)]}'
{
  "commit": "6ff942985389b9b64b944b98ab3e8a66e1eb436d",
  "tree": "0d59f3252dd1f51bee16398e7d59a69f40536b36",
  "parents": [
    "1f6c3dc7d736357d5454a73217d47ce93d2fb240"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "David Benjamin",
    "email": "davidben@google.com",
    "time": "Mon May 10 15:42:40 2021 -0400"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org",
    "email": "commit-bot@chromium.org",
    "time": "Thu May 13 16:17:12 2021 +0000"
  },
  "message": "Don\u0027t use SHA256(ticket) as the signaling session ID for tickets.\n\nWe\u0027ve inherited some behavior from OpenSSL where, in ticket-based client\nsessions, we fill in a placeholder session ID of SHA256(ticket). This\nwas done to avoid confusing other code in OpenSSL (and possibly\ncallers?) that assumed session_id_length !\u003d 0 determined validity.\n\nSeparately, TLS 1.2 session tickets are syntactically weird. The client\ngenerates a fake signaling session ID, which the server echoes on\nresumption.\n\nThese combined meant we used the placeholder SHA256 value as this\nsignaling ID. Since we already have code to generate random session IDs\nfor TLS 1.3, use that instead to minimize unnecessary implementation\nquirks visible on the wire. This removes one of the places we still rely\non the placeholders within the library.\n\nChange-Id: I0de2781da72e2bbc030505611589c853f105ce9d\nReviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/47446\nReviewed-by: Adam Langley \u003cagl@google.com\u003e\nCommit-Queue: David Benjamin \u003cdavidben@google.com\u003e\n",
  "tree_diff": [
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "2a8c75c81fba5789d112b510ad945dffaba46823",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "ssl/handshake_client.cc",
      "new_id": "8f23d959ed36c404000400c72b874d2785ad83b9",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "ssl/handshake_client.cc"
    }
  ]
}