| commit | 5245371a08528f7fb21ab20bd7a479d8e395b61c | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> | Tue Oct 22 18:47:13 2024 -0400 |
| committer | Boringssl LUCI CQ <boringssl-scoped@luci-project-accounts.iam.gserviceaccount.com> | Fri Nov 01 19:06:32 2024 +0000 |
| tree | 154baa09137860a7f990817d70f9da672498796f | |
| parent | 59f4cc4e90ec856504483a3125eccfe6c0a2b011 [diff] |
Pack DTLS fragments into records when possible We were sending at most one DTLS fragment per record, which prevents us from amortizing the overhead. In DTLS 1.2, this doesn't impact the encrypted epoch (just Finished), but it does make the unencrypted epoch slightly more efficient. In DTLS 1.3, it doesn't impact the unencrypted epochs, but the encrypted epochs become a lot more efficient. This is the DTLS analog to https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/28744 As part of this, test that: - Each handshake fragment contains as much of the message as can fit in the packet. - If the first record of packet N could have (partially) fit in packet N-1, the caller should have put it in packet N-1. - We never have two handshake records of the same epoch in a row in one packet. If we did, those could have been merged for less overhead. (That's what's fixed by this CL.) As part of this, we can remove the MTUExceeded tests. Those were, badly, testing that the peer successfully filled at least one packet. Now we test packet-filling more directly. Finally, although we don't particularly care about CBC ciphers, I've made the packet-filling code more accurate for CBC ciphers. This is purely so that we don't need as many special cases on the runner side when deciding if there was more room available in the packet. Bug: 42290594 Change-Id: Ia79b2a09d3008e95de08121fc4e35768c6f3ae77 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/72275 Auto-Submit: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nick Harper <nharper@chromium.org>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
Project links:
To file a security issue, use the Chromium process and mention in the report this is for BoringSSL. You can ignore the parts of the process that are specific to Chromium/Chrome.
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: