variable_nonce_len; | |
| out += aead->variable_nonce_len; | |
| } | |
| if (len < aead->tag_len) | |
| return 0; | |
| len -= aead->tag_len; | |
| ad[11] = len >> 8; | |
| ad[12] = len & 0xff; | |
| if (!EVP_AEAD_CTX_open( | |
| &aead->ctx, | |
| out, &n, len, | |
| nonce, nonce_used, | |
| in, len + aead->tag_len, | |
| ad, sizeof(ad))) | |
| { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| rec->data = rec->input = out; | |
| } | |
| rec->length = n; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| if (send) | |
| { | |
| ds=s->enc_write_ctx; | |
| rec= &(s->s3->wrec); | |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) | |
| enc=NULL; | |
| else | |
| { | |
| int ivlen; | |
| enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); | |
| /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ | |
| if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) | |
| && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) | |
| ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); | |
| else | |
| ivlen = 0; | |
| if (ivlen > 1) | |
| { | |
| if ( rec->data != rec->input) | |
| /* we can't write into the input stream: | |
| * Can this ever happen?? (steve) | |
| */ | |
| fprintf(stderr, | |
| "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", | |
| __FILE__, __LINE__); | |
| else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| ds=s->enc_read_ctx; | |
| rec= &(s->s3->rrec); | |
| if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) | |
| enc=NULL; | |
| else | |
| enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); | |
| } | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) | |
| { | |
| memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length); | |
| rec->input=rec->data; | |
| ret = 1; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| l=rec->length; | |
| bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); | |
| if ((bs != 1) && send) | |
| { | |
| i=bs-((int)l%bs); | |
| /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ | |
| /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ | |
| j=i-1; | |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) | |
| { | |
| if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) | |
| j++; | |
| } | |
| for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++) | |
| rec->input[k]=j; | |
| l+=i; | |
| rec->length+=i; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| { | |
| unsigned long ui; | |
| printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", | |
| ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); | |
| printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n", | |
| ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, | |
| DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, | |
| ds->cipher->iv_len); | |
| printf("\t\tIV: "); | |
| for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]); | |
| printf("\n"); | |
| printf("\trec->input="); | |
| for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]); | |
| printf("\n"); | |
| } | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| if (!send) | |
| { | |
| if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0) | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l); | |
| if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) | |
| ?(i<0) | |
| :(i==0)) | |
| return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ | |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) | |
| { | |
| rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
| rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
| rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; | |
| } | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| { | |
| unsigned long i; | |
| printf("\trec->data="); | |
| for (i=0; i<l; i++) | |
| printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n"); | |
| } | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| ret = 1; | |
| if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) | |
| mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); | |
| if ((bs != 1) && !send) | |
| ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); | |
| if (pad && !send) | |
| rec->length -= pad; | |
| } | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) | |
| { | |
| unsigned int ret; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL; | |
| int i; | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) | |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++) | |
| { | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid) | |
| { | |
| d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!d) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_cert_verify_mac, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d); | |
| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret); | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| return((int)ret); | |
| } | |
| /* tls1_handshake_digest calculates the current handshake hash and writes it to | |
| * |out|, which has space for |out_len| bytes. It returns the number of bytes | |
| * written or -1 in the event of an error. This function works on a copy of the | |
| * underlying digests so can be called multiple times and prior to the final | |
| * update etc. */ | |
| int tls1_handshake_digest(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t out_len) | |
| { | |
| const EVP_MD *md; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | |
| int i, err = 0, len = 0; | |
| long mask; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | |
| for (i = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(i, &mask, &md); i++) | |
| { | |
| int hash_size; | |
| unsigned int digest_len; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; | |
| if ((mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) == 0) | |
| continue; | |
| hash_size = EVP_MD_size(md); | |
| if (!hdgst || hash_size < 0 || (size_t)hash_size > out_len) | |
| { | |
| err = 1; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || | |
| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &digest_len) || | |
| digest_len != (unsigned int)hash_size) /* internal error */ | |
| { | |
| err = 1; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| out += digest_len; | |
| out_len -= digest_len; | |
| len += digest_len; | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | |
| if (err != 0) | |
| return -1; | |
| return len; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, | |
| const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | |
| unsigned char buf2[12]; | |
| int err=0; | |
| int digests_len; | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) | |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) | |
| return 0; | |
| digests_len = tls1_handshake_digest(s, buf, sizeof(buf)); | |
| if (digests_len < 0) | |
| { | |
| err = 1; | |
| digests_len = 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), | |
| str,slen, buf, digests_len, NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0, | |
| s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, | |
| out,buf2,sizeof buf2)) | |
| err = 1; | |
| if (err) | |
| return 0; | |
| else | |
| return sizeof buf2; | |
| } | |
| int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) | |
| { | |
| SSL3_RECORD *rec; | |
| unsigned char *seq; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX *hash; | |
| size_t md_size, orig_len; | |
| int i; | |
| EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; | |
| unsigned char header[13]; | |
| int t; | |
| if (send) | |
| { | |
| rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec); | |
| seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); | |
| hash=ssl->write_hash; | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec); | |
| seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); | |
| hash=ssl->read_hash; | |
| } | |
| t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); | |
| assert(t >= 0); | |
| md_size=t; | |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash)) | |
| return -1; | |
| mac_ctx = &hmac; | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq; | |
| s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); | |
| memcpy (p,&seq[2],6); | |
| memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); | |
| } | |
| else | |
| memcpy(header, seq, 8); | |
| /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */ | |
| orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8); | |
| rec->type &= 0xff; | |
| header[8]=rec->type; | |
| header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8); | |
| header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version); | |
| header[11]=(rec->length)>>8; | |
| header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff; | |
| if (!send && | |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && | |
| ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) | |
| { | |
| /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any | |
| * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of | |
| * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a | |
| * timing-oracle. */ | |
| ssl3_cbc_digest_record( | |
| mac_ctx, | |
| md, &md_size, | |
| header, rec->input, | |
| rec->length + md_size, orig_len, | |
| ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, | |
| ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, | |
| 0 /* not SSLv3 */); | |
| } | |
| else | |
| { | |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header)); | |
| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length); | |
| t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size); | |
| assert(t > 0); | |
| } | |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); | |
| if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) | |
| { | |
| for (i=7; i>=0; i--) | |
| { | |
| ++seq[i]; | |
| if (seq[i] != 0) break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return(md_size); | |
| } | |
| int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, | |
| int len) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; | |
| const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL; | |
| int col = 0, sol = 0; | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len); | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), | |
| TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, | |
| s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, | |
| co, col, | |
| s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, | |
| so, sol, | |
| p,len, | |
| s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff); | |
| #ifdef SSL_DEBUG | |
| fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n"); | |
| BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); | |
| fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n"); | |
| BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n"); | |
| BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n"); | |
| BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_TRACE_CRYPTO | |
| if (s->msg_callback) | |
| { | |
| s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_PREMASTER, | |
| p, len, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_CLIENT_RANDOM, | |
| s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, | |
| s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_SERVER_RANDOM, | |
| s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, | |
| s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| s->msg_callback(2, s->version, TLS1_RT_CRYPTO_MASTER, | |
| s->session->master_key, | |
| SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, | |
| s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| #endif | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); | |
| } | |
| int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, | |
| const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, | |
| size_t contextlen, int use_context) | |
| { | |
| unsigned char *buff; | |
| unsigned char *val = NULL; | |
| size_t vallen, currentvalpos; | |
| int rv; | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen); | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); | |
| if (buff == NULL) goto err2; | |
| /* construct PRF arguments | |
| * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate | |
| * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values | |
| * does not create a prohibited label. | |
| */ | |
| vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; | |
| if (use_context) | |
| { | |
| vallen += 2 + contextlen; | |
| } | |
| val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); | |
| if (val == NULL) goto err2; | |
| currentvalpos = 0; | |
| memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen); | |
| currentvalpos += llen; | |
| memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
| memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); | |
| currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; | |
| if (use_context) | |
| { | |
| val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; | |
| currentvalpos++; | |
| val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; | |
| currentvalpos++; | |
| if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) | |
| { | |
| memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* disallow prohibited labels | |
| * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) = | |
| * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the | |
| * comparisons won't have buffer overflow | |
| */ | |
| if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, | |
| TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; | |
| if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, | |
| TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; | |
| if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, | |
| TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; | |
| if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, | |
| TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1; | |
| rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), | |
| val, vallen, | |
| NULL, 0, | |
| NULL, 0, | |
| NULL, 0, | |
| NULL, 0, | |
| s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length, | |
| out,buff,olen); | |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG | |
| printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); | |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ | |
| goto ret; | |
| err1: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); | |
| rv = 0; | |
| goto ret; | |
| err2: | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_export_keying_material, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | |
| rv = 0; | |
| ret: | |
| if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff); | |
| if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val); | |
| return(rv); | |
| } | |
| int tls1_alert_code(int code) | |
| { | |
| switch (code) | |
| { | |
| case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); | |
| case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); | |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
| case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); | |
| case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); | |
| case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); | |
| case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1); | |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); | |
| case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); | |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); | |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); | |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); | |
| case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); | |
| case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); | |
| case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); | |
| case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); | |
| case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); | |
| case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); | |
| case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); | |
| case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); | |
| case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); | |
| case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
| case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); | |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); | |
| case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); | |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); | |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); | |
| case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); | |
| case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK:return(SSL3_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); | |
| #if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ | |
| case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return | |
| (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); | |
| #endif | |
| default: return(-1); | |
| } | |
| } |