| commit | dfd44900ff1883a74d785cf2c0f551f3abcfea84 | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Mon Nov 04 04:41:16 2024 +0000 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Mon Nov 18 22:47:35 2024 +0000 |
| tree | 92aec5e027b7a19a2b677c1218bd6826ccd9e598 | |
| parent | 7c3252a67badce0854305403be6f51b1b298895a [diff] |
Schedule ACKs when we receive a partial flight This implements a very simple ACK policy: for every ACKable record (i.e. contains no far-future fragments that we ignore), add it to a queue of record numbers to ACK and set an ACK timer at 1/4 of the current retransmission timeout. RFC 9147 doesn't say a whole lot, but this is arguably slightly different from the recommended policy. RFC 9147 has some text with implies you're only meant to ACK the current flight and not arbitrarily old message fragments. However, tracking that in the fully general case with post-handshake messages is unclear. There's no harm in ACKing those packets, so start with this. See discussion in https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/kjJnquJOVaWxu5hUCmNzB35eqY0/ Something kind of fun is that this provision in the spec happens for free: > ACKs SHOULD NOT be sent for these flights unless the responding flight > cannot be generated immediately. All other flights MUST be ACKed. In > this case, implementations MAY send explicit ACKs for the complete > received flight even though it will eventually also be implicitly > acknowledged through the responding flight. A notable example for this > is the case of client authentication in constrained environments, > where generating the CertificateVerify message can take considerable > time on the client. If we generate the next flight before the ACK timer, it will be canceled and we don't ACK. If the next flight is async and takes too long, the ACK timer will win and we tell the peer not to retransmit. Bug: 42290594 Change-Id: I7974499f82ce2b2c7da91f02ca65886b0f82896c Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/72952 Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
To file a security issue, use the Chromium process and mention in the report this is for BoringSSL. You can ignore the parts of the process that are specific to Chromium/Chrome.
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: