Pass explicit parameters elsewhere.
The remaining direct accesses are in functions which expect to be called
in and out of the handshake. Accordingly, they are NULL-checked.
Change-Id: I07a7de6bdca7b6f8d09e22da11b8863ebf41389a
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/12343
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/handshake_client.c b/ssl/handshake_client.c
index 2ee5408..09b16eb 100644
--- a/ssl/handshake_client.c
+++ b/ssl/handshake_client.c
@@ -535,7 +535,7 @@
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
if (is_initial_handshake) {
/* Renegotiations do not participate in session resumption. */
- ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
+ ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
}
ret = 1;
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@
/* The session wasn't resumed. Create a fresh SSL_SESSION to
* fill out. */
ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 0 /* client */)) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0 /* client */)) {
goto f_err;
}
/* Note: session_id could be empty. */
@@ -1424,7 +1424,7 @@
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
CBS supported_signature_algorithms;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
- !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+ !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return -1;
@@ -1736,7 +1736,7 @@
}
uint16_t signature_algorithm;
- if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(ssl, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
goto err;
}
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
diff --git a/ssl/handshake_server.c b/ssl/handshake_server.c
index 0f0c862..99b821e 100644
--- a/ssl/handshake_server.c
+++ b/ssl/handshake_server.c
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(ssl);
ssl->s3->initial_handshake_complete = 1;
- ssl_update_cache(ssl, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
+ ssl_update_cache(hs, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
ssl_do_info_callback(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
ret = 1;
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@
/* Negotiate the cipher suite. This must be done after |cert_cb| so the
* certificate is finalized. */
ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher =
- ssl3_choose_cipher(ssl, &client_hello, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
+ ssl3_choose_cipher(hs, &client_hello, ssl_get_cipher_preferences(ssl));
if (ssl->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
@@ -813,7 +813,7 @@
} else {
hs->ticket_expected = tickets_supported;
ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 1 /* server */)) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 1 /* server */)) {
goto err;
}
@@ -864,7 +864,7 @@
/* HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
* deferred. Complete it now. */
- if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(ssl, &al, &client_hello)) {
+ if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &al, &client_hello)) {
goto f_err;
}
@@ -1053,7 +1053,7 @@
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
/* Determine the group to use. */
uint16_t group_id;
- if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id)) {
+ if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@
/* Determine the signature algorithm. */
uint16_t signature_algorithm;
- if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(ssl, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
goto err;
}
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
diff --git a/ssl/internal.h b/ssl/internal.h
index eb2af49..1c72d04 100644
--- a/ssl/internal.h
+++ b/ssl/internal.h
@@ -1106,7 +1106,7 @@
/* ssl_negotiate_alpn negotiates the ALPN extension, if applicable. It returns
* one on successful negotiation or if nothing was negotiated. It returns zero
* and sets |*out_alert| to an alert on error. */
-int ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+int ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello);
typedef struct {
@@ -1178,13 +1178,14 @@
/* Signature algorithms. */
/* tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs parses |sigalgs| as the list of peer signature
- * algorithms and them on |ssl|. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
-int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *sigalgs);
+ * algorithms and saves them on |hs|. It returns one on success and zero on
+ * error. */
+int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const CBS *sigalgs);
/* tls1_choose_signature_algorithm sets |*out| to a signature algorithm for use
- * with |ssl|'s private key based on the peer's preferences and the algorithms
+ * with |hs|'s private key based on the peer's preferences and the algorithms
* supported. It returns one on success and zero on error. */
-int tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out);
+int tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out);
/* tls12_get_verify_sigalgs sets |*out| to the signature algorithms acceptable
* for the peer signature and returns the length of the list. */
@@ -1655,7 +1656,7 @@
CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert);
void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c);
void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c);
-int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *ssl, int is_server);
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int is_server);
int ssl_encrypt_ticket(SSL *ssl, CBB *out, const SSL_SESSION *session);
/* ssl_session_is_context_valid returns one if |session|'s session ID context
@@ -1721,13 +1722,13 @@
int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *ssl, long *out_verify_result,
STACK_OF(X509) * cert_chain);
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL *ssl, int mode);
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int mode);
/* ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers determines the key exchange and
* authentication cipher suite masks compatible with the server configuration
- * and current ClientHello parameters of |ssl|. It sets |*out_mask_k| to the key
+ * and current ClientHello parameters of |hs|. It sets |*out_mask_k| to the key
* exchange mask and |*out_mask_a| to the authentication mask. */
-void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_k,
+void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint32_t *out_mask_k,
uint32_t *out_mask_a);
int ssl_verify_alarm_type(long type);
@@ -1760,7 +1761,7 @@
int ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *ssl);
const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(
- SSL *ssl, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello,
const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *srvr);
int ssl3_new(SSL *ssl);
@@ -1859,7 +1860,7 @@
/* tls1_get_shared_group sets |*out_group_id| to the first preferred shared
* group between client and server preferences and returns one. If none may be
* found, it returns zero. */
-int tls1_get_shared_group(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_group_id);
+int tls1_get_shared_group(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_group_id);
/* tls1_set_curves converts the array of |ncurves| NIDs pointed to by |curves|
* into a newly allocated array of TLS group IDs. On success, the function
diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c
index 901b8af..d905ffe 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -241,8 +241,9 @@
}
const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(
- SSL *ssl, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello,
+ SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello,
const struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st *server_pref) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
const SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL;
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr = server_pref->ciphers, *prio, *allow;
int ok;
@@ -272,7 +273,7 @@
allow = srvr;
}
- ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(ssl, &mask_k, &mask_a);
+ ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(hs, &mask_k, &mask_a);
for (size_t i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) {
c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i);
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
index 76a9de0..8c1a300 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c
@@ -2059,8 +2059,9 @@
return ssl->s3->hs->num_certificate_types;
}
-void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL *ssl, uint32_t *out_mask_k,
+void ssl_get_compatible_server_ciphers(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint32_t *out_mask_k,
uint32_t *out_mask_a) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
*out_mask_k = SSL_kGENERIC;
*out_mask_a = SSL_aGENERIC;
@@ -2086,7 +2087,7 @@
/* Check for a shared group to consider ECDHE ciphers. */
uint16_t unused;
- if (tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &unused)) {
+ if (tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &unused)) {
mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE;
}
@@ -2103,7 +2104,8 @@
*out_mask_a = mask_a;
}
-void ssl_update_cache(SSL *ssl, int mode) {
+void ssl_update_cache(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int mode) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
SSL_CTX *ctx = ssl->initial_ctx;
/* Never cache sessions with empty session IDs. */
if (ssl->s3->established_session->session_id_length == 0 ||
@@ -2119,7 +2121,7 @@
* decides to renew the ticket. Once the handshake is completed, it should be
* inserted into the cache. */
if (ssl->s3->established_session != ssl->session ||
- (!ssl->server && ssl->s3->hs->ticket_expected)) {
+ (!ssl->server && hs->ticket_expected)) {
if (use_internal_cache) {
SSL_CTX_add_session(ctx, ssl->s3->established_session);
}
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_session.c b/ssl/ssl_session.c
index a452d32..ad75d22 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_session.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_session.c
@@ -449,7 +449,8 @@
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&session->ex_data, idx);
}
-int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *ssl, int is_server) {
+int ssl_get_new_session(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, int is_server) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (ssl->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_SESSION_CREATION) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_SESSION_MAY_NOT_BE_CREATED);
return 0;
@@ -470,7 +471,7 @@
session->ssl_version = ssl->version;
if (is_server) {
- if (ssl->s3->hs->ticket_expected) {
+ if (hs->ticket_expected) {
/* Don't set session IDs for sessions resumed with tickets. This will keep
* them out of the session cache. */
session->session_id_length = 0;
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 0b27165..85c2789 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -322,7 +322,8 @@
}
}
-int tls1_get_shared_group(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out_group_id) {
+int tls1_get_shared_group(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out_group_id) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
assert(ssl->server);
const uint16_t *groups, *pref, *supp;
@@ -341,11 +342,11 @@
if (ssl->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) {
pref = groups;
pref_len = groups_len;
- supp = ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list;
- supp_len = ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list_len;
+ supp = hs->peer_supported_group_list;
+ supp_len = hs->peer_supported_group_list_len;
} else {
- pref = ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list;
- pref_len = ssl->s3->hs->peer_supported_group_list_len;
+ pref = hs->peer_supported_group_list;
+ pref_len = hs->peer_supported_group_list_len;
supp = groups;
supp_len = groups_len;
}
@@ -1114,7 +1115,6 @@
static int ext_sigalgs_parse_clienthello(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
CBS *contents) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs);
hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0;
@@ -1127,7 +1127,7 @@
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(contents, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
CBS_len(contents) != 0 ||
CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
- !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+ !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
return 0;
}
@@ -1532,8 +1532,9 @@
return 1;
}
-int ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert,
+int ssl_negotiate_alpn(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint8_t *out_alert,
const struct ssl_early_callback_ctx *client_hello) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
CBS contents;
if (ssl->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL ||
!ssl_early_callback_get_extension(
@@ -1544,7 +1545,7 @@
}
/* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
- ssl->s3->hs->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
+ hs->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
CBS protocol_name_list;
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&contents, &protocol_name_list) ||
@@ -2296,10 +2297,9 @@
uint8_t **out_secret,
size_t *out_secret_len,
uint8_t *out_alert, CBS *contents) {
- SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
uint16_t group_id;
CBS key_shares;
- if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id)) {
+ if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_GROUP);
*out_alert = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
return 0;
@@ -2373,7 +2373,7 @@
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
uint16_t group_id;
CBB kse_bytes, public_key;
- if (!tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id) ||
+ if (!tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id) ||
!CBB_add_u16(out, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(out, &kse_bytes) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&kse_bytes, group_id) ||
@@ -3268,13 +3268,12 @@
return ret;
}
-int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL *ssl, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
+int tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, const CBS *in_sigalgs) {
/* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
- if (ssl3_protocol_version(ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
+ if (ssl3_protocol_version(hs->ssl) < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
return 1;
}
- SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
OPENSSL_free(hs->peer_sigalgs);
hs->peer_sigalgs = NULL;
hs->num_peer_sigalgs = 0;
@@ -3310,9 +3309,9 @@
return 1;
}
-int tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL *ssl, uint16_t *out) {
+int tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs, uint16_t *out) {
+ SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
CERT *cert = ssl->cert;
- SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs = ssl->s3->hs;
/* Before TLS 1.2, the signature algorithm isn't negotiated as part of the
* handshake. It is fixed at MD5-SHA1 for RSA and SHA1 for ECDSA. */
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_both.c b/ssl/tls13_both.c
index 6f697e6..ea3eb77 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_both.c
+++ b/ssl/tls13_both.c
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@
CBB_zero(&cbb);
uint16_t signature_algorithm;
- if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(ssl, &signature_algorithm)) {
+ if (!tls1_choose_signature_algorithm(hs, &signature_algorithm)) {
goto err;
}
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_client.c b/ssl/tls13_client.c
index 7319ca1..7a09fb1 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_client.c
+++ b/ssl/tls13_client.c
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@
return ssl_hs_error;
}
ssl_set_session(ssl, NULL);
- } else if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 0)) {
+ } else if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 0)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@
CBS_len(&context) != 0 ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &supported_signature_algorithms) ||
CBS_len(&supported_signature_algorithms) == 0 ||
- !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(ssl, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
+ !tls1_parse_peer_sigalgs(hs, &supported_signature_algorithms)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_DECODE_ERROR);
return ssl_hs_error;
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_server.c b/ssl/tls13_server.c
index 9778610..6bd6764 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_server.c
+++ b/ssl/tls13_server.c
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
/* Set up the new session, either using the original one as a template or
* creating a fresh one. */
if (session == NULL) {
- if (!ssl_get_new_session(ssl, 1 /* server */)) {
+ if (!ssl_get_new_session(hs, 1 /* server */)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@
/* HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
* deferred. Complete it now. */
- if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(ssl, &alert, &client_hello)) {
+ if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, &cbb, &body,
SSL3_MT_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&body, ssl->version) ||
- !tls1_get_shared_group(ssl, &group_id) ||
+ !tls1_get_shared_group(hs, &group_id) ||
!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&body, &extensions) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 2 /* length */) ||
