Use spans for the various TLS 1.3 secrets.
This undoes a lot of the MakeConstSpans and MakeSpans that were just
added, though it does require a bit of helper machinery. This should
make us much more consistent about which buffer is sized with which size
(even though they are secretly all the same size).
Change-Id: I772ffd2e69141ff20511bcd3add865afa82cf3a0
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/37127
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_server.cc b/ssl/tls13_server.cc
index 7b6f5df..d99b5b4 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_server.cc
+++ b/ssl/tls13_server.cc
@@ -607,9 +607,8 @@
// Derive and enable the handshake traffic secrets.
if (!tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(hs) ||
- !tls13_set_traffic_key(
- ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_seal,
- MakeConstSpan(hs->server_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len))) {
+ !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_seal,
+ hs->server_handshake_secret())) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -717,11 +716,11 @@
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (!tls13_add_finished(hs) ||
// Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys.
- !tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, MakeConstSpan(kZeroes, hs->hash_len)) ||
+ !tls13_advance_key_schedule(
+ hs, MakeConstSpan(kZeroes, hs->transcript.DigestLen())) ||
!tls13_derive_application_secrets(hs) ||
- !tls13_set_traffic_key(
- ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_seal,
- MakeConstSpan(hs->server_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len))) {
+ !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_seal,
+ hs->server_traffic_secret_0())) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -738,12 +737,12 @@
}
size_t finished_len;
- if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, hs->expected_client_finished, &finished_len,
- false /* client */)) {
+ if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, hs->expected_client_finished().data(),
+ &finished_len, false /* client */)) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- if (finished_len != hs->hash_len) {
+ if (finished_len != hs->expected_client_finished().size()) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return ssl_hs_error;
}
@@ -753,13 +752,13 @@
//
// TODO(davidben): This will need to be updated for DTLS 1.3.
assert(!SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl));
- assert(hs->hash_len <= 0xff);
- uint8_t header[4] = {SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 0, 0,
- static_cast<uint8_t>(hs->hash_len)};
+ assert(hs->expected_client_finished().size() <= 0xff);
+ uint8_t header[4] = {
+ SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 0, 0,
+ static_cast<uint8_t>(hs->expected_client_finished().size())};
bool unused_sent_tickets;
if (!hs->transcript.Update(header) ||
- !hs->transcript.Update(
- MakeConstSpan(hs->expected_client_finished, hs->hash_len)) ||
+ !hs->transcript.Update(hs->expected_client_finished()) ||
!tls13_derive_resumption_secret(hs) ||
!add_new_session_tickets(hs, &unused_sent_tickets)) {
return ssl_hs_error;
@@ -773,9 +772,8 @@
static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_second_client_flight(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) {
- if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(
- ssl, ssl_encryption_early_data, evp_aead_open,
- MakeConstSpan(hs->early_traffic_secret, hs->hash_len))) {
+ if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_early_data, evp_aead_open,
+ hs->early_traffic_secret())) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
hs->can_early_write = true;
@@ -809,9 +807,8 @@
ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
}
}
- if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(
- ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
- MakeConstSpan(hs->client_handshake_secret, hs->hash_len))) {
+ if (!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_handshake, evp_aead_open,
+ hs->client_handshake_secret())) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
hs->tls13_state = ssl->s3->early_data_accepted
@@ -917,9 +914,8 @@
// and derived the resumption secret.
!tls13_process_finished(hs, msg, ssl->s3->early_data_accepted) ||
// evp_aead_seal keys have already been switched.
- !tls13_set_traffic_key(
- ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_open,
- MakeConstSpan(hs->client_traffic_secret_0, hs->hash_len))) {
+ !tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, ssl_encryption_application, evp_aead_open,
+ hs->client_traffic_secret_0())) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}