)]}'
{
  "commit": "0bb026eee4ba651793129edaf3f886e4874535a4",
  "tree": "e8564ee5e81c35a4496a1729343c29be529c33f6",
  "parents": [
    "478b28ab12f2001a03261624261fd041f5439706"
  ],
  "author": {
    "name": "David Benjamin",
    "email": "davidben@google.com",
    "time": "Sun Oct 01 16:45:08 2023 -0400"
  },
  "committer": {
    "name": "Boringssl LUCI CQ",
    "email": "boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com",
    "time": "Mon Nov 06 12:52:52 2023 +0000"
  },
  "message": "Tighten the limit in ASN1_STRING_set further\n\nThe actual maximum allowed for this function is INT_MAX - 1. However,\nelsewhere we bound parsers to INT_MAX / 2, to guard against overflows\nelsewhere in crypto/asn1.\n\nAs parsing code is rewritten with CBS, it will naturally handle size_t.\nRather than manually pepper bounds checks in all the functions, we can\ncatch it at ASN1_STRING_set time. (Whether we\u0027ll still need this hack by\nthe end, I\u0027m not sure, but let\u0027s keep it for now.)\n\nBug: 547\nChange-Id: Ia24c9d77d198ba1b5200825a347ca91850f470a2\nReviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/63526\nAuto-Submit: David Benjamin \u003cdavidben@google.com\u003e\nReviewed-by: Bob Beck \u003cbbe@google.com\u003e\nCommit-Queue: Bob Beck \u003cbbe@google.com\u003e\n",
  "tree_diff": [
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "dd56c9890bf67d0b5164f75119af34d54bc2c8f4",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c",
      "new_id": "015862265dda1be62f3fab1a24648c314c6e9a6d",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c"
    },
    {
      "type": "modify",
      "old_id": "94f2272871b015a9a6f14f6efa40d6bd7469287d",
      "old_mode": 33188,
      "old_path": "crypto/asn1/asn1_test.cc",
      "new_id": "07628c88ff78994c9bf57b69ae84a95b4c2adae3",
      "new_mode": 33188,
      "new_path": "crypto/asn1/asn1_test.cc"
    }
  ]
}
