| commit | 90f0f05cca750b74c29c4ae8ee1ed800effa23c0 | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Mon Feb 12 14:48:31 2024 -0500 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Wed Feb 21 17:36:52 2024 +0000 |
| tree | 890398b91515ee987aea1fdb6637047cd45eb537 | |
| parent | 3f119b7f774900ce22e9b65068e10aa7bdc7fd91 [diff] |
Integrate TLS 1.2 sigalg and cipher suite selection In TLS 1.2, cipher suite negotiation is tied up with a ton of other decisions. Even though both sides have an ECDHE_RSA cipher in common, it may not work because there isn't a common ECDHE curve or sigalg. In that case, ideally we would consider a non-ECDHE_RSA cipher suite, notably one of the legacy RSA key exchange ciphers. If there is no ECDHE curve common, we already did this. However, if there was no sigalg in common, we would fail the connection rather than consider RSA key exchange. Giving this case a lifetime would normally be unimportant as RSA key exchange is thoroughly deprecated, but the SSL_CREDENTIAL work will need to consider signature algorithm matches, at which point we'll pick up behavior like this anyway. So I'm implementing it separately here just to get the behavior change out of the way. Update-Note: TLS 1.2 servers will now consider RSA key exchange when the signature algorithm portion of ECDHE_RSA fails. Previously, the connection would just fail. This change will not impact any connections that previously succeeded, only make some previously failing connections start to succeed. It also changes the error returned in some cases from NO_COMMON_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS to NO_SHARED_CIPHER. Bug: 249 Change-Id: I4a70036756ea998f38ea155f208e8122bf9a5b44 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/66368 Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: