Lift BIO above SSL_PROTOCOL_METHOD.
This gets us closer to exposing BIO-free APIs. The next step is probably
to make the experimental bssl::OpenRecord function call a split out core
of ssl_read_impl.
Change-Id: I4acebb43f708df8c52eb4e328da8ae3551362fb9
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/21865
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Valdez <svaldez@google.com>
diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.cc b/ssl/d1_both.cc
index daf62fc..5e5fc4b 100644
--- a/ssl/d1_both.cc
+++ b/ssl/d1_both.cc
@@ -272,9 +272,10 @@
// queue. Otherwise, it checks |msg_hdr| is consistent with the existing one. It
// returns NULL on failure. The caller does not take ownership of the result.
static hm_fragment *dtls1_get_incoming_message(
- SSL *ssl, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) {
+ SSL *ssl, uint8_t *out_alert, const struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr) {
if (msg_hdr->seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
msg_hdr->seq - ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq >= SSL_MAX_HANDSHAKE_FLIGHT) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return NULL;
}
@@ -287,7 +288,7 @@
if (frag->type != msg_hdr->type ||
frag->msg_len != msg_hdr->msg_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_FRAGMENT_MISMATCH);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
return NULL;
}
return frag;
@@ -296,81 +297,76 @@
// This is the first fragment from this message.
frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(msg_hdr);
if (frag == NULL) {
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return NULL;
}
ssl->d1->incoming_messages[idx] = frag;
return frag;
}
-int dtls1_read_message(SSL *ssl) {
- SSL3_RECORD *rr = &ssl->s3->rrec;
- if (rr->length == 0) {
- int ret = dtls1_get_record(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
- return ret;
- }
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_handshake(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+ uint8_t *out_alert, Span<uint8_t> in) {
+ uint8_t type;
+ Span<uint8_t> record;
+ auto ret = dtls_open_record(ssl, &type, &record, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+ if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
+ return ret;
}
- switch (rr->type) {
+ switch (type) {
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
// Unencrypted application data records are always illegal.
if (ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- return -1;
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
}
// Out-of-order application data may be received between ChangeCipherSpec
// and finished. Discard it.
- rr->length = 0;
- ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
- return 1;
+ return ssl_open_record_discard;
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
// We do not support renegotiation, so encrypted ChangeCipherSpec records
// are illegal.
if (!ssl->s3->aead_read_ctx->is_null_cipher()) {
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- return -1;
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
}
- if (rr->length != 1 || rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
+ if (record.size() != 1u || record[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return -1;
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
}
// Flag the ChangeCipherSpec for later.
ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec = true;
ssl_do_msg_callback(ssl, 0 /* read */, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
- MakeSpan(rr->data, rr->length));
-
- rr->length = 0;
- ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
- return 1;
+ record);
+ return ssl_open_record_success;
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
// Break out to main processing.
break;
default:
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- return -1;
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
}
CBS cbs;
- CBS_init(&cbs, rr->data, rr->length);
-
+ CBS_init(&cbs, record.data(), record.size());
while (CBS_len(&cbs) > 0) {
// Read a handshake fragment.
struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
CBS body;
if (!dtls1_parse_fragment(&cbs, &msg_hdr, &body)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_RECORD);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
- return -1;
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
}
const size_t frag_off = msg_hdr.frag_off;
@@ -380,15 +376,15 @@
frag_off + frag_len > msg_len ||
msg_len > ssl_max_handshake_message_len(ssl)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
- return -1;
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
}
// The encrypted epoch in DTLS has only one handshake message.
if (ssl->d1->r_epoch == 1 && msg_hdr.seq != ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
- ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
- return -1;
+ *out_alert = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
}
if (msg_hdr.seq < ssl->d1->handshake_read_seq ||
@@ -398,9 +394,9 @@
continue;
}
- hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_get_incoming_message(ssl, &msg_hdr);
+ hm_fragment *frag = dtls1_get_incoming_message(ssl, out_alert, &msg_hdr);
if (frag == NULL) {
- return -1;
+ return ssl_open_record_error;
}
assert(frag->msg_len == msg_len);
@@ -416,9 +412,7 @@
dtls1_hm_fragment_mark(frag, frag_off, frag_off + frag_len);
}
- rr->length = 0;
- ssl_read_buffer_discard(ssl);
- return 1;
+ return ssl_open_record_success;
}
bool dtls1_get_message(SSL *ssl, SSLMessage *out) {
@@ -496,17 +490,21 @@
return true;
}
-int dtls1_read_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl) {
- // Process handshake records until there is a ChangeCipherSpec.
- while (!ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec) {
- int ret = dtls1_read_message(ssl);
- if (ret <= 0) {
+ssl_open_record_t dtls1_open_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl, size_t *out_consumed,
+ uint8_t *out_alert,
+ Span<uint8_t> in) {
+ if (!ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec) {
+ // dtls1_open_handshake processes both handshake and ChangeCipherSpec.
+ auto ret = dtls1_open_handshake(ssl, out_consumed, out_alert, in);
+ if (ret != ssl_open_record_success) {
return ret;
}
}
-
- ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec = false;
- return 1;
+ if (ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec) {
+ ssl->d1->has_change_cipher_spec = false;
+ return ssl_open_record_success;
+ }
+ return ssl_open_record_discard;
}
