Convert comments in ssl.
That's the last of it!
Change-Id: I93d1f5ab7e95b2ad105c34b24297a0bf77625263
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/19784
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org>
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_server.cc b/ssl/tls13_server.cc
index 781d59e..26ce0e1 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_server.cc
+++ b/ssl/tls13_server.cc
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
-/* Per C99, various stdint.h macros are unavailable in C++ unless some macros
- * are defined. C++11 overruled this decision, but older Android NDKs still
- * require it. */
+// Per C99, various stdint.h macros are unavailable in C++ unless some macros
+// are defined. C++11 overruled this decision, but older Android NDKs still
+// require it.
#if !defined(__STDC_LIMIT_MACROS)
#define __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS
#endif
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
*out_need_retry = 0;
- /* We only support connections that include an ECDHE key exchange. */
+ // We only support connections that include an ECDHE key exchange.
CBS key_share;
if (!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &key_share,
TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)) {
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
return NULL;
}
- /* Limit to TLS 1.3 ciphers we know about. */
+ // Limit to TLS 1.3 ciphers we know about.
const SSL_CIPHER *candidate = SSL_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
if (candidate == NULL ||
SSL_CIPHER_get_min_version(candidate) > version ||
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@
continue;
}
- /* TLS 1.3 removes legacy ciphers, so honor the client order, but prefer
- * ChaCha20 if we do not have AES hardware. */
+ // TLS 1.3 removes legacy ciphers, so honor the client order, but prefer
+ // ChaCha20 if we do not have AES hardware.
if (aes_is_fine) {
return candidate;
}
@@ -155,12 +155,12 @@
static int add_new_session_tickets(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
- /* TLS 1.3 recommends single-use tickets, so issue multiple tickets in case
- * the client makes several connections before getting a renewal. */
+ // TLS 1.3 recommends single-use tickets, so issue multiple tickets in case
+ // the client makes several connections before getting a renewal.
static const int kNumTickets = 2;
- /* Rebase the session timestamp so that it is measured from ticket
- * issuance. */
+ // Rebase the session timestamp so that it is measured from ticket
+ // issuance.
ssl_session_rebase_time(ssl, hs->new_session.get());
for (int i = 0; i < kNumTickets; i++) {
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@
}
}
- /* Add a fake extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01. */
+ // Add a fake extension. See draft-davidben-tls-grease-01.
if (!CBB_add_u16(&extensions,
ssl_get_grease_value(ssl, ssl_grease_ticket_extension)) ||
!CBB_add_u16(&extensions, 0 /* empty */)) {
@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@
}
static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_select_parameters(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- /* At this point, most ClientHello extensions have already been processed by
- * the common handshake logic. Resolve the remaining non-PSK parameters. */
+ // At this point, most ClientHello extensions have already been processed by
+ // the common handshake logic. Resolve the remaining non-PSK parameters.
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
SSLMessage msg;
if (!ssl->method->get_message(ssl, &msg)) {
@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@
client_hello.session_id_len);
hs->session_id_len = client_hello.session_id_len;
- /* Negotiate the cipher suite. */
+ // Negotiate the cipher suite.
hs->new_cipher = choose_tls13_cipher(ssl, &client_hello);
if (hs->new_cipher == NULL) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
@@ -236,16 +236,16 @@
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
- * deferred. Complete it now. */
+ // HTTP/2 negotiation depends on the cipher suite, so ALPN negotiation was
+ // deferred. Complete it now.
uint8_t alert = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
if (!ssl_negotiate_alpn(hs, &alert, &client_hello)) {
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, alert);
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* The PRF hash is now known. Set up the key schedule and hash the
- * ClientHello. */
+ // The PRF hash is now known. Set up the key schedule and hash the
+ // ClientHello.
if (!tls13_init_key_schedule(hs) ||
!ssl_hash_message(hs, msg)) {
return ssl_hs_error;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
*out_session = NULL;
- /* Decode the ticket if we agreed on a PSK key exchange mode. */
+ // Decode the ticket if we agreed on a PSK key exchange mode.
CBS pre_shared_key;
if (!hs->accept_psk_mode ||
!ssl_client_hello_get_extension(client_hello, &pre_shared_key,
@@ -270,8 +270,8 @@
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
}
- /* Verify that the pre_shared_key extension is the last extension in
- * ClientHello. */
+ // Verify that the pre_shared_key extension is the last extension in
+ // ClientHello.
if (CBS_data(&pre_shared_key) + CBS_len(&pre_shared_key) !=
client_hello->extensions + client_hello->extensions_len) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_PRE_SHARED_KEY_MUST_BE_LAST);
@@ -287,8 +287,8 @@
return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
}
- /* TLS 1.3 session tickets are renewed separately as part of the
- * NewSessionTicket. */
+ // TLS 1.3 session tickets are renewed separately as part of the
+ // NewSessionTicket.
int unused_renew;
UniquePtr<SSL_SESSION> session;
enum ssl_ticket_aead_result_t ret =
@@ -305,34 +305,34 @@
}
if (!ssl_session_is_resumable(hs, session.get()) ||
- /* Historically, some TLS 1.3 tickets were missing ticket_age_add. */
+ // Historically, some TLS 1.3 tickets were missing ticket_age_add.
!session->ticket_age_add_valid) {
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
}
- /* Recover the client ticket age and convert to seconds. */
+ // Recover the client ticket age and convert to seconds.
client_ticket_age -= session->ticket_age_add;
client_ticket_age /= 1000;
struct OPENSSL_timeval now;
ssl_get_current_time(ssl, &now);
- /* Compute the server ticket age in seconds. */
+ // Compute the server ticket age in seconds.
assert(now.tv_sec >= session->time);
uint64_t server_ticket_age = now.tv_sec - session->time;
- /* To avoid overflowing |hs->ticket_age_skew|, we will not resume
- * 68-year-old sessions. */
+ // To avoid overflowing |hs->ticket_age_skew|, we will not resume
+ // 68-year-old sessions.
if (server_ticket_age > INT32_MAX) {
return ssl_ticket_aead_ignore_ticket;
}
- /* TODO(davidben,svaldez): Measure this value to decide on tolerance. For
- * now, accept all values. https://crbug.com/boringssl/113. */
+ // TODO(davidben,svaldez): Measure this value to decide on tolerance. For
+ // now, accept all values. https://crbug.com/boringssl/113.
*out_ticket_age_skew =
(int32_t)client_ticket_age - (int32_t)server_ticket_age;
- /* Check the PSK binder. */
+ // Check the PSK binder.
if (!tls13_verify_psk_binder(hs, session.get(), msg, &binders)) {
*out_alert = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
return ssl_ticket_aead_error;
@@ -368,21 +368,21 @@
break;
case ssl_ticket_aead_success:
- /* Carry over authentication information from the previous handshake into
- * a fresh session. */
+ // Carry over authentication information from the previous handshake into
+ // a fresh session.
hs->new_session =
SSL_SESSION_dup(session.get(), SSL_SESSION_DUP_AUTH_ONLY);
- if (/* Early data must be acceptable for this ticket. */
+ if (// Early data must be acceptable for this ticket.
ssl->cert->enable_early_data &&
session->ticket_max_early_data != 0 &&
- /* The client must have offered early data. */
+ // The client must have offered early data.
hs->early_data_offered &&
- /* Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT. */
+ // Channel ID is incompatible with 0-RTT.
!ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid &&
- /* Custom extensions is incompatible with 0-RTT. */
+ // Custom extensions is incompatible with 0-RTT.
hs->custom_extensions.received == 0 &&
- /* The negotiated ALPN must match the one in the ticket. */
+ // The negotiated ALPN must match the one in the ticket.
ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len == session->early_alpn_len &&
OPENSSL_memcmp(ssl->s3->alpn_selected, session->early_alpn,
ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len) == 0) {
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@
ssl->s3->session_reused = 1;
- /* Resumption incorporates fresh key material, so refresh the timeout. */
+ // Resumption incorporates fresh key material, so refresh the timeout.
ssl_session_renew_timeout(ssl, hs->new_session.get(),
ssl->session_ctx->session_psk_dhe_timeout);
break;
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@
return ssl_hs_pending_ticket;
}
- /* Record connection properties in the new session. */
+ // Record connection properties in the new session.
hs->new_session->cipher = hs->new_cipher;
if (hs->hostname != NULL) {
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@
}
}
- /* Store the initial negotiated ALPN in the session. */
+ // Store the initial negotiated ALPN in the session.
if (ssl->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
hs->new_session->early_alpn = (uint8_t *)BUF_memdup(
ssl->s3->alpn_selected, ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len);
@@ -435,13 +435,13 @@
if (ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb != NULL &&
ssl->ctx->dos_protection_cb(&client_hello) == 0) {
- /* Connection rejected for DOS reasons. */
+ // Connection rejected for DOS reasons.
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_CONNECTION_REJECTED);
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Incorporate the PSK into the running secret. */
+ // Incorporate the PSK into the running secret.
if (ssl->s3->session_reused) {
if (!tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, hs->new_session->master_key,
hs->new_session->master_key_length)) {
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@
ssl->s3->skip_early_data = 1;
}
- /* Resolve ECDHE and incorporate it into the secret. */
+ // Resolve ECDHE and incorporate it into the secret.
int need_retry;
if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &need_retry, &client_hello)) {
if (need_retry) {
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@
int need_retry;
if (!resolve_ecdhe_secret(hs, &need_retry, &client_hello)) {
if (need_retry) {
- /* Only send one HelloRetryRequest. */
+ // Only send one HelloRetryRequest.
ssl3_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
}
@@ -541,7 +541,7 @@
version = TLS1_2_VERSION;
}
- /* Send a ServerHello. */
+ // Send a ServerHello.
ScopedCBB cbb;
CBB body, extensions, session_id;
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) ||
@@ -567,14 +567,14 @@
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Derive and enable the handshake traffic secrets. */
+ // Derive and enable the handshake traffic secrets.
if (!tls13_derive_handshake_secrets(hs) ||
!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, hs->server_handshake_secret,
hs->hash_len)) {
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Send EncryptedExtensions. */
+ // Send EncryptedExtensions.
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS) ||
!ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(hs, &body) ||
@@ -583,16 +583,16 @@
}
if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
- /* Determine whether to request a client certificate. */
+ // Determine whether to request a client certificate.
hs->cert_request = !!(ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER);
- /* Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated. */
+ // Only request a certificate if Channel ID isn't negotiated.
if ((ssl->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER_IF_NO_OBC) &&
ssl->s3->tlsext_channel_id_valid) {
hs->cert_request = 0;
}
}
- /* Send a CertificateRequest, if necessary. */
+ // Send a CertificateRequest, if necessary.
if (hs->cert_request) {
CBB sigalgs_cbb;
if (!ssl->method->init_message(ssl, cbb.get(), &body,
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@
}
}
- /* Send the server Certificate message, if necessary. */
+ // Send the server Certificate message, if necessary.
if (!ssl->s3->session_reused) {
if (!ssl_has_certificate(ssl)) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@
static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_server_finished(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (!tls13_add_finished(hs) ||
- /* Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys. */
+ // Update the secret to the master secret and derive traffic keys.
!tls13_advance_key_schedule(hs, kZeroes, hs->hash_len) ||
!tls13_derive_application_secrets(hs) ||
!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_seal, hs->server_traffic_secret_0,
@@ -656,10 +656,10 @@
}
if (ssl->early_data_accepted) {
- /* If accepting 0-RTT, we send tickets half-RTT. This gets the tickets on
- * the wire sooner and also avoids triggering a write on |SSL_read| when
- * processing the client Finished. This requires computing the client
- * Finished early. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section 4.5.1. */
+ // If accepting 0-RTT, we send tickets half-RTT. This gets the tickets on
+ // the wire sooner and also avoids triggering a write on |SSL_read| when
+ // processing the client Finished. This requires computing the client
+ // Finished early. See draft-ietf-tls-tls13-18, section 4.5.1.
size_t finished_len;
if (!tls13_finished_mac(hs, hs->expected_client_finished, &finished_len,
0 /* client */)) {
@@ -671,10 +671,10 @@
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* Feed the predicted Finished into the transcript. This allows us to derive
- * the resumption secret early and send half-RTT tickets.
- *
- * TODO(davidben): This will need to be updated for DTLS 1.3. */
+ // Feed the predicted Finished into the transcript. This allows us to derive
+ // the resumption secret early and send half-RTT tickets.
+ //
+ // TODO(davidben): This will need to be updated for DTLS 1.3.
assert(!SSL_is_dtls(hs->ssl));
assert(hs->hash_len <= 0xff);
uint8_t header[4] = {SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 0, 0,
@@ -710,8 +710,8 @@
static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_process_end_of_early_data(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
hs->tls13_state = state_process_change_cipher_spec;
- /* If early data was accepted, the ChangeCipherSpec message will be in the
- * discarded early data. */
+ // If early data was accepted, the ChangeCipherSpec message will be in the
+ // discarded early data.
if (hs->early_data_offered && !hs->ssl->early_data_accepted) {
return ssl_hs_ok;
}
@@ -734,11 +734,11 @@
static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_read_client_certificate(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (!hs->cert_request) {
- /* OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
- * classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX. */
+ // OpenSSL returns X509_V_OK when no certificates are requested. This is
+ // classed by them as a bug, but it's assumed by at least NGINX.
hs->new_session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
- /* Skip this state. */
+ // Skip this state.
hs->tls13_state = state_read_channel_id;
return ssl_hs_ok;
}
@@ -764,7 +764,7 @@
SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
SSL *const ssl = hs->ssl;
if (sk_CRYPTO_BUFFER_num(hs->new_session->certs) == 0) {
- /* Skip this state. */
+ // Skip this state.
hs->tls13_state = state_read_channel_id;
return ssl_hs_ok;
}
@@ -824,10 +824,10 @@
return ssl_hs_read_message;
}
if (!ssl_check_message_type(ssl, msg, SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
- /* If early data was accepted, we've already computed the client Finished
- * and derived the resumption secret. */
+ // If early data was accepted, we've already computed the client Finished
+ // and derived the resumption secret.
!tls13_process_finished(hs, msg, ssl->early_data_accepted) ||
- /* evp_aead_seal keys have already been switched. */
+ // evp_aead_seal keys have already been switched.
!tls13_set_traffic_key(ssl, evp_aead_open, hs->client_traffic_secret_0,
hs->hash_len)) {
return ssl_hs_error;
@@ -839,10 +839,10 @@
return ssl_hs_error;
}
- /* We send post-handshake tickets as part of the handshake in 1-RTT. */
+ // We send post-handshake tickets as part of the handshake in 1-RTT.
hs->tls13_state = state_send_new_session_ticket;
} else {
- /* We already sent half-RTT tickets. */
+ // We already sent half-RTT tickets.
hs->tls13_state = state_done;
}
@@ -851,8 +851,8 @@
}
static enum ssl_hs_wait_t do_send_new_session_ticket(SSL_HANDSHAKE *hs) {
- /* If the client doesn't accept resumption with PSK_DHE_KE, don't send a
- * session ticket. */
+ // If the client doesn't accept resumption with PSK_DHE_KE, don't send a
+ // session ticket.
if (!hs->accept_psk_mode) {
hs->tls13_state = state_done;
return ssl_hs_ok;
