| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | |
| * All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written | |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | |
| * | |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | |
| * | |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | |
| * the code are not to be removed. | |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. | |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * | |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence | |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ | |
| #include <assert.h> | |
| #include <limits.h> | |
| #include <stdio.h> | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/buf.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len, | |
| char fragment); | |
| static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); | |
| int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int extend) { | |
| /* If |extend| is 0, obtain new n-byte packet; | |
| * if |extend| is 1, increase packet by another n bytes. | |
| * | |
| * The packet will be in the sub-array of |s->s3->rbuf.buf| specified by | |
| * |s->packet| and |s->packet_length|. (If DTLS and |extend| is 0, additional | |
| * bytes will be read into |rbuf|, up to the size of the buffer.) | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): |dtls1_get_record| and |ssl3_get_record| have very | |
| * different needs. Separate the two record layers. In DTLS, |BIO_read| is | |
| * called at most once, and only when |extend| is 0. In TLS, the buffer never | |
| * contains more than one record. */ | |
| int i, len, left; | |
| uintptr_t align = 0; | |
| uint8_t *pkt; | |
| SSL3_BUFFER *rb; | |
| if (n <= 0) { | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| rb = &s->s3->rbuf; | |
| if (rb->buf == NULL && !ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| left = rb->left; | |
| align = (uintptr_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| align = (0 - align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); | |
| if (!extend) { | |
| /* start with empty packet ... */ | |
| if (left == 0) { | |
| rb->offset = align; | |
| } else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| /* check if next packet length is large enough to justify payload | |
| * alignment... */ | |
| pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
| if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (pkt[3] << 8 | pkt[4]) >= 128) { | |
| /* Note that even if packet is corrupted and its length field is | |
| * insane, we can only be led to wrong decision about whether memmove | |
| * will occur or not. Header values has no effect on memmove arguments | |
| * and therefore no buffer overrun can be triggered. */ | |
| memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left); | |
| rb->offset = align; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset; | |
| s->packet_length = 0; | |
| /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ | |
| } | |
| /* In DTLS, if there is leftover data from the previous packet or |extend| is | |
| * true, clamp to the previous read. DTLS records may not span packet | |
| * boundaries. */ | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && n > left && (left > 0 || extend)) { | |
| n = left; | |
| } | |
| /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ | |
| if (left >= n) { | |
| s->packet_length += n; | |
| rb->left = left - n; | |
| rb->offset += n; | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| /* else we need to read more data */ | |
| len = s->packet_length; | |
| pkt = rb->buf + align; | |
| /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: |len| bytes already pointed | |
| * to by |packet|, |left| extra ones at the end. */ | |
| if (s->packet != pkt) { | |
| /* len > 0 */ | |
| memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left); | |
| s->packet = pkt; | |
| rb->offset = len + align; | |
| } | |
| if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int max = n; | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !extend) { | |
| max = rb->len - rb->offset; | |
| } | |
| while (left < n) { | |
| /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need to | |
| * read in more until we have len+n (up to len+max if possible). */ | |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); | |
| if (s->rbio != NULL) { | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_READING; | |
| i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left); | |
| } else { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
| i = -1; | |
| } | |
| if (i <= 0) { | |
| rb->left = left; | |
| if (len + left == 0) { | |
| ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); | |
| } | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| left += i; | |
| /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because the | |
| * underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed to byte | |
| * oriented as in the TLS case. */ | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && n > left) { | |
| n = left; /* makes the while condition false */ | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ | |
| rb->offset += n; | |
| rb->left = left - n; | |
| s->packet_length += n; | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| /* kMaxEmptyRecords is the number of consecutive, empty records that will be | |
| * processed. Without this limit an attacker could send empty records at a | |
| * faster rate than we can process and cause |ssl3_get_record| to loop | |
| * forever. */ | |
| static const uint8_t kMaxEmptyRecords = 32; | |
| /* kMaxWarningAlerts is the number of consecutive warning alerts that will be | |
| * processed. */ | |
| static const uint8_t kMaxWarningAlerts = 4; | |
| /* Call this to get a new input record. It will return <= 0 if more data is | |
| * needed, normally due to an error or non-blocking IO. When it finishes, one | |
| * packet has been decoded and can be found in | |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.data - data | |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.length - number of bytes */ | |
| /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ | |
| static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { | |
| uint8_t ssl_major, ssl_minor; | |
| int al, n, i, ret = -1; | |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr = &s->s3->rrec; | |
| uint8_t *p; | |
| uint16_t version; | |
| size_t extra; | |
| again: | |
| /* check if we have the header */ | |
| if (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY || | |
| s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, 0); | |
| if (n <= 0) { | |
| return n; /* error or non-blocking */ | |
| } | |
| s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY; | |
| /* Some bytes were read, so the read buffer must be existant and | |
| * |s->s3->init_extra| is defined. */ | |
| assert(s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL); | |
| extra = s->s3->init_extra ? SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA : 0; | |
| p = s->packet; | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ | |
| rr->type = *(p++); | |
| ssl_major = *(p++); | |
| ssl_minor = *(p++); | |
| version = (((uint16_t)ssl_major) << 8) | ssl_minor; | |
| n2s(p, rr->length); | |
| if (s->s3->have_version && version != s->version) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
| al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ | |
| } else { | |
| /* |packet_length| is non-zero and |s->rstate| is |SSL_ST_READ_BODY|. The | |
| * read buffer must be existant and |s->s3->init_extra| is defined. */ | |
| assert(s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL); | |
| extra = s->s3->init_extra ? SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA : 0; | |
| } | |
| /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ | |
| if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ | |
| i = rr->length; | |
| n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, 1); | |
| if (n <= 0) { | |
| /* Error or non-blocking IO. Now |n| == |rr->length|, and | |
| * |s->packet_length| == |SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH| + |rr->length|. */ | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ | |
| /* |rr->data| points to |rr->length| bytes of ciphertext in |s->packet|. */ | |
| rr->data = &s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]; | |
| /* Decrypt the packet in-place. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): This assumes |s->version| is the same as the record-layer | |
| * version which isn't always true, but it only differs with the NULL cipher | |
| * which ignores the parameter. */ | |
| size_t plaintext_len; | |
| if (!SSL_AEAD_CTX_open(s->aead_read_ctx, rr->data, &plaintext_len, rr->length, | |
| rr->type, s->version, s->s3->read_sequence, rr->data, | |
| rr->length)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!ssl3_record_sequence_update(s->s3->read_sequence, 8)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| if (plaintext_len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| assert(plaintext_len <= (1u << 16)); | |
| rr->length = plaintext_len; | |
| rr->off = 0; | |
| /* So at this point the following is true: | |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record; | |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.length is the number of bytes in the record; | |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.off is the offset to first valid byte; | |
| * ssl->s3->rrec.data the first byte of the record body. */ | |
| /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ | |
| s->packet_length = 0; | |
| /* just read a 0 length packet */ | |
| if (rr->length == 0) { | |
| s->s3->empty_record_count++; | |
| if (s->s3->empty_record_count > kMaxEmptyRecords) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| goto again; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->empty_record_count = 0; | |
| return 1; | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_write_app_data(SSL *ssl, const void *buf, int len) { | |
| return ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len); | |
| } | |
| /* Call this to write data in records of type |type|. It will return <= 0 if | |
| * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ | |
| int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { | |
| const uint8_t *buf = buf_; | |
| unsigned int tot, n, nw; | |
| int i; | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); | |
| tot = s->s3->wnum; | |
| s->s3->wnum = 0; | |
| if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s) && !SSL_in_false_start(s)) { | |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* Ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out than | |
| * the the original len from a write which didn't complete for non-blocking | |
| * I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for this in | |
| * ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be possible to | |
| * end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then promptly send | |
| * beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and report the error in | |
| * a way the user will notice. */ | |
| if (len < 0 || (size_t)len < tot) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int record_split_done = 0; | |
| n = (len - tot); | |
| for (;;) { | |
| /* max contains the maximum number of bytes that we can put into a | |
| * record. */ | |
| unsigned max = s->max_send_fragment; | |
| /* fragment is true if do_ssl3_write should send the first byte in its own | |
| * record in order to randomise a CBC IV. */ | |
| int fragment = 0; | |
| if (!record_split_done && s->s3->need_record_splitting && | |
| type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { | |
| /* Only the the first record per write call needs to be split. The | |
| * remaining plaintext was determined before the IV was randomized. */ | |
| fragment = 1; | |
| record_split_done = 1; | |
| } | |
| if (n > max) { | |
| nw = max; | |
| } else { | |
| nw = n; | |
| } | |
| i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &buf[tot], nw, fragment); | |
| if (i <= 0) { | |
| s->s3->wnum = tot; | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| if (i == (int)n || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
| (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { | |
| return tot + i; | |
| } | |
| n -= i; | |
| tot += i; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_seal_record seals a new record of type |type| and plaintext |in| and | |
| * writes it to |out|. At most |max_out| bytes will be written. It returns one | |
| * on success and zero on error. On success, it updates the write sequence | |
| * number. */ | |
| static int ssl3_seal_record(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t *out_len, | |
| size_t max_out, uint8_t type, const uint8_t *in, | |
| size_t in_len) { | |
| if (max_out < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| out[0] = type; | |
| /* Some servers hang if initial ClientHello is larger than 256 bytes and | |
| * record version number > TLS 1.0. */ | |
| uint16_t wire_version = s->version; | |
| if (!s->s3->have_version && s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { | |
| wire_version = TLS1_VERSION; | |
| } | |
| out[1] = wire_version >> 8; | |
| out[2] = wire_version & 0xff; | |
| size_t ciphertext_len; | |
| if (!SSL_AEAD_CTX_seal(s->aead_write_ctx, out + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
| &ciphertext_len, max_out - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
| type, wire_version, s->s3->write_sequence, in, | |
| in_len) || | |
| !ssl3_record_sequence_update(s->s3->write_sequence, 8)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (ciphertext_len >= 1 << 16) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_OVERFLOW); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| out[3] = ciphertext_len >> 8; | |
| out[4] = ciphertext_len & 0xff; | |
| *out_len = SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + ciphertext_len; | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(1 /* write */, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, out, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, | |
| s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| /* do_ssl3_write writes an SSL record of the given type. If |fragment| is 1 | |
| * then it splits the record into a one byte record and a record with the rest | |
| * of the data in order to randomise a CBC IV. */ | |
| static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len, | |
| char fragment) { | |
| SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &s->s3->wbuf; | |
| /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written out. This will | |
| * happen with non blocking IO */ | |
| if (wb->left != 0) { | |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len); | |
| } | |
| /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ | |
| if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { | |
| int ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ | |
| } | |
| if (wb->buf == NULL && !ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (len == 0) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (len == 1) { | |
| /* No sense in fragmenting a one-byte record. */ | |
| fragment = 0; | |
| } | |
| /* Align the output so the ciphertext is aligned to |SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD|. */ | |
| uintptr_t align; | |
| if (fragment) { | |
| /* Only CBC-mode ciphers require fragmenting. CBC-mode ciphertext is a | |
| * multiple of the block size which we may assume is aligned. Thus we only | |
| * need to account for a second copy of the record header. */ | |
| align = (uintptr_t)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| } else { | |
| align = (uintptr_t)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; | |
| } | |
| align = (0 - align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1); | |
| uint8_t *out = wb->buf + align; | |
| wb->offset = align; | |
| size_t max_out = wb->len - wb->offset; | |
| const uint8_t *orig_buf = buf; | |
| unsigned int orig_len = len; | |
| size_t fragment_len = 0; | |
| if (fragment) { | |
| /* Write the first byte in its own record as a countermeasure against | |
| * known-IV weaknesses in CBC ciphersuites. (See | |
| * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt.) */ | |
| if (!ssl3_seal_record(s, out, &fragment_len, max_out, type, buf, 1)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| out += fragment_len; | |
| max_out -= fragment_len; | |
| buf++; | |
| len--; | |
| } | |
| assert((((uintptr_t)out + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1)) | |
| == 0); | |
| size_t ciphertext_len; | |
| if (!ssl3_seal_record(s, out, &ciphertext_len, max_out, type, buf, len)) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| ciphertext_len += fragment_len; | |
| /* now let's set up wb */ | |
| wb->left = ciphertext_len; | |
| /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries | |
| * later */ | |
| s->s3->wpend_tot = orig_len; | |
| s->s3->wpend_buf = orig_buf; | |
| s->s3->wpend_type = type; | |
| s->s3->wpend_ret = orig_len; | |
| /* we now just need to write the buffer */ | |
| return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, orig_buf, orig_len); | |
| } | |
| /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ | |
| int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const uint8_t *buf, unsigned int len) { | |
| int i; | |
| SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf); | |
| if (s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len || | |
| (s->s3->wpend_buf != buf && | |
| !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || | |
| s->s3->wpend_type != type) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| for (;;) { | |
| ERR_clear_system_error(); | |
| if (s->wbio != NULL) { | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; | |
| i = BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]), | |
| (unsigned int)wb->left); | |
| } else { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); | |
| i = -1; | |
| } | |
| if (i == wb->left) { | |
| wb->left = 0; | |
| wb->offset += i; | |
| ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| return s->s3->wpend_ret; | |
| } else if (i <= 0) { | |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { | |
| /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in | |
| * using a datagram service */ | |
| wb->left = 0; | |
| } | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| /* TODO(davidben): This codepath is used in DTLS, but the write | |
| * payload may not split across packets. */ | |
| wb->offset += i; | |
| wb->left -= i; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec informs the record layer that a | |
| * ChangeCipherSpec record is required at this point. If a Handshake record is | |
| * received before ChangeCipherSpec, the connection will fail. Moreover, if | |
| * there are unprocessed handshake bytes, the handshake will also fail and the | |
| * function returns zero. Otherwise, the function returns one. */ | |
| int ssl3_expect_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0 || s->s3->tmp.reuse_message) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNPROCESSED_HANDSHAKE_DATA); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS; | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_read_app_data(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) { | |
| return ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, peek); | |
| } | |
| void ssl3_read_close_notify(SSL *ssl) { | |
| ssl3_read_bytes(ssl, 0, NULL, 0, 0); | |
| } | |
| /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. | |
| * 'type' is one of the following: | |
| * | |
| * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) | |
| * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) | |
| * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) | |
| * | |
| * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first | |
| * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). | |
| * | |
| * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as | |
| * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really | |
| * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. | |
| * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store | |
| * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol | |
| * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): | |
| * Change cipher spec protocol | |
| * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored | |
| * Alert protocol | |
| * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) | |
| * Handshake protocol | |
| * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have | |
| * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages | |
| * here, anything else is handled by higher layers | |
| * Application data protocol | |
| * none of our business | |
| */ | |
| int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, uint8_t *buf, int len, int peek) { | |
| int al, i, ret; | |
| unsigned int n; | |
| SSL3_RECORD *rr; | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; | |
| if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) || | |
| (peek && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) { | |
| /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ | |
| uint8_t *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; | |
| uint8_t *dst = buf; | |
| unsigned int k; | |
| /* peek == 0 */ | |
| n = 0; | |
| while (len > 0 && s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0) { | |
| *dst++ = *src++; | |
| len--; | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; | |
| n++; | |
| } | |
| /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ | |
| for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) { | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; | |
| } | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ | |
| /* This may require multiple iterations. False Start will cause | |
| * |s->handshake_func| to signal success one step early, but the handshake | |
| * must be completely finished before other modes are accepted. | |
| * | |
| * TODO(davidben): Move this check up to a higher level. */ | |
| while (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { | |
| assert(type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA); | |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| start: | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record | |
| * s->s3->rrec.data - data | |
| * s->s3->rrec.off - offset into 'data' for next read | |
| * s->s3->rrec.length - number of bytes. */ | |
| rr = &s->s3->rrec; | |
| /* get new packet if necessary */ | |
| if (rr->length == 0 || s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY) { | |
| ret = ssl3_get_record(s); | |
| if (ret <= 0) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ | |
| /* |change_cipher_spec is set when we receive a ChangeCipherSpec and reset by | |
| * ssl3_get_finished. */ | |
| if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && | |
| rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* If we are expecting a ChangeCipherSpec, it is illegal to receive a | |
| * Handshake record. */ | |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_HANDSHAKE_RECORD_BEFORE_CCS); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in | |
| * 'peek' mode) */ | |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { | |
| rr->length = 0; | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (type == rr->type) { | |
| s->s3->warning_alert_count = 0; | |
| /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ | |
| /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we are doing a | |
| * handshake for the first time */ | |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && | |
| s->aead_read_ctx == NULL) { | |
| /* TODO(davidben): Is this check redundant with the handshake_func | |
| * check? */ | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (len <= 0) { | |
| return len; | |
| } | |
| if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) { | |
| n = rr->length; | |
| } else { | |
| n = (unsigned int)len; | |
| } | |
| memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); | |
| if (!peek) { | |
| rr->length -= n; | |
| rr->off += n; | |
| if (rr->length == 0) { | |
| s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; | |
| rr->off = 0; | |
| if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { | |
| ssl3_release_read_buffer(s); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return n; | |
| } | |
| /* Process unexpected records. */ | |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { | |
| /* If peer renegotiations are disabled, all out-of-order handshake records | |
| * are fatal. Renegotiations as a server are never supported. */ | |
| if (!s->accept_peer_renegotiations || s->server) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* HelloRequests may be fragmented across multiple records. */ | |
| const size_t size = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment); | |
| const size_t avail = size - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; | |
| const size_t todo = (rr->length < avail) ? rr->length : avail; | |
| memcpy(s->s3->handshake_fragment + s->s3->handshake_fragment_len, | |
| &rr->data[rr->off], todo); | |
| rr->off += todo; | |
| rr->length -= todo; | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len += todo; | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < size) { | |
| goto start; /* fragment was too small */ | |
| } | |
| /* Parse out and consume a HelloRequest. */ | |
| if (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] != SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST || | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0 || | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0 || | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, | |
| s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s) || !s->s3->initial_handshake_complete) { | |
| /* This cannot happen. If a handshake is in progress, |type| must be | |
| * |SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE|. */ | |
| assert(0); | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | |
| goto err; | |
| } | |
| /* Renegotiation is only supported at quiescent points in the application | |
| * protocol, namely in HTTPS, just before reading the HTTP response. Require | |
| * the record-layer be idle and avoid complexities of sending a handshake | |
| * record while an application_data record is being written. */ | |
| if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0 || s->s3->rbuf.left != 0) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Begin a new handshake. */ | |
| s->state = SSL_ST_CONNECT; | |
| i = s->handshake_func(s); | |
| if (i < 0) { | |
| return i; | |
| } | |
| if (i == 0) { | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* The handshake completed synchronously. Continue reading records. */ | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| /* If an alert record, process one alert out of the record. Note that we allow | |
| * a single record to contain multiple alerts. */ | |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { | |
| /* Alerts may not be fragmented. */ | |
| if (rr->length < 2) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &rr->data[rr->off], 2, s, | |
| s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| const uint8_t alert_level = rr->data[rr->off++]; | |
| const uint8_t alert_descr = rr->data[rr->off++]; | |
| rr->length -= 2; | |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->info_callback; | |
| } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
| } | |
| if (cb != NULL) { | |
| uint16_t alert = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; | |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, alert); | |
| } | |
| if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { | |
| s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; | |
| if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { | |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested renegotiation and | |
| * the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal alert because if | |
| * application tried to renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and | |
| * expects it to succeed. | |
| * | |
| * In future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care if the | |
| * peer refused it where we carry on. */ | |
| else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->warning_alert_count++; | |
| if (s->s3->warning_alert_count > kMaxWarningAlerts) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARNING_ALERTS); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | |
| char tmp[16]; | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); | |
| BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%d", alert_descr); | |
| ERR_add_error_data(2, "SSL alert number ", tmp); | |
| s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; | |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
| return 0; | |
| } else { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { | |
| /* but we have not received a shutdown */ | |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; | |
| rr->length = 0; | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { | |
| /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know exactly what the | |
| * record payload has to look like */ | |
| if (rr->length != 1 || rr->off != 0 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS)) { | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
| goto f_err; | |
| } | |
| s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_EXPECT_CCS; | |
| rr->length = 0; | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, | |
| s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; | |
| if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { | |
| goto err; | |
| } else { | |
| goto start; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| /* We already handled these. */ | |
| assert(rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && | |
| rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); | |
| al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); | |
| f_err: | |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); | |
| err: | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { | |
| int i; | |
| if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) { | |
| i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; | |
| } else { | |
| i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; | |
| } | |
| if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { | |
| if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { | |
| /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ | |
| OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; | |
| if (!s->enc_method->setup_key_block(s)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!s->enc_method->change_cipher_state(s, i)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { | |
| /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ | |
| desc = s->enc_method->alert_value(desc); | |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) { | |
| /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ | |
| desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | |
| } | |
| if (desc < 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ | |
| if (level == 2 && s->session != NULL) { | |
| SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session); | |
| } | |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
| s->s3->send_alert[0] = level; | |
| s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc; | |
| if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) { | |
| /* data is still being written out. */ | |
| return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); | |
| } | |
| /* else data is still being written out, we will get written some time in the | |
| * future */ | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { | |
| int i, j; | |
| void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; | |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0; | |
| i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); | |
| if (i <= 0) { | |
| s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1; | |
| } else { | |
| /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. If the message | |
| * does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, we will not worry too much. */ | |
| if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { | |
| BIO_flush(s->wbio); | |
| } | |
| if (s->msg_callback) { | |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, | |
| s->msg_callback_arg); | |
| } | |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->info_callback; | |
| } else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) { | |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; | |
| } | |
| if (cb != NULL) { | |
| j = (s->s3->send_alert[0] << 8) | s->s3->send_alert[1]; | |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j); | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return i; | |
| } |