diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index bfe27cc..3ccb0a0d 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -944,6 +944,7 @@
 	unsigned int n;
 	SSL3_RECORD *rr;
 	void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
+	uint8_t alert_buffer[2];
 
 	if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
 		if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
@@ -1077,44 +1078,39 @@
 	/* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
 	 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
 	 */
+
+	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
 		{
-		unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
-		unsigned char *dest = NULL;
-		unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
-
-		if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
+		const size_t size = sizeof(s->s3->handshake_fragment);
+		const size_t avail = size - s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
+		const size_t len = (rr->length < avail) ? rr->length : avail;
+		memcpy(s->s3->handshake_fragment + s->s3->handshake_fragment_len,
+			&rr->data[rr->off], len);
+		rr->off += len;
+		rr->length -= len;
+		s->s3->handshake_fragment_len += len;
+		if (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len < size)
 			{
-			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
-			dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
-			dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
+			goto start; /* fragment was too small */
 			}
-		else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+		}
+	else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
+		{
+		const size_t len = sizeof(alert_buffer);
+		/* Note that this will still allow multiple alerts to
+		 * be processed in the same record */
+		if (rr->length < sizeof(alert_buffer))
 			{
-			dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
-			dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
-			dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
+			al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+			OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl3_read_bytes, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT);
+			goto f_err;
 			}
-
-		if (dest_maxlen > 0)
-			{
-			n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
-			if (rr->length < n)
-				n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
-
-			/* now move 'n' bytes: */
-			while (n-- > 0)
-				{
-				dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
-				rr->length--;
-				}
-
-			if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
-				goto start; /* fragment was too small */
-			}
+		memcpy(alert_buffer, &rr->data[rr->off], len);
+		rr->off += len;
+		rr->length -= len;
 		}
 
 	/* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4  iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
-	 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2      iff  rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
 	 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
 
 	/* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
@@ -1158,15 +1154,13 @@
 		goto start;
 		}
 
-	if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
+	if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
 		{
-		int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
-		int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
-
-		s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
+		uint8_t alert_level = alert_buffer[0];
+		uint8_t alert_descr = alert_buffer[1];
 
 		if (s->msg_callback)
-			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+			s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_buffer, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
 
 		if (s->info_callback != NULL)
 			cb=s->info_callback;
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_error.c b/ssl/ssl_error.c
index b070b5f..1737b1f 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_error.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_error.c
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
   {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE), "APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE"},
   {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT), "ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT"},
   {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_AUTHZ_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "AUTHZ_DATA_TOO_LARGE"},
+  {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT), "BAD_ALERT"},
   {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD), "BAD_ALERT_RECORD"},
   {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE), "BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE"},
   {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC), "BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC"},
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/common.go b/ssl/test/runner/common.go
index 6130343..9f79778 100644
--- a/ssl/test/runner/common.go
+++ b/ssl/test/runner/common.go
@@ -431,6 +431,13 @@
 	// the first 6 bytes of the ClientHello.
 	FragmentClientVersion bool
 
+	// FragmentAlert will cause all alerts to be fragmented across
+	// two records.
+	FragmentAlert bool
+
+	// SendSpuriousAlert will cause an spurious, unwanted alert to be sent.
+	SendSpuriousAlert bool
+
 	// RsaClientKeyExchangeVersion, if non-zero, causes the client to send a
 	// ClientKeyExchange with the specified version rather than the
 	// client_version when performing the RSA key exchange.
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/conn.go b/ssl/test/runner/conn.go
index e1ccbb7..f4b4c36 100644
--- a/ssl/test/runner/conn.go
+++ b/ssl/test/runner/conn.go
@@ -769,7 +769,12 @@
 		c.tmp[0] = alertLevelError
 	}
 	c.tmp[1] = byte(err)
-	c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2])
+	if c.config.Bugs.FragmentAlert {
+		c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:1])
+		c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[1:2])
+	} else {
+		c.writeRecord(recordTypeAlert, c.tmp[0:2])
+	}
 	// closeNotify is a special case in that it isn't an error:
 	if err != alertCloseNotify {
 		return c.out.setErrorLocked(&net.OpError{Op: "local error", Err: err})
@@ -1001,6 +1006,10 @@
 		return 0, alertInternalError
 	}
 
+	if c.config.Bugs.SendSpuriousAlert {
+		c.sendAlertLocked(alertRecordOverflow)
+	}
+
 	// SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 are susceptible to a chosen-plaintext
 	// attack when using block mode ciphers due to predictable IVs.
 	// This can be prevented by splitting each Application Data
diff --git a/ssl/test/runner/runner.go b/ssl/test/runner/runner.go
index 9172223..a302687 100644
--- a/ssl/test/runner/runner.go
+++ b/ssl/test/runner/runner.go
@@ -354,6 +354,18 @@
 	},
 	{
 		testType: serverTest,
+		name:     "FragmentAlert",
+		config: Config{
+			Bugs: ProtocolBugs{
+				FragmentAlert: true,
+				SendSpuriousAlert: true,
+			},
+		},
+		shouldFail:    true,
+		expectedError: ":BAD_ALERT:",
+	},
+	{
+		testType: serverTest,
 		name:     "EarlyChangeCipherSpec-server-1",
 		config: Config{
 			Bugs: ProtocolBugs{