Switch t1_lib, tls_record, and tls13_both to C++.
This leaves just the TLS 1.3 handshake code.
Bug: 132
Change-Id: I2bd87b0ecd0ae7d6ea1302bc62c67aec5ca1dccb
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/17767
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_both.cc b/ssl/tls13_both.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..763dc0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/tls13_both.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,663 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2016, Google Inc.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+ * OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+ * CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
+#include <openssl/mem.h>
+#include <openssl/stack.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+#include "../crypto/internal.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+
+/* kMaxKeyUpdates is the number of consecutive KeyUpdates that will be
+ * processed. Without this limit an attacker could force unbounded processing
+ * without being able to return application data. */
+static const uint8_t kMaxKeyUpdates = 32;
+
+int tls13_handshake(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int *out_early_return) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* Resolve the operation the handshake was waiting on. */
+ switch (hs->wait) {
+ case ssl_hs_error:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_flush:
+ case ssl_hs_flush_and_read_message: {
+ int ret = ssl->method->flush_flight(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if (hs->wait != ssl_hs_flush_and_read_message) {
+ break;
+ }
+ ssl->method->expect_flight(ssl);
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_read_message;
+ /* Fall-through. */
+ }
+
+ case ssl_hs_read_message: {
+ int ret = ssl->method->ssl_get_message(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case ssl_hs_read_change_cipher_spec: {
+ int ret = ssl->method->read_change_cipher_spec(ssl);
+ if (ret <= 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case ssl_hs_read_end_of_early_data: {
+ if (ssl->s3->hs->can_early_read) {
+ /* While we are processing early data, the handshake returns early. */
+ *out_early_return = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case ssl_hs_x509_lookup:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_channel_id_lookup:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_CHANNEL_ID_LOOKUP;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_private_key_operation:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_OPERATION;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_pending_ticket:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_PENDING_TICKET;
+ hs->wait = ssl_hs_ok;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_early_data_rejected:
+ ssl->rwstate = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+ /* Cause |SSL_write| to start failing immediately. */
+ hs->can_early_write = 0;
+ return -1;
+
+ case ssl_hs_ok:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Run the state machine again. */
+ hs->wait = hs->do_tls13_handshake(hs);
+ if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_error) {
+ /* Don't loop around to avoid a stray |SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE| the
+ * first time around. */
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (hs->wait == ssl_hs_ok) {
+ /* The handshake has completed. */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise, loop to the beginning and resolve what was blocking the
+ * handshake. */
+ }
+}
+
+int tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len,
+ enum ssl_cert_verify_context_t cert_verify_context) {
+ CBB cbb;
+ if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 64 + 33 + 1 + 2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+ if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, 0x20)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ const uint8_t *context;
+ size_t context_len;
+ if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_server) {
+ /* Include the NUL byte. */
+ static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify";
+ context = (const uint8_t *)kContext;
+ context_len = sizeof(kContext);
+ } else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_client) {
+ static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify";
+ context = (const uint8_t *)kContext;
+ context_len = sizeof(kContext);
+ } else if (cert_verify_context == ssl_cert_verify_channel_id) {
+ static const char kContext[] = "TLS 1.3, Channel ID";
+ context = (const uint8_t *)kContext;
+ context_len = sizeof(kContext);
+ } else {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, context, context_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t context_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ size_t context_hash_len;
+ if (!SSL_TRANSCRIPT_get_hash(&hs->transcript, context_hash,
+ &context_hash_len) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, context_hash, context_hash_len) ||
+ !CBB_finish(&cbb, out, out_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int tls13_process_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int allow_anonymous) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ CBS cbs, context, certificate_list;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &context) ||
+ CBS_len(&context) != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ const int retain_sha256 =
+ ssl->server && ssl->retain_only_sha256_of_client_certs;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(CRYPTO_BUFFER) *certs = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_null();
+ if (certs == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &certificate_list)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while (CBS_len(&certificate_list) > 0) {
+ CBS certificate, extensions;
+ if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &certificate) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions) ||
+ CBS_len(&certificate) == 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs) == 0) {
+ pkey = ssl_cert_parse_pubkey(&certificate);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* TLS 1.3 always uses certificate keys for signing thus the correct
+ * keyUsage is enforced. */
+ if (!ssl_cert_check_digital_signature_key_usage(&certificate)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (retain_sha256) {
+ /* Retain the hash of the leaf certificate if requested. */
+ SHA256(CBS_data(&certificate), CBS_len(&certificate),
+ hs->new_session->peer_sha256);
+ }
+ }
+
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *buf =
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_new_from_CBS(&certificate, ssl->ctx->pool);
+ if (buf == NULL ||
+ !sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_push(certs, buf)) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_free(buf);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse out the extensions. */
+ int have_status_request = 0, have_sct = 0;
+ CBS status_request, sct;
+ const SSL_EXTENSION_TYPE ext_types[] = {
+ {TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, &have_status_request, &status_request},
+ {TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, &have_sct, &sct},
+ };
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!ssl_parse_extensions(&extensions, &alert, ext_types,
+ OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(ext_types),
+ 0 /* reject unknown */)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* All Certificate extensions are parsed, but only the leaf extensions are
+ * stored. */
+ if (have_status_request) {
+ if (ssl->server || !ssl->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t status_type;
+ CBS ocsp_response;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&status_request, &status_type) ||
+ status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp ||
+ !CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&status_request, &ocsp_response) ||
+ CBS_len(&ocsp_response) == 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&status_request) != 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs) == 1 &&
+ !CBS_stow(&ocsp_response, &hs->new_session->ocsp_response,
+ &hs->new_session->ocsp_response_length)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (have_sct) {
+ if (ssl->server || !ssl->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_is_sct_list_valid(&sct)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ERROR_PARSING_EXTENSION);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(certs) == 1 &&
+ !CBS_stow(
+ &sct, &hs->new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+ &hs->new_session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(hs->peer_pubkey);
+ hs->peer_pubkey = pkey;
+ pkey = NULL;
+
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(hs->new_session->certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ hs->new_session->certs = certs;
+ certs = NULL;
+
+ if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_cache_objects(hs->new_session)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
+ if (!allow_anonymous) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
+ * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
+ hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
+
+ /* No certificate, so nothing more to do. */
+ ret = 1;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ hs->new_session->peer_sha256_valid = retain_sha256;
+
+ if (!ssl->ctx->x509_method->session_verify_cert_chain(hs->new_session,
+ ssl)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_pop_free(certs, CRYPTO_BUFFER_free);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int tls13_process_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ if (hs->peer_pubkey == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CBS cbs, signature;
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &signature_algorithm) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature) ||
+ CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ if (!tls12_check_peer_sigalg(ssl, &alert, signature_algorithm)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ hs->new_session->peer_signature_algorithm = signature_algorithm;
+
+ uint8_t *msg = NULL;
+ size_t msg_len;
+ if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
+ hs, &msg, &msg_len,
+ ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_client : ssl_cert_verify_server)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_msg(msg);
+
+ int sig_ok =
+ ssl_public_key_verify(ssl, CBS_data(&signature), CBS_len(&signature),
+ signature_algorithm, hs->peer_pubkey, msg, msg_len);
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ sig_ok = 1;
+ ERR_clear_error();
+#endif
+ if (!sig_ok) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_process_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int use_saved_value) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ uint8_t verify_data_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ const uint8_t *verify_data;
+ size_t verify_data_len;
+ if (use_saved_value) {
+ assert(ssl->server);
+ verify_data = hs->expected_client_finished;
+ verify_data_len = hs->hash_len;
+ } else {
+ if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data_buf, &verify_data_len,
+ !ssl->server)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ verify_data = verify_data_buf;
+ }
+
+ int finished_ok =
+ ssl->init_num == verify_data_len &&
+ CRYPTO_memcmp(verify_data, ssl->init_msg, verify_data_len) == 0;
+#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_FUZZER_MODE)
+ finished_ok = 1;
+#endif
+ if (!finished_ok) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_add_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body, certificate_list;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) ||
+ /* The request context is always empty in the handshake. */
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, 0) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&body, &certificate_list)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
+ return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get());
+ }
+
+ CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *leaf_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, 0);
+ CBB leaf, extensions;
+ if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &leaf) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&leaf, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(leaf_buf),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(leaf_buf)) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &extensions)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hs->scts_requested && ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list != NULL) {
+ CBB contents;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(
+ &contents,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->signed_cert_timestamp_list)) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hs->ocsp_stapling_requested &&
+ ssl->cert->ocsp_response != NULL) {
+ CBB contents, ocsp_response;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &contents) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&contents, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) ||
+ !CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&contents, &ocsp_response) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&ocsp_response,
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(ssl->cert->ocsp_response),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(ssl->cert->ocsp_response)) ||
+ !CBB_flush(&extensions)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (size_t i = 1; i < sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(cert->chain); i++) {
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER *cert_buf = sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_value(cert->chain, i);
+ CBB child;
+ if (!CBB_add_u24_length_prefixed(&certificate_list, &child) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&child, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buf),
+ CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buf)) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&certificate_list, 0 /* no extensions */)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get());
+}
+
+enum ssl_private_key_result_t tls13_add_certificate_verify(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ uint16_t signature_algorithm;
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ bssl::ScopedCBB cbb;
+ CBB body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
+ SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) ||
+ !CBB_add_u16(&body, signature_algorithm)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ /* Sign the digest. */
+ CBB child;
+ const size_t max_sig_len = EVP_PKEY_size(hs->local_pubkey);
+ uint8_t *sig;
+ size_t sig_len;
+ if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &child) ||
+ !CBB_reserve(&child, &sig, max_sig_len)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *msg = NULL;
+ size_t msg_len;
+ if (!tls13_get_cert_verify_signature_input(
+ hs, &msg, &msg_len,
+ ssl->server ? ssl_cert_verify_server : ssl_cert_verify_client)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+ bssl::UniquePtr<uint8_t> free_msg(msg);
+
+ enum ssl_private_key_result_t sign_result = ssl_private_key_sign(
+ hs, sig, &sig_len, max_sig_len, signature_algorithm, msg, msg_len);
+ if (sign_result != ssl_private_key_success) {
+ return sign_result;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBB_did_write(&child, sig_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, cbb.get())) {
+ return ssl_private_key_failure;
+ }
+
+ return ssl_private_key_success;
+}
+
+int tls13_add_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
+ size_t verify_data_len;
+ uint8_t verify_data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+ if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, verify_data, &verify_data_len, ssl->server)) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ CBB cbb, body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
+ !CBB_add_bytes(&body, verify_data, verify_data_len) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int tls13_receive_key_update(SSL *ssl) {
+ CBS cbs;
+ uint8_t key_update_request;
+ CBS_init(&cbs, ssl->init_msg, ssl->init_num);
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &key_update_request) ||
+ CBS_len(&cbs) != 0 ||
+ (key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED &&
+ key_update_request != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Acknowledge the KeyUpdate */
+ if (key_update_request == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED &&
+ !ssl->s3->key_update_pending) {
+ CBB cbb, body;
+ if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body, SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) ||
+ !CBB_add_u8(&body, SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED) ||
+ !ssl_add_message_cbb(ssl, &cbb) ||
+ !tls13_rotate_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal)) {
+ CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Suppress KeyUpdate acknowledgments until this change is written to the
+ * wire. This prevents us from accumulating write obligations when read and
+ * write progress at different rates. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section
+ * 4.5.3. */
+ ssl->s3->key_update_pending = 1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls13_post_handshake(SSL *ssl) {
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE) {
+ ssl->s3->key_update_count++;
+ if (ssl->s3->key_update_count > kMaxKeyUpdates) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_KEY_UPDATES);
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return tls13_receive_key_update(ssl);
+ }
+
+ ssl->s3->key_update_count = 0;
+
+ if (ssl->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEW_SESSION_TICKET &&
+ !ssl->server) {
+ return tls13_process_new_session_ticket(ssl);
+ }
+
+ ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+ return 0;
+}
