|author||David Benjamin <email@example.com>||Fri May 26 15:06:27 2023 -0400|
|committer||Boringssl LUCI CQ <firstname.lastname@example.org>||Wed May 31 21:32:59 2023 +0000|
Add a value barrier when checking for point doubling. Many of our point addition functions internally check for the doubling case and branch because the addition formulas are incomplete. This branch is fine because the multiplication formulas are arranged to not hit this case. However, we don't want to leak the couple of intermedate values that determine whether to branch. Previously, we ran into this with https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/36465. This wasn't sufficient. The compiler understands if (a & b) enough to compile into two branches. Thanks to Moritz Schneider, Nicolas Dutly, Daniele Lain, Ivan Puddu, and Srdjan Capkun for reporting this! Fix the leak by adding a value barrier on the final value. As we're also intentionally leaking the result of otherwise secret data flow, I've used the constant_time_declassify functions, which feed into our valgrind-based constant-time validation and double as barriers. Accordingly, I've also added some CONSTTIME_SECRET markers around the ECDSA nonce value, so we can check with valgrind the fix worked. The marker really should be at a lower level, at ec_random_nonzero_scalar or further (maybe RAND_bytes?), but for now I've just marked the nonce. To then clear valgrind, add constant_time_declassify in a few other places, like trying to convert infinity to affine coordinates. (ECDH deals with secret points, but it is public that the point isn't infinity.) Valgrind now says this code is constant-time, at least up to compilation differences introduced by the annotations. I've also inspected the compiler output. This seems to be fine, though neither test is quite satisfying. Ideally we could add annotations in ways that don't influence compiler output. Change-Id: Idfc413a75d92514717520404a0f5424903cb4453 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/60225 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <email@example.com> Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <firstname.lastname@example.org> Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <email@example.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
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