| /* | |
| * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project | |
| * 2001. | |
| */ | |
| /* ==================================================================== | |
| * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | |
| * | |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | |
| * are met: | |
| * | |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | |
| * | |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | |
| * distribution. | |
| * | |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | |
| * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | |
| * | |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | |
| * | |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | |
| * acknowledgment: | |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | |
| * | |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | |
| * ==================================================================== | |
| * | |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). */ | |
| #include <string.h> | |
| #include <openssl/digest.h> | |
| #include <openssl/err.h> | |
| #include <openssl/mem.h> | |
| #include <openssl/obj.h> | |
| #include <openssl/thread.h> | |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> | |
| #include "../internal.h" | |
| #include "internal.h" | |
| struct x509_purpose_st { | |
| int purpose; | |
| int trust; // Default trust ID | |
| int (*check_purpose)(const struct x509_purpose_st *, const X509 *, int); | |
| const char *sname; | |
| } /* X509_PURPOSE */; | |
| #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1 | EXFLAG_SS) | |
| #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ | |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) | |
| #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ | |
| (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) | |
| static int check_ca(const X509 *x); | |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca); | |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca); | |
| static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca); | |
| static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca); | |
| static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca); | |
| static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca); | |
| static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca); | |
| static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | |
| // X509_TRUST_NONE is not a valid |X509_TRUST_*| constant. It is used by | |
| // |X509_PURPOSE_ANY| to indicate that it has no corresponding trust type and | |
| // cannot be used with |X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose|. | |
| #define X509_TRUST_NONE (-1) | |
| static const X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, check_purpose_ssl_client, | |
| "sslclient"}, | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, check_purpose_ssl_server, | |
| "sslserver"}, | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, | |
| check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "nssslserver"}, | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, check_purpose_smime_sign, | |
| "smimesign"}, | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, | |
| "smimeencrypt"}, | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, check_purpose_crl_sign, | |
| "crlsign"}, | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_NONE, no_check, "any"}, | |
| // |X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER| performs no actual checks. OpenSSL's OCSP | |
| // implementation relied on the caller performing EKU and KU checks. | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, no_check, "ocsphelper"}, | |
| {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, | |
| "timestampsign"}, | |
| }; | |
| int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) { | |
| // This differs from OpenSSL, which uses -1 to indicate a fatal error and 0 to | |
| // indicate an invalid certificate. BoringSSL uses 0 for both. | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (id == -1) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| const X509_PURPOSE *pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(id); | |
| if (pt == NULL) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Historically, |check_purpose| implementations other than |X509_PURPOSE_ANY| | |
| // called |check_ca|. This is redundant with the |X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA| | |
| // logic, but |X509_check_purpose| is public API, so we preserve this | |
| // behavior. | |
| if (ca && id != X509_PURPOSE_ANY && !check_ca(x)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); | |
| } | |
| const X509_PURPOSE *X509_PURPOSE_get0(int id) { | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(xstandard); i++) { | |
| if (xstandard[i].purpose == id) { | |
| return &xstandard[i]; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(const char *sname) { | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < OPENSSL_ARRAY_SIZE(xstandard); i++) { | |
| if (strcmp(xstandard[i].sname, sname) == 0) { | |
| return xstandard[i].purpose; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->purpose; } | |
| int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(const X509_PURPOSE *xp) { return xp->trust; } | |
| int X509_supported_extension(const X509_EXTENSION *ex) { | |
| int nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); | |
| return nid == NID_key_usage || // | |
| nid == NID_subject_alt_name || // | |
| nid == NID_basic_constraints || // | |
| nid == NID_certificate_policies || // | |
| nid == NID_ext_key_usage || // | |
| nid == NID_policy_constraints || // | |
| nid == NID_name_constraints || // | |
| nid == NID_policy_mappings || // | |
| nid == NID_inhibit_any_policy; | |
| } | |
| static int setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) { | |
| if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| X509_NAME *iname = NULL; | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | |
| GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | |
| if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { | |
| iname = gen->d.directoryName; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (!iname) { | |
| iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | |
| } | |
| return DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); | |
| } | |
| static int setup_crldp(X509 *x) { | |
| int j; | |
| x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, &j, NULL); | |
| if (x->crldp == NULL && j != -1) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { | |
| if (!setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| int x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) { | |
| BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; | |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; | |
| EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; | |
| size_t i; | |
| int j; | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_read(&x->lock); | |
| const int is_set = x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET; | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_read(&x->lock); | |
| if (is_set) { | |
| return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0; | |
| } | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_lock_write(&x->lock); | |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) { | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock); | |
| return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0; | |
| } | |
| if (!X509_digest(x, EVP_sha256(), x->cert_hash, NULL)) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| // V1 should mean no extensions ... | |
| if (X509_get_version(x) == X509_VERSION_1) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; | |
| } | |
| // Handle basic constraints | |
| if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, &j, NULL))) { | |
| if (bs->ca) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; | |
| } | |
| if (bs->pathlen) { | |
| if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || !bs->ca) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| x->ex_pathlen = 0; | |
| } else { | |
| // TODO(davidben): |ASN1_INTEGER_get| returns -1 on overflow, | |
| // which currently acts as if the constraint isn't present. This | |
| // works (an overflowing path length constraint may as well be | |
| // infinity), but Chromium's verifier simply treats values above | |
| // 255 as an error. | |
| x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| x->ex_pathlen = -1; | |
| } | |
| BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; | |
| } else if (j != -1) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| // Handle key usage | |
| if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, &j, NULL))) { | |
| if (usage->length > 0) { | |
| x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; | |
| if (usage->length > 1) { | |
| x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; | |
| } | |
| } else { | |
| x->ex_kusage = 0; | |
| } | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; | |
| ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); | |
| } else if (j != -1) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| x->ex_xkusage = 0; | |
| if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, &j, NULL))) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { | |
| switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { | |
| case NID_server_auth: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_client_auth: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_email_protect: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_code_sign: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_ms_sgc: | |
| case NID_ns_sgc: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_OCSP_sign: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_time_stamp: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_dvcs: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; | |
| break; | |
| case NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage: | |
| x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_ANYEKU; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); | |
| } else if (j != -1) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, &j, NULL); | |
| if (x->skid == NULL && j != -1) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, &j, NULL); | |
| if (x->akid == NULL && j != -1) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| // Does subject name match issuer ? | |
| if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; | |
| // If SKID matches AKID also indicate self signed | |
| if (X509_check_akid(x, x->akid) == X509_V_OK && | |
| !ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, &j, NULL); | |
| if (x->altname == NULL && j != -1) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &j, NULL); | |
| if (x->nc == NULL && j != -1) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| if (!setup_crldp(x)) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | |
| } | |
| for (j = 0; j < X509_get_ext_count(x); j++) { | |
| const X509_EXTENSION *ex = X509_get_ext(x, j); | |
| if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) { | |
| continue; | |
| } | |
| if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; | |
| CRYPTO_MUTEX_unlock_write(&x->lock); | |
| return (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID) == 0; | |
| } | |
| // check_ca returns one if |x| should be considered a CA certificate and zero | |
| // otherwise. | |
| static int check_ca(const X509 *x) { | |
| // keyUsage if present should allow cert signing | |
| if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Version 1 certificates are considered CAs and don't have extensions. | |
| if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| // Otherwise, it's only a CA if basicConstraints says so. | |
| return ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)); | |
| } | |
| int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) { | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| return check_ca(x); | |
| } | |
| // check_purpose returns one if |x| is a valid part of a certificate path for | |
| // extended key usage |required_xku| and at least one of key usages in | |
| // |required_kus|. |ca| indicates whether |x| is a CA or end-entity certificate. | |
| static int check_purpose(const X509 *x, int ca, int required_xku, | |
| int required_kus) { | |
| // Check extended key usage on the entire chain. | |
| if (required_xku != 0 && xku_reject(x, required_xku)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Check key usages only on the end-entity certificate. | |
| return ca || !ku_reject(x, required_kus); | |
| } | |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca) { | |
| // We need to do digital signatures or key agreement. | |
| // | |
| // TODO(davidben): We do not implement any TLS client certificate modes based | |
| // on key agreement. | |
| return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SSL_CLIENT, | |
| X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT); | |
| } | |
| // Key usage needed for TLS/SSL server: digital signature, encipherment or | |
| // key agreement. The ssl code can check this more thoroughly for individual | |
| // key types. | |
| #define X509v3_KU_TLS \ | |
| (X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT | \ | |
| X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) | |
| static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca) { | |
| return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SSL_SERVER, X509v3_KU_TLS); | |
| } | |
| static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca) { | |
| // We need to encipher or Netscape complains. | |
| return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SSL_SERVER, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT); | |
| } | |
| static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca) { | |
| return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SMIME, | |
| X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE | X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION); | |
| } | |
| static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca) { | |
| return check_purpose(x, ca, XKU_SMIME, X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT); | |
| } | |
| static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca) { | |
| return check_purpose(x, ca, /*required_xku=*/0, X509v3_KU_CRL_SIGN); | |
| } | |
| static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | |
| int ca) { | |
| if (ca) { | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| // Check the optional key usage field: | |
| // if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature | |
| // and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall | |
| // be rejected). | |
| if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | |
| ((x->ex_kusage & | |
| ~(X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || | |
| !(x->ex_kusage & | |
| (X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION | X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. | |
| // | |
| // TODO(davidben): Should we check EKUs up the chain like the other cases? | |
| if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| // Extended Key Usage MUST be critical | |
| int i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); | |
| if (i_ext >= 0) { | |
| const X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext(x, i_ext); | |
| if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return 1; | |
| } | |
| static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) { return 1; } | |
| int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) { | |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), | |
| X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; | |
| } | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer) || !x509v3_cache_extensions(subject)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; | |
| } | |
| if (subject->akid) { | |
| int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); | |
| if (ret != X509_V_OK) { | |
| return ret; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (ku_reject(issuer, X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| int X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, const AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) { | |
| if (!akid) { | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| // Check key ids (if present) | |
| if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && | |
| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; | |
| } | |
| // Check serial number | |
| if (akid->serial && | |
| ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; | |
| } | |
| // Check issuer name | |
| if (akid->issuer) { | |
| // Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes SEQUENCE OF | |
| // GeneralName. So look for a DirName. There may be more than one but | |
| // we only take any notice of the first. | |
| GENERAL_NAMES *gens; | |
| GENERAL_NAME *gen; | |
| X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | |
| size_t i; | |
| gens = akid->issuer; | |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | |
| gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | |
| if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { | |
| nm = gen->d.dirn; | |
| break; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) { | |
| return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return X509_V_OK; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t X509_get_extension_flags(X509 *x) { | |
| // Ignore the return value. On failure, |x->ex_flags| will include | |
| // |EXFLAG_INVALID|. | |
| x509v3_cache_extensions(x); | |
| return x->ex_flags; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t X509_get_key_usage(X509 *x) { | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) { | |
| return x->ex_kusage; | |
| } | |
| // If there is no extension, key usage is unconstrained, so set all bits to | |
| // one. Note that, although we use |UINT32_MAX|, |ex_kusage| only contains the | |
| // first 16 bits when the extension is present. | |
| return UINT32_MAX; | |
| } | |
| uint32_t X509_get_extended_key_usage(X509 *x) { | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x)) { | |
| return 0; | |
| } | |
| if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) { | |
| return x->ex_xkusage; | |
| } | |
| // If there is no extension, extended key usage is unconstrained, so set all | |
| // bits to one. | |
| return UINT32_MAX; | |
| } | |
| const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_subject_key_id(X509 *x509) { | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return x509->skid; | |
| } | |
| const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_authority_key_id(X509 *x509) { | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->keyid : NULL; | |
| } | |
| const GENERAL_NAMES *X509_get0_authority_issuer(X509 *x509) { | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->issuer : NULL; | |
| } | |
| const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_authority_serial(X509 *x509) { | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509)) { | |
| return NULL; | |
| } | |
| return x509->akid != NULL ? x509->akid->serial : NULL; | |
| } | |
| long X509_get_pathlen(X509 *x509) { | |
| if (!x509v3_cache_extensions(x509) || (x509->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) == 0) { | |
| return -1; | |
| } | |
| return x509->ex_pathlen; | |
| } |