| /* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. |
| * |
| * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by |
| * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. |
| * |
| * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license provided above. |
| * |
| * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by |
| * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> |
| #include <openssl/bytestring.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #include <openssl/engine.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| #include "../crypto/dh/internal.h" |
| |
| static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver); |
| |
| static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver) |
| { |
| if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) |
| return(SSLv3_client_method()); |
| else |
| return(NULL); |
| } |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method, |
| ssl_undefined_function, |
| ssl3_connect, |
| ssl3_get_client_method) |
| |
| int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) |
| { |
| BUF_MEM *buf=NULL; |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; |
| int ret= -1; |
| int new_state,state,skip=0; |
| |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb=s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| s->in_handshake++; |
| if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); |
| |
| for (;;) |
| { |
| state=s->state; |
| |
| switch(s->state) |
| { |
| case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: |
| s->renegotiate=1; |
| s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; |
| /* break */ |
| case SSL_ST_BEFORE: |
| case SSL_ST_CONNECT: |
| case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: |
| case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: |
| |
| s->server=0; |
| if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); |
| |
| if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ |
| s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT; |
| |
| if (s->init_buf == NULL) |
| { |
| if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->init_buf=buf; |
| buf=NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } |
| |
| /* setup buffing BIO */ |
| if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; } |
| |
| /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ |
| |
| ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); |
| |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| |
| s->shutdown=0; |
| ret=ssl3_client_hello(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| |
| /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ |
| if (s->bbio != s->wbio) |
| s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio); |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| |
| if (s->hit) |
| { |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| { |
| /* receive renewed session ticket */ |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; |
| } |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: |
| if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) |
| { |
| ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| if (s->tlsext_status_expected) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| skip = 1; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| |
| /* at this point we check that we have the |
| * required stuff from the server */ |
| if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: |
| ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert |
| * sent back */ |
| /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain |
| * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ |
| /* XXX: For now, we do not support client |
| * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with |
| * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. |
| * We need to skip the certificate verify |
| * message when client's ECDH public key is sent |
| * inside the client certificate. |
| */ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) |
| { |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; |
| } |
| if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) |
| { |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; |
| } |
| |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A; |
| # endif |
| s->init_num=0; |
| |
| s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_next_proto(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| #endif |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_channel_id(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: |
| ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; |
| |
| /* clear flags */ |
| s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; |
| if (s->hit) |
| { |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* This is a non-resumption handshake. If it |
| * involves ChannelID, then record the |
| * handshake hashes at this point in the |
| * session so that any resumption of this |
| * session with ChannelID can sign those |
| * hashes. */ |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) |
| { |
| ret = tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if ((SSL_get_mode(s) & SSL_MODE_HANDSHAKE_CUTTHROUGH) |
| && ssl3_can_cutthrough(s) |
| && s->s3->previous_server_finished_len == 0 /* no cutthrough on renegotiation (would complicate the state machine) */ |
| ) |
| { |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| else |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| } |
| } |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE: |
| /* At this point, the next message must be entirely |
| * behind a ChangeCipherSpec. */ |
| if (!ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(s)) |
| { |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: |
| ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); |
| if (ret <= 0) goto end; |
| |
| if (s->hit) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL_ST_OK; |
| s->init_num=0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: |
| s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; |
| if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) |
| { |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_CUTTHROUGH_COMPLETE: |
| /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CHANGE; |
| |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); |
| ret = 1; |
| goto end; |
| /* break; */ |
| |
| case SSL_ST_OK: |
| /* clean a few things up */ |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
| |
| if (s->init_buf != NULL) |
| { |
| BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
| s->init_buf=NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, |
| * remove the buffering now */ |
| if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); |
| /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ |
| |
| s->init_num=0; |
| s->renegotiate=0; |
| s->new_session=0; |
| |
| ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); |
| if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; |
| |
| ret=1; |
| /* s->server=0; */ |
| s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect; |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); |
| |
| goto end; |
| /* break; */ |
| |
| default: |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_connect, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| ret= -1; |
| goto end; |
| /* break; */ |
| } |
| |
| /* did we do anything */ |
| if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) |
| { |
| if (s->debug) |
| { |
| if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) |
| { |
| new_state=s->state; |
| s->state=state; |
| cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1); |
| s->state=new_state; |
| } |
| } |
| skip=0; |
| } |
| end: |
| s->in_handshake--; |
| if (buf != NULL) |
| BUF_MEM_free(buf); |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| |
| int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| unsigned char *p,*d; |
| int i; |
| unsigned long l; |
| |
| buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; |
| if (sess == NULL || |
| sess->ssl_version != s->version || |
| !sess->session_id_length || |
| sess->not_resumable) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) |
| { |
| /* Determine which DTLS version to use */ |
| int options = s->options; |
| /* If DTLS 1.2 disabled correct the version number */ |
| if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2) |
| { |
| if (tls1_suiteb(s)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* Disabling all versions is silly: return an |
| * error. |
| */ |
| if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* Update method so we don't use any DTLS 1.2 |
| * features. |
| */ |
| s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); |
| s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* We only support one version: update method */ |
| if (options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1) |
| s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); |
| s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; |
| } |
| s->client_version = s->version; |
| } |
| /* else use the pre-loaded session */ |
| |
| p=s->s3->client_random; |
| |
| /* for DTLS if client_random is initialized, reuse it, we are |
| * required to use same upon reply to HelloVerify */ |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| { |
| size_t idx; |
| i = 1; |
| for (idx=0; idx < sizeof(s->s3->client_random); idx++) |
| { |
| if (p[idx]) |
| { |
| i = 0; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| i = 1; |
| |
| if (i) |
| ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 0, p, |
| sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); |
| |
| /* Do the message type and length last. |
| * Note: the final argument to ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext below |
| * depends on the size of this prefix. */ |
| d=p= ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| /* version indicates the negotiated version: for example from |
| * an SSLv2/v3 compatible client hello). The client_version |
| * field is the maximum version we permit and it is also |
| * used in RSA encrypted premaster secrets. Some servers can |
| * choke if we initially report a higher version then |
| * renegotiate to a lower one in the premaster secret. This |
| * didn't happen with TLS 1.0 as most servers supported it |
| * but it can with TLS 1.1 or later if the server only supports |
| * 1.0. |
| * |
| * Possible scenario with previous logic: |
| * 1. Client hello indicates TLS 1.2 |
| * 2. Server hello says TLS 1.0 |
| * 3. RSA encrypted premaster secret uses 1.2. |
| * 4. Handhaked proceeds using TLS 1.0. |
| * 5. Server sends hello request to renegotiate. |
| * 6. Client hello indicates TLS v1.0 as we now |
| * know that is maximum server supports. |
| * 7. Server chokes on RSA encrypted premaster secret |
| * containing version 1.0. |
| * |
| * For interoperability it should be OK to always use the |
| * maximum version we support in client hello and then rely |
| * on the checking of version to ensure the servers isn't |
| * being inconsistent: for example initially negotiating with |
| * TLS 1.0 and renegotiating with TLS 1.2. We do this by using |
| * client_version in client hello and not resetting it to |
| * the negotiated version. |
| */ |
| #if 0 |
| *(p++)=s->version>>8; |
| *(p++)=s->version&0xff; |
| s->client_version=s->version; |
| #else |
| *(p++)=s->client_version>>8; |
| *(p++)=s->client_version&0xff; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Random stuff */ |
| memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| |
| /* Session ID */ |
| if (s->new_session) |
| i=0; |
| else |
| i=s->session->session_id_length; |
| *(p++)=i; |
| if (i != 0) |
| { |
| if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i); |
| p+=i; |
| } |
| |
| /* cookie stuff for DTLS */ |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| { |
| if ( s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| *(p++) = s->d1->cookie_len; |
| memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); |
| p += s->d1->cookie_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Ciphers supported */ |
| i = ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s), &p[2]); |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s2n(i,p); |
| p+=i; |
| |
| /* COMPRESSION */ |
| *(p++)=1; |
| *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ |
| |
| /* TLS extensions*/ |
| if (ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, p-buf)) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_client_hello, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| l= p-d; |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, l); |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| err: |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *c; |
| CERT *ct = s->cert; |
| int al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,ok; |
| long n; |
| CBS server_hello, server_random, session_id; |
| uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite; |
| uint8_t compression_method; |
| /* Hello verify request and/or server hello version may not |
| * match so set first packet if we're negotiating version. |
| */ |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| s->first_packet = 1; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, |
| -1, |
| 20000, /* ?? */ |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| { |
| s->first_packet = 0; |
| if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) |
| { |
| if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0) |
| { |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| else /* already sent a cookie */ |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&server_hello, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &server_version) || |
| !CBS_get_bytes(&server_hello, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || |
| !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_hello, &session_id) || |
| CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE || |
| !CBS_get_u16(&server_hello, &cipher_suite) || |
| !CBS_get_u8(&server_hello, &compression_method)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) |
| { |
| /* Work out correct protocol version to use */ |
| int options = s->options; |
| if (server_version == DTLS1_2_VERSION |
| && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) |
| s->method = DTLSv1_2_client_method(); |
| else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); |
| s->version = server_version; |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| else if (server_version == DTLS1_VERSION |
| && !(options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) |
| s->method = DTLSv1_client_method(); |
| else |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
| s->version = server_version; |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->version = s->client_version = s->method->version; |
| } |
| |
| if (server_version != s->version) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); |
| s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (server_version & 0xff); |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Copy over the server random. */ |
| memcpy(s->s3->server_random, CBS_data(&server_random), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| |
| s->hit = 0; |
| |
| /* check if we want to resume the session based on external pre-shared secret */ |
| if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) |
| { |
| SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL; |
| s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key); |
| if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, |
| &s->session->master_key_length, |
| NULL, &pref_cipher, |
| s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) |
| { |
| s->session->cipher = pref_cipher ? |
| pref_cipher : |
| ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
| s->hit = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->hit && CBS_len(&session_id) != 0 && |
| CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, |
| s->session->session_id, s->session->session_id_length)) |
| { |
| if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length |
| || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length)) |
| { |
| /* actually a client application bug */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->hit = 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* a miss or crap from the other end */ |
| if (!s->hit) |
| { |
| /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new |
| * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ |
| if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) |
| { |
| if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) |
| { |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Note: session_id could be empty. */ |
| s->session->session_id_length = CBS_len(&session_id); |
| memcpy(s->session->session_id, CBS_data(&session_id), CBS_len(&session_id)); |
| } |
| |
| c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite); |
| if (c == NULL) |
| { |
| /* unknown cipher */ |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| /* If it is a disabled cipher we didn't send it in client hello, |
| * so return an error. |
| */ |
| if (c->algorithm_ssl & ct->mask_ssl || |
| c->algorithm_mkey & ct->mask_k || |
| c->algorithm_auth & ct->mask_a) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); |
| if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk, NULL, c)) |
| { |
| /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher |
| and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that |
| cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ |
| if (s->session->cipher) |
| s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; |
| if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; |
| /* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for |
| * client authentication. |
| */ |
| if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| goto f_err; |
| |
| /* Only the NULL compression algorithm is supported. */ |
| if (compression_method != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* TLS extensions */ |
| if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s, &server_hello)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* There should be nothing left over in the record. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&server_hello) != 0) |
| { |
| /* wrong packet length */ |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_hello, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| return(1); |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int al,i,ok,ret= -1; |
| unsigned long n; |
| X509 *x=NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; |
| SESS_CERT *sc; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| CBS cbs, certificate_list; |
| const uint8_t* data; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE, |
| s->max_cert_list, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| |
| CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list) || |
| CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) |
| { |
| CBS certificate; |
| if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| data = CBS_data(&certificate); |
| x = d2i_X509(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&certificate)); |
| if (x == NULL) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (!CBS_skip(&certificate, data - CBS_data(&certificate))) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (CBS_len(&certificate) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| x=NULL; |
| } |
| |
| i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); |
| if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) |
| ) |
| { |
| al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ |
| |
| sc=ssl_sess_cert_new(); |
| if (sc == NULL) goto err; |
| |
| if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); |
| s->session->sess_cert=sc; |
| |
| sc->cert_chain=sk; |
| /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's |
| * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ |
| x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); |
| sk=NULL; |
| /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ |
| |
| pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x); |
| |
| if ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) |
| { |
| x=NULL; |
| al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey); |
| if (i < 0) |
| { |
| x=NULL; |
| al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| int exp_idx = ssl_cipher_get_cert_index(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); |
| if (exp_idx >= 0 && i != exp_idx) |
| { |
| x=NULL; |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, SSL_R_WRONG_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| sc->peer_cert_type=i; |
| CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| /* Why would the following ever happen? |
| * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */ |
| if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) |
| X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); |
| sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x; |
| sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); |
| |
| if (s->session->peer != NULL) |
| X509_free(s->session->peer); |
| CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); |
| s->session->peer=x; |
| |
| s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; |
| |
| x=NULL; |
| ret=1; |
| if (0) |
| { |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| } |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| X509_free(x); |
| sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
| { |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| int al,ok; |
| long n,alg_k,alg_a; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| const EVP_MD *md = NULL; |
| RSA *rsa=NULL; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| DH *dh=NULL; |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; |
| BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; |
| EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; |
| #endif |
| CBS server_key_exchange, server_key_exchange_orig, parameter; |
| |
| /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() |
| * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, |
| -1, |
| s->max_cert_list, |
| &ok); |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) |
| { |
| if (ssl_cipher_requires_server_key_exchange(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* In plain PSK ciphersuite, ServerKeyExchange can be |
| omitted if no identity hint is sent. Set |
| session->sess_cert anyway to avoid problems |
| later.*/ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK) |
| { |
| /* PSK ciphersuites that also send a |
| * Certificate would have already initialized |
| * |sess_cert|. */ |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) |
| s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); |
| if (s->session->psk_identity_hint) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); |
| s->session->psk_identity_hint = NULL; |
| } |
| } |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| /* Retain a copy of the original CBS to compute the signature |
| * over. */ |
| CBS_init(&server_key_exchange, s->init_msg, n); |
| server_key_exchange_orig = server_key_exchange; |
| |
| if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) |
| { |
| if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) |
| { |
| RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp); |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) |
| { |
| DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL; |
| } |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) |
| { |
| EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL; |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); |
| } |
| |
| alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) |
| { |
| CBS psk_identity_hint; |
| |
| /* Each of the PSK key exchanges begins with a |
| * psk_identity_hint. */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &psk_identity_hint)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Store PSK identity hint for later use, hint is used in |
| * ssl3_send_client_key_exchange. Assume that the maximum |
| * length of a PSK identity hint can be as long as the maximum |
| * length of a PSK identity. Also do not allow NULL |
| * characters; identities are saved as C strings. |
| * |
| * TODO(davidben): Should invalid hints be ignored? It's a hint |
| * rather than a specific identity. */ |
| if (CBS_len(&psk_identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN || |
| CBS_contains_zero_byte(&psk_identity_hint)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Save the identity hint as a C string. */ |
| if (!CBS_strdup(&psk_identity_hint, &s->session->psk_identity_hint)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (0) {} |
| else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) |
| { |
| CBS rsa_modulus, rsa_exponent; |
| |
| /* TODO(davidben): This was originally for export |
| * reasons. Do we still need to support it? */ |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &rsa_modulus) || |
| CBS_len(&rsa_modulus) == 0 || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &rsa_exponent) || |
| CBS_len(&rsa_exponent) == 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&rsa_modulus), |
| CBS_len(&rsa_modulus), rsa->n))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&rsa_exponent), |
| CBS_len(&rsa_exponent), rsa->e))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) |
| pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); |
| else |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa; |
| rsa=NULL; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| else if (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) |
| { |
| CBS dh_p, dh_g, dh_Ys; |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_p) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_p) == 0 || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_g) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_g) == 0 || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &dh_Ys) || |
| CBS_len(&dh_Ys) == 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(dh->p = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_p), CBS_len(&dh_p), NULL))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_g), CBS_len(&dh_g), NULL))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!(dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(CBS_data(&dh_Ys), CBS_len(&dh_Ys), NULL))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_BN_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) |
| pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| else if (alg_a & SSL_aDSS) |
| pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); |
| #endif |
| /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ |
| |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh; |
| dh=NULL; |
| } |
| else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) || (alg_k & SSL_kDHd)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| else if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) |
| { |
| uint16_t curve_id; |
| int curve_nid = 0; |
| EC_GROUP *ngroup; |
| const EC_GROUP *group; |
| CBS point; |
| |
| /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the server's |
| * ephemeral ECDH public key. Check curve is one of |
| * our preferences, if not server has sent an invalid |
| * curve. |
| */ |
| if (!tls1_check_curve(s, &server_key_exchange, &curve_id)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((curve_nid = tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(curve_id)) == 0) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); |
| if (ngroup == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); |
| |
| group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); |
| |
| /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &point)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || |
| ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, |
| CBS_data(&point), CBS_len(&point), bn_ctx)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention |
| * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server |
| * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA. |
| */ |
| if (0) ; |
| else if (alg_a & SSL_aRSA) |
| pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) |
| pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); |
| #endif |
| /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ |
| EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); |
| s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh; |
| ecdh=NULL; |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| bn_ctx = NULL; |
| EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); |
| srvr_ecpoint = NULL; |
| } |
| #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ |
| |
| else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK)) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* At this point, |server_key_exchange| contains the |
| * signature, if any, while |server_key_exchange_orig| |
| * contains the entire message. From that, derive a CBS |
| * containing just the parameter. */ |
| CBS_init(¶meter, CBS_data(&server_key_exchange_orig), |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange_orig) - |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange)); |
| |
| /* if it was signed, check the signature */ |
| if (pkey != NULL) |
| { |
| CBS signature; |
| |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, &al, s, &server_key_exchange, pkey)) |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| else |
| md = EVP_sha1(); |
| |
| /* The last field in |server_key_exchange| is the |
| * signature. */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_key_exchange, &signature) || |
| CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| int num; |
| unsigned char *q, md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; |
| size_t md_len = 0; |
| |
| q=md_buf; |
| for (num=2; num > 0; num--) |
| { |
| unsigned int digest_len; |
| EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) |
| ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(¶meter), CBS_len(¶meter)); |
| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, &digest_len); |
| q += digest_len; |
| md_len += digest_len; |
| } |
| if (!RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, md_len, |
| CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), |
| pkey->pkey.rsa)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL); |
| EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx, CBS_data(¶meter), CBS_len(¶meter)); |
| if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature), pkey) <= 0) |
| { |
| /* bad signature */ |
| al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| if (ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) |
| { |
| /* Might be wrong key type, check it */ |
| if (ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) |
| /* Otherwise this shouldn't happen */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* still data left over */ |
| if (CBS_len(&server_key_exchange) > 0) |
| { |
| al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_key_exchange, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return(1); |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| if (rsa != NULL) |
| RSA_free(rsa); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (dh != NULL) |
| DH_free(dh); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); |
| if (ecdh != NULL) |
| EC_KEY_free(ecdh); |
| #endif |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME **a, const X509_NAME **b) |
| { |
| return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ok,ret=0; |
| unsigned long n; |
| unsigned int i; |
| X509_NAME *xn=NULL; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL; |
| CBS cbs; |
| CBS certificate_types; |
| CBS certificate_authorities; |
| const uint8_t *data; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, |
| -1, |
| s->max_cert_list, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) |
| { |
| s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; |
| /* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records |
| * as we wont be doing client auth. |
| */ |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
| { |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| return(1); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ |
| if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) |
| { |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); |
| if (ca_sk == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* get the certificate types */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_types)) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!CBS_stow(&certificate_types, |
| &s->s3->tmp.certificate_types, |
| &s->s3->tmp.num_certificate_types)) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| CBS supported_signature_algorithms; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* Clear certificate digests and validity flags */ |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) |
| { |
| s->cert->pkeys[i].digest = NULL; |
| s->cert->pkeys[i].valid_flags = 0; |
| } |
| if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* get the CA RDNs */ |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_authorities)) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| while (CBS_len(&certificate_authorities) > 0) |
| { |
| CBS distinguished_name; |
| if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_authorities, &distinguished_name)) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| data = CBS_data(&distinguished_name); |
| if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &data, CBS_len(&distinguished_name))) == NULL) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_skip(&distinguished_name, data - CBS_data(&distinguished_name))) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_certificate, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (CBS_len(&distinguished_name) != 0) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_certificate_request, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1; |
| if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) |
| sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free); |
| s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk; |
| ca_sk=NULL; |
| |
| ret=1; |
| err: |
| if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free); |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ok,al,ret=0; |
| long n; |
| CBS new_session_ticket, ticket; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, |
| SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, |
| 16384, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) |
| return((int)n); |
| |
| CBS_init(&new_session_ticket, s->init_msg, n); |
| |
| if (!CBS_get_u32(&new_session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint) || |
| !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&new_session_ticket, &ticket) || |
| CBS_len(&new_session_ticket) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick, &s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_new_session_ticket, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. |
| * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server |
| * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal |
| * client session ID matching to work and we know much |
| * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. |
| * |
| * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the |
| * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine |
| * session resumption. |
| * |
| * We choose the former approach because this fits in with |
| * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set |
| * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the |
| * ticket. |
| */ |
| EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&ticket), CBS_len(&ticket), |
| s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, |
| EVP_sha256(), NULL); |
| ret=1; |
| return(ret); |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| err: |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ok, al; |
| long n; |
| CBS certificate_status, ocsp_response; |
| uint8_t status_type; |
| size_t resplen; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, |
| 16384, |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| |
| CBS_init(&certificate_status, s->init_msg, n); |
| if (!CBS_get_u8(&certificate_status, &status_type) || |
| status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp || |
| !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_status, &ocsp_response) || |
| CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 || |
| CBS_len(&certificate_status) != 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| /* TODO(davidben): Make tlsext_ocsp_resplen a |
| * size_t. Currently it uses -1 to signal no response. The |
| * spec does not allow ocsp_response to be zero-length, so |
| * using 0 should be fine. */ |
| if (!CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, &resplen)) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; |
| if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
| if (ret == 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| if (ret < 0) |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_cert_status, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| return 1; |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ok,ret=0; |
| long n; |
| |
| n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, |
| SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, |
| SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, |
| 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ |
| &ok); |
| |
| if (!ok) return((int)n); |
| if (n > 0) |
| { |
| /* should contain no data */ |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_get_server_done, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| ret=1; |
| return(ret); |
| } |
| |
| |
| int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| int n = 0; |
| unsigned long alg_k; |
| unsigned long alg_a; |
| unsigned char *q; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; |
| const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; |
| unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
| int encoded_pt_len = 0; |
| BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL; |
| unsigned int psk_len = 0; |
| unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) |
| { |
| p = ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| |
| alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| |
| if (alg_a & SSL_aPSK) |
| { |
| char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; |
| size_t identity_len; |
| unsigned char *t = NULL; |
| unsigned char pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4]; |
| unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0; |
| int psk_err = 1; |
| |
| n = 0; |
| if (s->psk_client_callback == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_NO_CLIENT_CB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); |
| psk_len = s->psk_client_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity_hint, |
| identity, sizeof(identity), psk, sizeof(psk)); |
| if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto psk_err; |
| } |
| else if (psk_len == 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); |
| goto psk_err; |
| } |
| identity_len = OPENSSL_strnlen(identity, sizeof(identity)); |
| if (identity_len > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto psk_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)) |
| { |
| /* Create the shared secret now if we're not using ECDHE-PSK. |
| * TODO(davidben): Refactor this logic similarly |
| * to ssl3_get_client_key_exchange. */ |
| pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+psk_len; |
| t = pre_ms; |
| s2n(psk_len, t); |
| memset(t, 0, psk_len); |
| t+=psk_len; |
| s2n(psk_len, t); |
| memcpy(t, psk, psk_len); |
| |
| s->session->master_key_length = |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
| s->session->master_key, |
| pre_ms, pre_ms_len); |
| s2n(identity_len, p); |
| memcpy(p, identity, identity_len); |
| n = 2 + identity_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); |
| s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup(identity); |
| if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto psk_err; |
| } |
| psk_err = 0; |
| psk_err: |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(identity, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, sizeof(pre_ms)); |
| if (psk_err != 0) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Fool emacs indentation */ |
| if (0) {} |
| else if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) |
| { |
| RSA *rsa; |
| unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| |
| if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) |
| rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; |
| else |
| { |
| pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); |
| if ((pkey == NULL) || |
| (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || |
| (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| } |
| |
| tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; |
| tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; |
| if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf; |
| |
| q=p; |
| /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ |
| if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) |
| p+=2; |
| n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, |
| tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); |
| if (n <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ |
| if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) |
| { |
| s2n(n,q); |
| n+=2; |
| } |
| |
| s->session->master_key_length= |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
| s->session->master_key, |
| tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) |
| { |
| DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; |
| SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; |
| |
| if (scert == NULL) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (scert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) |
| dh_srvr=scert->peer_dh_tmp; |
| else |
| { |
| /* we get them from the cert */ |
| int idx = scert->peer_cert_type; |
| EVP_PKEY *spkey = NULL; |
| dh_srvr = NULL; |
| if (idx >= 0) |
| spkey = X509_get_pubkey( |
| scert->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); |
| if (spkey) |
| { |
| dh_srvr = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(spkey); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); |
| } |
| if (dh_srvr == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) |
| { |
| /* Use client certificate key */ |
| EVP_PKEY *clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; |
| dh_clnt = NULL; |
| if (clkey) |
| dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); |
| if (dh_clnt == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* generate a new random key */ |
| if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but |
| * make sure to clear it out afterwards */ |
| |
| n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt); |
| if (scert->peer_dh_tmp == NULL) |
| DH_free(dh_srvr); |
| |
| if (n <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* generate master key from the result */ |
| s->session->master_key_length= |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, |
| s->session->master_key,p,n); |
| /* clean up */ |
| memset(p,0,n); |
| |
| if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY) |
| n = 0; |
| else |
| { |
| /* send off the data */ |
| n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); |
| s2n(n,p); |
| BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p); |
| n+=2; |
| } |
| |
| DH_free(dh_clnt); |
| |
| /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/ |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| else if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) |
| { |
| const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; |
| EC_KEY *tkey; |
| int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; |
| int field_size = 0; |
| unsigned char *pre_ms; |
| unsigned char *t; |
| unsigned int pre_ms_len; |
| unsigned int i; |
| |
| if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Did we send out the client's |
| * ECDH share for use in premaster |
| * computation as part of client certificate? |
| * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. |
| */ |
| if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) && (s->cert != NULL)) |
| { |
| /* XXX: For now, we do not support client |
| * authentication using ECDH certificates. |
| * To add such support, one needs to add |
| * code that checks for appropriate |
| * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. |
| * For example, the cert have an ECC |
| * key on the same curve as the server's |
| * and the key should be authorized for |
| * key agreement. |
| * |
| * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect |
| * to skip sending the certificate verify |
| * message. |
| * |
| * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && |
| * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == |
| * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) |
| * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; |
| */ |
| } |
| |
| if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) |
| { |
| tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ |
| srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \ |
| sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); |
| if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) || |
| (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) || |
| (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; |
| } |
| |
| srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); |
| srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); |
| |
| if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (ecdh_clnt_cert) |
| { |
| /* Reuse key info from our certificate |
| * We only need our private key to perform |
| * the ECDH computation. |
| */ |
| const BIGNUM *priv_key; |
| tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; |
| priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); |
| if (priv_key == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_EC_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ |
| if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but |
| * make sure to clear it out afterwards |
| */ |
| |
| field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); |
| if (field_size <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); |
| if (n <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* ECDHE PSK ciphersuites from RFC 5489 */ |
| if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0) |
| { |
| pre_ms_len = 2+psk_len+2+n; |
| pre_ms = OPENSSL_malloc(pre_ms_len); |
| if (pre_ms == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| memset(pre_ms, 0, pre_ms_len); |
| t = pre_ms; |
| s2n(psk_len, t); |
| memcpy(t, psk, psk_len); |
| t += psk_len; |
| s2n(n, t); |
| memcpy(t, p, n); |
| s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ |
| -> generate_master_secret(s, |
| s->session->master_key, pre_ms, pre_ms_len); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(pre_ms, pre_ms_len); |
| OPENSSL_free(pre_ms); |
| } |
| if (!(alg_a & SSL_aPSK)) |
| { |
| /* generate master key from the result */ |
| s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ |
| -> generate_master_secret(s, |
| s->session->master_key, p, n); |
| } |
| memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */ |
| |
| if (ecdh_clnt_cert) |
| { |
| /* Send empty client key exch message */ |
| n = 0; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* First check the size of encoding and |
| * allocate memory accordingly. |
| */ |
| encoded_pt_len = |
| EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, |
| EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| NULL, 0, NULL); |
| |
| encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) |
| OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * |
| sizeof(unsigned char)); |
| bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || |
| (bn_ctx == NULL)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Encode the public key */ |
| encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, |
| EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); |
| |
| n = 0; |
| if ((alg_a & SSL_aPSK) && psk_len != 0) |
| { |
| i = strlen(s->session->psk_identity); |
| s2n(i, p); |
| memcpy(p, s->session->psk_identity, i); |
| p += i; |
| n = i + 2; |
| } |
| |
| *p = encoded_pt_len; /* length of encoded point */ |
| /* Encoded point will be copied here */ |
| p += 1; |
| n += 1; |
| /* copy the point */ |
| memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len); |
| /* increment n to account for length field */ |
| n += encoded_pt_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* Free allocated memory */ |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) |
| EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); |
| } |
| #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ |
| else if (!(alg_k & SSL_kPSK) || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && !(alg_a & SSL_aPSK))) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, |
| SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| err: |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) |
| EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); |
| #endif |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buf, *p; |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| uint8_t digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned digest_length; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; |
| EVP_MD_CTX mctx; |
| size_t signature_length = 0; |
| unsigned long n = 0; |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); |
| buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) |
| { |
| p= ssl_handshake_start(s); |
| pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; |
| /* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using |
| * agreed digest and cached handshake records. Otherwise, use |
| * SHA1 or MD5 + SHA1 depending on key type. |
| */ |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| const uint8_t *hdata; |
| size_t hdatalen; |
| md = s->cert->key->digest; |
| if (!BIO_mem_contents(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata, &hdatalen) || |
| !tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| p += 2; |
| n += 2; |
| if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) |
| || !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) |
| || !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, digest, &digest_length)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) |
| { |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_md5, digest); |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, |
| NID_sha1, &digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]); |
| digest_length = MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| /* Using a NULL signature MD makes EVP_PKEY_sign perform |
| * a raw RSA signature, rather than wrapping in a |
| * DigestInfo. */ |
| md = NULL; |
| } |
| else if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA || pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) |
| { |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, digest); |
| digest_length = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| md = EVP_sha1(); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Sign the digest. */ |
| pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); |
| if (pctx == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| |
| /* Initialize the EVP_PKEY_CTX and determine the size of the signature. */ |
| if (EVP_PKEY_sign_init(pctx) != 1 || |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) != 1 || |
| EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, NULL, &signature_length, |
| digest, digest_length) != 1) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (p + 2 + signature_length > buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (EVP_PKEY_sign(pctx, &p[2], &signature_length, |
| digest, digest_length) != 1) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_verify, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s2n(signature_length, p); |
| n += signature_length + 2; |
| |
| /* Now that client auth is completed, we no longer need cached |
| * handshake records and can digest them. */ |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) |
| { |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, n); |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; |
| } |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| err: |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); |
| EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| |
| /* Check a certificate can be used for client authentication. Currently |
| * check cert exists, if we have a suitable digest for TLS 1.2 if |
| * static DH client certificates can be used and optionally checks |
| * suitability for Suite B. |
| */ |
| static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned long alg_k; |
| if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey) |
| return 0; |
| /* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */ |
| if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest) |
| return 0; |
| /* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. |
| * This also adjusts suite B digest if necessary. |
| */ |
| if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT && |
| !tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2)) |
| return 0; |
| alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| /* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */ |
| if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) |
| { |
| SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert; |
| int i = scert->peer_cert_type; |
| EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL; |
| clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey; |
| /* If client key not DH assume it can be used */ |
| if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH) |
| return 1; |
| if (i >= 0) |
| spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509); |
| if (spkey) |
| { |
| /* Compare server and client parameters */ |
| i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(spkey); |
| if (i != 1) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; |
| } |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) |
| { |
| X509 *x509=NULL; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) |
| { |
| /* Let cert callback update client certificates if required */ |
| if (s->cert->cert_cb) |
| { |
| i = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); |
| if (i < 0) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| } |
| if (ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; |
| else |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* We need to get a client cert */ |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) |
| { |
| /* If we get an error, we need to |
| * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); |
| * We then get retried later */ |
| i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); |
| if (i < 0) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; |
| return(-1); |
| } |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) |
| { |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; |
| if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) || |
| !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey)) |
| i=0; |
| } |
| else if (i == 1) |
| { |
| i=0; |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); |
| } |
| |
| if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509); |
| if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| if (i && !ssl3_check_client_certificate(s)) |
| i = 0; |
| if (i == 0) |
| { |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) |
| { |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); |
| return(1); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Ok, we have a cert */ |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) |
| { |
| s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; |
| ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, |
| (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key); |
| } |
| /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ |
| return ssl_do_write(s); |
| } |
| |
| #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) |
| |
| int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int i,idx; |
| long alg_k,alg_a; |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; |
| SESS_CERT *sc; |
| RSA *rsa; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| DH *dh; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* we don't have a certificate */ |
| if (!ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) |
| return 1; |
| |
| alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| |
| sc=s->session->sess_cert; |
| if (sc == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* This is the passed certificate */ |
| |
| idx=sc->peer_cert_type; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) |
| { |
| if (ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, |
| s) == 0) |
| { /* check failed */ |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| else if (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDSA_SIGNING_CERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| else if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_ECDH_CERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| #endif |
| pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); |
| i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey); |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); |
| |
| |
| /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ |
| if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| else if ((alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| #endif |
| if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && |
| !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if ((alg_k & SSL_kEDH) && |
| !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHr) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && |
| !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| else if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHd) && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && |
| !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_client_key_exchange, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| |
| return(1); |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| err: |
| return(0); |
| } |
| |
| # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) |
| int ssl3_send_next_proto(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned int len, padding_len; |
| unsigned char *d; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_A) |
| { |
| len = s->next_proto_negotiated_len; |
| padding_len = 32 - ((len + 2) % 32); |
| d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| d[4] = len; |
| memcpy(d + 5, s->next_proto_negotiated, len); |
| d[5 + len] = padding_len; |
| memset(d + 6 + len, 0, padding_len); |
| *(d++)=SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO; |
| l2n3(2 + len + padding_len, d); |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_NEXT_PROTO_B; |
| s->init_num = 4 + 2 + len + padding_len; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| } |
| |
| return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); |
| } |
| |
| # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ |
| |
| int ssl3_send_channel_id(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *d; |
| int ret = -1, public_key_len; |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| size_t sig_len; |
| ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; |
| unsigned char *public_key = NULL, *derp, *der_sig = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->state != SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_A) |
| return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); |
| |
| if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private && s->ctx->channel_id_cb) |
| { |
| EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; |
| s->ctx->channel_id_cb(s, &key); |
| if (key != NULL) |
| { |
| s->tlsext_channel_id_private = key; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!s->tlsext_channel_id_private) |
| { |
| s->rwstate=SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP; |
| return (-1); |
| } |
| s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; |
| |
| d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| *(d++)=SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS; |
| l2n3(2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d); |
| if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, d); |
| else |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, d); |
| s2n(TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE, d); |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| |
| public_key_len = i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, NULL); |
| if (public_key_len <= 0) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_CANNOT_SERIALIZE_PUBLIC_KEY); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| /* i2d_PublicKey will produce an ANSI X9.62 public key which, for a |
| * P-256 key, is 0x04 (meaning uncompressed) followed by the x and y |
| * field elements as 32-byte, big-endian numbers. */ |
| if (public_key_len != 65) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_CHANNEL_ID_NOT_P256); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| public_key = OPENSSL_malloc(public_key_len); |
| if (!public_key) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| derp = public_key; |
| i2d_PublicKey(s->tlsext_channel_id_private, &derp); |
| |
| if (EVP_DigestSignInit(&md_ctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, |
| s->tlsext_channel_id_private) != 1) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNINIT_FAILED); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!tls1_channel_id_hash(&md_ctx, s)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, NULL, &sig_len)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| der_sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len); |
| if (!der_sig) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&md_ctx, der_sig, &sig_len)) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_EVP_DIGESTSIGNFINAL_FAILED); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| derp = der_sig; |
| sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, (const unsigned char**) &derp, sig_len); |
| if (sig == NULL) |
| { |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_send_channel_id, SSL_R_D2I_ECDSA_SIG); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* The first byte of public_key will be 0x4, denoting an uncompressed key. */ |
| memcpy(d, public_key + 1, 64); |
| d += 64; |
| memset(d, 0, 2 * 32); |
| BN_bn2bin(sig->r, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r)); |
| d += 32; |
| BN_bn2bin(sig->s, d + 32 - BN_num_bytes(sig->s)); |
| d += 32; |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANNEL_ID_B; |
| s->init_num = 4 + 2 + 2 + TLSEXT_CHANNEL_ID_SIZE; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| |
| ret = ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); |
| |
| err: |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| if (public_key) |
| OPENSSL_free(public_key); |
| if (der_sig) |
| OPENSSL_free(der_sig); |
| if (sig) |
| ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) |
| { |
| int i = 0; |
| /* TODO(fork): remove */ |
| #if 0 |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE |
| if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) |
| { |
| i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, |
| SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), |
| px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
| if (i != 0) |
| return i; |
| } |
| #endif |
| #endif |
| if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) |
| i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey); |
| return i; |
| } |