Temporarily disable the Trusty CRYPTO_sysrand implementation
This effectively reverts
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/61465, as a
temporary workaround for b/291102972. Once the broken
libcrypto_baremetal target in Android is fixed, we'll restore this file.
Bug: b:291102972
Change-Id: I830b61219e863cd7a72858a44df5fd958b023fd0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/61585
Commit-Queue: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Beck <bbe@google.com>
Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
diff --git a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h
index 91bbe58..029e0f7 100644
--- a/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/fipsmodule/rand/internal.h
@@ -29,7 +29,10 @@
#if defined(BORINGSSL_UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE)
#define OPENSSL_RAND_DETERMINISTIC
#elif defined(OPENSSL_TRUSTY)
-#define OPENSSL_RAND_TRUSTY
+// TODO(b/291102972): This should define OPENSSL_RAND_TRUSTY to activate the
+// Trusty RNG implementation. However, due to a different, non-Trusty target
+// incorrectly defining __TRUSTY__, things will break if we follow our standard
+// pattern here.
#elif defined(OPENSSL_WINDOWS)
#define OPENSSL_RAND_WINDOWS
#elif defined(OPENSSL_LINUX)
