| // Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. |
| // |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| // |
| // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| // |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| // limitations under the License. |
| |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| |
| #include "../internal.h" |
| |
| |
| int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *password, size_t password_len, |
| const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, uint32_t iterations, |
| const EVP_MD *digest, size_t key_len, uint8_t *out_key) { |
| // See RFC 8018, section 5.2. |
| bssl::ScopedHMAC_CTX hctx; |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), password, password_len, digest, NULL)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| uint32_t i = 1; |
| size_t md_len = EVP_MD_size(digest); |
| while (key_len > 0) { |
| size_t todo = md_len; |
| if (todo > key_len) { |
| todo = key_len; |
| } |
| |
| uint8_t i_buf[4]; |
| i_buf[0] = (uint8_t)((i >> 24) & 0xff); |
| i_buf[1] = (uint8_t)((i >> 16) & 0xff); |
| i_buf[2] = (uint8_t)((i >> 8) & 0xff); |
| i_buf[3] = (uint8_t)(i & 0xff); |
| |
| // Compute U_1. |
| uint8_t digest_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) || |
| !HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), salt, salt_len) || |
| !HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), i_buf, 4) || |
| !HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, NULL)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_memcpy(out_key, digest_tmp, todo); |
| for (uint32_t j = 1; j < iterations; j++) { |
| // Compute the remaining U_* values and XOR. |
| if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) || |
| !HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, md_len) || |
| !HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, NULL)) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| for (size_t k = 0; k < todo; k++) { |
| out_key[k] ^= digest_tmp[k]; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| key_len -= todo; |
| out_key += todo; |
| i++; |
| } |
| |
| // RFC 8018 describes iterations (c) as being a "positive integer", so a |
| // value of 0 is an error. |
| // |
| // Unfortunately not all consumers of PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() check their return |
| // value, expecting it to succeed and unconditionally using |out_key|. As a |
| // precaution for such callsites in external code, the old behavior of |
| // iterations < 1 being treated as iterations == 1 is preserved, but |
| // additionally an error result is returned. |
| // |
| // TODO(eroman): Figure out how to remove this compatibility hack, or change |
| // the default to something more sensible like 2048. |
| if (iterations == 0) { |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *password, size_t password_len, |
| const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, |
| uint32_t iterations, size_t key_len, |
| uint8_t *out_key) { |
| return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, password_len, salt, salt_len, iterations, |
| EVP_sha1(), key_len, out_key); |
| } |