Blind the range check for finding a Rabin-Miller witness.

Rabin-Miller requires selecting a random number from 2 to |w|-1.
This is done by picking an N-bit number and discarding out-of-range
values. This leaks information about |w|, so apply blinding. Rather than
discard bad values, adjust them to be in range.
Though not uniformly selected, these adjusted values
are still usable as Rabin-Miller checks.

Rabin-Miller is already probabilistic, so we could reach the desired
confidence levels by just suitably increasing the iteration count.
However, to align with FIPS 186-4, we use a more pessimal analysis: we
do not count the non-uniform values towards the iteration count. As a
result, this function is more complex and has more timing risk than
necessary.

We count both total iterations and uniform ones and iterate until we've
reached at least |BN_PRIME_CHECKS_BLINDED| and |iterations|,
respectively.  If the latter is large enough, it will be the limiting
factor with high probability and we won't leak information.

Note this blinding does not impact most calls when picking primes
because composites are rejected early. Only the two secret primes see
extra work.  So while this does make the BNTest.PrimeChecking test take
about 2x longer to run on debug mode, RSA key generation time is fine.

Another, perhaps simpler, option here would have to run
bn_rand_range_words to the full 100 count, select an arbitrary
successful try, and declare failure of the entire keygen process (as we
do already) if all tries failed. I went with the option in this CL
because I happened to come up with it first, and because the failure
probability decreases much faster. Additionally, the option in this CL
does not affect composite numbers, while the alternate would. This gives
a smaller multiplier on our entropy draw. We also continue to use the
"wasted" work for stronger assurance on primality. FIPS' numbers are
remarkably low, considering the increase has negligible cost.

Thanks to Nathan Benjamin for helping me explore the failure rate as the
target count and blinding count change.

Now we're down to the rest of RSA keygen, which will require all the
operations we've traditionally just avoided in constant-time code!

Median of 29 RSA keygens: 0m0.169s -> 0m0.298s
(Accuracy beyond 0.1s is questionable. The runs at subsequent test- and
rename-only CLs were 0m0.217s, 0m0.245s, 0m0.244s, 0m0.247s.)

Bug: 238
Change-Id: Id6406c3020f2585b86946eb17df64ac42f30ebab
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/25890
Commit-Queue: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
3 files changed
tree: e6ea5fb4fa88a60b5f0610b67551bea1a0af0bb6
  1. .github/
  2. crypto/
  3. decrepit/
  4. fipstools/
  5. fuzz/
  6. include/
  7. infra/
  8. ssl/
  9. third_party/
  10. tool/
  11. util/
  12. .clang-format
  13. .gitignore
  14. API-CONVENTIONS.md
  15. BUILDING.md
  16. CMakeLists.txt
  17. codereview.settings
  18. CONTRIBUTING.md
  19. FUZZING.md
  20. INCORPORATING.md
  21. LICENSE
  22. PORTING.md
  23. README.md
  24. sources.cmake
  25. STYLE.md
README.md

BoringSSL

BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.

Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.

Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.

BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.

Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.

There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: