tree f16a469b1926c627db8beb1c23591ee0832019c6
parent 1c375dda8a254d762f1439e22489b505a2a051bd
author David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> 1405141819 -0400
committer Adam Langley <agl@google.com> 1405371030 +0000

Be strict about expecting a server Certificate message.

Introduce a ssl_cipher_has_server_public_key to save the repeated
NULL/PSK/RSA_PSK[*] check. Don't allow skipping to ServerKeyExchange when
expecting Certificate; the messages expected are determined by the cipher
suite. The ssl3_get_server_public_key call is already guarded.

As the previous test demonstrates, this is safe because of the
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm call, but avoid the looseness in the parsing
there.

[*] NB: we don't implement RSA_PSK, and OpenSSL has never implemented it.

Change-Id: I0571e6bcbeb8eb883f77878bdc98d1aa3a287cf3
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1156
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>