Enforce max_early_data_size on the server.
BUG=76
Change-Id: I8b754ba17b3e0beee425929e4b53785b2e95f0ae
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/15164
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/tls_record.c b/ssl/tls_record.c
index 0f9720c..e67e0b4 100644
--- a/ssl/tls_record.c
+++ b/ssl/tls_record.c
@@ -128,8 +128,8 @@
/* kMaxEarlyDataSkipped is the maximum number of rejected early data bytes that
* will be skipped. Without this limit an attacker could send records at a
* faster rate than we can process and cause trial decryption to loop forever.
- * This value should be slightly above kMaxEarlyDataAccepted in tls13_server.c,
- * which is measured in plaintext. */
+ * This value should be slightly above kMaxEarlyDataAccepted, which is measured
+ * in plaintext. */
static const size_t kMaxEarlyDataSkipped = 16384;
/* kMaxWarningAlerts is the number of consecutive warning alerts that will be
