| commit | 4bc3b8427402f1d142a7f9aeb1a4e418775381b0 | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Tue Sep 02 18:49:23 2025 -0400 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Wed Sep 03 22:04:05 2025 -0700 |
| tree | 6f1da6c83a58808c568f31779fe6329b359ae0ca | |
| parent | 9e96cc5383e12853cd24cf3442fa691191b2bbf5 [diff] |
Add X509_parse_with_algorithms This controls the algorithms that the SPKI will be parsed with. Note there is a decision point here with our API: is an X509 a holder of an EVP_PKEY, and thus parsed with algorithms in mind, or is it just an abstractly parsed certificate, and algorithms are instead passed to an X509_get_publickey_with_algorithms. This CL takes the first route, largely because upstream already went down this path in many ways: - X509_get0_pubkey expose the fact that X509's retain a cached EVP_PKEY. - Upstream OpenSSL added X509_new_ex which passes an OSSL_LIB_CTX into the X509. It's a little unfortunate that this pattern relies on object reuse in d2i_X509, but so it goes. - A caller using the same X509 to verify mutiple signatures (e.g. a root CA) might wish to hold on to the EVP_PKEY to avoid importing the key a bunch. (This probably doesn't matter too much, but if we ever add an API to precompute a table to speed up ECDSA verify...) This changes follows in those footsteps. Note this means that the same certificate bytes might produce semantically different X509 objects (with or without the SPKI in EVP_PKEY form) depending on how it was parsed. This is a little unfortunate but probably the most straightforward model given where we are. Bug: 42290364, 384818542 Change-Id: I8c0c95cb1d3221fc0b79a7749833c4f0d87646eb Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/81787 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
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