Reformat the rest of ssl/.
Change-Id: I7dc264f7e29b3ba8be4c717583467edf71bf8dd9
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index c3cac06..5975f70 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -118,392 +118,369 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "ssl_locl.h"
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess);
+
+
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *tick, int ticklen,
+ const uint8_t *sess_id, int sesslen,
+ SSL_SESSION **psess);
static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s);
static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s);
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- 0,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_handshake_write,
- };
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ 0,
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ ssl3_handshake_write,
+};
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_handshake_write,
- };
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ ssl3_handshake_write,
+};
const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
- tls1_enc,
- tls1_mac,
- tls1_setup_key_block,
- tls1_generate_master_secret,
- tls1_change_cipher_state,
- tls1_final_finish_mac,
- TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
- tls1_cert_verify_mac,
- TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
- tls1_alert_code,
- tls1_export_keying_material,
- SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
- |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
- SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
- ssl3_set_handshake_header,
- ssl3_handshake_write,
- };
+ tls1_enc,
+ tls1_mac,
+ tls1_setup_key_block,
+ tls1_generate_master_secret,
+ tls1_change_cipher_state,
+ tls1_final_finish_mac,
+ TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
+ tls1_cert_verify_mac,
+ TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
+ tls1_alert_code,
+ tls1_export_keying_material,
+ SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF
+ |SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
+ SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH,
+ ssl3_set_handshake_header,
+ ssl3_handshake_write,
+};
-static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2)
- {
- uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t*)p1);
- uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t*)p2);
- if (u1 < u2)
- {
- return -1;
- }
- else if (u1 > u2)
- {
- return 1;
- }
- else
- {
- return 0;
- }
- }
+static int compare_uint16_t(const void *p1, const void *p2) {
+ uint16_t u1 = *((const uint16_t *)p1);
+ uint16_t u2 = *((const uint16_t *)p2);
+ if (u1 < u2) {
+ return -1;
+ } else if (u1 > u2) {
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
-/* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be more
- * than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello. This
- * function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
+/* Per http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.1.4, there may not be
+ * more than one extension of the same type in a ClientHello or ServerHello.
+ * This function does an initial scan over the extensions block to filter those
* out. */
-static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs)
- {
- CBS extensions = *cbs;
- size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
- uint16_t *extension_types = NULL;
- int ret = 0;
+static int tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(const CBS *cbs) {
+ CBS extensions = *cbs;
+ size_t num_extensions = 0, i = 0;
+ uint16_t *extension_types = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
- /* First pass: count the extensions. */
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0)
- {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
+ /* First pass: count the extensions. */
+ while (CBS_len(&extensions) > 0) {
+ uint16_t type;
+ CBS extension;
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- {
- goto done;
- }
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
- num_extensions++;
- }
+ num_extensions++;
+ }
- if (num_extensions == 0)
- {
- return 1;
- }
+ if (num_extensions == 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- extension_types = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions);
- if (extension_types == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto done;
- }
+ extension_types =
+ (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t) * num_extensions);
+ if (extension_types == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls1_check_duplicate_extensions,
+ ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto done;
+ }
- /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
- extensions = *cbs;
- for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++)
- {
- CBS extension;
+ /* Second pass: gather the extension types. */
+ extensions = *cbs;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+ CBS extension;
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- {
- /* This should not happen. */
- goto done;
- }
- }
- assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &extension_types[i]) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ /* This should not happen. */
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ assert(CBS_len(&extensions) == 0);
- /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
- qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t);
- for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++)
- {
- if (extension_types[i-1] == extension_types[i])
- {
- goto done;
- }
- }
+ /* Sort the extensions and make sure there are no duplicates. */
+ qsort(extension_types, num_extensions, sizeof(uint16_t), compare_uint16_t);
+ for (i = 1; i < num_extensions; i++) {
+ if (extension_types[i - 1] == extension_types[i]) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
- ret = 1;
+ ret = 1;
+
done:
- if (extension_types)
- OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
- return ret;
- }
+ if (extension_types)
+ OPENSSL_free(extension_types);
+ return ret;
+}
-char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx)
- {
- CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions;
+char ssl_early_callback_init(struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx) {
+ CBS client_hello, session_id, cipher_suites, compression_methods, extensions;
- CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len);
+ CBS_init(&client_hello, ctx->client_hello, ctx->client_hello_len);
- /* Skip client version. */
- if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2))
- return 0;
+ if (/* Skip client version. */
+ !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 2) ||
+ /* Skip client nonce. */
+ !CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32) ||
+ /* Extract session_id. */
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Skip client nonce. */
- if (!CBS_skip(&client_hello, 32))
- return 0;
+ ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
+ ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
- /* Extract session_id. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id))
- return 0;
- ctx->session_id = CBS_data(&session_id);
- ctx->session_id_len = CBS_len(&session_id);
+ /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
+ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl)) {
+ CBS cookie;
- /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
- if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ctx->ssl))
- {
- CBS cookie;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie))
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Extract cipher_suites. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
+ CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 || (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
+ ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
- /* Extract cipher_suites. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites) ||
- CBS_len(&cipher_suites) < 2 ||
- (CBS_len(&cipher_suites) & 1) != 0)
- return 0;
- ctx->cipher_suites = CBS_data(&cipher_suites);
- ctx->cipher_suites_len = CBS_len(&cipher_suites);
+ /* Extract compression_methods. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
+ CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
+ ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
- /* Extract compression_methods. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &compression_methods) ||
- CBS_len(&compression_methods) < 1)
- return 0;
- ctx->compression_methods = CBS_data(&compression_methods);
- ctx->compression_methods_len = CBS_len(&compression_methods);
+ /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
+ * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */
+ if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0) {
+ ctx->extensions = NULL;
+ ctx->extensions_len = 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
- /* If the ClientHello ends here then it's valid, but doesn't have any
- * extensions. (E.g. SSLv3.) */
- if (CBS_len(&client_hello) == 0)
- {
- ctx->extensions = NULL;
- ctx->extensions_len = 0;
- return 1;
- }
+ /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
+ !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
+ CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
+ ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
- /* Extract extensions and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions) ||
- CBS_len(&client_hello) != 0)
- return 0;
- ctx->extensions = CBS_data(&extensions);
- ctx->extensions_len = CBS_len(&extensions);
+ return 1;
+}
- return 1;
- }
+char SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
+ const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx, uint16_t extension_type,
+ const uint8_t **out_data, size_t *out_len) {
+ CBS extensions;
-char
-SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
- uint16_t extension_type,
- const unsigned char **out_data,
- size_t *out_len)
- {
- CBS extensions;
+ CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len);
- CBS_init(&extensions, ctx->extensions, ctx->extensions_len);
+ while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+ uint16_t type;
+ CBS extension;
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
- {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
+ /* Decode the next extension. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- return 0;
+ if (type == extension_type) {
+ *out_data = CBS_data(&extension);
+ *out_len = CBS_len(&extension);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
- if (type == extension_type)
- {
- *out_data = CBS_data(&extension);
- *out_len = CBS_len(&extension);
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
- }
-
+ return 0;
+}
/* ECC curves from RFC4492 */
-static const int nid_list[] =
- {
- NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
- NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
- NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
- NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
- NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
- NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
- NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
- NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
- NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
- NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
- NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
- NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
- NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
- NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
- NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
- NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
- NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
- NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
- NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
- NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
- NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
- NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
- NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
- NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
- NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
- };
+static const int nid_list[] = {
+ NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
+ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
+ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
+ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
+ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
+ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
+ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
+ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
+ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
+ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
+ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
+ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
+ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
+ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
+ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
+ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
+ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
+ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
+ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
+ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
+ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+ NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
+ NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
+ NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
+};
-static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] =
- {
- TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
- };
+static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] = {
+ TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
+};
-static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] =
- {
- 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
- 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
- 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
- };
+static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
+ 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
+ 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
+ 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
+};
-int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id)
- {
- if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))
- return OBJ_undef;
- return nid_list[curve_id-1];
- }
+int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id) {
+ if (curve_id < 1 || curve_id > sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])) {
+ return OBJ_undef;
+ }
+ return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
+}
-uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
- {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
- {
- /* nid_list[i] stores the NID corresponding to curve ID i+1. */
- if (nid == nid_list[i])
- return i + 1;
- }
- /* Use 0 for non-existent curve ID. Note: this assumes that curve ID 0
- * will never be allocated. */
- return 0;
- }
+uint16_t tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) {
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) {
+ /* nid_list[i] stores the NID corresponding to curve ID i+1. */
+ if (nid == nid_list[i]) {
+ return i + 1;
+ }
+ }
-/* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len|
- * to the list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero,
- * return the peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred
- * list. */
+ /* Use 0 for non-existent curve ID. Note: this assumes that curve ID 0 will
+ * never be allocated. */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* tls1_get_curvelist sets |*out_curve_ids| and |*out_curve_ids_len| to the
+ * list of allowed curve IDs. If |get_peer_curves| is non-zero, return the
+ * peer's curve list. Otherwise, return the preferred list. */
static void tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int get_peer_curves,
- const uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len)
- {
- if (get_peer_curves)
- {
- *out_curve_ids = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist;
- *out_curve_ids_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- return;
- }
+ const uint16_t **out_curve_ids,
+ size_t *out_curve_ids_len) {
+ if (get_peer_curves) {
+ *out_curve_ids = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist;
+ *out_curve_ids_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ return;
+ }
- *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
- *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
- if (!*out_curve_ids)
- {
- *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default;
- *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]);
- }
- }
+ *out_curve_ids = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
+ *out_curve_ids_len = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
+ if (!*out_curve_ids) {
+ *out_curve_ids = eccurves_default;
+ *out_curve_ids_len = sizeof(eccurves_default) / sizeof(eccurves_default[0]);
+ }
+}
-int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id)
- {
- uint8_t curve_type;
- uint16_t curve_id;
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t curves_len, i;
+int tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, uint16_t *out_curve_id) {
+ uint8_t curve_type;
+ uint16_t curve_id;
+ const uint16_t *curves;
+ size_t curves_len, i;
- /* Only support named curves. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) ||
- curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
- !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id))
- return 0;
+ /* Only support named curves. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type) ||
+ curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE ||
+ !CBS_get_u16(cbs, &curve_id)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
- {
- if (curve_id == curves[i])
- {
- *out_curve_id = curve_id;
- return 1;
- }
- }
- return 0;
- }
+ tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
+ for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
+ if (curve_id == curves[i]) {
+ *out_curve_id = curve_id;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
-int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s)
- {
- const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
- size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
+ return 0;
+}
- /* Can't do anything on client side */
- if (s->server == 0)
- return NID_undef;
+int tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s) {
+ const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
+ size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
- /* Return first preference shared curve */
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
- &supp, &supplen);
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE),
- &pref, &preflen);
- for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++)
- {
- for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++)
- {
- if (pref[i] == supp[j])
- return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]);
- }
- }
- return NID_undef;
- }
+ /* Can't do anything on client side */
+ if (s->server == 0) {
+ return NID_undef;
+ }
+
+ /* Return first preference shared curve */
+ tls1_get_curvelist(s, !!(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &supp,
+ &supplen);
+ tls1_get_curvelist(s, !(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE), &pref,
+ &preflen);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++) {
+ if (pref[i] == supp[j]) {
+ return tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NID_undef;
+}
/* NOTE: tls1_ec_curve_id2nid and tls1_set_curves assume that
*
@@ -513,851 +490,850 @@
*
* Those implementations must be revised before adding support for curve IDs
* that break these assumptions. */
-OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT(
- (sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])) < 32, small_curve_ids);
+OPENSSL_COMPILE_ASSERT((sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])) < 32,
+ small_curve_ids);
int tls1_set_curves(uint16_t **out_curve_ids, size_t *out_curve_ids_len,
- const int *curves, size_t ncurves)
- {
- uint16_t *curve_ids;
- size_t i;
- /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
- * while curve ids < 32
- */
- uint32_t dup_list = 0;
- curve_ids = (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
- if (!curve_ids)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++)
- {
- uint32_t idmask;
- uint16_t id;
- id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
- idmask = ((uint32_t)1) << id;
- if (!id || (dup_list & idmask))
- {
- OPENSSL_free(curve_ids);
- return 0;
- }
- dup_list |= idmask;
- curve_ids[i] = id;
- }
- if (*out_curve_ids)
- OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids);
- *out_curve_ids = curve_ids;
- *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves;
- return 1;
- }
+ const int *curves, size_t ncurves) {
+ uint16_t *curve_ids;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Bitmap of curves included to detect duplicates: only works
+ * while curve ids < 32. */
+ uint32_t dup_list = 0;
+ curve_ids = (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(ncurves * sizeof(uint16_t));
+ if (curve_ids == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ncurves; i++) {
+ uint32_t idmask;
+ uint16_t id;
+ id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(curves[i]);
+ idmask = ((uint32_t)1) << id;
+ if (!id || (dup_list & idmask)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(curve_ids);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dup_list |= idmask;
+ curve_ids[i] = id;
+ }
+
+ if (*out_curve_ids) {
+ OPENSSL_free(*out_curve_ids);
+ }
+ *out_curve_ids = curve_ids;
+ *out_curve_ids_len = ncurves;
+
+ return 1;
+}
/* tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key sets |*out_curve_id| and |*out_comp_id| to the
* TLS curve ID and point format, respectively, for |ec|. It returns one on
* success and zero on failure. */
-static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id, uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec)
- {
- int nid;
- uint16_t id;
- const EC_GROUP *grp;
- if (!ec)
- return 0;
+static int tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(uint16_t *out_curve_id,
+ uint8_t *out_comp_id, EC_KEY *ec) {
+ int nid;
+ uint16_t id;
+ const EC_GROUP *grp;
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
- if (!grp)
- return 0;
+ if (ec == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Determine curve ID */
- nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
- id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
- if (!id)
- return 0;
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
+ if (grp == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not
- * supported. */
- *out_curve_id = id;
+ /* Determine curve ID */
+ nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+ id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
+ if (!id) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (out_comp_id)
- {
- if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED)
- *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
- else
- *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+ /* Set the named curve ID. Arbitrary explicit curves are not supported. */
+ *out_curve_id = id;
+
+ if (out_comp_id) {
+ if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
+ *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
+ } else {
+ *out_comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
/* tls1_check_point_format returns one if |comp_id| is consistent with the
* peer's point format preferences. */
-static int tls1_check_point_format(SSL *s, uint8_t comp_id)
- {
- uint8_t *p = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist;
- size_t plen = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length;
- size_t i;
+static int tls1_check_point_format(SSL *s, uint8_t comp_id) {
+ uint8_t *p = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist;
+ size_t plen = s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ size_t i;
- /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything
- * is supported (see RFC4492). */
- if (p == NULL)
- return 1;
+ /* If point formats extension present check it, otherwise everything is
+ * supported (see RFC4492). */
+ if (p == NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- for (i = 0; i < plen; i++)
- {
- if (comp_id == p[i])
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < plen; i++) {
+ if (comp_id == p[i]) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
-/* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our and
- * the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* tls1_check_curve_id returns one if |curve_id| is consistent with both our
+ * and the peer's curve preferences. Note: if called as the client, only our
* preferences are checked; the peer (the server) does not send preferences. */
-static int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id)
- {
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t curves_len, i, j;
+static int tls1_check_curve_id(SSL *s, uint16_t curve_id) {
+ const uint16_t *curves;
+ size_t curves_len, i, j;
- /* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */
- for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++)
- {
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &curves, &curves_len);
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
- {
- if (curves[i] == curve_id)
- break;
- }
- if (i == curves_len)
- return 0;
- /* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a
- * client, only check our list. */
- if (!s->server)
- return 1;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+ /* Check against our list, then the peer's list. */
+ for (j = 0; j <= 1; j++) {
+ tls1_get_curvelist(s, j, &curves, &curves_len);
+ for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
+ if (curves[i] == curve_id) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
-static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats,
- size_t *pformatslen)
- {
- /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise
- * use default */
- if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
- {
- *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
- *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
- }
- else
- {
- *pformats = ecformats_default;
- *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
- }
- }
+ if (i == curves_len) {
+ return 0;
+ }
-int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x)
- {
- int ret = 0;
- EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
- uint16_t curve_id;
- uint8_t comp_id;
+ /* Servers do not present a preference list so, if we are a client, only
+ * check our list. */
+ if (!s->server) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
- if (!pkey ||
- pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC ||
- !tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec) ||
- !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
- !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))
- {
- goto done;
- }
+ return 1;
+}
- ret = 1;
+static void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const uint8_t **pformats,
+ size_t *pformatslen) {
+ /* If we have a custom point format list use it otherwise use default */
+ if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) {
+ *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
+ *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
+ } else {
+ *pformats = ecformats_default;
+ *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
+ }
+}
+
+int tls1_check_ec_cert(SSL *s, X509 *x) {
+ int ret = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+ uint16_t curve_id;
+ uint8_t comp_id;
+
+ if (!pkey ||
+ pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC ||
+ !tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec) ||
+ !tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
+ !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
done:
- if (pkey)
- EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- return ret;
- }
+ if (pkey) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
-int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
- {
- uint16_t curve_id;
- EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto)
- {
- /* Need a shared curve */
- return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef;
- }
- if (!ec)
- {
- if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb)
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
- return tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, NULL, ec) &&
- tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id);
- }
+int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s) {
+ uint16_t curve_id;
+ EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) {
+ /* Need a shared curve */
+ return tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef;
+ }
+ if (!ec) {
+ if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, NULL, ec) &&
+ tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id);
+}
/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
- * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
- */
+ * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. */
#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
-#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
- tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
+#define tlsext_sigalg(md) tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
static const uint8_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
- tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
+ tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
};
-size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char **psigs)
- {
- /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
- if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs)
- {
- *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
- return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
- }
- else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs)
- {
- *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
- return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
- }
- else
- {
- *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
- return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
- }
- }
-/* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of
- * |cbs|. It checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported
- * signature algorithms and, if so, writes the relevant digest into
- * |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0 and writes an alert
- * into |*out_alert|.
- */
-int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert,
- SSL *s, CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- const unsigned char *sent_sigs;
- size_t sent_sigslen, i;
- int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
- uint8_t hash, signature;
- /* Should never happen */
- if (sigalg == -1)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) ||
- !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
- if (sigalg != signature)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- {
- uint16_t curve_id;
- uint8_t comp_id;
- /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
- if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (s->server)
- {
- if (!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
- !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
+size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, const uint8_t **psigs) {
+ /* If server use client authentication sigalgs if not NULL */
+ if (s->server && s->cert->client_sigalgs) {
+ *psigs = s->cert->client_sigalgs;
+ return s->cert->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else if (s->cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+ *psigs = s->cert->conf_sigalgs;
+ return s->cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ *psigs = tls12_sigalgs;
+ return sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
+ }
+}
- /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
- sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
- for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i+=2, sent_sigs+=2)
- {
- if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1])
- break;
- }
- /* Allow fallback to SHA-1. */
- if (i == sent_sigslen && hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash);
- if (*out_md == NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
-/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled
- * if it isn't supported or doesn't appear in supported signature
- * algorithms. Unlike ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific
- * session and not global settings.
- *
- */
-void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
- {
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- const unsigned char *sigalgs;
- size_t i, sigalgslen;
- int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
- c->mask_a = 0;
- c->mask_k = 0;
- /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
- if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s))
- c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
- else
- c->mask_ssl = 0;
- /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support
- * any for RSA, DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just
- * TLS 1.2.
- */
- sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
- for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2)
- {
- switch(sigalgs[1])
- {
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- have_rsa = 1;
- break;
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- have_ecdsa = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature
- * algorithms.
- */
- if (!have_rsa)
- {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
- }
- if (!have_ecdsa)
- {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
- }
- /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
- if (!s->psk_client_callback)
- {
- c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
- c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
- }
- }
+/* tls12_check_peer_sigalg parses a SignatureAndHashAlgorithm out of |cbs|. It
+ * checks it is consistent with |s|'s sent supported signature algorithms and,
+ * if so, writes the relevant digest into |*out_md| and returns 1. Otherwise it
+ * returns 0 and writes an alert into |*out_alert|. */
+int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(const EVP_MD **out_md, int *out_alert, SSL *s,
+ CBS *cbs, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+ const uint8_t *sent_sigs;
+ size_t sent_sigslen, i;
+ int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
+ uint8_t hash, signature;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (sigalg == -1) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &hash) ||
+ !CBS_get_u8(cbs, &signature)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
+ if (sigalg != signature) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ uint16_t curve_id;
+ uint8_t comp_id;
+ /* Check compression and curve matches extensions */
+ if (!tls1_curve_params_from_ec_key(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (s->server && (!tls1_check_curve_id(s, curve_id) ||
+ !tls1_check_point_format(s, comp_id))) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check signature matches a type we sent */
+ sent_sigslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sent_sigs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sent_sigslen; i += 2, sent_sigs += 2) {
+ if (hash == sent_sigs[0] && signature == sent_sigs[1]) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Allow fallback to SHA-1. */
+ if (i == sent_sigslen && hash != TLSEXT_hash_sha1) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_md = tls12_get_hash(hash);
+ if (*out_md == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, tls12_check_peer_sigalg, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Get a mask of disabled algorithms: an algorithm is disabled if it isn't
+ * supported or doesn't appear in supported signature algorithms. Unlike
+ * ssl_cipher_get_disabled this applies to a specific session and not global
+ * settings. */
+void ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s) {
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ const uint8_t *sigalgs;
+ size_t i, sigalgslen;
+ int have_rsa = 0, have_ecdsa = 0;
+ c->mask_a = 0;
+ c->mask_k = 0;
+
+ /* Don't allow TLS 1.2 only ciphers if we don't suppport them */
+ if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s)) {
+ c->mask_ssl = SSL_TLSV1_2;
+ } else {
+ c->mask_ssl = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Now go through all signature algorithms seeing if we support any for RSA,
+ * DSA, ECDSA. Do this for all versions not just TLS 1.2. */
+ sigalgslen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &sigalgs);
+ for (i = 0; i < sigalgslen; i += 2, sigalgs += 2) {
+ switch (sigalgs[1]) {
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ have_rsa = 1;
+ break;
+
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ have_ecdsa = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Disable auth if we don't include any appropriate signature algorithms. */
+ if (!have_rsa) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aRSA;
+ }
+ if (!have_ecdsa) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA;
+ }
+
+ /* with PSK there must be client callback set */
+ if (!s->psk_client_callback) {
+ c->mask_a |= SSL_aPSK;
+ c->mask_k |= SSL_kPSK;
+ }
+}
/* header_len is the length of the ClientHello header written so far, used to
* compute padding. It does not include the record header. Pass 0 if no padding
* is to be done. */
-unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit, size_t header_len)
- {
- int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
- int using_ecc = 0;
- if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
- {
- size_t i;
- unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
- STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
+uint8_t *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *limit,
+ size_t header_len) {
+ int extdatalen = 0;
+ uint8_t *ret = buf;
+ uint8_t *orig = buf;
+ /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
+ int using_ecc = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
- {
- const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION || SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
- alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
- alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
- if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))
- {
- using_ecc = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
- && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return orig;
+ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) {
+ using_ecc = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
- ret+=2;
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+ return orig;
+ }
- if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+ ret += 2;
- if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- {
- /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
- unsigned long size_str;
- long lenmax;
+ if (ret >= limit) {
+ return NULL; /* should never occur. */
+ }
- /* check for enough space.
- 4 for the servername type and entension length
- 2 for servernamelist length
- 1 for the hostname type
- 2 for hostname length
- + hostname length
- */
-
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
- || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
- return NULL;
-
- /* extension type and length */
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
- s2n(size_str+5,ret);
-
- /* length of servername list */
- s2n(size_str+3,ret);
-
- /* hostname type, length and hostname */
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
- s2n(size_str,ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
- ret+=size_str;
- }
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+ unsigned long size_str;
+ long lenmax;
- /* Add RI if renegotiating */
- if (s->renegotiate)
- {
- int el;
-
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
+ /* check for enough space.
+ 4 for the servername type and entension length
+ 2 for servernamelist length
+ 1 for the hostname type
+ 2 for hostname length
+ + hostname length */
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
+ lenmax = limit - ret - 9;
+ size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (lenmax < 0 || size_str > (unsigned long)lenmax) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
+ /* extension type and length */
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
+ s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
- ret += el;
- }
+ /* length of servername list */
+ s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
- /* Add extended master secret. */
- if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ /* hostname type, length and hostname */
+ *(ret++) = (uint8_t)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
+ s2n(size_str, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
+ ret += size_str;
+ }
- if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
- {
- int ticklen = 0;
- if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
- ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+ /* Add RI if renegotiating */
+ if (s->renegotiate) {
+ int el;
- /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
- * rest for ticket
- */
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
- s2n(ticklen,ret);
- if (ticklen)
- {
- memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
- ret += ticklen;
- }
- }
+ if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- {
- size_t salglen;
- const unsigned char *salg;
- salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
- s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
- s2n(salglen, ret);
- memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
- ret += salglen;
- }
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if (s->ocsp_stapling_enabled)
- {
- /* The status_request extension is excessively extensible at
- * every layer. On the client, only support requesting OCSP
- * responses with an empty responder_id_list and no
- * extensions. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
- s2n(1 + 2 + 2, ret);
- /* status_type */
- *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
- /* responder_id_list - empty */
- s2n(0, ret);
- /* request_extensions - empty */
- s2n(0, ret);
- }
+ if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
- {
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
- * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ ret += el;
+ }
- if (s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
- {
- /* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support for
- * certificate timestamps. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ /* Add extended master secret. */
+ if (s->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
- {
- if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
- s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
- s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len,ret);
- memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
- s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
- ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
- }
+ if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
+ int ticklen = 0;
+ if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) {
+ ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
+ }
- if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
- {
- /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
- * support for Channel ID. */
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new)
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
- else
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for
+ * ticket. */
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
+ s2n(ticklen, ret);
+ if (ticklen) {
+ memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
+ ret += ticklen;
+ }
+ }
- if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
- {
- int el;
+ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ size_t salglen;
+ const uint8_t *salg;
+ salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &salg);
+ if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < salglen + 6) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
+ s2n(salglen + 2, ret);
+ s2n(salglen, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, salg, salglen);
+ ret += salglen;
+ }
- ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
+ /* The status_request extension is excessively extensible at every layer.
+ * On the client, only support requesting OCSP responses with an empty
+ * responder_id_list and no extensions. */
+ if (limit - ret - 4 - 1 - 2 - 2 < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+ s2n(1 + 2 + 2, ret);
+ /* status_type */
+ *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
+ /* responder_id_list - empty */
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ /* request_extensions - empty */
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
- if(!ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret += el;
- }
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+ /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support for
+ * Next Protocol Negotiation */
+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
- if (using_ecc)
- {
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
- long lenmax;
- const uint8_t *formats;
- const uint16_t *curves;
- size_t formats_len, curves_len, i;
+ if (s->signed_cert_timestamps_enabled && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+ /* The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support for
+ * certificate timestamps. */
+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len);
+ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
+ if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
+ s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
+ s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list, s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
+ ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
+ }
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
- if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
- if (formats_len > 255)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
- s2n(formats_len + 1,ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formats_len;
- memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len);
- ret+=formats_len;
+ if (s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) {
+ /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support for
+ * Channel ID. */
+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->ctx->tlsext_channel_id_enabled_new) {
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, ret);
+ } else {
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, ret);
+ }
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
- /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
- tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
+ if (SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
+ int el;
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
- if ((curves_len * 2) > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
- if ((curves_len * 2) > 65532)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
- s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret);
+ ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
- s2n(curves_len * 2, ret);
- for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++)
- {
- s2n(curves[i], ret);
- }
- }
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if (header_len > 0)
- {
- size_t clienthello_minsize = 0;
- header_len += ret - orig;
- if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200)
- {
- /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
- * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
- *
- * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
- * extensions it MUST always appear last. */
- clienthello_minsize = 0x200;
- }
- if (s->fastradio_padding)
- {
- /* Pad the ClientHello record to 1024 bytes to fast forward
- * the radio into DCH (high data rate) state in 3G networks.
- * Note that when fastradio_padding is enabled, even if the
- * header_len is less than 255 bytes, the padding will be
- * applied regardless. This is slightly different from the TLS
- * padding extension suggested in
- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 */
- clienthello_minsize = 0x400;
- }
- if (header_len < clienthello_minsize)
- {
- size_t padding_len = clienthello_minsize - header_len;
- /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always
- * include least one byte of data if including the
- * extension. WebSphere Application Server 7.0 is
- * intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
- if (padding_len >= 4 + 1)
- padding_len -= 4;
- else
- padding_len = 1;
- if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0)
- return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
- s2n(padding_len, ret);
- memset(ret, 0, padding_len);
- ret += padding_len;
- }
- }
+ if (!ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret += el;
+ }
- if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2)== 0)
- return orig;
+ if (using_ecc) {
+ /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
+ long lenmax;
+ const uint8_t *formats;
+ const uint16_t *curves;
+ size_t formats_len, curves_len, i;
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
- }
+ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &formats, &formats_len);
-unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *limit)
- {
- int extdatalen=0;
- unsigned char *orig = buf;
- unsigned char *ret = buf;
- int next_proto_neg_seen;
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
- using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
- /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
- if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- return orig;
-
- ret+=2;
- if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
+ lenmax = limit - ret - 5;
+ if (lenmax < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (formats_len > (size_t)lenmax) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (formats_len > 255) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if (!s->hit && s->should_ack_sni && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
+ s2n(formats_len + 1, ret);
+ *(ret++) = (uint8_t)formats_len;
+ memcpy(ret, formats, formats_len);
+ ret += formats_len;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
+ tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curves_len);
- if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
- {
- int el;
-
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
+ lenmax = limit - ret - 6;
+ if (lenmax < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (curves_len * 2 > (size_t)lenmax) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (curves_len * 2 > 65532) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
+ s2n((curves_len * 2) + 2, ret);
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
+ s2n(curves_len * 2, ret);
+ for (i = 0; i < curves_len; i++) {
+ s2n(curves[i], ret);
+ }
+ }
- ret += el;
- }
+ if (header_len > 0) {
+ size_t clienthello_minsize = 0;
+ header_len += ret - orig;
+ if (header_len > 0xff && header_len < 0x200) {
+ /* Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
+ *
+ * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing extensions
+ * it MUST always appear last. */
+ clienthello_minsize = 0x200;
+ }
+ if (s->fastradio_padding) {
+ /* Pad the ClientHello record to 1024 bytes to fast forward the radio
+ * into DCH (high data rate) state in 3G networks. Note that when
+ * fastradio_padding is enabled, even if the header_len is less than 255
+ * bytes, the padding will be applied regardless. This is slightly
+ * different from the TLS padding extension suggested in
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 */
+ clienthello_minsize = 0x400;
+ }
+ if (header_len < clienthello_minsize) {
+ size_t padding_len = clienthello_minsize - header_len;
+ /* Extensions take at least four bytes to encode. Always include least
+ * one byte of data if including the extension. WebSphere Application
+ * Server 7.0 is intolerant to the last extension being zero-length. */
+ if (padding_len >= 4 + 1) {
+ padding_len -= 4;
+ } else {
+ padding_len = 1;
+ }
- if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (limit - ret - 4 - (long)padding_len < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
+ s2n(padding_len, ret);
+ memset(ret, 0, padding_len);
+ ret += padding_len;
+ }
+ }
- if (using_ecc)
- {
- const unsigned char *plist;
- size_t plistlen;
- /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
- long lenmax;
+ extdatalen = ret - orig - 2;
+ if (extdatalen == 0) {
+ return orig;
+ }
- tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
+ return ret;
+}
- if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
- if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) return NULL;
- if (plistlen > 255)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
- s2n(plistlen + 1,ret);
- *(ret++) = (unsigned char) plistlen;
- memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
- ret+=plistlen;
+uint8_t *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, uint8_t *buf, uint8_t *limit) {
+ int extdatalen = 0;
+ uint8_t *orig = buf;
+ uint8_t *ret = buf;
+ int next_proto_neg_seen;
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ int using_ecc = (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
+ using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
- }
- /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
+ /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+ return orig;
+ }
- if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
- && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ ret += 2;
+ if (ret >= limit) {
+ return NULL; /* should never happen. */
+ }
- if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ if (!s->hit && s->should_ack_sni && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if(s->srtp_profile)
- {
- int el;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
- ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
-
- if((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
+ if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
+ int el;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
- s2n(el,ret);
+ if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if(!ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- return NULL;
- }
- ret+=el;
- }
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
- next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
- {
- const unsigned char *npa;
- unsigned int npalen;
- int r;
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
- r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
- {
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
- s2n(npalen,ret);
- memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
- ret += npalen;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- }
+ if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- {
- const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
- size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+ ret += el;
+ }
- if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
- return NULL;
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation,ret);
- s2n(3 + len,ret);
- s2n(1 + len,ret);
- *ret++ = len;
- memcpy(ret, selected, len);
- ret += len;
- }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
- /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
- * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid)
- {
- if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
- return NULL;
- if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new,ret);
- else
- s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id,ret);
- s2n(0,ret);
- }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
- if ((extdatalen = ret-orig-2) == 0)
- return orig;
+ if (using_ecc) {
+ const uint8_t *plist;
+ size_t plistlen;
+ /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
+ long lenmax;
- s2n(extdatalen, orig);
- return ret;
- }
+ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &plist, &plistlen);
+
+ lenmax = limit - ret - 5;
+ if (lenmax < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (plistlen > (size_t)lenmax) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (plistlen > 255) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
+ s2n(plistlen + 1, ret);
+ *(ret++) = (uint8_t)plistlen;
+ memcpy(ret, plist, plistlen);
+ ret += plistlen;
+ }
+ /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
+
+ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ if (s->srtp_profile) {
+ int el;
+
+ ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
+
+ if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
+ s2n(el, ret);
+
+ if (!ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ret += el;
+ }
+
+ next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
+ const uint8_t *npa;
+ unsigned int npalen;
+ int r;
+
+ r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(
+ s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
+ s2n(npalen, ret);
+ memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
+ ret += npalen;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ const uint8_t *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
+ size_t len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
+
+ if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
+ s2n(3 + len, ret);
+ s2n(1 + len, ret);
+ *ret++ = len;
+ memcpy(ret, selected, len);
+ ret += len;
+ }
+
+ /* If the client advertised support for Channel ID, and we have it
+ * enabled, then we want to echo it back. */
+ if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
+ if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new, ret);
+ } else {
+ s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id, ret);
+ }
+ s2n(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ extdatalen = ret - orig - 2;
+ if (extdatalen == 0) {
+ return orig;
+ }
+
+ s2n(extdatalen, orig);
+ return ret;
+}
/* tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
* ClientHello.
@@ -1366,875 +1342,739 @@
* return.
*
* returns: 1 on success. */
-static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
- {
- CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name_list_copy;
- const unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
- int r;
+static int tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
+ CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name_list_copy;
+ const uint8_t *selected;
+ uint8_t selected_len;
+ int r;
- if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
- return 1;
+ if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(cbs) != 0 ||
- CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2)
- goto parse_error;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &protocol_name_list) ||
+ CBS_len(cbs) != 0 || CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) < 2) {
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
- /* Validate the protocol list. */
- protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
- while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0)
- {
- CBS protocol_name;
+ /* Validate the protocol list. */
+ protocol_name_list_copy = protocol_name_list;
+ while (CBS_len(&protocol_name_list_copy) > 0) {
+ CBS protocol_name;
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name))
- goto parse_error;
- }
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list_copy, &protocol_name)) {
+ goto parse_error;
+ }
+ }
- r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- CBS_data(&protocol_name_list), CBS_len(&protocol_name_list),
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
- if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (!s->s3->alpn_selected)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
- }
- return 1;
+ r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(
+ s, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&protocol_name_list),
+ CBS_len(&protocol_name_list), s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
+ if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ }
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+ if (!s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
parse_error:
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+}
-static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
- {
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- CBS extensions;
+static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+ CBS extensions;
- s->should_ack_sni = 0;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
+ s->should_ack_sni = 0;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
- }
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+ }
- /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
- if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
- s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
- }
- /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
- if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
- s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- }
- /* Clear ECC extensions */
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- }
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist != 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- }
+ /* Clear any signature algorithms extension received */
+ if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->peer_sigalgs);
+ s->cert->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
+ }
- /* There may be no extensions. */
- if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0)
- {
- goto ri_check;
- }
+ /* Clear any shared signature algorithms */
+ if (s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->cert->shared_sigalgs);
+ s->cert->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ }
- /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Clear ECC extensions */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ }
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
- {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ }
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* There may be no extensions. */
+ if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
+ goto ri_check;
+ }
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- {
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension),
- CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
- }
+ /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
+ !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
-/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
+ while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+ uint16_t type;
+ CBS extension;
- - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
- - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
- in which case an fatal alert is generated.
- - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
- - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
- to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
- - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
- it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
- Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
- set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
- case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
- a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
- presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
- the value of the Host: field.
- - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
- if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
- i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
- - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
+ /* Decode the next extension. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
-*/
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) {
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, (uint8_t *)CBS_data(&extension),
+ CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+ }
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- {
- CBS server_name_list;
- char have_seen_host_name = 0;
+ /* The servername extension is treated as follows:
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
+ - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, in
+ which case an fatal alert is generated.
+ - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
+ - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
+ to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
+ - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
+ it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
+ Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
+ set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
+ case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
+ a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
+ presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
+ the value of the Host: field.
+ - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the
+ session,
+ i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
+ - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. */
- /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
- while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0)
- {
- uint8_t name_type;
- CBS host_name;
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+ CBS server_name_list;
+ char have_seen_host_name = 0;
- /* Decode the NameType. */
- if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &server_name_list) ||
+ CBS_len(&server_name_list) < 1 || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Only host_name is supported. */
- if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
- continue;
+ /* Decode each ServerName in the extension. */
+ while (CBS_len(&server_name_list) > 0) {
+ uint8_t name_type;
+ CBS host_name;
- if (have_seen_host_name)
- {
- /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain
- * more than one name of the same
- * name_type. */
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Decode the NameType. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u8(&server_name_list, &name_type)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- have_seen_host_name = 1;
+ /* Only host_name is supported. */
+ if (name_type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) {
+ continue;
+ }
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
- CBS_len(&host_name) < 1)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (have_seen_host_name) {
+ /* The ServerNameList MUST NOT contain more than one name of the same
+ * name_type. */
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
- CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
+ have_seen_host_name = 1;
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- assert(s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- /* This should be impossible. */
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&server_name_list, &host_name) ||
+ CBS_len(&host_name) < 1) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
- if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (CBS_len(&host_name) > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name ||
+ CBS_contains_zero_byte(&host_name)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
- s->should_ack_sni = 1;
- }
- }
- }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ assert(s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL);
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+ /* This should be impossible. */
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
- {
- CBS ec_point_format_list;
+ /* Copy the hostname as a string. */
+ if (!CBS_strdup(&host_name, &s->session->tlsext_hostname)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ s->should_ack_sni = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+ CBS ec_point_format_list;
- if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves)
- {
- CBS elliptic_curve_list;
- size_t i, num_curves;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
+ CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
- CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
- (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
+ &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) {
+ CBS elliptic_curve_list;
+ size_t i, num_curves;
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist =
- (uint16_t*)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
- for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++)
- {
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i]))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
- {
- CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &elliptic_curve_list) ||
+ CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) == 0 ||
+ (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) & 1) != 0 ||
+ CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
+ }
- /* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It
- * contains a list of SignatureAndHashAlgorithms
- * which are two bytes each. */
- if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
- (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist =
+ (uint16_t *)OPENSSL_malloc(CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list));
- if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal
- * error.
- */
- if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
- return 0;
- }
- }
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist == NULL) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
- s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL)
- {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ num_curves = CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) / 2;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_curves; i++) {
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&elliptic_curve_list,
+ &s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist[i])) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
- /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
- * renegotiation.
- *
- * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
- * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
- * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
- * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
- * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
- * anything like that, but this might change).
+ if (CBS_len(&elliptic_curve_list) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
- * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
- * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
- * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
- * Finished message could have been computed.) */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ellipticcurvelist_length = num_curves;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
+ CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
- s->ctx->alpn_select_cb &&
- s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
- {
- if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- }
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension,
+ &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
+ CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id &&
- s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
- {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Ensure the signature algorithms are non-empty. It contains a list of
+ * SignatureAndHashAlgorithms which are two bytes each. */
+ if (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
+ (CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) % 2) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- }
+ if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* If sigalgs received and no shared algorithms fatal error. */
+ if (s->cert->peer_sigalgs && !s->cert->shared_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext,
+ SSL_R_NO_SHARED_SIGATURE_ALGORITHMS);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 && s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ /* The extension must be empty. */
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
- s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled)
- {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a renegotiation.
+ *
+ * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we probably shouldn't
+ * rely that it couldn't be set on the initial renegotation too in
+ * certain cases (when there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
+ * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing anything like that,
+ * but this might change).
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
- }
+ * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake in this connection
+ * is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > 0. (We are talking about a check
+ * that will happen in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
+ * Finished message could have been computed.) */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
+ s->ctx->alpn_select_cb && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ if (!tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id && s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) {
+ /* The extension must be empty. */
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new &&
+ s->tlsext_channel_id_enabled) {
+ /* The extension must be empty. */
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* session ticket processed earlier */
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- }
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
+ s->version != SSL3_VERSION) {
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret &&
- s->version != SSL3_VERSION)
- {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
+ }
+ }
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
- }
- }
+ri_check:
+ /* Need RI if renegotiating */
- ri_check:
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Need RI if renegotiating */
+ return 1;
+}
- if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
- !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
+int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) {
+ int alert = -1;
+ if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return 0;
+ }
- return 1;
- }
+ if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext,
+ SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return 0;
+ }
-int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
- {
- int alert = -1;
- if (ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0)
- {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
- return 1;
- }
+ return 1;
+}
/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
- * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
- * the length of the block. */
-static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs)
- {
- CBS copy = *cbs;
+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
+ * fill the length of the block. */
+static char ssl_next_proto_validate(const CBS *cbs) {
+ CBS copy = *cbs;
- while (CBS_len(©) != 0)
- {
- CBS proto;
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(©, &proto) ||
- CBS_len(&proto) == 0)
- {
- return 0;
- }
- }
- return 1;
- }
+ while (CBS_len(©) != 0) {
+ CBS proto;
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(©, &proto) || CBS_len(&proto) == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
-static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert)
- {
- int tlsext_servername = 0;
- int renegotiate_seen = 0;
- CBS extensions;
+ return 1;
+}
- /* TODO(davidben): Move all of these to some per-handshake state that
- * gets systematically reset on a new handshake; perhaps allocate it
- * fresh each time so it's not even kept around post-handshake. */
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs, int *out_alert) {
+ int tlsext_servername = 0;
+ int renegotiate_seen = 0;
+ CBS extensions;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
+ /* TODO(davidben): Move all of these to some per-handshake state that gets
+ * systematically reset on a new handshake; perhaps allocate it fresh each
+ * time so it's not even kept around post-handshake. */
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
- if (s->s3->alpn_selected)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
- s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
- }
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 0;
+ s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 0;
- /* Clear ECC extensions */
- if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
- s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
- }
+ if (s->s3->alpn_selected) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
+ s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
+ }
- /* There may be no extensions. */
- if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0)
- {
- goto ri_check;
- }
+ /* Clear ECC extensions */
+ if (s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist != 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist);
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
+ s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
+ }
- /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
- !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* There may be no extensions. */
+ if (CBS_len(cbs) == 0) {
+ goto ri_check;
+ }
- while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0)
- {
- uint16_t type;
- CBS extension;
+ /* Decode the extensions block and check it is valid. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(cbs, &extensions) ||
+ !tls1_check_duplicate_extensions(&extensions)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Decode the next extension. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
- !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ while (CBS_len(&extensions) != 0) {
+ uint16_t type;
+ CBS extension;
- if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
- {
- s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, (unsigned char*)CBS_data(&extension),
- CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
- }
+ /* Decode the next extension. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16(&extensions, &type) ||
+ !CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extensions, &extension)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
- {
- /* The extension must be empty. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- /* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */
- if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- tlsext_servername = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
- {
- CBS ec_point_format_list;
+ if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) {
+ s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, (uint8_t *)CBS_data(&extension),
+ CBS_len(&extension), s->tlsext_debug_arg);
+ }
- if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
+ /* The extension must be empty. */
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
- &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
- {
- if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* We must have sent it in ClientHello. */
+ if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
- {
- /* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if
- * we've requested a status request message. */
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- if (!s->ocsp_stapling_enabled)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
- /* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */
- s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
- unsigned char *selected;
- unsigned char selected_len;
+ tlsext_servername = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) {
+ CBS ec_point_format_list;
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&extension, &ec_point_format_list) ||
+ CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* The data must be valid. */
- if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (!CBS_stow(&ec_point_format_list, &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist,
+ &s->s3->tmp.peer_ecpointformatlist_length)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || CBS_len(&extension) > 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
- CBS_data(&extension), CBS_len(&extension),
- s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) {
+ /* The extension MUST be empty and may only sent if we've requested a
+ * status request message. */
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
- if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
- s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
- {
- CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
+ if (!s->ocsp_stapling_enabled) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* We must have requested it. */
- if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* Set a flag to expect a CertificateStatus message */
+ s->s3->tmp.certificate_status_expected = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
+ s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
+ uint8_t *selected;
+ uint8_t selected_len;
- /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList
- * which must have exactly one ProtocolName. Each of
- * these is length-prefixed. */
- if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0 ||
- !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
- CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ /* We must have requested it. */
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name,
- &s->s3->alpn_selected,
- &s->s3->alpn_selected_len))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
+ /* The data must be valid. */
+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(&extension)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id)
- {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new)
- {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
- s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp)
- {
- if (CBS_len(&extension) == 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(
+ s, &selected, &selected_len, CBS_data(&extension),
+ CBS_len(&extension),
+ s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
- if (!s->hit)
- {
- if (!CBS_stow(&extension,
- &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
- &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- renegotiate_seen = 1;
- }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
- {
- if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert))
- return 0;
- }
+ s->next_proto_negotiated = BUF_memdup(selected, selected_len);
+ if (s->next_proto_negotiated == NULL) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
- {
- if (/* It is invalid for the server to select EMS and
- SSLv3. */
- s->version == SSL3_VERSION ||
- CBS_len(&extension) != 0)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
+ s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
+ s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
+ CBS protocol_name_list, protocol_name;
- s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
- }
- }
+ /* We must have requested it. */
+ if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
- {
- if (s->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
- {
- s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
- if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- }
+ /* The extension data consists of a ProtocolNameList which must have
+ * exactly one ProtocolName. Each of these is length-prefixed. */
+ if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&extension, &protocol_name_list) ||
+ CBS_len(&extension) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&protocol_name_list, &protocol_name) ||
+ CBS_len(&protocol_name_list) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- ri_check:
+ if (!CBS_stow(&protocol_name, &s->s3->alpn_selected,
+ &s->s3->alpn_selected_len)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id) {
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
- * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
- * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
- * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
- * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
- * absence on initial connect only.
- */
- if (!renegotiate_seen
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
- && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
- {
- *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
- return 0;
- }
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_channel_id_new) {
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
- return 1;
- }
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid = 1;
+ s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_timestamp) {
+ if (CBS_len(&extension) == 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Session resumption uses the original session information. */
+ if (!s->hit &&
+ !CBS_stow(&extension, &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list,
+ &s->session->tlsext_signed_cert_timestamp_list_length)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
-int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- return 1;
- }
+ renegotiate_seen = 1;
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
+ if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, &extension, out_alert)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) {
+ if (/* It is invalid for the server to select EMS and
+ SSLv3. */
+ s->version == SSL3_VERSION || CBS_len(&extension) != 0) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
-int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- return 1;
- }
+ s->s3->tmp.extended_master_secret = 1;
+ }
+ }
-static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1 && s->tlsext_hostname) {
+ if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
+ s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
+ if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
- /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
- /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
- * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
- */
+ri_check:
+ /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid an
+ * attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello because the
+ * client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. However this would
+ * mean we could not connect to any server which doesn't support RI so for
+ * the immediate future tolerate RI absence on initial connect only. */
+ if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) &&
+ !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext,
+ SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ return 1;
+}
- switch (ret)
- {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- return -1;
+int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; }
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
- return 1;
+int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) { return 1; }
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
- s->should_ack_sni = 0;
- return 1;
+static int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) {
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
+ /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
+ * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. */
-static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
- {
- int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
- int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ } else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL &&
+ s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
+ ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(
+ s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ }
- /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
- * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
- * it must contain uncompressed.
- */
- unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
- unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
- if (((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
- !tls1_check_point_format(s, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed))
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
- return -1;
- }
- ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
- if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
- else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
- ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
- switch (ret)
- {
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
- return -1;
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
+ s->should_ack_sni = 0;
+ return 1;
- case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
- ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
- return 1;
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
- default:
- return 1;
- }
- }
+static int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) {
+ int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
+ int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
-int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
- {
- int alert = -1;
- if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION)
- return 1;
+ /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite,
+ * then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it must contain
+ * uncompressed. */
+ unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ if (((alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)) &&
+ !tls1_check_point_format(s, TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext,
+ SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
- if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0)
- {
- ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
- return 0;
- }
+ if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
+ ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al,
+ s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ } else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL &&
+ s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) {
+ ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(
+ s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
+ }
- if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
- return 0;
- }
+ switch (ret) {
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
+ return -1;
- return 1;
- }
+ case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
+ return 1;
+
+ default:
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, CBS *cbs) {
+ int alert = -1;
+ if (s->version < SSL3_VERSION) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(s, cbs, &alert) <= 0) {
+ ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext,
+ SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
* ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
@@ -2262,49 +2102,46 @@
* the client's ticket. Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
*/
int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *ctx,
- SSL_SESSION **ret)
- {
- *ret = NULL;
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
- const unsigned char *data;
- size_t len;
- int r;
+ SSL_SESSION **ret) {
+ *ret = NULL;
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
+ const uint8_t *data;
+ size_t len;
+ int r;
- /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
- * to permit stateful resumption.
- */
- if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
- return 0;
- if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) && !ctx->extensions)
- return 0;
- if (!SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(
- ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, &data, &len))
- {
- return 0;
- }
- if (len == 0)
- {
- /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
- * currently have one. */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 1;
- }
- r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id,
- ctx->session_id_len, ret);
- switch (r)
- {
- case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 2;
- case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
- return r;
- case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
- s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
- return 3;
- default: /* fatal error */
- return -1;
- }
- }
+ /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful
+ * resumption. */
+ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) ||
+ (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION && !ctx->extensions) ||
+ !SSL_early_callback_ctx_extension_get(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,
+ &data, &len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (len == 0) {
+ /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have one. */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, data, len, ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
+ ret);
+ switch (r) {
+ case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 2;
+
+ case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
+ return r;
+
+ case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
+ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
+ return 3;
+
+ default: /* fatal error */
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
*
@@ -2319,539 +2156,552 @@
* -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
* 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
* 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
- * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
- */
-static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
- const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
- SSL_SESSION **psess)
- {
- SSL_SESSION *sess;
- unsigned char *sdec;
- const unsigned char *p;
- int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
- unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- HMAC_CTX hctx;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
- SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
- if (eticklen < 48)
- return 2;
- /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
- HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
- if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
- {
- unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
- int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
- &ctx, &hctx, 0);
- if (rv < 0)
- return -1;
- if (rv == 0)
- return 2;
- if (rv == 2)
- renew_ticket = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* Check key name matches */
- if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
- return 2;
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
- tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) ||
- !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
- tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16))
- {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- }
- /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
- * integrity checks on ticket.
- */
- mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
- if (mlen < 0)
- {
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- eticklen -= mlen;
- /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
- HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
- HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
- HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
- if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return 2;
- }
- /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
- /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
- p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
- sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
- if (!sdec)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
- if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
- {
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- return 2;
- }
- slen += mlen;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- p = sdec;
+ * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. */
+static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const uint8_t *etick, int eticklen,
+ const uint8_t *sess_id, int sesslen,
+ SSL_SESSION **psess) {
+ SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ uint8_t *sdec;
+ const uint8_t *p;
+ int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
+ uint8_t tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ HMAC_CTX hctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
- sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
- OPENSSL_free(sdec);
- if (sess)
- {
- /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
- * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
- * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
- * as required by standard.
- */
- if (sesslen)
- memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
- sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
- *psess = sess;
- if (renew_ticket)
- return 4;
- else
- return 3;
- }
- ERR_clear_error();
- /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
- * ticket. */
- return 2;
- }
+ /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
+ if (eticklen < 48) {
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
+ HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
+ uint8_t *nctick = (uint8_t *)etick;
+ int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, &ctx, &hctx, 0);
+ if (rv < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ return 2;
+ }
+ if (rv == 2) {
+ renew_ticket = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Check key name matches */
+ if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) {
+ return 2;
+ }
+ if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(),
+ NULL) ||
+ !EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
+ tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16)) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity
+ * checks on ticket. */
+ mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
+ if (mlen < 0) {
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ eticklen -= mlen;
+ /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
+ HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
+ HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
+ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
+ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return 2;
+ }
+
+ /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
+ /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
+ p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
+ sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
+ if (!sdec) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
+ if (EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ return 2;
+ }
+ slen += mlen;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ p = sdec;
+
+ sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
+ OPENSSL_free(sdec);
+ if (sess) {
+ /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect that the
+ * ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session structure. If it
+ * is empty set length to zero as required by standard. */
+ if (sesslen) {
+ memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
+ }
+ sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
+ *psess = sess;
+ if (renew_ticket) {
+ return 4;
+ }
+ return 3;
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. */
+ return 2;
+}
/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
+typedef struct {
+ int nid;
+ int id;
+} tls12_lookup;
-typedef struct
- {
- int nid;
- int id;
- } tls12_lookup;
+static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {{NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
+ {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
+ {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
+ {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
+ {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
+ {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}};
-static const tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
- {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
- {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
- {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
- {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
- {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
- {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
-};
+static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {{EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
+ {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}};
-static const tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
- {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
- {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
-};
+static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) {
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ if (table[i].nid == nid) {
+ return table[i].id;
+ }
+ }
-static int tls12_find_id(int nid, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
- {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
- {
- if (table[i].nid == nid)
- return table[i].id;
- }
- return -1;
- }
+ return -1;
+}
-static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
- {
- size_t i;
- for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
- {
- if ((table[i].id) == id)
- return table[i].nid;
- }
- return NID_undef;
- }
+static int tls12_find_nid(int id, const tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) {
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
+ if (table[i].id == id) {
+ return table[i].nid;
+ }
+ }
-int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
- {
- int sig_id, md_id;
- if (!md)
- return 0;
- md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (md_id == -1)
- return 0;
- sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
- if (sig_id == -1)
- return 0;
- p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
- p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
- return 1;
- }
+ return NID_undef;
+}
-int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
- {
- return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- }
+int tls12_get_sigandhash(uint8_t *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md) {
+ int sig_id, md_id;
-const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
- {
- switch(hash_alg)
- {
- case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
- return EVP_md5();
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
- return EVP_sha1();
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
- return EVP_sha224();
+ if (!md) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
- return EVP_sha256();
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
- return EVP_sha384();
+ md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
+ sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (md_id == -1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
- return EVP_sha512();
- default:
- return NULL;
+ sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
+ if (sig_id == -1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- }
- }
+ p[0] = (uint8_t)md_id;
+ p[1] = (uint8_t)sig_id;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) {
+ return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
+ sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(uint8_t hash_alg) {
+ switch (hash_alg) {
+ case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
+ return EVP_md5();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
+ return EVP_sha1();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
+ return EVP_sha224();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+
+ case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
+ return EVP_sha512();
+
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+}
/* tls12_get_pkey_type returns the EVP_PKEY type corresponding to TLS signature
* algorithm |sig_alg|. It returns -1 if the type is unknown. */
-static int tls12_get_pkey_type(uint8_t sig_alg)
- {
- switch(sig_alg)
- {
- case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
- return EVP_PKEY_RSA;
- case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
- return EVP_PKEY_EC;
- }
- return -1;
- }
+static int tls12_get_pkey_type(uint8_t sig_alg) {
+ switch (sig_alg) {
+ case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
+ return EVP_PKEY_RSA;
+
+ case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
+ return EVP_PKEY_EC;
+
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
/* Convert TLS 1.2 signature algorithm extension values into NIDs */
static void tls1_lookup_sigalg(int *phash_nid, int *psign_nid,
- int *psignhash_nid, const unsigned char *data)
- {
- int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
- if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid)
- return;
- if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid)
- {
- hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (phash_nid)
- *phash_nid = hash_nid;
- }
- if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid)
- {
- sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- if (psign_nid)
- *psign_nid = sign_nid;
- }
- if (psignhash_nid)
- {
- if (sign_nid && hash_nid)
- OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid,
- hash_nid, sign_nid);
- else
- *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
- }
- }
+ int *psignhash_nid, const uint8_t *data) {
+ int sign_nid = 0, hash_nid = 0;
+ if (!phash_nid && !psign_nid && !psignhash_nid) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (phash_nid || psignhash_nid) {
+ hash_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[0], tls12_md,
+ sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (phash_nid) {
+ *phash_nid = hash_nid;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (psign_nid || psignhash_nid) {
+ sign_nid = tls12_find_nid(data[1], tls12_sig,
+ sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (psign_nid) {
+ *psign_nid = sign_nid;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (psignhash_nid) {
+ if (sign_nid && hash_nid) {
+ OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(psignhash_nid, hash_nid, sign_nid);
+ } else {
+ *psignhash_nid = NID_undef;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/* Given preference and allowed sigalgs set shared sigalgs */
-static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig,
- const unsigned char *pref, size_t preflen,
- const unsigned char *allow, size_t allowlen)
- {
- const unsigned char *ptmp, *atmp;
- size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
- for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i+=2, ptmp+=2)
- {
- /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
- if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL)
- continue;
- if (tls12_get_pkey_type(ptmp[1]) == -1)
- continue;
- for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j+=2, atmp+=2)
- {
- if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1])
- {
- nmatch++;
- if (shsig)
- {
- shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
- shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid,
- &shsig->sign_nid,
- &shsig->signandhash_nid,
- ptmp);
- shsig++;
- }
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- return nmatch;
- }
+static int tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(TLS_SIGALGS *shsig, const uint8_t *pref,
+ size_t preflen, const uint8_t *allow,
+ size_t allowlen) {
+ const uint8_t *ptmp, *atmp;
+ size_t i, j, nmatch = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0, ptmp = pref; i < preflen; i += 2, ptmp += 2) {
+ /* Skip disabled hashes or signature algorithms */
+ if (tls12_get_hash(ptmp[0]) == NULL ||
+ tls12_get_pkey_type(ptmp[1]) == -1) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0, atmp = allow; j < allowlen; j += 2, atmp += 2) {
+ if (ptmp[0] == atmp[0] && ptmp[1] == atmp[1]) {
+ nmatch++;
+ if (shsig) {
+ shsig->rhash = ptmp[0];
+ shsig->rsign = ptmp[1];
+ tls1_lookup_sigalg(&shsig->hash_nid, &shsig->sign_nid,
+ &shsig->signandhash_nid, ptmp);
+ shsig++;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return nmatch;
+}
/* Set shared signature algorithms for SSL structures */
-static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s)
- {
- const unsigned char *pref, *allow, *conf;
- size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
- size_t nmatch;
- TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- if (c->shared_sigalgs)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
- c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
- }
- /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
- if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs)
- {
- conf = c->client_sigalgs;
- conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
- }
- else if (c->conf_sigalgs)
- {
- conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
- conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
- }
- else
- conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
- if(s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE)
- {
- pref = conf;
- preflen = conflen;
- allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
- allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
- }
- else
- {
- allow = conf;
- allowlen = conflen;
- pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
- preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
- }
- nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
- if (!nmatch)
- return 1;
- salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
- if (!salgs)
- return 0;
- nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
- c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
- c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
- return 1;
- }
-
+static int tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s) {
+ const uint8_t *pref, *allow, *conf;
+ size_t preflen, allowlen, conflen;
+ size_t nmatch;
+ TLS_SIGALGS *salgs = NULL;
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+
+ if (c->shared_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->shared_sigalgs);
+ c->shared_sigalgs = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If client use client signature algorithms if not NULL */
+ if (!s->server && c->client_sigalgs) {
+ conf = c->client_sigalgs;
+ conflen = c->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else if (c->conf_sigalgs) {
+ conf = c->conf_sigalgs;
+ conflen = c->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ conflen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &conf);
+ }
+
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
+ pref = conf;
+ preflen = conflen;
+ allow = c->peer_sigalgs;
+ allowlen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+ } else {
+ allow = conf;
+ allowlen = conflen;
+ pref = c->peer_sigalgs;
+ preflen = c->peer_sigalgslen;
+ }
+
+ nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(NULL, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+ if (!nmatch) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ salgs = OPENSSL_malloc(nmatch * sizeof(TLS_SIGALGS));
+ if (!salgs) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ nmatch = tls12_do_shared_sigalgs(salgs, pref, preflen, allow, allowlen);
+ c->shared_sigalgs = salgs;
+ c->shared_sigalgslen = nmatch;
+ return 1;
+}
/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
+int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs) {
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
-int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const CBS *sigalgs)
- {
- CERT *c = s->cert;
+ /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
+ if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
- /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
- if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
- return 1;
- /* Length must be even */
- if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0)
- return 0;
- /* Should never happen */
- if (!c)
- return 0;
+ /* Length must be even */
+ if (CBS_len(sigalgs) % 2 != 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- if (!CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen))
- return 0;
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (!c) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
- return 1;
- }
+ if (!CBS_stow(sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgs, &c->peer_sigalgslen)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
-const EVP_MD *tls1_choose_signing_digest(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- CERT *c = s->cert;
- int type = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
- size_t i;
+ tls1_set_shared_sigalgs(s);
+ return 1;
+}
- /* Select the first shared digest supported by our key. */
- for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++)
- {
- const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rhash);
- if (md == NULL || tls12_get_pkey_type(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rsign) != type)
- continue;
- if (!EVP_PKEY_supports_digest(pkey, md))
- continue;
- return md;
- }
+const EVP_MD *tls1_choose_signing_digest(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey) {
+ CERT *c = s->cert;
+ int type = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
+ size_t i;
- /* If no suitable digest may be found, default to SHA-1. */
- return EVP_sha1();
- }
+ /* Select the first shared digest supported by our key. */
+ for (i = 0; i < c->shared_sigalgslen; i++) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = tls12_get_hash(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rhash);
+ if (md == NULL ||
+ tls12_get_pkey_type(c->shared_sigalgs[i].rsign) != type ||
+ !EVP_PKEY_supports_digest(pkey, md)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ return md;
+ }
-int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
- int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
- unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
- {
- const unsigned char *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
- if (psig == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (idx >= 0)
- {
- idx <<= 1;
- if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen)
- return 0;
- psig += idx;
- if (rhash)
- *rhash = psig[0];
- if (rsig)
- *rsig = psig[1];
- tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
- }
- return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
- }
+ /* If no suitable digest may be found, default to SHA-1. */
+ return EVP_sha1();
+}
-int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx,
- int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
- unsigned char *rsig, unsigned char *rhash)
- {
- TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
- if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen)
- return 0;
- shsigalgs += idx;
- if (phash)
- *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
- if (psign)
- *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
- if (psignhash)
- *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
- if (rsig)
- *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
- if (rhash)
- *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
- return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
- }
-
-/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the given
- * SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */
-int
-tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s)
- {
- EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
- unsigned char temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- unsigned temp_digest_len;
- int i;
- static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
+int SSL_get_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash, int *psignhash,
+ uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash) {
+ const uint8_t *psig = s->cert->peer_sigalgs;
- if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
- if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer))
- return 0;
+ if (psig == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
+ if (idx >= 0) {
+ idx <<= 1;
+ if (idx >= (int)s->cert->peer_sigalgslen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ psig += idx;
+ if (rhash) {
+ *rhash = psig[0];
+ }
+ if (rsig) {
+ *rsig = psig[1];
+ }
+ tls1_lookup_sigalg(phash, psign, psignhash, psig);
+ }
- if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
- {
- static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic,
- sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
- if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0)
- return 0;
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
- }
+ return s->cert->peer_sigalgslen / 2;
+}
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
- for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++)
- {
- if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL)
- continue;
- EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
- EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
- EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
- }
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+int SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(SSL *s, int idx, int *psign, int *phash,
+ int *psignhash, uint8_t *rsig, uint8_t *rhash) {
+ TLS_SIGALGS *shsigalgs = s->cert->shared_sigalgs;
- return 1;
- }
+ if (!shsigalgs || idx >= (int)s->cert->shared_sigalgslen) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ shsigalgs += idx;
+ if (phash) {
+ *phash = shsigalgs->hash_nid;
+ }
+ if (psign) {
+ *psign = shsigalgs->sign_nid;
+ }
+ if (psignhash) {
+ *psignhash = shsigalgs->signandhash_nid;
+ }
+ if (rsig) {
+ *rsig = shsigalgs->rsign;
+ }
+ if (rhash) {
+ *rhash = shsigalgs->rhash;
+ }
+
+ return s->cert->shared_sigalgslen;
+}
+
+/* tls1_channel_id_hash calculates the signed data for a Channel ID on the
+ * given SSL connection and writes it to |md|. */
+int tls1_channel_id_hash(EVP_MD_CTX *md, SSL *s) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
+ uint8_t temp_digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned temp_digest_len;
+ int i;
+ static const char kClientIDMagic[] = "TLS Channel ID signature";
+
+ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer &&
+ !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, free_handshake_buffer)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kClientIDMagic, sizeof(kClientIDMagic));
+
+ if (s->hit && s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
+ static const char kResumptionMagic[] = "Resumption";
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, kResumptionMagic, sizeof(kResumptionMagic));
+ if (s->session->original_handshake_hash_len == 0) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
+ s->session->original_handshake_hash_len);
+ }
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) {
+ if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]);
+ EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, temp_digest, &temp_digest_len);
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(md, temp_digest, temp_digest_len);
+ }
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+
+ return 1;
+}
/* tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id records the current handshake
* hashes in |s->session| so that Channel ID resumptions can sign that data. */
-int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s)
- {
- int digest_len;
- /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because
- * the handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original,
- * full handshake. */
- if (s->hit)
- return -1;
- /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
- * negotiated. */
- if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new)
- return -1;
+int tls1_record_handshake_hashes_for_channel_id(SSL *s) {
+ int digest_len;
+ /* This function should never be called for a resumed session because the
+ * handshake hashes that we wish to record are for the original, full
+ * handshake. */
+ if (s->hit) {
+ return -1;
+ }
- digest_len = tls1_handshake_digest(
- s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
- sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
- if (digest_len < 0)
- return -1;
+ /* It only makes sense to call this function if Channel IDs have been
+ * negotiated. */
+ if (!s->s3->tlsext_channel_id_new) {
+ return -1;
+ }
- s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
+ digest_len =
+ tls1_handshake_digest(s, s->session->original_handshake_hash,
+ sizeof(s->session->original_handshake_hash));
+ if (digest_len < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
- return 1;
- }
+ s->session->original_handshake_hash_len = digest_len;
-int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen, int client)
- {
- unsigned char *sigalgs, *sptr;
- int rhash, rsign;
- size_t i;
- if (salglen & 1)
- return 0;
- sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
- if (sigalgs == NULL)
- return 0;
- for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i+=2)
- {
- rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
- sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
- rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
- sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ return 1;
+}
- if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1)
- goto err;
- *sptr++ = rhash;
- *sptr++ = rsign;
- }
+int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *psig_nids, size_t salglen,
+ int client) {
+ uint8_t *sigalgs, *sptr;
+ int rhash, rsign;
+ size_t i;
- if (client)
- {
- if (c->client_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
- c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
- }
- else
- {
- if (c->conf_sigalgs)
- OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
- c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
- c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
- }
+ if (salglen & 1) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- return 1;
+ sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(salglen);
+ if (sigalgs == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
- err:
- OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
- return 0;
- }
+ for (i = 0, sptr = sigalgs; i < salglen; i += 2) {
+ rhash = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_md,
+ sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ rsign = tls12_find_id(*psig_nids++, tls12_sig,
+ sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
+ if (rhash == -1 || rsign == -1) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ *sptr++ = rhash;
+ *sptr++ = rsign;
+ }
+
+ if (client) {
+ if (c->client_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ }
+ c->client_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->client_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ } else {
+ if (c->conf_sigalgs) {
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ }
+ c->conf_sigalgs = sigalgs;
+ c->conf_sigalgslen = salglen;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(sigalgs);
+ return 0;
+}
