commit ef14b2d86e4ce24d7adc2d7948b5372bc3b62c33
author David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> Wed Nov 11 14:01:27 2015 -0800
committer Adam Langley <agl@google.com> Wed Nov 11 22:19:36 2015 +0000
tree 3dc8352c02389149258e3734d6a1a3655840b38e
parent cd24a39f1b3644da333bfcb43865ab7a6587c5cc

Remove stl_compat.h.

Chromium's toolchains may now assume C++11 library support, so we may freely
use C++11 features. (Chromium's still in the process of deciding what to allow,
but we use Google's style guide directly, toolchain limitations aside.)

Change-Id: I1c7feb92b7f5f51d9091a4c686649fb574ac138d
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/6465
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>

crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.cc

diff --git a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.cc b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.cc
index b916509..5e021bd 100644
--- a/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.cc
+++ b/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_test.cc
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 
 #include "../test/scoped_types.h"
-#include "../test/stl_compat.h"
 
 enum Api {
   kEncodedApi,
@@ -118,9 +117,8 @@
   size_t buf_len = 2 * bn_len;
   std::vector<uint8_t> raw_buf(buf_len);
   // Pad the bignums with leading zeroes.
-  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(bssl::vector_data(&raw_buf), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) ||
-      !BN_bn2bin_padded(bssl::vector_data(&raw_buf) + bn_len, bn_len,
-                        ecdsa_sig->s)) {
+  if (!BN_bn2bin_padded(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) ||
+      !BN_bn2bin_padded(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s)) {
     return false;
   }
 
@@ -129,18 +127,16 @@
   uint8_t dirt = raw_buf[11] ? raw_buf[11] : 1;
   raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
   // Now read the BIGNUMs back in from raw_buf.
-  if (BN_bin2bn(bssl::vector_data(&raw_buf), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL ||
-      BN_bin2bn(bssl::vector_data(&raw_buf) + bn_len, bn_len,
-                ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL ||
+  if (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL ||
+      BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL ||
       !VerifyECDSASig(api, digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey, 0)) {
     return false;
   }
 
   // Sanity check: Undo the modification and verify signature.
   raw_buf[offset] ^= dirt;
-  if (BN_bin2bn(bssl::vector_data(&raw_buf), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL ||
-      BN_bin2bn(bssl::vector_data(&raw_buf) + bn_len, bn_len,
-                ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL ||
+  if (BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data(), bn_len, ecdsa_sig->r) == NULL ||
+      BN_bin2bn(raw_buf.data() + bn_len, bn_len, ecdsa_sig->s) == NULL ||
       !VerifyECDSASig(api, digest, digest_len, ecdsa_sig, eckey, 1)) {
     return false;
   }
@@ -221,8 +217,7 @@
     // Create a signature.
     unsigned sig_len = ECDSA_size(eckey.get());
     std::vector<uint8_t> signature(sig_len);
-    if (!ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, bssl::vector_data(&signature), &sig_len,
-                    eckey.get())) {
+    if (!ECDSA_sign(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), &sig_len, eckey.get())) {
       fprintf(out, " failed\n");
       return false;
     }
@@ -230,32 +225,32 @@
     fprintf(out, ".");
     fflush(out);
     // Verify the signature.
-    if (!ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, bssl::vector_data(&signature),
-                      signature.size(), eckey.get())) {
+    if (!ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
+                      eckey.get())) {
       fprintf(out, " failed\n");
       return false;
     }
     fprintf(out, ".");
     fflush(out);
     // Verify the signature with the wrong key.
-    if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, bssl::vector_data(&signature),
-                     signature.size(), wrong_eckey.get())) {
+    if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
+                     wrong_eckey.get())) {
       fprintf(out, " failed\n");
       return false;
     }
     fprintf(out, ".");
     fflush(out);
     // Verify the signature using the wrong digest.
-    if (ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, bssl::vector_data(&signature),
-                      signature.size(), eckey.get())) {
+    if (ECDSA_verify(0, wrong_digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size(),
+                     eckey.get())) {
       fprintf(out, " failed\n");
       return false;
     }
     fprintf(out, ".");
     fflush(out);
     // Verify a truncated signature.
-    if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, bssl::vector_data(&signature),
-                      signature.size() - 1, eckey.get())) {
+    if (ECDSA_verify(0, digest, 20, signature.data(), signature.size() - 1,
+                     eckey.get())) {
       fprintf(out, " failed\n");
       return false;
     }
@@ -263,7 +258,7 @@
     fflush(out);
     // Verify a tampered signature.
     ScopedECDSA_SIG ecdsa_sig(ECDSA_SIG_from_bytes(
-        bssl::vector_data(&signature), signature.size()));
+        signature.data(), signature.size()));
     if (!ecdsa_sig ||
         !TestTamperedSig(out, kEncodedApi, digest, 20, ecdsa_sig.get(),
                          eckey.get(), order.get())) {
@@ -327,8 +322,8 @@
     return false;
   }
   std::vector<uint8_t> bytes(order_len, 0xff);
-  if (!BN_bin2bn(bssl::vector_data(&bytes), bytes.size(), sig->r) ||
-      !BN_bin2bn(bssl::vector_data(&bytes), bytes.size(), sig->s)) {
+  if (!BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), sig->r) ||
+      !BN_bin2bn(bytes.data(), bytes.size(), sig->s)) {
     return false;
   }
   /* Serialize it. */