| commit | c5a99415cc722455451175869580b5080acf0924 | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Tue Nov 14 17:29:28 2023 -0500 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Tue Nov 14 23:19:57 2023 +0000 |
| tree | 113fa427f3e8b45fcea8ab87f9d94c3b0ae9f3ef | |
| parent | ad57528d2c978543106f9b115bd0eb658f3ebdd2 [diff] |
Limit the SHA_CTX workaround to C Anonymous unions are now standard in C, as of C11, but not in C++. Enabling sufficiently strict warnings in GCC and Clang flag this. I considered whether we should just remove this and go back to the OpenSSL formulation, but we actually rely on this being an array when calling sha1_block_data_order. Upstream types these as taking pointers to the context, which would work, but taking a pointer to the state is a bit more accurate. (The assembly function should not touch the buffering inside the context.) This anonymous union does mean wpa_supplicant's behavior is slightly questionable from a strict aliasing perspective, but ah well. wpa_supplicant uses this to implement an old FIPS 186-2 PRF, which was based on SHA-1's underlying permutation. Ideally we would either implement this PRF for them, or have them use their own SHA-1 implementation. They've actually done the latter for OpenSSL 3.0, but it's a little silly to duplicate the code. strongswan and go/another-fips-186-2-prf seems to do this too. I'm not positive what strongswan is doing. I've filed crbug.com/boringssl/667 for follow-up work. Bug: 667 Fixed: 566 Change-Id: Ife32cc8c278e0dbbd95401ccdd3bd62945e10cf2 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/63967 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: