commit b11902a385ad1ecf8800e7aa970545b7b6ae8c50
author Kris Kwiatkowski <kris@cloudflare.com> Sat Aug 24 11:01:04 2019 +0100
committer CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Wed Oct 23 21:26:29 2019 +0000
tree e3f1f2f1f388a21af750f9bd06a130db0caffd46
parent fe37af11a69c88ae5c63c5eb846552237a4fc8e9

HelloRetryRequest getter

Adds getter indicating whether HelloRetryRequest was triggered
during TLSv1.3 handshake.

Change-Id: I84922188ded81ec89259b5f333c80494426759f8
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/37304
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
Commit-Queue: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>

ssl/tls13_client.cc

diff --git a/ssl/tls13_client.cc b/ssl/tls13_client.cc
index 15c18c2..fa3f3a6 100644
--- a/ssl/tls13_client.cc
+++ b/ssl/tls13_client.cc
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@
   }
 
   ssl->method->next_message(ssl);
-  hs->received_hello_retry_request = true;
+  ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request = true;
   hs->tls13_state = state_send_second_client_hello;
   // 0-RTT is rejected if we receive a HelloRetryRequest.
   if (hs->in_early_data) {
@@ -269,8 +269,7 @@
   }
 
   // Check that the cipher matches the one in the HelloRetryRequest.
-  if (hs->received_hello_retry_request &&
-      hs->new_cipher != cipher) {
+  if (ssl->s3->used_hello_retry_request && hs->new_cipher != cipher) {
     OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(SSL, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
     ssl_send_alert(ssl, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
     return ssl_hs_error;