Remove hash table lookups from ex_data.
Instead, each module defines a static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS to hold the values.
This makes CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data a no-op as spreading the
CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASSes across modules (and across crypto and ssl) makes cleanup
slightly trickier. We can make it do something if needbe, but it's probably not
worth the trouble.
Change-Id: Ib6f6fd39a51d8ba88649f0fa29c66db540610c76
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/4375
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
index dae3376..a0cd9fc 100644
--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
+++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
#include "../internal.h"
+static CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS g_ex_data_class = CRYPTO_EX_DATA_CLASS_INIT;
+
/* CRL score values */
/* No unhandled critical extensions */
@@ -2054,8 +2056,13 @@
{
/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
* SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
- return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
- new_func, dup_func, free_func);
+ int index;
+ if (!CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(&g_ex_data_class, &index, argl, argp,
+ new_func, dup_func, free_func))
+ {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return index;
}
int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
@@ -2225,7 +2232,7 @@
ctx->cert=x509;
ctx->untrusted=chain;
- if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
+ if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx,
&ctx->ex_data))
{
goto err;
@@ -2316,7 +2323,7 @@
err:
if (ex_data_allocated)
{
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &ctx->ex_data);
}
if (ctx->param != NULL)
{
@@ -2357,7 +2364,7 @@
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
ctx->chain=NULL;
}
- CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
+ CRYPTO_free_ex_data(&g_ex_data_class, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}
