| commit | c5154f7dbc0bccce20c00aaf7b14cf441e090a1e | [log] [tgz] |
|---|---|---|
| author | Matthew Braithwaite <mab@google.com> | Wed Apr 11 17:00:54 2018 -0700 |
| committer | CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> | Thu Apr 12 19:54:42 2018 +0000 |
| tree | 44a137003ea3287704b73b766bbb5a34516158e8 | |
| parent | 868ec7354b7391e1e847635a298cb20bc0fd307a [diff] |
SSL_serialize_handoff: serialize fewer things. In the handoff+handback case, bssl_shim.cc creates 3 |SSL| objects: one to receive the ClientHello, one to receive the handoff, and a third one to receive the handback. Before 56986f9, only the first of these received any configuration. Since that commit, all 3 of them receive the same configuration. That means that the handback message no longer needs to serialize as many things. N.B. even before 56986f9, not all of the fields were necessary. For example, there was no reason to serialize |conf_max_version| and |conf_min_version| in the handback, so far as I can tell. This commit is mechanical: it simply removes everything that doesn't cause any tests to fail. In the long run, I'll need to carefully check for two possibilities: - Knobs that affect the handshake after the server's first message it sent. These are troublesome because that portion of the handshake may run on a different |SSL|, depending on whether the handback is early or late. - Getters that may be called post-handshake, and that callers may reasonably expect to reflect the value that was used during handshake. (I'm not sure that either case exists!) Change-Id: Ibf6e0be6609ad6e83ab50e69199e9b2d51e59a87 Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/27364 Commit-Queue: Matt Braithwaite <mab@google.com> CQ-Verified: CQ bot account: commit-bot@chromium.org <commit-bot@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>
BoringSSL is a fork of OpenSSL that is designed to meet Google's needs.
Although BoringSSL is an open source project, it is not intended for general use, as OpenSSL is. We don't recommend that third parties depend upon it. Doing so is likely to be frustrating because there are no guarantees of API or ABI stability.
Programs ship their own copies of BoringSSL when they use it and we update everything as needed when deciding to make API changes. This allows us to mostly avoid compromises in the name of compatibility. It works for us, but it may not work for you.
BoringSSL arose because Google used OpenSSL for many years in various ways and, over time, built up a large number of patches that were maintained while tracking upstream OpenSSL. As Google's product portfolio became more complex, more copies of OpenSSL sprung up and the effort involved in maintaining all these patches in multiple places was growing steadily.
Currently BoringSSL is the SSL library in Chrome/Chromium, Android (but it's not part of the NDK) and a number of other apps/programs.
There are other files in this directory which might be helpful: