| commit | 08b1f38577b6da8533179ffdb4a42b5afc36dc27 | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Tue Feb 28 17:22:23 2023 -0500 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Wed Mar 01 17:26:52 2023 +0000 |
| tree | b3cf11637201262c19aa19b261687b245720e698 | |
| parent | 028bae7ddc67b6061d80c17b0be4e2f60d94731b [diff] |
Use KEM terminology in TLS ECDHE and key_share abstractions TLS 1.2 ECDHE and TLS 1.3 key shares were originally designed around Diffie-Hellman-like primitives and use language based on that. Post-quantum replacements do not look like Diffie-Hellman, where each part exchanges a public key, but schemes that work differently can still slot in without protocol changes. We previously came up with our own Offer/Accept/Finish abstraction for early post-quantum experiments, but the NIST constructions are all expressed as KEMs: First, the recipient generates a keypair and sends the public key. Then the sender encapsulates a symmetric secret and sends the ciphertext. Finally, the recipient decapsulates the ciphertext to get the secret. Align our C++ and Go abstractions to this terminology. The functions are now called Generate/Encap/Decap, and the output of Encap is called "ciphertext", which seems to align with what most folks use. (RFC 9180 uses "enc" for "encapsulated key", but they staple a KEM to an AEAD, so "ciphertext" would be ambiguous.) Where variable names refer to parts of the protocol, rather than the the underlying KEM-like construction, I've kept variable names matching the protocol mechanism, so we still talk about "curves" and "key shares", but, when using the post-quantum replacements, the terminology is no longer quite accurate. I've also not yet renamed SSLKeyShare yet, though the name is now inaccurate. Also ideally we'd touch that up so the stateful object is just a KEM private key, for SSLKEMKey. Though at that point, we maybe should just add EVP_KEM and EVP_KEM_KEY APIs to libcrypto. Change-Id: Icbcc1840c5d2dfad210ef4caad2a7c4bf8146553 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/57726 Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: